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DTSTART:20230312T070000
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DTSTART:20221106T060000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20230717T143000
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/ura-seminar-
 rian-neogi
SUMMARY:URA Seminar - Rian Neogi
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Budget Feasible Mechanisms\n\nSPEAKER:\n Rian Neogi\n\nA
 FFILIATION:\n University of Waterloo\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 5479\n\nABSTRACT: I
 n the setting of budget feasible mechanism design\, a buyer\nwants to purc
 hase items from a set of agents. Each agent can supply at\nitem at an incu
 rred cost of c_i to themself\, and the buyer wants to\noptimize over their
  own valuation for the set of items bought. The\ncost c_i is private infor
 mation that the buyer doesn't have access to.\nThe goal is to design a mec
 hanism that is truthful\, in the sense that\nthe sellers do not have incen
 tive to deviate from reporting their true\ncosts\, and budget feasible\, i
 n the sense that the total payments made\nto the sellers is within some bu
 dget B.
DTSTAMP:20260403T072329Z
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