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DTSTART:20260308T070000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20260410T103000
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/crypto-readi
 ng-group-elnaz-hessami-pilehrood-shadowfax
SUMMARY:Crypto Reading Group - Elnaz Hessami Pilehrood-Shadowfax: Hybrid\nS
 ecurity and Deniability for AKEMs
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:SPEAKER:\n\n Elnaz Hessami Pilehrood\n\nAFFILIATION:\n Universi
 ty of Waterloo\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 6029\n\nABSTRACT:As cryptographic protoco
 ls transition to post-quantum\nsecurity\, most adopt hybrid solutions comb
 ining classical and\npost-quantum assumptions. This shift often sacrifices
  efficiency\,\ncompactness\, or even security. One such property is deniab
 ility\, which\nenables users to plausibly deny authorship of potentially\n
 incriminating messages. While classical protocols like X3DH key\nagreement
  (used in Signal and WhatsApp) provide deniability\,\npost-quantum protoco
 ls like PQXDH and Apple’s iMessage with PQ3 do\nnot. This work addresses
  this gap by investigating how to efficiently\npreserve deniability in pos
 t-quantum protocols. Specifically\, we\npropose two hybrid schemes for aut
 henticated key encapsulation\nmechanisms (AKEMs). The first is a black-box
  construction that\npreserves deniability when both constituent AKEMs are 
 deniable. The\nsecond is Shadowfax\, a non-black-box AKEM that achieves hy
 brid\nsecurity\, integrating a classical non-interactive key exchange\, a\
 npost-quantum key encapsulation mechanism\, and a post-quantum ring\nsigna
 ture. Shadowfax satisfies deniability in both dishonest and\nhonest receiv
 er settings\, relying on statistical security in the\nformer and on a sing
 le pre- or post-quantum assumption in the latter.\nFinally\, we provide se
 veral portable implementations of Shadowfax.\nWhen instantiated with stand
 ardised components (ML–KEM and Falcon)\,\nShadowfax yields ciphertexts o
 f 1 728 bytes and public keys of 2 036\nbytes\, with encapsulation and dec
 apsulation costs of 1.8M and 0.7M\ncycles on an Apple M1 Pro.
DTSTAMP:20260402T171017Z
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