

Evaluation of the Impact of the Increase in EI Allowable Earnings Pilot Project on Working While on Claim and Job Search Behaviour in Canada¹

**Stéphanie Lhuis, Assistant Professor of Economics,
University of Waterloo**

**Brian P. McCall, Professor of Economics and Professor of Education,
University of Michigan**

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the change in allowable earnings proposed in a pilot project (WWOC) of the Canadian Employment Insurance system implemented in December 2005 in some Canadian regions on working while on claim behaviour and on job search behaviour. The WWOC pilot is expected to increase the subsidy to low earnings/part-time work. Search theory would predict that, all else equal, individuals would increase their intensity of search for these types of jobs. We find evidence that the WWOC pilot substantially increased the incidence and duration of work while on claim receiving full benefits and reduced the incidence and duration of working while on claim receiving no benefits for both men and women. We also find differences in the impact of the WWOC pilot on the job search behaviour of men. These results suggest that the WWOC pilot significantly encouraged working while on claim in low-paying jobs allowing receipt of full benefits. The WWOC pilot significantly reduced the number of hours looking for a job and reduced the likelihood of looking for only a full-time job (relative to looking for only a part-time job or either). These results are robust to the various robustness check analyses performed.

JEL codes: J08 – J64 – J65

¹ This work has been made publicly available since June 2018.

1. Introduction

Since the Canadian Employment Insurance Act of 1996, several pilot projects affecting various parameters of the Employment Insurance (EI) system have been proposed to further encourage labour market attachments of Employment Insurance recipients. Pilot Project #8 was one of three new EI pilot projects implemented in December 2005. This particular pilot project increased the level of allowable earnings from employment during a claim period from the maximum of \$50 or 25% of the benefit amount to the maximum of \$75 or 40% of their benefit amount in 23 selected high unemployment regions in Canada. Such a change gives unemployed workers increased incentives to work while on claim. These changes applied to all those receiving regular, fishing, parental, and compassionate care benefits. The EI economic regions for which the pilot applied are high unemployment regions in which the unemployment rate is at least 10%. The pilot project was extended to all regions effective December 7, 2008 through December 4, 2010 (and further extended for 8-month until June 25, 2011).

The current allowable earnings formula along with the new formula for the WWOC pilot project regions are plotted in Figure 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, the new pilot program allows \$75 in earnings up to a weekly benefit amount (WBA) of \$187.5 while the current provisions allow earnings of \$50 up to a WBA of \$200. Moreover, once the WBA exceeds \$200 the slope of the line under the pilot is steeper (.4) than the current slope (.25). Thus, for example, at a WBA of \$400, allowable earnings are \$160 under the pilot and \$100 under the current formula. Figure 2 plots the WBA as a function of earnings for the pilot and the current earnings allowance formulas for a claimant who is eligible for up to \$400 in weekly benefits. Under the WWOC pilot program, income (earnings + WBA) for someone earning \$160 would be \$400 + \$160 = \$560 while under the current program income would be \$340 + \$160 = \$500. However, for someone earning \$560, total income would be \$560 under both the WWOC pilot and current earnings formula. Thus the WWOC pilot increases the subsidy to low earnings/part-time work.

In a report prepared for the HRSDC evaluation group (Lluis and McCall, 2008), we present preliminary results from an analysis of the impact of Pilot Project #8, the working while on claim pilot (or WWOC pilot) on working on claim behaviour, weeks of benefits paid and total benefits paid using administrative data on Employment Insurance (EI) claims and data from the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) for the years 1990-2007. To measure the impact of the WWOC pilot empirically, we exploited the fact that the WWOC pilot project was, before December 7 2008, limited to only 23 EI regions. This fact allowed us to employ a difference-in-differences approach to analyze the impacts of the change by comparing working while on claim behaviour in the treated and control regions before and after the change. Further, the fact that, for those individuals unemployed at the time of the change, the new allowable earnings

formula applied for only that part of the unemployment spell subsequent to the change, allows us to use this within individual difference to further identify the impact of the change. This was done by employing econometric duration methods in conjunction with time-varying covariates used to model the “within” spell change.

Overall, we found evidence that the WWOC pilot substantially increased the incidence and duration of working while on claim and receive full benefits and significantly reduced (but with a weaker impact) the incidence and duration of working on claim receiving partial or no benefits. These results suggest that the WWOC pilot significantly encouraged working while on claim in low-paying jobs allowing receipt of full benefits and discouraged working while on claim in high-paying jobs. The results on average total weeks on claim, weeks receiving benefits and amount of benefits paid were not robust to the various checks performed. In fact, the findings related to any type of working on claim behaviour other than working on claim receiving full benefits were generally less robust and depended on the model specification and characteristics of the claims or claimants.

In the present update study, we use the same data on administrative and COEP claims over a time period extended until 2009. Adding years of data allows us to exploit greater information after the implementation of the pilot on December 2005 by using 4 years of working on claim behaviour since the start of the pilot instead of two. Up until December 2008 (before the WWOC pilot extended to all regions), we will be able to replicate the difference in difference strategy used in our previous report comparing the treated regions to the control regions before and after the change. We also expect the greater time period and sample of claims to help strengthen the robustness of the results.

Additionally, if the change in the allowable earnings formula affects individuals’ decision to work on claim in a low earnings/part-time job, it may also change search behaviour. Search theory would predict that, all else equal, individuals would increase their intensity of search for these types of jobs. Part of this increased search intensity may come through a reduction in search for high earnings/full-time jobs and some through an increase in overall search intensity (See McCall, 1996). In this update study, we will look at the effect of the WWOC pilot on outcome variables related to job search by further exploiting the COEP survey data which contains detailed information on job search.

Furthermore, we look at the effect of the WWOC pilot on various behaviours related to EI dependency. In particular, we look at whether the pilot affected: a) the way a claim is terminated, b) the likelihood of repeat usage of EI, c) the number of jobs (if any) held during a claim. Finally, following the literature emphasizing the role of EI in helping improve the match between individuals’ skills and jobs, we estimated the impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood that claimants return to the same employer, industry and occupation after an EI spell.

We can also analyze employer/industry and occupation changes “within” an unemployment spell for those who experienced working while on claim.

Finally, the fact that after December 2008, all regions were affected allows us to perform additional robustness analyses. In particular, given that the WWOC pilot # 8 originally applied to 23 regions with higher unemployment rates, the group of EI regions which becomes affected by the WWOC pilot after December 2008, corresponds to the group of lower unemployment regions and the impact of the WWOC pilot on this group of regions can be compared to the pilot’s impact on the group of higher unemployment regions. In sum, this update study will have three objectives: i) replicate the difference in difference strategy and robustness checks used in our previous study, ii) perform additional robustness checks exploiting the change in the design of the WWOC pilot between 2008 and 2009 and, iii) add an analysis of search behaviour and EI dependency.

The next section summarizes the methodology. Section 3 presents the data and choice of samples. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 presents the conclusions.

2. Methodology

This section outlines the methodology that we use to investigate the impacts of WWOC pilot, which changed the allowable earnings formula for EI recipients in 23 EI regions from December of 2005 until December 2008. The allowable earnings formula for EI recipients in 23 EI regions was changed on December 11, 2005 from allowable earnings while receiving EI that are determined as the maximum of 25% of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) and \$50 to allowable earnings while receiving that are determined as the maximum of 40% of WBA and \$75. The WWOC pilot was subsequently extended to cover all economic regions. These changes applied to all those receiving regular, fishing, parental, and compassionate care benefits. In this section, we provide greater details on identification issues and the methodology and robustness checks used to address them.

A) Identification Issues

One potential difficulty in identifying the impact of the change in the allowable earnings formula is that several other pilot programs were being conducted at the same time within many of the same EI regions. The pilot programs were

1. Calculating Benefit Rate Based on the Claimant’s 14 Highest Weeks of Insurable Earnings (Best 14 pilot).
2. Providing Increased Access to Employment and Unemployment Benefits for New Entrants and Re-Entrants (NERE pilot).

3. Increasing the Weeks of EI benefits, which later became the Extended Employment Insurance Pilot project (EW pilots).

Next, we describe each of these three other pilot programs and how we will take account of their impact in our analysis of the impact of the WWOC pilot on working on claim behaviour.

Best 14 Pilot

Benefits are usually calculated using the formula:

$$\text{WBA} = (\text{Insured earnings in last 26 weeks} / \max(\text{insured weeks in last 26 weeks}, \text{divisor})) \times \text{benefit rate}$$

where the divisor depends on the EI region's unemployment rate according to the following Table.

Divisor Table

Unemployment rate in your region	Minimum divisor
0% to 6%	22
6.1% to 7%	21
7.1% to 8%	20
8.1% to 9%	19
9.1% to 10%	18
10.1% to 11%	17
11.1% to 12%	16
12.1% to 13%	15
13.1% and over	14

For the Best 14 pilot, only the 14 weeks of highest income is used to calculate the benefit amount (out of 52 weeks instead of 26 weeks of the Rate Calculation Period). The objective is to encourage individuals to accept all available work, including weeks of work that are shorter, "lower-income" than their normal full weeks. Consequently, the rules may help employers facing labour shortages have access to additional workers. This pilot began October 30, 2005 in the same 23 EI regions as the Allowable Earnings Pilot.

NERE pilot:

Since 1997, new entrants and re-entrants have to have had 910 hours of employment to qualify for EI benefits. This requirement is much higher than the maximum requirement across all regions for regular claimants, 700 hours. Some concern exists, however, that 910 hours may be difficult to obtain in high unemployment regions, particularly in rural and remote parts of the country. The new pilot project reduces the entrance requirement to 840 hours rather than the 910 hours. This pilot began December 11, 2005 in the same 23 EI regions as the WWOC Pilot.

EW Pilots:

The EW pilots increased the EI benefit duration by 5 weeks to a maximum of 45 weeks. The first pilot was initiated June 6, 2004 and ended June 4, 2006 in 24 economic regions, 23 of which were the same as those in the Allowable Earnings pilot. A new EW pilot, Pilot #10, began shortly thereafter and ran from June 11, 2006 to December 9, 2007 in 21 economic regions. This pilot was subsequently extended until June 6, 2009.

There are two new potential difficulties in the update study: a) the different pilots did not get extended at the same time period, and b) the extension did not apply to the same group of regions.

1. Calculating Benefit Rate Based on the Claimant's 14 Highest Weeks of Insurable Earnings (Best 14 Weeks).
 - i. Extended to (25) regions with unemployment rate of at least 8% from October 26, 2008 to October 23, 2010 (and again by 8-month to June 25, 2011)
2. Providing Increased Access to Employment and Unemployment Benefits for New Entrants and Re-Entrants (NERE).
 - i. Extended to regions with unemployment rate of at least 8% from December 7, 2008 to December 4, 2010
3. Increasing the Weeks of EI benefits (Extended Weeks).
 - i. Replaced in March 2009 by a similar program that covers all regions

Our main objective in this update study is to use the same strategy as our 2008 HRSDC report for taking into account the NERE and best 14 pilots: we will exclude the sample of claims eligible for the NERE pilot and control for benefit rates in our estimations. As a robustness check, we will run the estimations for the sample that excludes claims that qualify for the best 14 program. The fact that the two pilots apply to different economic regions after 2008 implies that the sample of claims that do not qualify for the NERE or best 14 will come from different regions before and after 2008. This will not affect our main analysis which we replicate up until December 2008, prior to the changes in the treated regions of the NERE and best 14 programs.

For the extended weeks pilot, we can use the same DID strategy as before given that we restrict the sample to claims prior to December 2008 which is before March 2009 when the EW pilot starts to apply to all regions. Assuming that the EW pilot and the WWOC pilot each have an independent impact on working on claim behavior, we can estimate and net out the effect of the EW pilot from the impact of the WWOC estimating both effects in the same main equation as detailed in the next section.

Another objective of this update is to perform additional robustness checks exploiting the fact that the WWOC pilot project was extended to all regions effective December 7, 2008 through December 4, 2010. We can use this change in the treatment of regions after 2008 by comparing the effect of the pilot on the group of treated regions prior to 2008 (the high unemployment regions) with the pilot's impact on the group of treated regions post 2008 (the low unemployment regions). Furthermore, we can exploit the fact that the EW pilot's extension to all EI economic regions occurred 3 months after the WWOC pilot's extension. This implies that between December 2008 and March 2009, the new group of treated regions (the low unemployment regions) under the WWOC pilot is not yet affected by the EW pilot. We can use this change to further isolate the impact of the WWOC pilot by comparing the estimate over this 3 month period to the estimate obtained after March 2009 when the low unemployment regions affected by the WWOC pilot also became affected by the EW pilot.

B) Estimation Methods

We plan to estimate the impact of the WWOC pilot on various outcomes that comprise working on claim behaviour using several different statistical approaches. Each statistical approach has its advantages and disadvantages which will be discussed below. Since the WWOC pilot was initiated in only a limited number of regions, one estimation technique that we plan to implement to measure the impact of the allowable earnings pilot is a difference in differences (D-I-D) approach.

Let Y be the outcome of interest, let T denote the "treated" (affected by pilot) regions and NT is the "not treated" (not affected by pilot) regions. Let B denote before the pilot was initiated and A denote after the pilot was initiated. Then the D-I-D estimate of the effect of the treatment on the mean value of Y is

$$\Delta \bar{Y}_{D-I-D} = (\bar{Y}_{T,A} - \bar{Y}_{T,B}) - (\bar{Y}_{NT,A} - \bar{Y}_{NT,B})$$

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 A + \beta_3 T \times A + \beta_4 X_4 + \dots + \beta_k X_k + \varepsilon$$

In a regression framework the D-I-D estimate is the coefficient of the $T \times A$ (β_3) interaction term, where T is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the claimant is in the treated region, A is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the claim is after the pilot began and X_4 through X_k are additional predictor variables that are included to control for differences between the treated and untreated groups. Such an approach can also be used in other types of empirical models other than the linear regression model, including dichotomous choice, duration, and competing risks models. Again, the estimated effect of the treatment (pilot program) would be based on the coefficient estimates for the $T \times A$ interaction term.

One problem that immediately arises using this framework is that since two additional pilot projects started around the same time as the allowable earnings project, the effect would be a composite effect of the three pilot projects.² One way in which the effect of the WWOC pilot could be isolated from the other two pilot using the D-I-D methodology is by including in the sample only those EI claimants in both the pilot and the control regions that would be unaffected by these two other pilots. So, estimates would be based only on claimants that are not new entrants or re-entrants into the labour force and those who would be unaffected by the change in the WBA formula in the Best 14 weeks pilot. Strictly speaking, the estimated effect using only this subset of EI claimants would apply only to those EI claimants unaffected by both the NERE and Best 14 Weeks pilots. However, given the small number of individuals unaffected by Best 14 (those with 14 or less weeks of insured earnings) we use only the subset of claimants unaffected by the NERE pilot and net out the impact of the Best 14 pilot by controlling for the weekly benefit amount in the estimates. That is, the impact of Best 14 operates via its impact on WBA. So controlling for WBA should adjust for its impact. We also re-estimated the previous model over the subsample of claimants for which the BEST 14 pilot does not apply (in addition to controlling for benefit rates). We selected claims with maximum insurable earnings of \$19500 for the years until July 2007 (and \$19994 after July 2007). These claimants qualify for full benefits regardless of weeks used and therefore do not qualify for the BEST 14 pilot. Any difference between the results over this particular sample of claimants and the original sample of all claimants implies that the BEST 14 pilot affects working on claim behavior (even after controlling for benefits rates).

Since the first EW pilot began before the other three pilots, its effect would be in both the before and after groups in the treatment group of the WWOC pilot and would be “differenced out” in estimations as long as the sample of “before” claims includes only those claims that began after June 2004. The estimate obtained from this approach would be a valid estimate of the effect of the WWOC pilot in the situation where no EW pilot was in effect under the assumption that there were no interaction effects between the additional benefit weeks of

² Although the Best 14 pilot officially started in October, it was slowly phased in.

the EW pilot and the allowable earnings change of the WWOC pilot. In our main specification, we capture the impact of the EW pilot by augmenting the equation with an A indicator for the time period after the implementation of the first EW pilot and an interaction term TxA terms where T indicates the same treated EI regions as those of the WWOC.³

One issue that arises is whether the regions that are not involved in the pilots are a reasonable control (comparison) group for the regions involved in the pilot. In other words, is

$$(\bar{Y}_{NT,A} - \bar{Y}_{NT,B})$$

a valid estimate for the counterfactual of what would have happened in the pilot regions (what the change in would have been) had there been no pilot projects. One reason why this may not be the case is that the pilot regions were chosen specifically from those regions with high unemployment rates.

This assumption is tantamount to assuming that while the levels of Y may differ between the pilot regions and other regions, the changes in Y (other than those induced by policy changes) are similar over time. This can be checked by performing the same difference in differences estimate using periods where no change in policy occurred and determining whether the D-I-D estimates are approximately zero. This is what the literature refers to as a “placebo” treatment effect estimate.

To further check the robustness of the D-I-D estimates, we can better match EI regions in the control set to EI regions involved in the pilots. In particular, we can use only those regions in the control group whose unemployment rates were high but not quite high enough to be selected for the pilot programs. For example, one could include regions with maximum unemployment rates between 7.5% and 10%. One would also limit the treatment EI regions to those just above the 10% threshold, for example between 10% and 12.5%. The D-I-D analysis will then be performed only on those claimants in these two sets of regions to check the robustness of the empirical estimates.

