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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20250522T130000
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/co-reading-g
 roup-rian-neogi-8
SUMMARY:C&O Reading Group -Rian Neogi
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: An O(log log n)-approximate budget-feasible mechanism f
 or\nsubadditive valuations\n\nSPEAKER:\n Rian Neogi\n\nAFFILIATION:\n Univ
 ersity of Waterloo\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 6029\n\nABSTRACT:In the setting of bu
 dget feasible mechanism design\, a buyer\nwants to purchase items from a s
 et of agents. Each agent holds one\nitem\, and incurs a cost of c_i upon s
 upplying the item to the buyer.\nThe buyer wants to maximize the value of 
 the set of items that are\nbought from the sellers. The buyer has a budget
  B on the total\npayments made to the sellers. The cost c_i is private inf
 ormation that\nthe buyer doesn't have access to. The goal is to design a m
 echanism\nthat is truthful\, in the sense that the sellers do not have inc
 entive\nto deviate from reporting their true costs\, and budget feasible\,
  in\nthe sense that the total payments made to the sellers is within some\
 nbudget B\, and that outputs a set whose value is a good approximation\nto
  the algorithmic optimum\, OPT = max{v(S) : c(S)<=B}.\n\nIn this talk\, I 
 will present our recent work that obtains an O(log log\nn)-approximate bud
 get-feasible mechanism when the valuation function\nis subadditive. This i
 s joint work with Kanstantsin Pashkovich and\nChaitanya Swamy.
DTSTAMP:20260403T072115Z
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