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DTSTART:20260308T070000
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DTSTART:20251102T060000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20260626T113000
SEQUENCE:0
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URL:https://uwaterloo.ca/combinatorics-and-optimization/events/combopt-read
 inggroup-rian-neogi-multidimensional-budget
SUMMARY:CombOpt ReadingGroup - Rian Neogi-Multidimensional Budget-feasible\
 nmechanism design
CLASS:PUBLIC
DESCRIPTION:SPEAKER:\n\n Rian Neogi\n\nAFFILIATION:\n University of Waterlo
 o\n\nLOCATION:\n MC 6029\n\nABSTRACT:  \n\nIn budget-feasible mechanism 
 design\, there is a set of items U. A\nbuyer wishes to purchase a set of i
 tems from the sellers of maximum\nvalue\, where the value of a subset S of
  items is provided by a\nvaluation function v. Each element e is held by a
  distinct seller\, who\nincurs a private cost c_e for supplying her item. 
 The buyer also has a\nbudget of B on the total payments made to the seller
 s. The private\ncosts c_e are known only to the sellers\, and not to the b
 uyer. Each\nseller e reports a cost r_e to the mechanism\, which may or ma
 y not be\nequal to her true cost c_e. As a result\, a seller may choose to
 \nmisreport her cost if she sees that she is better off when doing so\n(fo
 r example\, the mechanism might be giving her a higher payment under\nthe 
 misreported cost).  \nBudget-feasible mechanisms have been well-studied o
 ver the past 15\nyears. In this talk\, we will introduce a generalization 
 of the\nsetting\, where each agent can now hold multiple items. This\ngene
 ralizes the problem into what is known as a multi-parameter\ndomain\, whic
 h brings about several complications\, including strong\nimpossibility res
 ults with respect to the typical benchmark of the\nalgorithmic optimum. In
  lieu of these impossibility results\, we\npropose a novel benchmark for t
 he setting. We prove positive results\nwith respect to this new benchmark\
 , qualitatively matching prior\nresults in single-parameter budget-feasibl
 e mechanism design. \nThis is joint work with Kanstantsin Pashkovich and C
 haitanya Swamy\,\nand is to appear in EC 2026.
DTSTAMP:20260624T172532Z
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