In the D-I-D analysis above, the effect of the WWOC pilot program would be an average of all groups. There may be substantial heterogeneity of the impact of the WWOC pilot program by different demographic factors. We examined differences in the impact by industry groups, age and gender, seasonal versus non-seasonal workers, repeat/frequent versus new/non-frequent

³ Because Southern interior B.C. was part of the first EW pilot (which covers 24 regions) but not the WWOC pilot 23

EI regions, we dropped the region from our analysis. The second EW pilot which started in 2006 had the same features as the first except that it applied to 21 regions of the 23 WWOC regions (Northern Alberta and South Coastal B.C. were excluded). We adjusted the T and TxA terms accordingly.

claimants, rural versus non rural claimants and low WBA/ high WBA claimants to study any differences in the impact of the pilot program on working on claim behaviour.

One other aspect of the WWOC pilot that we exploit is the fact that for those receiving EI benefits at the time the allowable earnings pilot commenced, the new allowable earnings formula applied from the time of commencement forward. Using a competing risks modeling approach, as described in the Appendix, and incorporating a WWOC pilot indicator variable as a time-varying covariate, we can then estimate the impact of the pilot by using this within-spell variation in the allowable earnings amount.

We analyse several different outcome variables using these approaches. The different outcome variables will require different statistical modelling approaches. One dependent variable would be an indicator for whether or not an EI claimant worked on claim during the benefit period. For this analysis, we would apply multivariate logit models or random effects logit models when the panel aspect of the data is exploited. Secondly, we plan to analyze the total weeks on claim, total weeks working on claim, and total benefits paid using a multiple linear regression models or the random-effects equivalent when the panel aspects of the data are exploited. In the analysis of the impact of the WWOC on job search outcomes, we will use information from the COEP dataset related to the number of hours looking for a job, the number of methods used to search and the likelihood of looking for a full-time job. Next, using a competing risks model we estimated the impact of the WWOC pilot program on the duration until an individual first works on claim or returns to work. We further subdivide the working on claim risk into working on claim with full benefits/partial benefits and working on claim with no benefits. Appendix A to this report explains more fully some of the statistical models that we used in our analysis.

3. Data Description

Two datasets are used for the analysis: the Record of Employment (ROE) and Status vector (SV) administrative data files and the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) survey data. The first dataset contains a random sample of individuals who have filed a claim since 2003 and includes information on all individuals' claims and ROEs between January 1, 1990 to 2010. The proportion of claimants drawn for the sample is taken from a 20% random sample of all individuals who filed a claim since 2003.⁴ The second dataset contains all respondents of all the COEP survey cohorts between 1990 and 2009 and includes information on all individuals' claims

4 From the administrative file, a work history was derived starting from the employment date of the earliest ROE. Each week, the individual was either working or not and if not working, whether an EI claim was filed and the amount of benefits the individual was paid. From the SV data file, weekly information was used to determine if an individual was working while on claim and the extent of the benefit reduction the individual incurred for that week.

and ROEs between January 1, 1990 and June 13, 2010.⁵ The COEP is a survey of individuals drawn from the Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) EI Database and consists of persons who experienced a job separation during a particular three month period, as documented in the Record of Employment (ROE) file. The first cohort had a job separation between July and September 1995 (cohort 1) and the last cohort (cohort A9) had a job separation between July and September 2008. The COEP data was matched to the administrative data from the ROE and SV files.⁶

In both datasets, the ROEs have been limited to the 40 jobs with the highest total tenure over this period. We further selected claims for the years 1991 to 2009 as some of the claims prior to November 1990 were stored differently and claims past 2009 may still be ongoing. Appendix A tables 1 to 10 and Appendix C tables 1 to 10 report the main descriptive statistics for the administrative and COEP claims respectively.

The estimations will be performed using only claims in which all weeks of paid benefits involved regular benefits.⁷ Since we restrict the main analysis to the time period prior to the extension of the WWOC pilot to all regions, we exclude claims with benefit period commencement 6 months before December 7, 2008.

The final sample size for the administrative claims is 128,040 claims for men and 83,917 claims for women for the period 1997-2008.⁸ For the COEP sample, the final sample size over the same time period is 16,488 claims for men and 13,260 claims for women.⁹

4. Multivariate Analysis

To determine the impact of the WWOC pilot, a difference in difference approach was taken. We compared the difference in various measures of working while on claim behaviour between

⁵ No survey was conducted for the ROE job loss periods of January to June 1998 (cohorts 11 and 12), October 1998 to June 1999 (cohorts 14 to 16), October 2000 to June 2001 (cohorts 18 to 20), October 2002 to March 2003 (cohorts 30-31), July 2003 to September 2004 (cohorts 33-37), January to March 2005 (cohort 39), October 2005 to March 2006 (cohorts 42-43).

⁶ Each individual in the COEP has at least one ROE that matches the administrative file.

⁷ We also restricted the sample to the regions that were affected by all the pilots (dropping south interior BC which was not part of the Allowable Earnings pilot).

⁸ To use a consistent measure of reported working time throughout the period, we start the period of analysis in 1997, when reported working time changed from weeks to hours.

⁹ The substantially lower sample size for COEP claims might be due to the low match rate between the COEP respondents and the ROE-SV claims.

the period after the WWOC pilot went into effect versus before it went into effect for the economic regions in the WWOC pilot program, and compared that to the difference between after versus before the WWOC pilot went into effect for economic regions not in the pilot program. This latter difference is the hypothesized counterfactual, what would have happened to working while on claim behaviour had there been no pilot program initiated in the WWOC pilot regions. In a multivariate analysis (eg. Logit or Linear regression analysis), the difference in differences estimate is obtained from the coefficient estimate associated with the interaction (WWOC_after_reg) of a dummy variable indicating the WWOC pilot regions (Pilot Regions) with a dummy variable indicating the claims that commenced after the WWOC pilot began (WWOC_after). To account for the fact that the WWOC pilot regions may differ from other regions, we included controls for claimants' age, benefit rates (CPI adjusted), insured hours, insured earnings (CPI adjusted), aboriginal status, visible minority status, occupation, province year of claim, and month of claim. We also controlled for regional unemployment.

a) Effect of the WWOC pilot on the Probability of Working on Claim

The WWOC pilot was not the only pilot program taking place. There were also programs in effect for new and re-entrants (NERE pilot) and for claimants with variable earnings (BEST 14 pilot). To account for the potential effects of the NERE pilot, we estimated models on samples restricted to individuals who were not eligible for the NERE pilot. Since the BEST 14 pilot operates via changing the benefit rate, controlling for the benefit rate will net out its effect. The logit estimates for men with regard to the probability of working on claim, working while on claim with full benefits, working while on claim with partial benefit and working while on claim with no benefits are presented in Table 1. The corresponding results for women are presented in Table 2. The results exclude NERE pilot participants and control for benefit rates and EI regions. Note that in the analysis of the EW pilot, we did not use claims within 6 months of the WWOC pilot since those currently on claim when the WWOC pilot went into effect were eligible to receive the enhanced WWOC benefits from that point forward. We therefore dropped claims during the period of the first week of June 2005 and the last week before December 11 2005.¹⁰

For men, there was no significant effect of the WWOC pilot on working while on claim (column 1 of the table). On the other hand, when we distinguish work on claim with full, partial and no benefits, the WWOC pilot has a strongly significant impact. As can be seen from the estimates in the last three columns of Table 1, the WWOC pilot statistically significantly

10 Because some claimants whose claims began before six months prior to the WWOC pilot, but whose unemployment spell lasted longer than 6 months, will be eligible to participate in the WWOC project for the remainder of the spell, we re-estimated the models excluding claimants within 9 months of the WWOC project to check the robustness of the results. The tables are presented in Appendix B and the results will be discussed in the subsection describing robustness checks.

increases the probability of working on claim with full benefits and decreases the probability of working on claim with no benefits for men. The implied odds ratio associated with the WWOC_after_reg variable for the probability of working while on claim with full benefits equals 1.956 and implies that after the pilot went into effect male claimants in the pilot regions were 96% more likely to work on claim with full benefits.¹¹ The implied odds ratio associated with the WWOC_after_reg variable for the probability of working while on claim with no benefits equals 0.838 and implies that after the pilot went into effect male claimants in the pilot regions were 16.2% less likely to work on claim with no benefits.

The results from Table 2 show that for women, the pattern is similar. There is no statistically significant effect of the pilot on working while on claim (column 1), but the effect is statistically significant and of opposite sign when we further distinguish working on claim with full, partial or no benefits. The pilot has a positive effect on working while on claim with full benefits. The implied odds ratio associated with the WWOC_after_reg variable for the probability of working while on claim with full benefits equals 1.690 and implies that after the pilot went into effect female claimants in the pilot regions were 69% more likely to work on claim with full benefits. The implied odds ratio associated with the WWOC_after_reg variable for the probability of working while on claim with no benefits equals 0.799 and implies that after the pilot went into effect, female claimants in the pilot regions were 20.1% less likely to work on claim with no benefits.

b) Effect of the WWOC pilot on Average Weeks Working on Claim

We also analyzed the impact of the WWOC pilot on average weeks of working while on claim, average weeks of working while on claim with full benefits, average weeks of working while on claim with partial benefits, and average weeks of working while on claim with no benefits. Tables 3 and 4 present the results for men and women respectively.

As can be seen from Table 3 for men, the WWOC pilot has, all else equal, a statistically significant effect on average weeks of work while on claim with full benefits and no benefits. The point estimates suggest that the WWOC pilot, all else equal, increased the average weeks working while on claim with full benefits by 0.64 weeks (2/3 of a week which would be about 3 days) and decreased weeks working on claim with no benefits by 0.37 weeks which corresponds to about a 1 day reduction.

The estimates for women in Table 4 show that the WWOC pilot statistically significantly increases weeks working while on claim with full benefits and reduces average weeks working while on claim with no benefits. The point estimates suggest that the WWOC pilot, all else

¹¹ The odds ratio is computed using the formula $\exp(\beta)$ where β is the estimated coefficient of interest.

equal, increased average weeks working while on claim with full benefits 0.72 weeks and decreased average weeks working while on claim with no benefits by 0.71.

c) Effect of the WWOC pilot on Total Number of Weeks on Claim, Number of Weeks Receiving Benefits and Amount of Benefits Received

We also analyzed the effects on the average total weeks on claim (whether working while on claim or not working), average number of weeks receiving benefits and total benefits received. Tables 5 and 6 present the results for men and women respectively. For both men and women, the WWOC pilot statistically significantly reduces total weeks on claim by 1.2 weeks for men and 1.5 weeks for women, significantly increased weeks receiving benefits by 0.54 weeks for men and by 0.67 weeks for women. The WWOC pilot statistically significantly reduced total benefits paid by \$328.58 for men and \$370.89 for women.

Overall, the findings can be summarized as follows:

1) For both men and women, the WWOC pilot substantially increased the likelihood of working on claim with full benefits by 96% for men and 69% for women and reduced the probability of working on claim with no benefits by 16% for men and by 20.1% for women. The effect of the WWOC pilot on working while on claim with partial benefits was not statistically significant for both men and women.

2) For both men and women, the WWOC pilot increased average weeks working on claim by with full benefits by 0.6 weeks for men and 0.7 weeks for women and reduced average weeks working on claim with no benefits by 0.4 weeks for men and 0.7 weeks for women.

3) For both men and women, the WWOC pilot reduced average total weeks on claim by 1.2 weeks for men and 1.5 weeks for women. The WWOC pilot increased total weeks receiving benefits by 0.5 weeks for men and 0.6 weeks for women and reduced total benefits received by \$328.58 for men and \$370.89 for women.

6. Robustness Checks

We performed various robustness checks on the administrative ROE-SV. The analysis can be divided into 2 parts: a) sensitivity of the estimates to identification and specification issues, b) robustness of the estimates to the choice of sample and variables and to the design of the pilot.

a) Identification and Specification

Placebo

We performed a “placebo” treatment analysis. We ran a regression in which we chose a random starting date (Jan 2nd, 2000) for the WWOC pilot and the end date of December 31st,

2003. We define the start of the treatment during the week of December 8 2002. In this falsification exercise, we expect to find no statistically significant impact of the pilot on the treated regions for the period 2000-2003. The results are presented in Appendix B Tables B1 (Men) and B2 (Women) for the logit estimations and B3-B6 for the OLS estimations.

For both men and women, we find no impact of the pilot on the incidence (probabilities) and duration (weeks) of working while on claim, total weeks on claim, weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid at the 5% level. Notice however that for women, the analysis based on weeks working on claim, total weeks on claim, weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid is sensitive to the choice of date for the treatment. As a result, we conclude that for men, the WWOC pilot estimates associated with all the working on claim outcome variables are robust to placebo effects and for women, the results are robust only for the incidence of working on claim.

EW Pilot 9 Months

When we estimated the effect of the EW pilot, we excluded claims during the period of the first week of June 2005 and the last week before December 11 2005 (a six months period). Because some claimants whose claims began before six months prior to the WWOC pilot, but whose unemployment spell lasted longer than six months, will be eligible to participate in the WWOC project for the remainder of the spell, we re-estimated the models excluding claimants within nine months of the WWOC project to check the robustness of the results. The results are presented in Appendix B Tables B7-B8 for the logit estimations and B9-B12 for the OLS estimations. The results are very similar to those when claims within six months of the WWOC pilot are dropped (main Tables 1-6).

BEST 14

We further investigated the issue of isolating the effect of the WWOC pilot from the effect of the concurrent pilot BEST 14. In addition to controlling for benefit rates in the specification, we re-estimated the previous model over the subsample of claimants for which the BEST 14 pilot does not apply. We selected claims with insured earnings greater than \$19500 (and \$19994 after July 2007 and \$20540 after January 2008). These claimants qualify for full benefits regardless of weeks used and therefore do not qualify for the BEST 14 pilot. Any difference between the results over this particular sample of claimants and the original sample of all claimants implies that the BEST 14 pilot affects working on claim behavior (even after controlling for benefits rates).

The results for the specification that excludes NERE claimants and includes region effects are presented in Appendix B Tables B13-B14 for the logit estimations and B15-B18 for the OLS

estimations.¹² For both men and women, the results for the incidence and duration of working on claim with full benefits are similar to those obtained over the larger sample of claims (Tables 1-4). For men, the results are qualitatively similar for incidence and duration of working while on claim with no benefits and for total weeks on claim while for women, the results associated with working while on claim with no benefits and total weeks on claim are not statistically significant. The difference in the results compared to the full sample of claims may not be surprising given that the sample of claims for which the no best 14 pilot does not apply is a particular sample characterized by claims with high insured earnings.

Unemployment Rates

The WWOC pilot has been restricted to high unemployment regions and therefore the treated and untreated regions have not been randomly chosen. On the other hand, we can use the fact that the treated and control regions have been selected based on their level of unemployment to check for robustness of the results to the use of more homogenous groups of regions. In particular, to better match the untreated regions in the control group to the treated regions involved in the pilots, we used only regions with maximum unemployment rates between 7.5% and 10% in the control group and limited the treated regions to those just above the 10% threshold, for example between 10% and 12.5%. The results for the specification that excludes NERE claimants and includes region effects are presented in Appendix B Tables B19-B20 for the logit estimations and Tables B21-B24 for the OLS estimations.

For both men and women, the results for incidence and duration of working while on claim and for total weeks on claim are qualitatively similar to those found in Tables 1-4 based on a more heterogeneous set (in terms of unemployment rate) of treated and controlled EI regions. For men, the estimates of the effect of the pilot on incidence and duration of working while on claim with full and no benefits are close to the estimates in Tables 1-4 while for women, the estimates become weaker for working while on claim with full benefits and stronger for working while on claim with no benefits. For both men and women, the estimates of the effect of the pilot on total weeks on claim are stronger for the sample of more homogenous regions (in terms of unemployment rate).

We conclude that for men, the impact of the WWOC pilot on working while on claim behaviour is not sensitive to the higher unemployment rate levels of the treated EI regions while it seems to be sensitive to the unemployment rate levels of the treated regions for

¹² Note that we performed this robustness check for the analysis of the working on claim behaviour (probability and number of weeks working on claim). Due to endogeneity issues and problems of sample selection bias, we did not perform the check for the analysis of outcome variables such as weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid.

women. For outcomes related to weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid, the results for both men and women are quite different from those found in Tables 5 and 6. We conclude that the impacts of the WWOC pilot on weeks receiving benefits and on total benefits paid are sensitive to the disparity in unemployment rates between treated and controlled EI regions.

b) Sample and Variables

COEP Claims

We replicated the previous analysis on the sample of COEP claims matched with the ROE-SV information. Appendix C provides the summary statistics (Tables C1-C10) and tables for the main estimation results based on the specification that excludes NERE participants, controls for the BEST 14 pilot through control for benefit rates and includes region-specific dummies (Tables C11-C12 for the logit analysis of the probability of working while on claim, Tables C13-C14 for the OLS regressions of the effect of the WWOC pilot on weeks working on claim, and Tables C15-C16 for the OLS regressions of the effect of the WWOC on average total weeks on claim, weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid).

