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DTSTART:20230312T070000
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DTSTART:20221106T060000
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UID:69d0d143ab7bc
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20230717T130000
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20230717T130000
URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/co-reading-g
 roup-rian-neogi-0
SUMMARY:C&amp;O Reading Group - Rian Neogi
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Budget Feasible Mechanisms : Part II\n\nSPEAKER:\n Rian 
 Neogi\n\nAFFILIATION:\n University of Waterloo\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 6029\n\nA
 BSTRACT: In the setting of budget feasible mechanism design\, a buyer\nwan
 ts to purchase items from a set of agents. Each agent can supply at\nitem 
 at an incurred cost of c_i to themself\, and the buyer wants to\noptimize 
 over their own valuation for the set of items bought. The\ncost c_i is pri
 vate information that the buyer doesn't have access to.\nThe goal is to de
 sign a mechanism that is truthful\, in the sense that\nthe sellers do not 
 have incentive to deviate from reporting their true\ncosts\, and budget fe
 asible\, in the sense that the total payments made\nto the sellers is with
 in some budget B.
DTSTAMP:20260404T085219Z
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