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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20251112T103000
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/crypto-readi
 ng-group-yuheng-elle-wen
SUMMARY:Crypto Reading Group -Yuheng (Elle) Wen
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:TITLE:Seems Legit: Automated Analysis of  Subtle Attacks on Pr
 otocols\nthat Use Signatures\n\nSpeaker\n Yuheng (Elle) Wen\n\nAffiliation
 \n University of Waterloo\n\nLocation\n MC 5479\n\nABSTRACT: The standard
  definition of security for digital\nsignatures—existential unforgeabili
 ty—does not ensure certain\nproperties that protocol designers might exp
 ect. For example\, in many\nmodern signature schemes\, one signature may v
 erify against multiple\ndistinct public keys. It is left to protocol desig
 ners to ensure that\nthe absence of these properties does not lead to atta
 cks. Modern\nautomated protocol analysis tools are able to provably exclud
 e large\nclasses of attacks on complex real-world protocols such as TLS 1.
 3 and\n5G. However\, their abstraction of signatures (implicitly) assumes 
 much\nmore than existential unforgeability\, thereby missing several class
 es\nof practical attacks. We give a hierarchy of new formal models for\nsi
 gnature schemes that captures these subtleties\, and thereby allows\nus to
  analyse (often unexpected) behaviours of real-world protocols\nthat were 
 previously out of reach of symbolic analysis. We implement\nour models in 
 the Tamarin Prover\, yielding the first way to perform\nthese analyses aut
 omatically\, and validate them on several case\nstudies. In the process\, 
 we find new attacks on DRKey and SOAP’s\nWS-Security\, both protocols wh
 ich were previously proven secure in\ntraditional symbolic models.
DTSTAMP:20260402T171008Z
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