The results are qualitatively similar to those based on the ROE-SV administrative data. For men, the point estimates for the effects of the WWOC pilot on incidence and duration of working while on claim and on total weeks on claim are very similar to those using the ROE-SV administrative dataset. The effect of the WWOC pilot on the incidence of working while on claim with no benefits is not statistically significant. The results for weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid do not hold using the COEP dataset. For women, only the results associated with the likelihood of working on claim with full benefits hold. The other estimates are of similar sign and magnitude but more imprecisely estimated.

Additional Controls

Using the COEP claims, we tested the robustness of the previous analysis to the inclusion of additional controls describing individual and job characteristics available in the COEP dataset. In particular, we augmented the previous models to include the following variables. a) Education: less than high school, high school, post secondary, or other education that could be counted towards a degree, b) marital status: married, single or previously married (separated/divorced/widowed), c) the presence of kids (dummy =1 if yes), whether the spouse works, self-reported health status (1 is very good, 4 is poor), d) reason for separation (voluntary separation, temporary layoff, permanent layoff, fired, injury illness or disability, other), e) whether the job prior to separation has irregular work hours (dummy =1 if yes), and f) whether the individual received severance or vacation pay, a pension pay out, an early retirement package, or other payment prior to leaving the job.

Tables C17-C18 show the results based on the logit estimations of the WWOC pilot effects on the likelihood of working on claim, working on claim with full benefits, working on claim with partial benefits and working on claim with no benefits for men and women respectively. In Tables C19-C20, we replicated the analysis for the effect of the WWOC pilot on the number of weeks working on claim with full, partial and no benefits. Tables C21-C22 show the results of the OLS analysis of the pilots on total weeks on claim, weeks receiving benefits and total benefits received.

As can be seen from comparing tables C17-C22 to tables C11-C16, adding controls does not change the results qualitatively. In most cases, the estimates of the effect of the WWOC pilot are slightly smaller for men (and slightly larger for women) when additional demographic controls are included.

We can also conclude from the analysis in Table C17 that the male claimants that are more likely to work on claim with full benefits (second column of the table) and therefore benefit from the pilot tend to be: more educated, married, with an irregular work schedule, and are those whose last job was in the sector of transportation and government services, food and other services. Female claimants that are more likely to work on claim with full benefits tend to be: more educated, with children, on temporary or permanent layoff or fired, are less likely to work in education services.

Repeat Users

The administrative-SV dataset comes from claimants who have filed a claim since 2003 and uses all their claims from 1997 to 2008.¹³ The use of claims outside the selection window means that these claims are more likely to be from repeat users of employment insurance. To check the robustness of the results to the presence of repeat users of EI we performed two sets of analyses: a) we re-estimated the model using only claims filed for the period 2003-2008, and b) we used the full period of claims between 1997-2008 but augmented the specification with a dummy identifying individuals who are repeat users¹⁴ and performed random effect estimations to control for unobserved heterogeneity correlated with repeat users of employment insurance.

The estimations performed over the sample period 2003-2008 are presented in Appendix D Tables D1-D6 for the logit and ols estimations. The results are very similar to the ones obtained

13 Similarly, the COEP survey data selects survey respondents with ROE-documented separations between 1997 and 2006 and uses administrative data on claims for these individuals during the period 1997-2008

14 The dummy equals one whenever an individual has filed three or more claims in the last five years.

over the period 1997-2008 suggesting that the presence of repeat users of EI from using data since 2003 does not affect the main results.

The results based on the addition of a dummy variable indicating repeat user claimants and random-effect estimations are presented in Appendix D Tables D7-D12. Again, the point estimates are similar to the ones obtained with simple logits and OLS estimations and without controls for repeat users providing additional evidence that the results are not likely to be driven by repeat users of employment insurance. We also consider a specification in which the repeat users dummy is interacted with the pilot dummies which we estimate using random effect estimations. The results are presented in Appendix D Tables D13-D18. The results show that the effect of the WWOC pilot on working on claim with full benefits and with no benefits are as substantial for nonrepeat users as they are for repeat users of EI (only slightly weaker) providing additional evidence that the results are not driven by the repeat users of EI.

Analysis of 2008-2009

Another objective of this update is to perform additional robustness checks exploiting the fact that the WWOC pilot project was extended to all regions effective December 7, 2008 through December 4, 2010. We use this change in the treatment of regions after 2008 by comparing the effect of the pilot on the group of treated regions prior to 2008 (the high unemployment regions) with the pilot's impact on the group of treated regions post 2008 (the low unemployment regions). We augment the specification of the main equation by adding interactions of the time period past December 7, 2008 and the group of regions that used to be the control regions (lower unemployment regions) prior to that period. We name these WWOCP11b_after and WWOCP11b_after_region.

Furthermore, we can exploit the fact that the EW pilot's extension to all EI economic regions occurred 3 months after the WWOC pilot's extension. This implies that between December 2008 and March 2009, the new group of treated regions (the low unemployment regions) under the WWOC pilot is not yet affected by the EW pilot. We can use this change to further isolate the impact of the WWOC pilot by comparing the estimate over this 3 month period to the estimate obtained after March 2009 when the low unemployment regions affected by the WWOC pilot also became affected by the EW pilot. We name these WWOCP11b_only_after and WWOCP11b_only_after_region. The results are presented in Appendix D, tables D19 and D20 for men and women respectively.

The results on the effect of the WWOC pilot prior to December 2008 (the pilot was then called pilot #8) are similar to those found previously. The results on the effect of the WWOC pilot after December 2008 are not significant. This is likely due to the fact that there are only a few more observations to exploit between December 2008 and December 2009. As can be seen

from the Tables, the standard errors are large making an estimation of the particular changes in the pilot design very imprecise.

In summary, the results that are robust to the main robustness checks performed are as follows:¹⁵

- 1) the WWOC pilot program, all else equal, substantially increased the probability of working while on claim with full benefits for both men and women
- 2) the WWOC pilot program, all else equal, had a slight decreasing effect on the probability of working while on claim with no benefits for men and women
- 3) the WWOC pilot program, all else equal, substantially increased average weeks working while on claim with full benefits for both men and women,
- 4) the WWOC pilot program, all else equal, had a decreasing effect on average weeks working while on claim with no benefits for both men and women,
- 5) the WWOC pilot program, all else equal, decreased average total weeks on claim (whether working while on claim or not working) for both men and women.

The results on weeks receiving benefits and amount of benefits paid were not robust to the main robustness checks performed.

Going back to our prediction on the effects of the WWOC pilot on working while on claim behaviour, we conclude that the WWOC pilot has been successful in increasing the incidence and duration of working while on claim for individuals likely to work in lower earnings jobs that allow receipt of full benefits. Using information on reported weekly earnings and averaging over occurrences of working on claim with full benefits, we calculated a dollar value of \$1160 a week in weekly earnings for claims that report working on claim with full benefits. In addition, the WWOC significantly reduced the incidence and duration of working while on claim for individuals likely to work in relatively higher earnings jobs that lead to no benefits receipt. Based on the same earnings information and method, we calculated a dollar value of \$13656 in weekly earnings for claims that report working on claim receiving no benefits. These two results suggest that for both men and women, the WWOC pilot seems to have strongly encouraged working while on claim in low-paying jobs and, to a smaller extent, discouraged working while on claim in high-paying jobs.

¹⁵ We considered the match between the controlled and treated EI regions in terms of unemployment rates and the repeat user tests (estimations over the period 2003 to 2008 and random-effect estimations of specifications that include a repeat users dummy) as the most important robustness checks to pass.

7. Competing Risks Analysis

The competing risks estimates are presented in Tables 7-8. Estimates were obtained separately for men and women. The estimates are based on the subset of regular EI claims for the years 1997-2008. Recall that the competing risk model analyzes the determinants of the duration until a claimant either first works on claim or exits the EI system (either because the claimant found a job or because they exhausted their benefits). For those who work on claim before exiting the EI system, the model distinguishes between, working on claim with full benefits, working on claim with partial benefits and working on claim with no benefits. Claimants who have neither become re-employed nor worked on claim by the time their entitlement runs out are right censored. Column (1) of the Tables 7-8 present estimates for the permanent re-employment risk while columns (2)-(4) present estimates for the working on claim with full, partial or no benefits risks, respectively.

The results for men are presented in Table 7. We focus only on the estimates pertaining to the pilot programs. Coefficient estimates measuring the impact of the extended weeks pilot program are those associated with the EW Pilot After variable. The estimated impact of the extended weeks program is not statistically significant for the exiting the EI system risk or the working on claim with partial benefits risk. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant and negative for both the working on claim with full benefits and the working on claim with no benefits risks.

Coefficient estimates measuring the impact of the working while on claim pilot program are those associated with the WWOC Pilot After variable. The WWOC pilot has a statistically significant negative impact on the exiting the EI system risk, the working on claim with partial benefit risk and the working on claim with no benefits risk. It does, however, have a statistically significant and positive effect on the working on claim with full benefits risk. The point estimate implies that the WWOC pilot increased the relative risk of working on claim with full benefits, all else equal, by approximately 99%. The WWOC pilot also has a statistically significant negative effect on both the working on claim with partial and no benefits risk. The point estimates imply that the relative risks of working on claim with partial benefits is reduced, all else equal, by about 11% while the working on claim with no benefits is reduced by 9%.

The results for women are presented in Table 8. For the sake of brevity we focus on the estimates pertaining to the pilot programs. Coefficient estimates measuring the impact of the extended weeks pilot program are those associated with the EW Pilot After variable. The extended weeks program has a statistically significant negative impact on the working on claim with no benefit risk and a statistically significant positive on the exiting EI system risk.

Coefficient estimates measuring the impact of the working while on claim pilot program are those associated with the WWOC Pilot After variable. The WWOC pilot has a statistically significant negative impact on the exiting EI system risk. Moreover it has a statistically significant and positive effect on the working on claim with full benefits risk. The point estimate implies that the WWOC pilot increased the relative risk of working on claim with full benefits, all else equal, by approximately 110% for women. The WWOC pilot has a statistically significant negative effect on both the working on claim with partial benefits and working on claim with no benefits risk. The point estimates imply that the relative risks of working on claim with partial benefits is reduced, all else equal, by about 9% and that the risks of working on claim with no benefits is reduced by around 16% for women.

8. Analysis by subgroups of claimants

We further examined the effects of the WWOC pilot for different subgroups of claimants including claimants in different age groups, claimants with different benefit amounts, frequent versus no frequent claimants (seasonal versus non seasonal claims) and claimants in rural versus non rural areas. The results based on the administrative-SV dataset are presented in Appendices E through H. All analyses are based on the specification that excludes NERE participants, controls for the Best 14 pilot by controlling for benefit rates and includes region-specific dummies. Given the weaker robustness of the results regarding the effect of the WWOC pilot on weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid, we will concentrate the discussion on the results related to the incidence and duration of working while on claim and to total weeks on claim.

a) Age Groups

The results of the analysis by age group for the administrative claim dataset are presented in Appendix G. We divided individuals into three groups: young age (age 15 to 25), prime age (age 26 to 55) and old age (age 56 or older). We interacted the main indicators, Pilot_regions, WWOC_aft and WWOC_aft_reg with the age group dummies. The results of the logit estimations are shown in tables E1-E2 for the logit estimations and E3-E6 for the OLS estimations.

For men, the WWOC pilot statistically significantly increases the likelihood of working while on claim with full benefits for all age groups with stronger effects for older men (aged 56 or older). The impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood of working while on claim with no benefits is also stronger among older claimants. When broken down by age groups, the increased incidence of working while on claim receiving full benefits and the reduced incidence of working while on claim with no benefits that resulted from the WWOC pilot affects every age groups but more strongly the group of older male claimants.

For women, the WWOC pilot statistically significantly increases the likelihood of working while on claim with full benefits for all age groups with similar effects for the group of older women (aged 56 and older) and for the middle age group (aged 25 to 55). The impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood of working while on claim with no benefits is stronger among older female claimants. When broken down by age groups, the increased incidence of working while on claim receiving full benefits and the reduced incidence of working while on claim with no benefits that resulted from the WWOC pilot affects every age groups but more strongly the group of older women.

The results for the OLS estimates of the effect of the WWOC pilot on the number of weeks working on claim are presented in tables E3 and E4. For both men and women, the WWOC pilot significantly increased the number of weeks working on claim with full benefits and significantly decreased the number of weeks working on claim with no benefits for all age groups, with a stronger effect among older men and women.

From Tables E5 and E6, the negative impact of the WWOC pilot on total weeks on claim is stronger among younger men and women (aged less than 25).

b) Benefit Rate Groups

We created dummies to divide individuals into three benefit rate categories: benefit rates less than \$200, between \$201 and \$300, more than \$300.¹⁶ We interacted the main indicators, Pilot_regions, WWOC_aft and WWOC_aft_reg with the benefit group dummies. The results for the administrative claim dataset are presented in Appendix F, tables F1-F6.

For men, the greater incidence of the WWOC pilot on working on claim with full benefits has the strongest effect for claims with benefit rates between \$201 and \$300. The lower incidence of the WWOC pilot on working on claim with no benefits has the strongest effect for claims with benefit rates of less than \$200. For women, the greater incidence of the WWOC pilot on working on claim with full benefits has the strongest effect for claims with benefit rates less than \$200. The lower incidence of the WWOC pilot on working on claim with no benefits has the strongest effect for claims with benefit rates of more than \$300.

For men, the increase in weeks working while on claim with full benefits resulting from the WWOC pilot is the strongest for claims with benefit rates greater than \$300. The reduction in weeks working while on claim with no benefits resulting from the WWOC pilot is strongest for claims with benefit rates less than \$200. For women, the increase in weeks working while on claim with full benefits resulting from the WWOC pilot is the strongest for claims with benefit

¹⁶ Benefit rates non adjusted by CPI were used.

rates less than \$200. The reduction in weeks working while on claim with no benefits resulting from the WWOC pilot is strongest for claims with benefit rates greater than \$300.

For men, the reduction in total weeks on claim resulting from the WWOC pilot is the strongest for claims with benefit rates less than \$200. For women, the reduction in total weeks on claim resulting from the WWOC pilot is the strongest for claims with benefit rates between \$200 and \$300.

c) Seasonal-Non Seasonal Groups

A claim is classified as seasonal (or an individual is considered to be a seasonal claimant) if it is the third claim in the last five years and if all the claims occurred in the same time period. We created an indicator dummy for whether the claim is seasonal and interacted it with the main pilot indicators. Appendix G table G1-G6 shows the results of the analysis.

For both men and women, the results regarding incidence and duration of working while on claim with full benefits and no benefits are stronger among seasonal claimants. The results regarding the effect of the pilot on total weeks on claim are stronger for non seasonal male claimants and seasonal female claimants.

d) Rural-Non Rural Groups

Appendix H tables H1-H6 presents the results of the effect of the WWOC pilot on working while on claim behaviour in rural and urban areas.

For both men and women, the WWOC pilot has a stronger effect on the incidence of working while on claim with full benefits in rural areas and a stronger effect on the incidence of working while on claim with no benefits in urban areas.

For men, the effect of the WWOC pilot on weeks working while on claim with full benefits and no benefits is stronger in urban areas. For women, the effect of the WWOC pilot on weeks working while on claim with full benefits is also stronger in urban areas and the effect on weeks working while on claim with no benefits is stronger in rural areas.

The impact of the WWOC pilot on average total weeks on claim is stronger in urban areas for men.

9. Impact on Job Search Outcomes and Other Unemployment Related Behaviour

Job Search

We further investigated the idea that the WWOC pilot increases the subsidy to low earnings/part-time work and the possibility that it affects search intensity outcomes. Using

information from the COEP survey, we looked at the pilot's impact on three additional dependent variables: Number of hours looking for a job¹⁷, number of methods used to look for a job¹⁸, whether the individual looked for a full-time job only, a part-time job only or either of the two¹⁹. We performed Ordinary Least Square estimations for the continuous variables related to hours looking for a job and number of methods used to look for a job and logit estimations for the probability of looking for only a full-time job (=1) relative to looking for only a part-time job or looking for either a full-time or a part-time job (=0). The right-hand side variables and the specification is identical to the one used in the previous sections. We concentrate on the sample of claimants that are nonrepeat users of EI.

The results are presented in Appendix I Tables I1 and I2 for men and women respectively. For men, the results show a statistically significantly negative effect of the WWOC pilot on hours spent looking for a job. For women, the WWOC pilot statistically significantly increased the number of search methods.

We also estimated the impact of the WWOC pilot on the individual job search methods, separately for repeat and nonrepeat users. The results are presented in Appendix I Tables I3-I8. Overall, for both men and women, the WWOC pilot has a strong statistically significant positive impact on the likelihood of looking for a job through volunteering among nonrepeat users.

Claim Termination

By promoting further working while on claim, the WWOC pilot may increase the likelihood that the claim ends before the end of the entitlement period (or the 52 weeks from the start of the claim) because individuals found a job that turned into a long-term job. On the other hand, because it is possible to postpone the benefits lost if a job is found (and the earnings exceed the cut-off) and still collect them before the end of the claim period if the individual is unemployed then, the WWOC pilot may increase the likelihood of taking a transitory short-period job that allows claimants to be back to unemployment before the end of the benefit period in order to collect the postponed benefits.

