BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Drupal iCal API//EN
X-WR-CALNAME:Events items teaser
X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/Toronto
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/Toronto
X-LIC-LOCATION:America/Toronto
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZNAME:EDT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
DTSTART:20190310T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZNAME:EST
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
DTSTART:20181104T060000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:69c234050b0b2
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20190411T103000
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20190411T103000
URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/artificial-intelligence-group/events/ai-seminar-vo
 ting-games-trembling-hand-equilibria
LOCATION:DC - William G. Davis Computer Research Centre 200 University Aven
 ue West 1304 Waterloo ON N2L 3G1 Canada
SUMMARY:AI Seminar: Voting Games: Trembling Hand Equilibria
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:SVETLANA OBRAZTSOVA\n_Nanyang Technological University_\n\nTrad
 itionally\, computational social choice focuses on evaluating\nvoting rule
 s by their resistance to strategic behaviours\, and uses\ncomputational co
 mplexity as a barrier to them. In contrast\, recent\nworks (counting from 
 2010) take another natural approach and analyse\nvoting scenarios from a g
 ame-theoretic perspective\, viewing strategic\nparties as players and exam
 ining possible stable outcomes of their\ninteraction (i.e.\, equilibria). 
 The main problem of this approach is\nmultiple unrealistic Nash equilibria
 . Fortunately\, several refinements\nhave been developed that allow to fil
 ter out some undesirable Nash\nEquilibria. 
DTSTAMP:20260324T064941Z
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR