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DTSTART:20260308T070000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20260515T123000
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/combopt-read
 inggroup-kelly-dance-contract-design-beyond
SUMMARY:CombOpt ReadingGroup - Kelly Dance-Contract Design Beyond\nHidden-A
 ctions
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:SPEAKER:\n\n Kelly Dance\n\nAFFILIATION:\n University of Waterl
 oo\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 6029\n\nABSTRACT:\n\nIn the classical principal-agent
  hidden-action contract model\, a\nprincipal delegates the execution of a 
 costly task to an agent. In\norder to complete the task\, the agent choose
 s an action from a set of\nactions\, where each potential action is associ
 ated with a cost and a\nsuccess probability to accomplish the task. To inc
 entivize the agent\nto exert effort\, the principal can commit to a contra
 ct\, which is the\namount of payment based on the task's success but not o
 n the\nhidden-action chosen by the agent. \nIn this work\, we study the co
 ntract design framework under binary\noutcomes where we relax the hidden-a
 ction assumption. We introduce new\nmodels where the principal is allowed 
 to inspect subsets of actions at\nsome cost that depends on the inspected 
 subset. If the principal\ndiscovers that the agent did not select the agre
 ed-upon action through\nthe inspection\, the principal can withhold paymen
 t. This relaxation of\nthe model introduces a broader strategy space for t
 he principal\, who\nnow faces a tradeoff between positive incentives (incr
 easing payment)\nand negative incentives (increasing inspection). \nWe dev
 ise algorithms for finding the best deterministic and randomized\nincentiv
 e-compatible inspection schemes for various assumptions on the\ninspection
  cost function. In particular\, we show the tractability of\nthe case of 
 submodular inspection cost functions.  \nWE COMPLEMENT OUR RESULTS BY SHO
 WING THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO\nEFFICIENTLY FIND THE OPTIMAL RANDOMIZED INS
 PECTION SCHEME FOR THE MORE\nGENERAL CASE OF XOS INSPECTION COST FUNCTIONS
 \, AND THAT THERE IS NO\nPTAS FOR THE CASE OF SUBADDITIVE INSPECTION COST 
 FUNCTIONS.\"
DTSTAMP:20260516T191045Z
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