¹⁷ The question reads as follow: "In the period between [xstart] and [xend], when you were looking for work, about how many HOURS did you spend actively looking for work in a typical WEEK? (Include all the time it took you to look at job ads, fill applications, travel and attend interviews.)".

¹⁸ The question reads as follows: "In the period between [xstart] and [xend], when you were looking for work, which of the following search methods did you use? a) Talking to friends / relatives, b) Direct contact with employers c) Answering ads about jobs, d) Visiting a Canada Employment Centre, e) Visiting a provincial agency, f) Visiting a union hiring hall, g) Visiting a private employment agency, h) Placing a job ad, i) Searching on the Internet, j) Other methods". We define the number of job search methods by the a variable equal to the sum of each individual methods used.

¹⁹ In this period, were you looking for a full-time job, a part-time job, or either? (The period is between [xstart] and [xend].)

We attempted to address this issue by exploiting information on the reasons for termination of a claim. We use information on the type of claim termination with the following possible description: 1-Not terminated, 2-Has lapsed (claimant stops reporting before the entitlement period is exhausted), 3-Has exhausted (all entitlement weeks used), 4-Has been externally terminated (claim terminated by Commission), 5-Claimant is deceased, 6-Terminated at 52 weeks duration (benefit period ends before entitlement exhausted). We deleted observations associated with deceased claimants and estimated a multinomial logit with option 6 (terminated at 52 weeks) as the base category. We included all the right-hand side variables used in the specification from the previous sections. As with the job search outcomes, we concentrate on the sample of non repeat users. The results are presented in Appendix I Tables I9 and I10 for men and women respectively.

For both men and women, the results show a statistically significant positive impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood that claimants will stop reporting that they are unemployed before the end of the entitlement period. This result contradicts the idea that individuals would take a short-term temporary job and leave it before the end of the entitlement period in order to collect the postponed benefits. On the other end, for both men and women, the WWOC pilot increases the likelihood that a claim ends externally, by a decision of the Commission, which suggests that the WWOC pilot may have increased individuals' attempt to exploit the EI system's allowable earnings provisions of the pilot.

EI Dependency

Next, we estimated the impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood of repeat usage of EI. We used the indicator variable for repeat users (defined in section 8) as the dependent variable in a regression with all the right hand side variables defined in the main analysis and ran a logistic estimation. We selected the period 2003-2008 to obtain a sample with a more balanced proportion of repeat and non repeat users.²⁰ The results are presented in Appendix I Tables I11 and I12 for men and women respectively. For men, the WWOC pilot has a statistically significant negative impact on the likelihood of repeat usage of EI. The point estimates suggest that the likelihood of repeat usage of EI is significantly reduced by 12% after the implementation of the WWOC pilot. The effect is negative but not statistically significant for women.

²⁰ The administrative-SV dataset comes from claimants who have filed a claim since 2003 and uses all their claims from 1997 to 2008. The use of claims outside the selection window means that these claims are more likely to be from repeat users of employment insurance. Using the whole period would artificially create a decreasing effect of the WWOC pilot introduced in 2005 on repeat users given the disproportionately higher number of repeat users prior to 2003.

We also estimated a specification in which the difference in difference setting for the impact of the WWOC pilot is further differentiated by whether the claimant has ever had a week of working on claim (indicator called `any_wk_claim`). The idea is that it is possible that the WWOC pilot has a weaker or stronger effect on EI dependency for individuals who experienced a week of working on claim compared to those who did not. Tables I13a and I14a present the results of the logit estimations and Tables I13b and I14b show the results of the conditional logit estimations (where we correct for the possibility that working while on claim might be correlated with an unobserved individual fixed-effect) for men and women respectively. For men, we see that the WWOC pilot has a significantly decreasing effect on the likelihood of EI dependency and there is no statistically significant additional effect of the WWOC pilot on repeat usage of EI for claimants who experienced working while on claim. For women the results are similar qualitatively but with weaker levels of significance. Note that the indicator associated with working while on claim strongly positively affects the likelihood of EI dependency. Given the difference in difference specification, this corresponds to claimants who worked on claim in the control regions.

We can also measure the effect of the WWOC pilot on the number of jobs held during a given claim period. Some individuals hold several short-term jobs while under an EI claim. We can use the number of jobs per claim as our dependent variable and estimate whether the WWOC pilot had an effect in reducing or increasing these multiple short-term jobs. As for the previous analysis, we restrict the sample period to 2003-2008. The results based on the specification that further differentiate the effect of the WWOC pilot for claimants that experienced working while on claim are presented in Appendix I Tables I15a and I16a for men and women respectively (Tables 15b and 16b are for the fixed-effect estimations). For both men and women, the results show a statistically significant negative effect of the WWOC pilot on the number of jobs held during a claim. This suggests that although working while on claim may lead to accept low earnings part-time jobs, the more generous allowable earnings formula of the pilot may lead individuals to choose relatively better jobs than before which can be held over a longer time period than before and therefore less of these jobs would be exploited during a claim period. There is no statistically significant differential effect of the WWOC pilot for claimants who've experience no working while on claim.

Skill-job Match

Our last set of analyses considers the impact of the WWOC pilot on the likelihood of improving the skill-job match. For claimants observed over more than one EI spell, we can check whether after an EI spell, they tend to go back to the same employer, occupation or industry as the one held prior to the EI spell. We can also check whether during an EI spell, the jobs held for those who work while on claim tend to be in the same industry or at the same

employer as before the beginning of the spell (using information from claimants ROE). We can expect two opposite effects of the pilot on job changes. By allowing individuals to work at higher earnings jobs (compared to before the WWOC pilot) without losing the EI benefits, the WWOC pilot may help improve the quality of the match between an individual's skills and the job requirements as individuals will risk trying new (higher earnings) jobs that might lead to a better match between the individual's skills and the job which they would have ignored prior to the introduction of the pilot. In this case, we expect the WWOC pilot to lead to a greater likelihood of a claimants changing job (occupation or industry) after a period of unemployment. On the other hand, the WWOC pilot may increase firms' use of temporary layoffs with the expectation of hiring workers back later. In this case, the pilot would be associated with a greater likelihood of returning to the same employer. Furthermore, claimants that tend to accumulate several short-term jobs within an EI spells, may be more likely to return to the same industry or employer as well.

Using information from each claimant's ROE, we can compare information on the employer ID and the industry of the different jobs held prior to the beginning of a spell as well as for those who experienced multiple jobs while on claim, we have the ROE information that allows us to compare the employer ID and industry of these jobs compared to the job lost that lead to the start of a claim.

The results based on job changes between EI spells are presented in Appendix I Tables I17a and I18a for men and women respectively. For men who did not experience working while on claim, there is no evidence that the WWOC pilot increased the likelihood that individuals go back to the same employer, occupation or industry (WWOC_after_region). For men who experienced working while on claim, there is statistically significant evidence that the pilot reduced the likelihood of returning to the same employer and occupation (WWOC_after_region_wwoc) suggesting the WWOC pilot affected the skill-job match for men. For women, the results associated with the WWOC pilot are not statistically significant.

The results based on job changes within a given EI spell for claimants who experienced working while on claim are presented in Appendix I Tables I19a and I20a for men and women respectively. In this analysis, we further distinguished claimants by whether they are classified as repeat users or not (following the definition seen in the previous sections). If the WWOC pilot affects within EI spell job changes, the effect might be stronger for repeat users. As can be seen from Table I19a, there is no significant impact of the WWOC pilot on returning to the previous job for either repeat or non repeat users. For women however (Table I20a), there is strong evidence that the pilot reduced the likelihood of returning to the same employer or to a job in the same industry as prior to the EI spell for both repeat and non repeat users. Tables I17b and

I18b, Tables I19b and 20b present the results of the fixed and random-effect logit estimations respectively.

10. Conclusions

This update study has examined the impact of the WWOC pilot on various behaviours related to working while on claim. We find substantial and robust evidence that the WWOC pilot increased the extent to which individuals work while on claim with full benefits for both men and women. In particular, the WWOC pilot increased the likelihood of working on claim with full benefits by 96% for men and 69% for women, and increased average weeks working on claim with full benefits by 0.6 weeks for men and by 0.7 weeks for women. These results are robust to most of the robustness checks performed and to the type of analysis done (DID and competing risks models). These results suggest that the WWOC pilot significantly encouraged working while on claim in low-paying jobs allowing receipt of full benefits.

The magnitude of the effect depends on the group of claimants analyzed. It is stronger for older claimants, seasonal claimants and slightly stronger for claimants in rural areas. We also find that the most likely to respond to the pilot in terms of working while on claim with full benefits are recipients with benefit rates close to the \$200 benefits cutoff (between \$201 and \$300).

For the results in terms of other types of working on claim behaviour, the other robust result (although of weaker magnitude) is that the pilot significantly reduced the probability of working on claim with no benefits by 16.2% for men and 20.1% for women. These results suggest that the WWOC pilot significantly, but with a weaker impact, discouraged working while on claim in high-paying jobs. The WWOC pilot also statistically significantly reduced average total weeks on claim by 1.2 weeks for men and 1.5 weeks for women. This last result is also robust to the main checks performed.

The findings related to the other types of working on claim behaviour (working on claim with partial benefits) and regarding average weeks receiving benefits and total benefits paid depend on the group of claimants analyzed and more importantly, do not pass the main robustness checks performed.

An analysis of the impact of the WWOC pilot on other unemployment related behaviours indicates that the WWOC pilot had a significant impact on several decisions other than working while on claim. We find that the WWOC pilot had a statistically significant impact on job search outcomes, termination of a claim, likelihood of repeat use of EI and changes in employer and occupation.

The WWOC pilot significantly reduced the number of hours spent looking for a job by 2.5 hours for men, and for women, the WWOC pilot significantly increased the number of job search methods used. The WWOC pilot statistically significantly increased the likelihood of volunteering as a job search method for both men and women. The WWOC pilot significantly increased the likelihood that individuals stop reporting their unemployment status before the end of a benefit period. On the other hand, the WWOC pilot significantly increased the likelihood that a claim ends by Commission. The WWOC pilot statistically significantly decreased the likelihood of repeated use of EI and the number of jobs held per claim. The WWOC pilot statistically significantly increased the likelihood that men change employer and occupation after a period of unemployment.

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Table 1: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
Pilot_regions	-0.025 (0.110)	-0.480*** (0.160)	-0.132 (0.113)	0.109 (0.114)
WWOC_after	0.091 (0.069)	-0.221** (0.109)	-0.065 (0.076)	0.205*** (0.075)
WWOC_after_region	0.023 (0.039)	0.671*** (0.061)	0.039 (0.042)	-0.177*** (0.042)
EW_after	-0.013 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.067)	0.022 (0.044)	-0.062 (0.045)
EW_after_region	0.040 (0.037)	0.060 (0.058)	-0.048 (0.040)	0.097** (0.039)
age	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
u	0.012** (0.005)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)
brate_adj	0.003*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
ent_weeks	0.023*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)
insear_adj	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.042*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.004)
aboriginal	-0.532*** (0.046)	-0.800*** (0.090)	-0.408*** (0.050)	-0.466*** (0.051)
disabled	-0.070 (0.135)	0.307* (0.183)	0.104 (0.137)	0.001 (0.144)
vis_min	0.206* (0.112)	-0.071 (0.193)	0.173 (0.114)	0.233* (0.121)
mgmt	-0.856*** (0.040)	-0.094 (0.059)	-0.643*** (0.044)	-1.234*** (0.050)
bu_fin_adm	-0.262*** (0.034)	0.201*** (0.048)	-0.094*** (0.035)	-0.530*** (0.038)
nat_appl_sc	-0.451*** (0.031)	0.069 (0.045)	-0.363*** (0.033)	-0.689*** (0.034)
health	-0.041 (0.106)	0.351*** (0.135)	0.164 (0.107)	-0.126 (0.111)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-0.168*** (0.048)	0.267*** (0.067)	0.091* (0.048)	-0.602*** (0.055)
art_cult	0.169*** (0.053)	0.456*** (0.072)	0.265*** (0.054)	0.045 (0.057)
sales	-0.206***	0.257***	-0.043	-0.433***

	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.029)
trade_trpt	0.027	-0.174***	-0.085***	0.025
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.020)
oc_primary	-0.239***	-0.249***	-0.305***	-0.290***
	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.028)
agr_serv	-0.101***	0.063	-0.220***	-0.215***
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.041)
fish_trap	0.427***	0.053	0.091	0.576***
	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.057)
log_fores	-0.024	-0.473***	-0.280***	0.081**
	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.037)
mining	0.095**	0.039	0.217***	0.087**
	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.044)
constr	0.207***	-0.249***	-0.161***	0.300***
	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.018)
transp	0.012	0.301***	0.141***	-0.046
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.030)
comm	-0.048	0.198**	0.170***	-0.140**
	(0.057)	(0.081)	(0.058)	(0.062)
wtrade	-0.163***	-0.012	-0.214***	-0.217***
	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.030)
rtrade	-0.223***	-0.066	-0.185***	-0.378***
	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.032)
fin_ins	-0.182***	0.032	-0.166**	-0.276***
	(0.066)	(0.098)	(0.071)	(0.074)
real_est	-0.301***	-0.062	-0.196**	-0.316***
	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.079)	(0.086)
bus_serv	0.036	0.198	0.195*	-0.109
	(0.101)	(0.154)	(0.104)	(0.116)
gov_serv	-0.218***	0.256***	0.000	-0.419***
	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.033)
edu_serv	0.160***	0.208***	0.449***	-0.142**
	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.054)	(0.061)
hlth_serv	0.619***	0.390**	0.880***	0.637***
	(0.148)	(0.160)	(0.139)	(0.148)
food_serv	-0.101***	-0.052	-0.044	-0.209***
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.041)
other_serv	-0.098***	0.158***	-0.093***	-0.319***
	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.030)
yr_1997	0.101**	-0.134*	-0.051	0.198***
	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.046)	(0.046)
yr_1998	0.095**	0.053	0.003	0.175***
	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.040)
yr_1999	0.090**	0.060	0.004	0.099**
	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.039)	(0.039)
yr_2001	-0.062	-0.008	0.069	-0.152***

	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.047)	(0.046)
yr_2002	-0.051	-0.016	0.100**	-0.198***
	(0.043)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.046)
yr_2003	-0.150***	-0.106	0.083*	-0.308***
	(0.042)	(0.067)	(0.045)	(0.045)
yr_2004	-0.178***	-0.087	0.036	-0.327***
	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.050)	(0.050)
yr_2005	-0.172***	-0.092	0.017	-0.327***
	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.065)	(0.065)
yr_2006	-0.240***	0.055	0.029	-0.424***
	(0.092)	(0.144)	(0.100)	(0.100)
yr_2007	-0.216**	0.206	0.057	-0.416***
	(0.093)	(0.145)	(0.101)	(0.100)
yr_2008	-0.204**	0.287*	0.047	-0.355***
	(0.096)	(0.149)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Constant	-0.903***	-1.761***	-0.512***	-1.796***
	(0.142)	(0.210)	(0.146)	(0.147)
Observations	128,040	128,040	128,040	128,040

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 2: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
 ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
 No NERE Participants
 1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
Pilot_regions	-0.034 (0.125)	-0.066 (0.168)	-0.013 (0.126)	0.103 (0.142)
WWOC_after	0.234*** (0.090)	0.022 (0.110)	0.266*** (0.089)	0.273*** (0.097)
WWOC_after_region	-0.046 (0.050)	0.525*** (0.061)	-0.058 (0.050)	-0.224*** (0.055)
EW_after	-0.059 (0.050)	-0.066 (0.066)	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.134** (0.057)
EW_after_region	0.091** (0.045)	0.077 (0.056)	0.088* (0.045)	0.181*** (0.049)
age	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
u	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.006)
brate_adj	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
ent_weeks	0.032*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.003)
insear_adj	-0.057*** (0.006)	-0.077*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.062*** (0.006)
aboriginal	-0.793*** (0.063)	-0.837*** (0.093)	-0.699*** (0.066)	-0.677*** (0.074)
disabled	-0.128 (0.194)	-0.193 (0.253)	0.043 (0.196)	0.026 (0.213)
vis_min	0.090 (0.131)	0.033 (0.181)	0.123 (0.133)	0.305** (0.142)
mgmt	-0.637*** (0.043)	-0.069 (0.055)	-0.552*** (0.044)	-1.035*** (0.051)
bu_fin_adm	-0.353*** (0.027)	0.068** (0.033)	-0.333*** (0.027)	-0.586*** (0.028)
nat_appl_sc	-0.516*** (0.053)	-0.095 (0.070)	-0.488*** (0.054)	-0.714*** (0.059)
health	0.059 (0.049)	0.053 (0.058)	0.195*** (0.047)	-0.056 (0.048)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-0.060* (0.034)	0.268*** (0.043)	0.042 (0.034)	-0.341*** (0.036)
art_cult	-0.137*** (0.053)	0.094 (0.065)	-0.187*** (0.052)	-0.328*** (0.057)
sales	-0.287***	0.126***	-0.175***	-0.549***

	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.028)
trade_trpt	-0.196***	-0.136***	-0.233***	-0.276***
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.038)
oc_primary	-0.529***	-0.248***	-0.535***	-0.542***
	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.051)
agr_serv	-0.328***	-0.308***	-0.501***	-0.306***
	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.052)
fish_trap	-0.105	-0.178*	-0.231**	-0.167*
	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.091)	(0.098)
log_fores	0.230**	-0.111	-0.214**	0.338***
	(0.107)	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.106)
mining	-0.001	-0.053	-0.074	0.172
	(0.117)	(0.146)	(0.120)	(0.132)
constr	-0.211***	-0.059	-0.304***	-0.307***
	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.055)
transp	0.002	0.024	0.084	-0.179***
	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.060)
comm	0.127*	0.317***	0.236***	0.134*
	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.081)
wtrade	-0.175***	-0.144***	-0.198***	-0.254***
	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.043)
rtrade	-0.172***	0.052	-0.131***	-0.287***
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.031)
fin_ins	0.018	0.137**	0.128**	0.031
	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.057)
real_est	-0.230***	0.078	-0.135**	-0.399***
	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.076)
bus_serv	-0.034	0.014	0.056	0.172
	(0.108)	(0.143)	(0.109)	(0.115)
gov_serv	-0.025	-0.067*	-0.015	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.034)
edu_serv	0.022	-0.411***	0.180***	-0.261***
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.033)
hlth_serv	0.713***	-0.072	0.846***	0.954***
	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.074)	(0.075)
food_serv	-0.024	0.080**	0.054*	-0.116***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.031)
other_serv	-0.250***	-0.006	-0.272***	-0.414***
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)
yr_1997	-0.003	0.075	-0.104*	0.075
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.058)
yr_1998	0.166***	0.132**	0.114**	0.208***
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.052)
yr_1999	0.135***	0.102*	0.138***	0.137***
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.052)
yr_2001	-0.037	0.081	0.042	-0.144***

	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.053)
yr_2002	-0.085*	0.020	0.013	-0.221***
	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.053)
yr_2003	-0.162***	0.072	-0.058	-0.310***
	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.048)	(0.052)
yr_2004	-0.126**	0.072	-0.048	-0.293***
	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.057)	(0.061)
yr_2005	-0.125*	0.064	-0.025	-0.318***
	(0.071)	(0.093)	(0.072)	(0.078)
yr_2006	-0.317***	-0.016	-0.265**	-0.578***
	(0.115)	(0.143)	(0.114)	(0.124)
yr_2007	-0.358***	0.055	-0.342***	-0.561***
	(0.116)	(0.144)	(0.115)	(0.125)
yr_2008	-0.277**	0.097	-0.224*	-0.378***
	(0.121)	(0.149)	(0.120)	(0.130)
Constant	0.230	-1.959***	0.280	-0.643***
	(0.173)	(0.218)	(0.171)	(0.189)
Observations	83,917	83,917	83,917	83,917

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 3: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
Pilot_regions	-0.567 (0.509)	-0.308*** (0.108)	-0.413*** (0.146)	0.154 (0.440)
WWOC_after	0.090 (0.290)	-0.219** (0.087)	-0.066 (0.104)	0.374 (0.239)
WWOC_after_region	0.166 (0.189)	0.637*** (0.056)	-0.096 (0.064)	-0.375** (0.157)
EW_after	-0.480*** (0.179)	-0.044 (0.047)	-0.054 (0.066)	-0.382*** (0.147)
EW_after_region	0.375** (0.175)	0.073 (0.047)	0.008 (0.062)	0.294** (0.145)
age	0.036*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.032*** (0.002)
u	0.042* (0.024)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.007)	0.044** (0.020)
brate_adj	0.010*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.001)
ent_weeks	0.140*** (0.011)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.089*** (0.009)
insear_adj	0.027 (0.019)	-0.040*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)	0.088*** (0.016)
aboriginal	-2.051*** (0.153)	-0.381*** (0.035)	-0.490*** (0.055)	-1.179*** (0.123)
disabled	0.151 (0.635)	-0.011 (0.171)	0.360 (0.239)	-0.197 (0.479)
vis_min	0.380 (0.455)	0.064 (0.104)	0.170 (0.166)	0.146 (0.367)
mgmt	-3.456*** (0.146)	0.189*** (0.059)	-0.158** (0.065)	-3.487*** (0.102)
bu_fin_adm	-1.513*** (0.146)	0.237*** (0.048)	0.268*** (0.065)	-2.019*** (0.105)
nat_appl_sc	-2.687*** (0.126)	0.191*** (0.042)	-0.207*** (0.047)	-2.672*** (0.100)
health	-0.200 (0.562)	0.292** (0.136)	0.778*** (0.257)	-1.270*** (0.385)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-1.464*** (0.230)	0.287*** (0.070)	0.726*** (0.101)	-2.477*** (0.168)
art_cult	0.248 (0.250)	0.366*** (0.079)	0.588*** (0.107)	-0.706*** (0.187)
sales	-0.899***	0.262***	0.520***	-1.680***

	(0.119)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.088)
trade_trpt	-0.074	-0.069***	-0.111***	0.106
	(0.092)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.078)
oc_primary	-1.410***	-0.041	-0.298***	-1.071***
	(0.119)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.101)
agr_serv	-0.690***	0.217***	-0.089	-0.818***
	(0.148)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.118)
fish_trap	1.427***	-0.135*	0.030	1.531***
	(0.273)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.230)
log_fores	0.527***	-0.240***	-0.358***	1.125***
	(0.187)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.169)
mining	0.508**	0.011	0.165***	0.331*
	(0.199)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.171)
constr	1.285***	-0.039*	-0.236***	1.560***
	(0.085)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.075)
transp	0.355**	0.226***	0.465***	-0.336***
	(0.144)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.116)
comm	0.472*	0.059	0.751***	-0.339
	(0.286)	(0.068)	(0.125)	(0.211)
wtrade	-0.965***	0.054	-0.174***	-0.845***
	(0.119)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.093)
rtrade	-0.963***	0.219***	-0.058	-1.123***
	(0.117)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.085)
fin_ins	-0.409	0.309***	-0.195**	-0.523**
	(0.271)	(0.112)	(0.097)	(0.209)
real_est	-1.118***	-0.118	-0.188	-0.812***
	(0.306)	(0.072)	(0.123)	(0.222)
bus_serv	0.038	0.102	0.002	-0.066
	(0.439)	(0.126)	(0.159)	(0.338)
gov_serv	-0.911***	0.204***	0.215***	-1.330***
	(0.128)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.096)
edu_serv	-0.292	-0.203***	0.461***	-0.550**
	(0.285)	(0.054)	(0.116)	(0.221)
hlth_serv	6.116***	0.003	3.439***	2.674***
	(1.027)	(0.156)	(0.538)	(0.668)
food_serv	-0.335**	0.117**	0.066	-0.518***
	(0.149)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.101)
other_serv	-0.500***	0.209***	0.003	-0.713***
	(0.116)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.089)
yr_1997	0.551***	-0.091*	-0.176***	0.818***
	(0.211)	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.180)
yr_1998	0.683***	0.017	0.066	0.600***
	(0.176)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.149)
yr_1999	0.181	0.026	-0.023	0.177
	(0.170)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.144)
yr_2001	-0.386*	-0.016	0.019	-0.388**

	(0.210)	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.177)
yr_2002	-0.482**	-0.023	0.128*	-0.586***
	(0.207)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.173)
yr_2003	-0.760***	-0.087	0.085	-0.757***
	(0.201)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.168)
yr_2004	-0.387*	-0.060	0.093	-0.421**
	(0.218)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.182)
yr_2005	-0.192	-0.024	0.109	-0.277
	(0.282)	(0.075)	(0.099)	(0.235)
yr_2006	0.020	0.130	0.125	-0.235
	(0.412)	(0.118)	(0.145)	(0.343)
yr_2007	0.291	0.252**	0.164	-0.126
	(0.415)	(0.119)	(0.146)	(0.345)
yr_2008	0.859**	0.391***	0.226	0.242
	(0.433)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.359)
Constant	0.800	-0.018	1.496***	-0.677
	(0.645)	(0.159)	(0.199)	(0.550)
Observations	128,040	128,040	128,040	128,040
R-squared	0.123	0.030	0.030	0.150

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 4: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
Pilot_regions	-0.807 (0.600)	-0.270* (0.145)	-0.436 (0.295)	-0.101 (0.419)
WWOC_after	0.826* (0.478)	0.233 (0.183)	0.157 (0.234)	0.436 (0.318)
WWOC_after_region	-0.042 (0.270)	0.723*** (0.088)	-0.051 (0.135)	-0.714*** (0.183)
EW_after	-0.423* (0.248)	0.029 (0.074)	-0.081 (0.125)	-0.370** (0.169)
EW_after_region	0.596** (0.245)	-0.006 (0.073)	0.182 (0.125)	0.420** (0.167)
age	0.070*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.002)	0.061*** (0.002)
u	-0.045 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.036* (0.020)
brate_adj	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
ent_weeks	0.269*** (0.015)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.096*** (0.008)	0.150*** (0.011)
insear_adj	-0.315*** (0.035)	-0.098*** (0.013)	-0.129*** (0.016)	-0.088*** (0.023)
aboriginal	-3.997*** (0.246)	-0.629*** (0.065)	-1.385*** (0.134)	-1.983*** (0.146)
disabled	-0.758 (0.995)	-0.222 (0.208)	-0.050 (0.498)	-0.486 (0.657)
vis_min	0.807 (0.681)	-0.136 (0.152)	0.339 (0.328)	0.605 (0.449)
mgmt	-2.751*** (0.207)	0.307*** (0.074)	-0.027 (0.109)	-3.031*** (0.135)
bu_fin_adm	-1.498*** (0.144)	0.473*** (0.043)	0.291*** (0.064)	-2.262*** (0.108)
nat_appl_sc	-2.975*** (0.235)	0.175** (0.074)	-0.369*** (0.106)	-2.781*** (0.160)
health	2.825*** (0.313)	0.149** (0.068)	1.922*** (0.148)	0.754*** (0.232)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-0.043 (0.179)	0.289*** (0.046)	1.256*** (0.084)	-1.588*** (0.132)
art_cult	-1.422*** (0.263)	0.211*** (0.068)	0.294** (0.122)	-1.927*** (0.192)
sales	-0.991***	0.322***	0.766***	-2.079***

	(0.149)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.109)
trade_trpt	-1.020***	-0.063	-0.145*	-0.812***
	(0.195)	(0.048)	(0.081)	(0.153)
oc_primary	-2.950***	-0.006	-0.603***	-2.341***
	(0.230)	(0.070)	(0.094)	(0.168)
agr_serv	-2.159***	-0.192***	-0.713***	-1.253***
	(0.232)	(0.067)	(0.101)	(0.169)
fish_trap	-1.225**	-0.459***	-0.312	-0.453
	(0.552)	(0.152)	(0.218)	(0.413)
log_fores	-1.185**	-0.309*	-0.618***	-0.258
	(0.497)	(0.167)	(0.202)	(0.361)
mining	-1.031*	-0.283*	-0.711***	-0.037
	(0.532)	(0.150)	(0.232)	(0.390)
constr	-1.336***	0.221**	-0.442***	-1.115***
	(0.231)	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.157)
transp	-0.109	0.047	0.199	-0.356*
	(0.283)	(0.080)	(0.134)	(0.197)
comm	1.750***	0.400***	0.959***	0.390
	(0.440)	(0.155)	(0.217)	(0.285)
wtrade	-1.517***	-0.113**	-0.197**	-1.207***
	(0.187)	(0.057)	(0.099)	(0.124)
rtrade	-0.883***	0.160***	0.333***	-1.377***
	(0.158)	(0.050)	(0.086)	(0.100)
fin_ins	0.704**	0.014	0.881***	-0.191
	(0.293)	(0.090)	(0.162)	(0.179)
real_est	-0.724**	0.345**	0.415**	-1.485***
	(0.347)	(0.143)	(0.199)	(0.199)
bus_serv	-0.428	-0.300***	-0.083	-0.045
	(0.528)	(0.086)	(0.227)	(0.383)
gov_serv	0.389**	-0.179***	-0.095	0.663***
	(0.174)	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.127)
edu_serv	-0.630***	-0.434***	-0.261***	0.065
	(0.148)	(0.034)	(0.071)	(0.108)
hlth_serv	6.974***	-0.331***	2.986***	4.319***
	(0.517)	(0.093)	(0.256)	(0.375)
food_serv	-0.428***	0.028	0.309***	-0.765***
	(0.163)	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.110)
other_serv	-1.803***	0.133***	-0.276***	-1.660***
	(0.149)	(0.050)	(0.080)	(0.095)
yr_1997	-0.374	0.038	-0.490***	0.078
	(0.298)	(0.078)	(0.147)	(0.212)
yr_1998	0.758***	0.073	-0.008	0.693***
	(0.275)	(0.071)	(0.135)	(0.194)
yr_1999	0.565**	0.094	0.102	0.370*
	(0.271)	(0.070)	(0.135)	(0.192)
yr_2001	-0.266	-0.007	0.218*	-0.476**

	(0.260)	(0.065)	(0.126)	(0.185)
yr_2002	-0.686***	-0.034	0.133	-0.786***
	(0.255)	(0.065)	(0.125)	(0.180)
yr_2003	-0.880***	0.054	0.015	-0.949***
	(0.246)	(0.063)	(0.120)	(0.173)
yr_2004	-0.834***	-0.004	0.032	-0.862***
	(0.296)	(0.081)	(0.145)	(0.208)
yr_2005	-0.763**	-0.034	0.061	-0.790***
	(0.363)	(0.101)	(0.180)	(0.253)
yr_2006	-1.700***	-0.319	-0.224	-1.156***
	(0.608)	(0.214)	(0.298)	(0.412)
yr_2007	-1.296**	-0.177	-0.252	-0.866**
	(0.612)	(0.215)	(0.300)	(0.415)
yr_2008	0.090	-0.144	0.299	-0.065
	(0.646)	(0.225)	(0.317)	(0.439)
Constant	4.773***	-0.705***	2.063***	3.415***
	(0.879)	(0.222)	(0.429)	(0.625)
Observations	83,917	83,917	83,917	83,917
R-squared	0.140	0.043	0.063	0.140

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 5: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
Pilot_regions	-2.154*** (0.665)	-0.721*** (0.196)	-326.436* (181.410)
WWOC_after	0.112 (0.423)	-0.285** (0.142)	-113.229 (126.238)
WWOC_after_region	-1.190*** (0.251)	0.541*** (0.089)	-328.583*** (74.755)
EW_after	-0.771*** (0.251)	-0.098 (0.085)	-83.186 (75.425)
EW_after_region	-0.393* (0.236)	0.081 (0.082)	-216.462*** (69.258)
age	0.135*** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	15.576*** (0.868)
u	0.046 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.009)	17.616** (8.190)
brate_adj	0.028*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	28.069*** (0.299)
ent_weeks	0.633*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.005)	135.037*** (3.904)
insear_adj	-0.431*** (0.023)	-0.061*** (0.009)	-250.460*** (6.995)
aboriginal	1.865*** (0.248)	-0.872*** (0.071)	1,208.429*** (78.445)
disabled	0.665 (0.798)	0.348 (0.325)	251.287 (205.079)
vis_min	1.112* (0.665)	0.234 (0.205)	320.161* (193.667)
mgmt	0.010 (0.244)	0.031 (0.091)	1,524.356*** (82.594)
bu_fin_adm	0.192 (0.220)	0.506*** (0.084)	774.539*** (66.941)
nat_appl_sc	-2.005*** (0.191)	-0.016 (0.066)	465.855*** (59.541)
health	-1.148* (0.682)	1.070*** (0.307)	-77.424 (201.144)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-2.514*** (0.332)	1.013*** (0.127)	-8.841 (92.841)
art_cult	0.656** (0.328)	0.954*** (0.140)	523.988*** (92.125)
sales	0.065	0.781***	687.532***

	(0.162)	(0.066)	(46.386)
trade_trpt	0.109	-0.179***	106.067***
	(0.126)	(0.039)	(36.088)
oc_primary	-0.254*	-0.339***	632.153***
	(0.154)	(0.054)	(43.318)
agr_serv	-0.321*	0.128	282.959***
	(0.193)	(0.082)	(49.770)
fish_trap	3.449***	-0.104	1,007.403***
	(0.276)	(0.113)	(75.941)
log_fores	0.328	-0.598***	-279.584***
	(0.228)	(0.062)	(61.758)
mining	-0.048	0.176**	-183.422**
	(0.273)	(0.078)	(84.023)
constr	1.548***	-0.276***	-2.130
	(0.109)	(0.034)	(31.425)
transp	-0.514***	0.691***	31.636
	(0.184)	(0.071)	(53.830)
comm	0.795**	0.811***	192.533*
	(0.378)	(0.151)	(116.177)
wtrade	0.564***	-0.120*	622.440***
	(0.182)	(0.061)	(54.683)
rtrade	-0.596***	0.160**	320.683***
	(0.170)	(0.070)	(49.013)
fin_ins	1.241***	0.114	604.332***
	(0.408)	(0.151)	(131.924)
real_est	1.055**	-0.305**	716.778***
	(0.423)	(0.152)	(124.025)
bus_serv	0.850	0.103	298.275*
	(0.566)	(0.212)	(165.393)
gov_serv	-1.428***	0.419***	-57.551
	(0.170)	(0.071)	(50.022)
edu_serv	-7.441***	0.258*	-2,342.299***
	(0.400)	(0.133)	(93.704)
hlth_serv	3.111***	3.442***	-818.366***
	(1.033)	(0.595)	(310.433)
food_serv	-0.215	0.183*	218.440***
	(0.197)	(0.093)	(53.705)
other_serv	-0.476***	0.213***	204.517***
	(0.153)	(0.065)	(42.853)
yr_1997	-1.702***	-0.267***	-1,052.528***
	(0.280)	(0.087)	(72.531)
yr_1998	0.475**	0.083	-325.763***
	(0.230)	(0.077)	(60.467)
yr_1999	0.143	0.003	-201.263***
	(0.225)	(0.075)	(58.843)
yr_2001	0.648**	0.002	549.583***

	(0.277)	(0.094)	(73.807)
yr_2002	0.358	0.104	657.418***
	(0.275)	(0.094)	(73.977)
yr_2003	0.358	-0.003	885.976***
	(0.269)	(0.091)	(72.202)
yr_2004	1.233***	0.034	1,148.837***
	(0.294)	(0.099)	(80.274)
yr_2005	1.271***	0.085	1,210.996***
	(0.380)	(0.130)	(107.260)
yr_2006	1.561***	0.255	1,404.261***
	(0.576)	(0.195)	(167.424)
yr_2007	1.795***	0.417**	1,517.526***
	(0.580)	(0.197)	(168.945)
yr_2008	3.715***	0.617***	2,128.056***
	(0.597)	(0.206)	(174.928)
Constant	9.609***	1.478***	-4,109.167***
	(0.854)	(0.273)	(233.004)
Observations	128,028	128,040	128,040
R-squared	0.221	0.036	0.253

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 6: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
Pilot_regions	-3.158*** (0.723)	-0.706** (0.349)	-571.001*** (160.679)
WWOC_after	0.536 (0.533)	0.390 (0.307)	-11.483 (143.217)
WWOC_after_region	-1.546*** (0.298)	0.672*** (0.168)	-370.892*** (80.291)
EW_after	-0.656** (0.298)	-0.052 (0.151)	-103.811 (78.770)
EW_after_region	-0.010 (0.277)	0.176 (0.150)	-31.994 (71.992)
age	0.171*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.002)	16.286*** (0.965)
u	-0.041 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.018)	14.785* (8.139)
brate_adj	0.020*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	27.006*** (0.454)
ent_weeks	0.721*** (0.016)	0.119*** (0.009)	104.045*** (4.083)
insear_adj	-0.573*** (0.037)	-0.227*** (0.022)	-217.300*** (10.662)
aboriginal	0.864** (0.363)	-2.014*** (0.158)	1,367.937*** (108.372)
disabled	1.011 (1.160)	-0.272 (0.546)	598.532** (300.126)
vis_min	1.692** (0.801)	0.203 (0.371)	329.829* (186.103)
mgmt	-1.735*** (0.270)	0.280** (0.138)	692.773*** (80.221)
bu_fin_adm	-1.742*** (0.170)	0.764*** (0.080)	148.252*** (42.528)
nat_appl_sc	-3.326*** (0.330)	-0.194 (0.139)	-152.839 (95.213)
health	-0.331 (0.322)	2.071*** (0.168)	-759.201*** (79.587)
socsc_ed_gov_rel	-1.800*** (0.215)	1.545*** (0.100)	-351.645*** (52.876)
art_cult	-2.367*** (0.319)	0.505*** (0.148)	-81.809 (81.152)
sales	-1.984***	1.088***	-17.789

	(0.166)	(0.083)	(39.318)
trade_trpt	-1.098***	-0.208**	-19.526
	(0.223)	(0.099)	(51.728)
oc_primary	-1.506***	-0.608***	416.679***
	(0.247)	(0.125)	(57.212)
agr_serv	-0.598**	-0.906***	348.956***
	(0.253)	(0.129)	(55.617)
fish_trap	1.265***	-0.771***	935.701***
	(0.455)	(0.290)	(113.147)
log_fores	0.105	-0.928***	272.492*
	(0.582)	(0.275)	(151.532)
mining	0.832	-0.994***	377.605
	(0.748)	(0.282)	(244.109)
constr	-0.396	-0.221	541.497***
	(0.273)	(0.149)	(75.461)
transp	-1.703***	0.246	-88.747
	(0.345)	(0.167)	(85.738)
comm	3.633***	1.359***	304.037**
	(0.546)	(0.281)	(147.195)
wtrade	0.020	-0.310**	462.852***
	(0.245)	(0.120)	(65.882)
rtrade	-0.453**	0.493***	156.694***
	(0.177)	(0.103)	(41.767)
fin_ins	1.209***	0.895***	153.394
	(0.360)	(0.193)	(100.034)
real_est	0.075	0.760***	417.136***
	(0.418)	(0.249)	(110.917)
bus_serv	0.560	-0.383	184.991
	(0.664)	(0.253)	(166.561)
gov_serv	0.032	-0.274***	-83.463
	(0.197)	(0.100)	(53.156)
edu_serv	-6.547***	-0.695***	-2,073.253***
	(0.184)	(0.082)	(41.331)
hlth_serv	3.379***	2.655***	-1,105.859***
	(0.496)	(0.281)	(138.442)
food_serv	-0.623***	0.337***	33.649
	(0.170)	(0.101)	(37.559)
other_serv	-1.496***	-0.143	180.969***
	(0.170)	(0.097)	(42.156)
yr_1997	-2.025***	-0.452***	-637.419***
	(0.353)	(0.174)	(75.335)
yr_1998	0.400	0.065	-300.369***
	(0.313)	(0.159)	(66.567)
yr_1999	0.096	0.195	-152.467**
	(0.306)	(0.158)	(65.150)
yr_2001	-0.118	0.211	248.538***

	(0.305)	(0.148)	(67.197)
yr_2002	-0.413	0.100	345.644***
	(0.303)	(0.147)	(67.200)
yr_2003	-0.115	0.069	655.915***
	(0.291)	(0.141)	(65.228)
yr_2004	0.852**	0.028	966.781***
	(0.347)	(0.172)	(82.273)
yr_2005	0.574	0.027	948.965***
	(0.428)	(0.214)	(104.875)
yr_2006	0.143	-0.544	1,024.329***
	(0.687)	(0.380)	(177.541)
yr_2007	0.626	-0.429	1,117.220***
	(0.692)	(0.382)	(178.998)
yr_2008	2.906***	0.156	1,656.403***
	(0.723)	(0.402)	(188.626)
Constant	12.901***	1.358***	-3,000.747***
	(1.032)	(0.515)	(235.204)
Observations	83,908	83,917	83,917
R-squared	0.300	0.074	0.351

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table 7

**Competing Risks Estimates: No Unobserved Heterogeneity
Men, 1997-2008, Regular Claims, ROE-SV Sample**

Variable	Exiting EI System	Working on Claim with		
		Full Benefits	Partial Benefits	No Benefits
WWOC Pilot After	-0.0767 (0.0240)	0.6900 (0.0660)	-0.1212 (0.0410)	-0.0998 (0.0331)
Pilot Region	-0.0007 (0.0095)	0.0862 (0.0286)	0.0013 (0.0155)	0.1418 (0.0133)
WWOC After	-0.0284 (0.0420)	-0.3995 (0.1285)	0.0203 (0.0737)	0.0325 (0.0658)
EW Pilot After	0.0338 (0.0246)	0.0854 (0.0774)	-0.0887 (0.0420)	-0.1192 (0.0376)
EW After	0.0994 (0.0223)	0.2431 (0.0613)	0.0060 (0.0363)	0.2385 (0.0292)
Age	-0.2763 (0.0343)	0.5159 (0.0826)	-1.4875 (0.0573)	0.0523 (0.0445)
Benefit Rate	0.2159 (0.0530)	0.8202 (0.1395)	-0.0325 (0.0814)	2.9101 (0.0681)
Entitlement Weeks	-4.6913 (0.0706)	0.1346 (0.1702)	-0.1935 (0.1000)	0.2521 (0.0705)
EC Region Unemployment Rate	-0.0204 (0.0174)	-0.2254 (0.0457)	-0.1608 (0.0261)	-0.0658 (0.0183)
vis_min	-0.1112 (0.0778)	-0.0732 (0.2272)	0.0636 (0.1029)	-0.0746 (0.1069)
aboriginal	-0.2887 (0.0237)	-1.1475 (0.1135)	-0.2934 (0.0456)	-0.4735 (0.0426)
disabled	-0.3380 (0.0524)	0.0970 (0.2119)	0.0250 (0.1266)	0.1390 (0.1077)
Logging & Forestry	0.0787 (0.0304)	-0.5327 (0.0776)	-0.2417 (0.0451)	0.1637 (0.0285)
Fishing and Trapping	-0.2425 (0.0595)	-0.1710 (0.0915)	-0.2206 (0.0670)	0.1998 (0.0367)
Mining	0.1213 (0.0246)	-0.0170 (0.0754)	0.0848 (0.0429)	0.1284 (0.0313)
Manufacturing	-0.0157 (0.0133)	-0.0685 (0.0376)	-0.0229 (0.0221)	0.0818 (0.0181)
Construction	0.0897 (0.0136)	-0.1574 (0.0380)	-0.1377 (0.0226)	0.2030 (0.0169)
Transportation & Storage	0.0339	0.0076	0.0677	0.0769

	(0.0203)	(0.0519)	(0.0314)	(0.0256)
Communication & Other Utility	-0.0238	0.1427	0.1026	-0.1041
	(0.0376)	(0.0908)	(0.0533)	(0.0495)
Wholesale Trade	-0.0970	-0.0749	-0.1882	-0.0578
	(0.0188)	(0.0499)	(0.0307)	(0.0265)
Retail Trade	-0.0480	0.1554	-0.1164	-0.3102
	(0.0176)	(0.0459)	(0.0291)	(0.0290)
Finance & Insurance	-0.0278	-0.0688	-0.1565	-0.1150
	(0.0398)	(0.1031)	(0.0636)	(0.0573)
Real Estate & Insurance Agent	-0.0923	-0.2346	-0.1442	-0.2850
	(0.0474)	(0.1260)	(0.0712)	(0.0678)
Business Service	-0.0512	-0.1271	0.0268	-0.1189
	(0.0570)	(0.1629)	(0.0814)	(0.0850)
Government Service	0.1144	0.2290	0.0702	-0.2730
	(0.0208)	(0.0478)	(0.0314)	(0.0298)
Educational Service	0.8130	0.3661	0.7481	0.1228
	(0.0276)	(0.0885)	(0.0501)	(0.0574)
Health and Social Services	-0.2408	0.2025	0.4867	0.7331
	(0.0748)	(0.2571)	(0.1222)	(0.1019)
Accommodation, Food & Beverage Serv.	-0.0158	0.1234	0.0025	-0.2104
	(0.0256)	(0.0565)	(0.0341)	(0.0396)
Other Service	-0.0179	-0.0438	-0.0282	-0.0261
	0.0608	0.1593	(0.0261)	(0.0976)
February	-0.0156	0.0705	-0.0312	0.0115
	(0.0147)	(0.0413)	(0.0253)	(0.0206)
March	-0.0275	0.0524	-0.0058	0.0139
	(0.0151)	(0.0413)	(0.0252)	(0.0206)
April	-0.1277	-0.0587	-0.0486	0.0401
	(0.0156)	(0.0441)	(0.0264)	(0.0212)
May	-0.2398	-0.0462	-0.0531	0.1387
	(0.0172)	(0.0476)	(0.0282)	(0.0221)
June	-0.3492	-0.2329	-0.0981	0.2188
	(0.0195)	(0.0533)	(0.0305)	(0.0231)
July	-0.2900	-0.1173	-0.0806	0.2211
	(0.0187)	(0.0514)	(0.0305)	(0.0239)
August	-0.2900	-0.1943	-0.0401	0.2248
	(0.0185)	(0.0540)	(0.0306)	(0.0242)
September	-0.4261	-0.1727	-0.1627	0.3031
	(0.0233)	(0.0571)	(0.0338)	(0.0249)
October	-0.4247	-0.1012	-0.0597	0.2293
	(0.0204)	(0.0548)	(0.0318)	(0.0245)
November	-0.3258	-0.0658	-0.1712	0.1019
	(0.0203)	(0.0510)	(0.0312)	(0.0242)

December	-0.2126 (0.0174)	0.0084 (0.0467)	-0.1080 (0.0288)	0.0256 (0.0230)
1998	-0.1124 (0.0273)	-0.1310 (0.0684)	-0.0245 (0.0360)	-0.0992 (0.0257)
1999	-0.0697 (0.0281)	-0.0333 (0.0684)	-0.0786 (0.0370)	-0.1436 (0.0267)
2000	-0.0433 (0.0279)	-0.0496 (0.0685)	-0.1438 (0.0378)	-0.1680 (0.0271)
2001	-0.1379 (0.0269)	-0.1671 (0.0678)	-0.1574 (0.0369)	-0.2599 (0.0268)
2002	-0.1372 (0.0258)	-0.1744 (0.0677)	-0.1151 (0.0363)	-0.2757 (0.0269)
2003	-0.0911 (0.0250)	-0.2426 (0.0657)	-0.1834 (0.0351)	-0.3762 (0.0262)
2004	-0.1936 (0.0268)	-0.3369 (0.0751)	-0.1325 (0.0395)	-0.4080 (0.0314)
2005	-0.1501 (0.0353)	-0.4171 (0.1014)	-0.0875 (0.0552)	-0.4096 (0.0453)
2006	-0.0973 (0.0552)	-0.1104 (0.1598)	-0.1698 (0.0919)	-0.3810 (0.0780)
2007	-0.1398 (0.0556)	0.0536 (0.1601)	-0.2103 (0.0926)	-0.3465 (0.0784)
2008	-0.2540 (0.0570)	0.1252 (0.1630)	-0.2885 (0.0955)	-0.3666 (0.0801)
Nova Scotia	0.1132 (0.0271)	-0.0132 (0.0587)	0.0110 (0.0393)	0.0689 (0.0239)
New Brunswick	0.0773 (0.0277)	0.2028 (0.0539)	-0.1471 (0.0384)	0.1688 (0.0224)
Quebec	0.1555 (0.0223)	0.1415 (0.0474)	0.0552 (0.0315)	-0.0969 (0.0201)
Manitoba	0.2345 (0.0287)	0.0101 (0.0820)	0.0572 (0.0478)	-0.7909 (0.0472)
Saskatchewan	0.2552 (0.0286)	-0.0692 (0.0727)	0.1156 (0.0437)	-0.5316 (0.0364)
Alberta	0.2612 (0.0258)	-0.3092 (0.0679)	0.1842 (0.0388)	-0.5358 (0.0298)
British Columbia	0.1437 (0.0261)	-0.3161 (0.0638)	0.3155 (0.0361)	-0.1117 (0.0251)
Other Provinces	0.0813 (0.0341)	0.2658 (0.0635)	0.1531 (0.0438)	-0.1487 (0.0300)
Economic Region Controls	No			
2-Digit Occupation Controls	Yes			
Insured Hours Controls	Yes			

Source: 1997-2008 ROE-SV Claims.

Table 8

Competing Risks Estimates: Two Mass-Point Unobserved Heterogeneity

Women, 1997-2008, Regular Claims, ROE-SV Sample

Variable	Exiting EI System	Working on Claim with		
		Full Benefits	Partial Benefits	No Benefits
WWOC Pilot After	-0.0888 (0.0320)	0.7424 (0.0621)	-0.0950 (0.0409)	-0.1745 (0.0482)
Pilot Region	-0.0396 (0.0132)	0.0782 (0.0280)	0.0007 (0.0164)	0.0826 (0.0195)
WWOC After	-0.0482 (0.0713)	0.0074 (0.1190)	0.1745 (0.0782)	0.1809 (0.0943)
EW Pilot After	0.0833 (0.0340)	-0.0083 (0.0742)	-0.0524 (0.0447)	-0.2417 (0.0534)
EW After	-0.0278 (0.0291)	0.0859 (0.0577)	0.1799 (0.0366)	0.3275 (0.0424)
Age	-0.4621 (0.0487)	-0.1004 (0.0911)	-1.0159 (0.0608)	0.7000 (0.0684)
Benefit Rate	0.8354 (0.0712)	0.9164 (0.1368)	-0.2859 (0.0887)	-0.4560 (0.0962)
Entitlement Weeks	-5.2598 (0.0872)	0.1628 (0.1642)	-0.3657 (0.0988)	0.8345 (0.1020)
EC Region Unemployment Rate	-0.1077 (0.0223)	-0.1024 (0.0439)	-0.0641 (0.0251)	-0.1322 (0.0281)
vis_min	-0.0782 (0.0963)	-0.3149 (0.2282)	-0.0781 (0.1133)	0.0032 (0.1336)
aboriginal	-0.2103 (0.0365)	-0.8018 (0.1011)	-0.5893 (0.0587)	-0.6440 (0.0767)
disabled	-0.2184 (0.1221)	-0.2001 (0.3231)	0.0729 (0.1655)	-0.0547 (0.2018)
Logging & Forestry	-0.0595 (0.1026)	0.1757 (0.1305)	-0.0785 (0.0973)	0.3357 (0.0781)
Fishing and Trapping	-0.2173 (0.1255)	-0.0868 (0.1312)	-0.1056 (0.0927)	-0.0511 (0.0762)
Mining	-0.1152 (0.1040)	-0.2190 (0.1718)	-0.0561 (0.1037)	0.1774 (0.1037)
Manufacturing	-0.0670 (0.0228)	-0.0120 (0.0424)	-0.0212 (0.0256)	0.1785 (0.0255)
Construction	-0.0082	0.1108	-0.1711	-0.0472

	(0.0338)	(0.0620)	(0.0454)	(0.0473)
Transportation & Storage	0.0914	0.0811	0.1676	-0.0483
	(0.0421)	(0.0795)	(0.0479)	(0.0570)
Communication & Other Utility	-0.1372	0.1968	0.0864	-0.0546
	(0.0647)	(0.0948)	(0.0616)	(0.0750)
Wholesale Trade	-0.0925	-0.1606	-0.1474	-0.1074
	(0.0290)	(0.0592)	(0.0363)	(0.0400)
Retail Trade	-0.0751	0.1237	-0.0316	-0.1797
	(0.0221)	(0.0384)	(0.0249)	(0.0291)
Finance & Insurance	-0.1370	0.0170	0.0068	0.0572
	(0.0405)	(0.0738)	(0.0460)	(0.0535)
Real Estate & Insurance Agent	-0.0551	0.0817	-0.0593	-0.3067
	(0.0465)	(0.0847)	(0.0564)	(0.0724)
Business Service	0.0015	-0.4203	-0.0554	0.0954
	(0.0748)	(0.1755)	(0.0829)	(0.0867)
Government Service	0.0328	-0.0046	0.0740	0.0883
	(0.0240)	(0.0452)	(0.0291)	(0.0307)
Educational Service	1.1199	0.0142	0.6236	-0.1040
	(0.0187)	(0.0471)	(0.0286)	(0.0381)
Health and Social Services	-0.2575	0.0662	0.5180	0.8217
	(0.0668)	(0.1238)	(0.0586)	(0.0499)
Accommodation, Food & Beverage Serv.	-0.0209	0.1662	0.0741	-0.0812
	(0.0236)	(0.0391)	(0.0249)	(0.0289)
Other Service	-0.0213	-0.0400	-0.0264	-0.0306
	0.0539	0.0753	(0.0772)	(0.1991)
February	-0.0028	0.0150	0.0163	-0.0060
	(0.0284)	(0.0479)	(0.0303)	(0.0324)
March	-0.0278	0.0605	-0.0002	-0.0175
	(0.0283)	(0.0471)	(0.0303)	(0.0323)
April	-0.0455	0.0074	0.0078	0.0361
	(0.0293)	(0.0492)	(0.0311)	(0.0329)
May	-0.0445	0.0119	0.0229	0.0883
	(0.0312)	(0.0510)	(0.0319)	(0.0333)
June	-0.0166	-0.1405	0.0078	0.0864
	(0.0309)	(0.0542)	(0.0327)	(0.0346)
July	0.3558	-0.1026	0.0212	-0.0432
	(0.0247)	(0.0493)	(0.0305)	(0.0340)
August	0.3977	-0.0070	0.0254	-0.2043
	(0.0242)	(0.0476)	(0.0298)	(0.0348)
September	-0.1622	-0.0121	0.0499	0.0773
	(0.0312)	(0.0529)	(0.0326)	(0.0354)
October	-0.1708	-0.0432	-0.0181	0.0661
	(0.0329)	(0.0533)	(0.0334)	(0.0350)

November	-0.1402	-0.0332	-0.0738	-0.0046
	(0.0311)	(0.0517)	(0.0329)	(0.0348)
December	-0.0902	-0.0496	-0.0495	-0.0389
	(0.0305)	(0.0510)	(0.0325)	(0.0346)
1998	-0.0658	-0.0640	-0.0296	-0.0252
	(0.0357)	(0.0629)	(0.0361)	(0.0360)
1999	-0.0009	-0.1194	-0.0110	-0.0894
	(0.0349)	(0.0640)	(0.0365)	(0.0371)
2000	0.0320	-0.1417	-0.0624	-0.1816
	(0.0342)	(0.0648)	(0.0373)	(0.0380)
2001	0.0389	-0.1719	-0.0913	-0.2759
	(0.0320)	(0.0634)	(0.0367)	(0.0381)
2002	0.0597	-0.2042	-0.0820	-0.3099
	(0.0327)	(0.0630)	(0.0363)	(0.0384)
2003	0.0490	-0.1075	-0.1896	-0.3972
	(0.0309)	(0.0589)	(0.0348)	(0.0371)
2004	-0.1012	-0.2019	-0.1796	-0.3911
	(0.0379)	(0.0722)	(0.0427)	(0.0453)
2005	-0.0909	-0.2219	-0.1456	-0.3757
	(0.0469)	(0.0957)	(0.0567)	(0.0634)
2006	-0.0392	-0.3359	-0.2741	-0.5140
	(0.0852)	(0.1500)	(0.0960)	(0.1111)
2007	-0.0563	-0.1712	-0.3881	-0.4572
	(0.0852)	(0.1504)	(0.0966)	(0.1115)
2008	-0.2039	-0.2690	-0.4004	-0.4098
	(0.0885)	(0.1549)	(0.1003)	(0.1144)
Nova Scotia	0.2199	-0.0261	0.0017	-0.1529
	(0.0393)	(0.0604)	(0.0387)	(0.0374)
New Brunswick	0.1040	0.1636	-0.0896	0.2992
	(0.0402)	(0.0551)	(0.0371)	(0.0314)
Quebec	0.1915	0.0682	-0.0440	-0.1687
	(0.0312)	(0.0466)	(0.0305)	(0.0294)
Manitoba	0.2427	0.1520	-0.0107	-0.8305
	(0.0419)	(0.0855)	(0.0530)	(0.0781)
Saskatchewan	0.2237	0.2297	0.0503	-0.8294
	(0.0415)	(0.0710)	(0.0466)	(0.0646)
Alberta	0.2530	-0.1170	0.0312	-0.8505
	(0.0356)	(0.0642)	(0.0387)	(0.0491)
British Columbia	0.1707	-0.0560	0.0089	-0.4101
	(0.0348)	(0.0583)	(0.0360)	(0.0385)
Other Provinces	0.1437	0.2091	-0.0763	-0.0505
	(0.0454)	(0.0621)	(0.0442)	(0.0420)
Economic Region Controls	No			

2-Digit Occupation Controls	Yes
Insured Hours Controls	Yes

Source: 1997-2008 ROE-SV Claims.

APPENDICES E, F, G and H TABLES

**Sub-Group Analysis
Based on Main Specification (as in Tables 1-6)**

Table E1: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
age25_55	0.064*** (0.024)	-0.001 (0.037)	0.118*** (0.025)	0.127*** (0.026)
age_more55	-0.556*** (0.043)	0.211*** (0.067)	-0.377*** (0.047)	-0.617*** (0.047)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	-0.066 (0.088)	-0.322** (0.133)	-0.033 (0.089)	0.091 (0.089)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	-0.031 (0.086)	-0.286** (0.129)	-0.057 (0.086)	0.079 (0.086)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	0.101 (0.092)	-0.149 (0.139)	0.069 (0.095)	0.114 (0.094)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	0.120* (0.062)	-0.216** (0.099)	-0.077 (0.066)	0.143** (0.066)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.108* (0.055)	-0.268*** (0.088)	-0.067 (0.058)	0.191*** (0.058)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	0.019 (0.067)	-0.162 (0.104)	-0.214*** (0.074)	0.039 (0.072)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-0.126** (0.052)	0.539*** (0.075)	0.058 (0.054)	-0.257*** (0.055)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	0.033 (0.033)	0.662*** (0.050)	0.070** (0.034)	-0.104*** (0.034)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	0.092 (0.058)	0.750*** (0.080)	0.023 (0.068)	-0.284*** (0.064)
Constant	-1.091*** (0.113)	-1.576*** (0.169)	-0.820*** (0.112)	-2.076*** (0.114)
Observations	217,250	217,250	217,250	217,250

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table E2: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
age25_55	-0.096** (0.041)	-0.109** (0.052)	-0.028 (0.041)	-0.057 (0.045)
age_more55	-0.438*** (0.069)	0.028 (0.091)	-0.420*** (0.072)	-0.468*** (0.077)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	-0.114 (0.131)	-0.092 (0.175)	-0.027 (0.133)	0.007 (0.150)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	-0.020 (0.125)	-0.064 (0.168)	-0.008 (0.126)	0.129 (0.142)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	0.014 (0.137)	-0.013 (0.183)	-0.037 (0.140)	0.070 (0.156)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	0.355*** (0.108)	0.037 (0.135)	0.331*** (0.108)	0.296** (0.120)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.219** (0.091)	0.011 (0.111)	0.258*** (0.090)	0.267*** (0.098)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	0.238** (0.108)	0.065 (0.134)	0.251** (0.110)	0.244** (0.120)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-0.330*** (0.102)	0.331*** (0.121)	-0.157 (0.101)	-0.284** (0.113)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	-0.004 (0.053)	0.552*** (0.065)	0.009 (0.052)	-0.168*** (0.057)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	-0.055 (0.095)	0.500*** (0.113)	-0.367*** (0.100)	-0.461*** (0.108)
Constant	0.134 (0.175)	-1.844*** (0.220)	0.086 (0.174)	-0.818*** (0.192)
Observations	83,917	83,917	83,917	83,917

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table E3: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
age25_55	0.525*** (0.157)	0.038 (0.043)	0.294*** (0.069)	0.193 (0.121)
age_more55	-2.307*** (0.278)	0.332*** (0.090)	-0.268*** (0.103)	-2.371*** (0.223)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	0.142 (0.467)	-0.128 (0.116)	-0.222 (0.166)	0.491 (0.382)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	0.320 (0.456)	-0.088 (0.112)	-0.312** (0.157)	0.719* (0.376)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	0.933* (0.494)	0.089 (0.140)	-0.067 (0.169)	0.911** (0.404)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	0.701** (0.344)	-0.092 (0.106)	0.047 (0.128)	0.746*** (0.280)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.342 (0.320)	-0.205** (0.099)	-0.070 (0.112)	0.616** (0.265)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	0.421 (0.373)	-0.223* (0.132)	0.156 (0.135)	0.487 (0.300)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-1.290*** (0.322)	0.235** (0.108)	-0.314*** (0.118)	-1.211*** (0.248)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	0.308 (0.231)	0.516*** (0.066)	-0.093 (0.079)	-0.115 (0.191)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	-0.381 (0.370)	1.742*** (0.192)	-0.408*** (0.119)	-1.715*** (0.280)
Constant	-3.780*** (0.602)	-0.332* (0.187)	0.858*** (0.213)	-4.306*** (0.482)
Observations	95,010	95,010	95,010	95,010
R-squared	0.121	0.041	0.029	0.150

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table E4: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
age25_55	0.507** (0.219)	0.045 (0.056)	0.255** (0.121)	0.208 (0.138)
age_more55	-1.066*** (0.396)	0.310** (0.127)	-0.173 (0.190)	-1.202*** (0.270)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	0.120 (0.678)	-0.373** (0.173)	-0.232 (0.392)	0.725* (0.408)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	0.189 (0.651)	-0.346** (0.165)	-0.284 (0.373)	0.819** (0.395)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	0.029 (0.718)	0.016 (0.210)	-0.620 (0.394)	0.632 (0.450)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	1.046* (0.549)	0.209 (0.187)	0.315 (0.287)	0.522 (0.351)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.617 (0.501)	0.186 (0.173)	0.089 (0.248)	0.341 (0.331)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	1.308** (0.587)	0.387* (0.224)	0.394 (0.283)	0.527 (0.392)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-0.704 (0.584)	0.297 (0.184)	0.184 (0.316)	-1.184*** (0.351)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	-0.151 (0.322)	0.495*** (0.102)	0.008 (0.162)	-0.653*** (0.219)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	-1.662*** (0.579)	1.522*** (0.305)	-1.033*** (0.256)	-2.150*** (0.378)
Constant	-1.165 (0.971)	-2.565*** (0.372)	0.427 (0.493)	0.973 (0.622)
Observations	63,402	63,402	63,402	63,402
R-squared	0.147	0.057	0.064	0.140

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table E5: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
age25_55	1.390*** (0.246)	0.332*** (0.085)	144.216** (69.352)
age_more55	0.061 (0.408)	0.064 (0.142)	575.893*** (119.842)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	3.243*** (0.707)	-0.350 (0.213)	1,030.118*** (191.853)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	2.869*** (0.684)	-0.399** (0.202)	1,011.600*** (185.423)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	3.083*** (0.740)	0.022 (0.229)	965.258*** (204.219)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	1.088** (0.506)	-0.045 (0.175)	37.218 (151.320)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.739 (0.466)	-0.275* (0.157)	-11.006 (140.950)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	1.263** (0.545)	-0.067 (0.196)	228.095 (164.052)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-1.848*** (0.452)	-0.079 (0.169)	-397.479*** (134.770)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	-1.182*** (0.296)	0.423*** (0.107)	-299.006*** (88.406)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	-0.883* (0.468)	1.334*** (0.226)	-245.308* (143.262)
Constant	-0.736 (0.809)	0.526* (0.298)	-6,681.353*** (228.770)
Observations	95,004	95,010	95,010
R-squared	0.227	0.038	0.261

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table E6: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
age25_55	2.156*** (0.319)	0.299** (0.140)	545.221*** (79.420)
age_more55	1.484*** (0.500)	0.137 (0.235)	769.865*** (122.899)
Pilot_reg_age_less25	0.437 (0.927)	-0.605 (0.451)	-226.797 (237.427)
Pilot_reg_age25_55	-0.398 (0.885)	-0.630 (0.428)	-421.322* (228.984)
Pilot_reg_age_more55	-0.581 (0.951)	-0.604 (0.465)	-504.973** (243.768)
WWOC_aft_age_less25	1.032 (0.673)	0.524 (0.358)	4.457 (179.244)
WWOC_aft_age25_55	0.600 (0.573)	0.275 (0.315)	24.799 (156.033)
WWOC_aft_age_more55	1.117 (0.684)	0.780** (0.369)	8.599 (181.649)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_less25	-2.059*** (0.681)	0.481 (0.387)	-515.512*** (169.341)
WWOC_aft_reg_age25_55	-1.638*** (0.337)	0.502** (0.199)	-409.015*** (90.902)
WWOC_aft_reg_age_more55	-1.812*** (0.586)	0.488 (0.396)	12.249 (157.714)
Constant	2.520** (1.122)	-2.138*** (0.640)	-1,037.630*** (300.774)
Observations	63,400	63,402	63,402
R-squared	0.321	0.080	0.352

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F1: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
ben200_300	-0.026 (0.040)	0.143** (0.063)	0.167*** (0.042)	-0.132*** (0.046)
ben_more300	-0.032 (0.053)	0.471*** (0.080)	0.251*** (0.056)	-0.150*** (0.058)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	0.053 (0.115)	-0.350** (0.168)	0.003 (0.118)	0.268** (0.121)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	0.001 (0.113)	-0.445*** (0.164)	-0.083 (0.116)	0.181 (0.117)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-0.055 (0.110)	-0.523*** (0.161)	-0.174 (0.114)	0.058 (0.115)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	0.037 (0.094)	-0.391** (0.154)	-0.169* (0.103)	0.124 (0.110)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	0.055 (0.077)	-0.313** (0.125)	-0.062 (0.084)	0.116 (0.087)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	0.107 (0.070)	-0.197* (0.111)	-0.073 (0.076)	0.235*** (0.076)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	-0.074 (0.107)	0.518*** (0.158)	0.183 (0.116)	-0.319** (0.124)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	0.047 (0.064)	0.775*** (0.097)	0.102 (0.069)	-0.153** (0.072)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	0.022 (0.042)	0.663*** (0.064)	0.026 (0.045)	-0.176*** (0.044)
Constant	-0.969*** (0.146)	-1.557*** (0.217)	-0.578*** (0.151)	-1.938*** (0.153)
Observations	128,040	128,040	128,040	128,040

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F2: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
ben200_300	0.098*** (0.038)	0.053 (0.049)	0.123*** (0.038)	0.078* (0.041)
ben_more300	0.070 (0.057)	0.301*** (0.072)	0.005 (0.057)	0.069 (0.062)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	0.030 (0.127)	-0.004 (0.170)	0.094 (0.128)	0.180 (0.144)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	-0.024 (0.127)	-0.141 (0.170)	-0.051 (0.128)	0.117 (0.144)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-0.115 (0.127)	-0.059 (0.171)	-0.106 (0.128)	0.009 (0.144)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	0.072 (0.098)	-0.164 (0.125)	0.093 (0.098)	0.177* (0.106)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	0.198** (0.095)	0.091 (0.118)	0.248*** (0.095)	0.211** (0.103)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	0.355*** (0.093)	0.060 (0.115)	0.393*** (0.093)	0.395*** (0.100)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	0.129* (0.075)	0.707*** (0.092)	0.128* (0.074)	-0.141* (0.080)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	-0.058 (0.067)	0.564*** (0.082)	-0.076 (0.066)	-0.198*** (0.072)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	-0.074 (0.062)	0.391*** (0.075)	-0.088 (0.061)	-0.239*** (0.068)
Constant	0.196 (0.176)	-1.777*** (0.221)	0.162 (0.174)	-0.685*** (0.192)
Observations	83,917	83,917	83,917	83,917

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F3: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
ben200_300	-0.582*** (0.149)	0.114*** (0.039)	0.366*** (0.065)	-1.061*** (0.112)
ben_more300	-0.321 (0.219)	0.265*** (0.060)	0.627*** (0.087)	-1.214*** (0.173)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	-0.299 (0.522)	-0.240** (0.112)	-0.213 (0.156)	0.154 (0.446)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	-0.081 (0.515)	-0.320*** (0.111)	-0.315** (0.152)	0.555 (0.442)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-0.751 (0.513)	-0.338*** (0.109)	-0.498*** (0.147)	0.085 (0.443)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	0.174 (0.345)	-0.349*** (0.096)	-0.265** (0.134)	0.787*** (0.275)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	-0.042 (0.310)	-0.225** (0.092)	-0.037 (0.119)	0.220 (0.251)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	0.144 (0.296)	-0.199** (0.089)	-0.086 (0.105)	0.429* (0.245)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	-0.711 (0.434)	0.367** (0.145)	0.396** (0.200)	-1.475*** (0.291)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	-0.031 (0.281)	0.573*** (0.099)	0.027 (0.117)	-0.631*** (0.207)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	0.277 (0.204)	0.669*** (0.061)	-0.141** (0.066)	-0.250 (0.172)
Constant	0.497 (0.660)	0.106 (0.163)	1.488*** (0.207)	-1.096* (0.560)
Observations	128,040	128,040	128,040	128,040
R-squared	0.123	0.030	0.031	0.150

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F4: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
ben200_300	0.630*** (0.193)	0.008 (0.045)	0.458*** (0.095)	0.164 (0.138)
ben_more300	0.456 (0.294)	0.201** (0.079)	0.309** (0.146)	-0.053 (0.206)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	-0.404 (0.610)	-0.282* (0.148)	-0.151 (0.298)	0.029 (0.425)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	-1.042* (0.613)	-0.319** (0.147)	-0.686** (0.302)	-0.038 (0.428)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-1.032* (0.611)	-0.230 (0.151)	-0.576* (0.299)	-0.226 (0.426)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	0.077 (0.508)	0.117 (0.186)	-0.117 (0.248)	0.077 (0.343)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	0.627 (0.498)	0.349* (0.189)	0.178 (0.245)	0.100 (0.333)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	1.318*** (0.490)	0.204 (0.187)	0.274 (0.239)	0.839** (0.326)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	0.817** (0.404)	0.952*** (0.128)	0.441** (0.201)	-0.576** (0.274)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	0.052 (0.362)	0.564*** (0.121)	-0.165 (0.180)	-0.347 (0.247)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	-0.339 (0.330)	0.677*** (0.117)	-0.200 (0.163)	-0.817*** (0.220)
Constant	4.679*** (0.895)	-0.526** (0.227)	1.930*** (0.438)	3.274*** (0.634)
Observations	83,917	83,917	83,917	83,917
R-squared	0.141	0.044	0.063	0.141

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F5: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
ben200_300	0.699*** (0.212)	0.480*** (0.079)	495.704*** (45.437)
ben_more300	0.798*** (0.297)	0.892*** (0.111)	501.422*** (75.142)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	-1.628** (0.688)	-0.453** (0.207)	-732.056*** (181.810)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	-1.632** (0.677)	-0.636*** (0.202)	-518.261*** (182.557)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-2.403*** (0.671)	-0.836*** (0.197)	-195.518 (182.498)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	-0.844* (0.511)	-0.613*** (0.172)	-588.417*** (132.901)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	-0.258 (0.453)	-0.261* (0.157)	-233.673* (130.557)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	0.257 (0.432)	-0.285** (0.144)	-14.213 (129.039)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	1.434** (0.586)	0.764*** (0.257)	-107.904 (112.863)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	-1.504*** (0.367)	0.600*** (0.160)	-739.112*** (94.156)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	-1.292*** (0.270)	0.527*** (0.094)	-281.980*** (82.552)
Constant	8.976*** (0.877)	1.594*** (0.282)	-3,565.910*** (237.020)
Observations	128,028	128,040	128,040
R-squared	0.222	0.037	0.256

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table F6: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
ben200_300	0.534** (0.228)	0.466*** (0.109)	-40.083 (46.543)
ben_more300	0.352 (0.347)	0.509*** (0.172)	-150.988* (82.464)
Pilot_reg_ben_less200	-2.500*** (0.733)	-0.433 (0.354)	-798.922*** (160.866)
Pilot_reg_ben200_300	-3.415*** (0.738)	-1.004*** (0.356)	-558.632*** (162.869)
Pilot_reg_ben_more300	-3.720*** (0.741)	-0.806** (0.356)	-362.998** (169.365)
WWOC_aft_ben_less200	-0.230 (0.567)	-0.001 (0.320)	-158.985 (142.740)
WWOC_aft_ben200_300	0.268 (0.562)	0.527* (0.320)	18.346 (146.086)
WWOC_aft_ben_more300	0.903 (0.557)	0.479 (0.314)	59.269 (152.824)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_less200	-0.172 (0.412)	1.393*** (0.247)	-437.640*** (82.687)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben200_300	-1.232*** (0.391)	0.399* (0.225)	-480.520*** (94.558)
WWOC_aft_reg_ben_more300	-2.528*** (0.383)	0.477** (0.209)	-165.115 (117.547)
Constant	12.323*** (1.051)	1.405*** (0.526)	-2,783.594*** (239.694)
Observations	83,908	83,917	83,917
R-squared	0.301	0.075	0.352

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table G1: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
seasonal	0.158*** (0.031)	0.257*** (0.048)	0.055* (0.033)	0.086*** (0.032)
Pilot_reg_nonseasonal	-0.081 (0.117)	-0.483*** (0.167)	-0.168 (0.119)	0.093 (0.120)
WWOC_aft_nonseasonal	0.089 (0.073)	-0.214* (0.115)	-0.054 (0.079)	0.170** (0.080)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonseasonal	0.027 (0.043)	0.661*** (0.065)	0.047 (0.046)	-0.188*** (0.046)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-0.190 (0.120)	-0.677*** (0.172)	-0.271** (0.123)	0.021 (0.124)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	0.160* (0.086)	-0.129 (0.136)	-0.049 (0.094)	0.330*** (0.093)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	0.007 (0.074)	0.693*** (0.109)	-0.022 (0.082)	-0.211*** (0.077)
Constant	-0.759*** (0.150)	-1.621*** (0.219)	-0.370** (0.154)	-1.742*** (0.155)
Observations	114,438	114,438	114,438	114,438

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table G2: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
 ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
 No NERE Participants
 1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
seasonal	0.013 (0.037)	-0.032 (0.053)	0.017 (0.038)	0.008 (0.041)
Pilot_reg_nonseasonal	-0.060 (0.132)	0.052 (0.178)	-0.021 (0.133)	0.048 (0.149)
WWOC_aft_nonseasonal	0.195** (0.096)	0.041 (0.117)	0.234** (0.095)	0.280*** (0.103)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonseasonal	-0.061 (0.055)	0.469*** (0.066)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.262*** (0.060)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-0.105 (0.135)	-0.074 (0.183)	-0.139 (0.136)	0.028 (0.151)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	0.291*** (0.111)	0.062 (0.146)	0.360*** (0.111)	0.363*** (0.121)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	-0.058 (0.092)	0.636*** (0.119)	-0.108 (0.090)	-0.261*** (0.099)
Constant	0.435** (0.184)	-1.905*** (0.231)	0.518*** (0.181)	-0.506** (0.199)
Observations	74,407	74,407	74,407	74,407

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table G3: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
seasonal	0.984*** (0.149)	0.252*** (0.037)	0.071 (0.045)	0.661*** (0.132)
Pilot_reg_nonsea	-0.734 (0.543)	-0.296** (0.119)	-0.390** (0.154)	-0.048 (0.468)
WWOC_aft_nonsea	0.013 (0.315)	-0.218** (0.096)	-0.097 (0.114)	0.327 (0.259)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonsea	0.213 (0.209)	0.643*** (0.063)	-0.057 (0.072)	-0.373** (0.172)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-1.096** (0.557)	-0.499*** (0.123)	-0.502*** (0.159)	-0.094 (0.482)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	0.554 (0.384)	-0.246** (0.110)	0.115 (0.132)	0.686** (0.327)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	0.390 (0.378)	0.834*** (0.119)	-0.260** (0.116)	-0.185 (0.325)
Constant	0.838 (0.689)	0.063 (0.174)	1.577*** (0.213)	-0.802 (0.586)
Observations	114,438	114,438	114,438	114,438
R-squared	0.127	0.032	0.033	0.154

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table G4: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
 ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
 No NERE Participants
 1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
seasonal	0.803*** (0.193)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.251*** (0.077)	1.075*** (0.155)
Pilot_reg_nonsea	-0.934 (0.653)	-0.207 (0.160)	-0.399 (0.320)	-0.328 (0.461)
WWOC_aft_nonsea	0.956* (0.516)	0.263 (0.204)	0.189 (0.256)	0.504 (0.341)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonsea	-0.024 (0.300)	0.711*** (0.100)	-0.069 (0.151)	-0.665*** (0.201)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-1.449** (0.665)	-0.314* (0.161)	-0.758** (0.320)	-0.377 (0.476)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	1.785*** (0.582)	0.421* (0.215)	0.648** (0.271)	0.715* (0.415)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	-0.462 (0.490)	0.715*** (0.164)	-0.045 (0.213)	-1.132*** (0.365)
Constant	5.429*** (0.950)	-0.795*** (0.239)	2.254*** (0.462)	3.970*** (0.680)
Observations	74,407	74,407	74,407	74,407
R-squared	0.146	0.045	0.069	0.144

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table G5: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
seasonal	-1.217*** (0.170)	0.323*** (0.060)	-702.474*** (41.387)
Pilot_reg_nonsea	-2.334*** (0.678)	-0.686*** (0.209)	-342.718* (186.064)
WWOC_aft_nonsea	0.602 (0.431)	-0.314** (0.154)	79.641 (128.073)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonsea	-1.319*** (0.266)	0.586*** (0.100)	-389.872*** (79.951)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-1.949*** (0.692)	-1.001*** (0.215)	-109.531 (187.984)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	0.480 (0.492)	-0.131 (0.177)	-155.645 (137.529)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	-0.753* (0.427)	0.575*** (0.172)	-85.512 (110.160)
Constant	10.722*** (0.864)	1.640*** (0.294)	-3,953.369*** (236.989)
Observations	114,428	114,438	114,438
R-squared	0.239	0.039	0.277

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table G6: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
seasonal	-1.435*** (0.208)	-0.272*** (0.091)	-770.618*** (38.685)
Pilot_reg_nonsea	-3.190*** (0.730)	-0.606 (0.379)	-584.594*** (160.836)
WWOC_aft_nonsea	0.810 (0.539)	0.452 (0.337)	78.652 (147.631)
WWOC_aft_reg_nonsea	-1.424*** (0.317)	0.641*** (0.188)	-351.531*** (86.402)
Pilot_reg_seasonal	-3.013*** (0.741)	-1.072*** (0.378)	-394.477** (160.794)
WWOC_aft_seasonal	0.540 (0.608)	1.069*** (0.355)	-255.337* (153.697)
WWOC_aft_reg_seasonal	-1.790*** (0.488)	0.670** (0.275)	-199.885* (107.992)
Constant	14.315*** (1.055)	1.459*** (0.554)	-2,985.129*** (238.227)
Observations	74,398	74,407	74,407
R-squared	0.342	0.081	0.398

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table H1: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
rural	0.063 (0.054)	-0.123 (0.094)	0.025 (0.061)	0.024 (0.060)
Pilot_reg_rural	-0.146 (0.152)	0.011 (0.239)	-0.431*** (0.160)	0.304* (0.174)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	-0.092 (0.087)	-0.297** (0.141)	-0.196** (0.097)	0.045 (0.096)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	0.090 (0.065)	0.662*** (0.104)	0.113 (0.072)	-0.153** (0.071)
Pilot_reg_urban	-0.073 (0.140)	0.055 (0.217)	-0.301** (0.146)	0.313* (0.161)
WWOC_aft_urban	0.012 (0.075)	-0.288** (0.118)	-0.049 (0.082)	0.056 (0.082)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	0.020 (0.048)	0.583*** (0.072)	-0.029 (0.053)	-0.163*** (0.052)
Constant	-1.069*** (0.179)	-2.703*** (0.264)	-0.327* (0.190)	-2.624*** (0.200)
Observations	61,463	61,463	61,463	61,463

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table H2: Logit Estimates of the Probability of Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
rural	-0.024 (0.052)	-0.022 (0.069)	0.054 (0.053)	0.117** (0.057)
Pilot_reg_rural	-0.531*** (0.143)	-0.487*** (0.175)	-0.323** (0.141)	-0.801*** (0.151)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	-0.020 (0.092)	-0.201* (0.110)	0.096 (0.090)	-0.014 (0.097)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	-0.038 (0.065)	0.705*** (0.081)	-0.029 (0.065)	-0.167** (0.071)
Pilot_reg_urban	-0.612*** (0.140)	-0.609*** (0.172)	-0.252* (0.138)	-0.684*** (0.147)
WWOC_aft_urban	0.218*** (0.080)	0.061 (0.092)	0.283*** (0.077)	0.200** (0.082)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	-0.216*** (0.051)	0.563*** (0.058)	-0.135*** (0.049)	-0.417*** (0.053)
EW_after	-0.158*** (0.047)		-0.083* (0.048)	
EW_after_region	0.177*** (0.050)		0.091* (0.049)	
Constant	-9.830 (0.000)	-11.846 (0.000)	-9.765 (0.000)	-6.711*** (1.035)
Observations	65,601	65,601	65,601	65,601

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations include all the variables from the main specification as well as dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table H3: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
rural	-0.072 (0.236)	0.031 (0.057)	-0.265*** (0.073)	0.161 (0.206)
Pilot_reg_rural	1.509** (0.602)	-0.105 (0.170)	-0.088 (0.218)	1.702*** (0.493)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	-0.448 (0.364)	-0.340*** (0.106)	0.029 (0.127)	-0.137 (0.305)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	0.039 (0.288)	0.642*** (0.086)	-0.220** (0.094)	-0.383 (0.243)
Pilot_reg_urban	1.659*** (0.548)	-0.073 (0.161)	-0.097 (0.205)	1.829*** (0.441)
WWOC_aft_urban	-0.347 (0.317)	-0.270*** (0.097)	-0.049 (0.114)	-0.028 (0.262)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	0.098 (0.241)	0.650*** (0.075)	-0.203** (0.083)	-0.349* (0.199)
Constant	-3.947*** (0.762)	-0.547** (0.251)	1.132*** (0.280)	-4.532*** (0.616)
Observations	61,463	61,463	61,463	61,463
R-squared	0.118	0.038	0.030	0.138

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Table H4: OLS Estimates of the Number of Weeks Working While on Claim
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) All Types	(2) Full Benefits	(3) Partial Benefits	(4) No Benefits
rural	-0.094 (0.302)	0.038 (0.094)	-0.074 (0.146)	-0.058 (0.208)
Pilot_reg_rural	-0.335 (0.951)	-0.046 (0.233)	-0.477 (0.506)	0.188 (0.609)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	0.287 (0.584)	0.097 (0.223)	0.003 (0.288)	0.187 (0.387)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	-0.851** (0.410)	0.685*** (0.142)	-0.446** (0.203)	-1.090*** (0.276)
Pilot_reg_urban	-0.572 (0.878)	-0.151 (0.199)	-0.436 (0.480)	0.015 (0.558)
WWOC_aft_urban	0.640 (0.515)	0.260 (0.196)	0.037 (0.252)	0.342 (0.340)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	0.305 (0.351)	0.862*** (0.116)	0.189 (0.174)	-0.746*** (0.238)
Constant	-4.579*** (1.195)	-2.051*** (0.399)	0.070 (0.620)	-2.598*** (0.778)
Observations	42,154	42,154	42,154	42,154
R-squared	0.153	0.054	0.064	0.142

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table H5: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Men
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
rural	-0.303 (0.333)	-0.233** (0.096)	-133.505 (97.329)
Pilot_reg_rural	3.653*** (0.904)	-0.193 (0.287)	706.651*** (252.232)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	-0.598 (0.521)	-0.311* (0.172)	-91.127 (156.082)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	-0.404 (0.386)	0.422*** (0.133)	-15.842 (115.267)
Pilot_reg_urban	3.514*** (0.829)	-0.170 (0.271)	608.439*** (232.776)
WWOC_aft_urban	-0.444 (0.457)	-0.319** (0.156)	-152.655 (137.394)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	-1.106*** (0.311)	0.447*** (0.117)	-339.178*** (92.319)
Constant	-0.515 (1.203)	0.585 (0.390)	-8,335.369*** (334.478)
Observations	61,458	61,463	61,463
R-squared	0.205	0.040	0.227

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table H6: OLS Estimates for Weeks on Claim and Benefits Paid
ROE-SV Administrative Claims for Women
No NERE Participants
1997-2008

VARIABLES	(1) Total Wks on Claim	(2) Wks with Benefits	(3) Total Ben. Paid
rural	0.223 (0.381)	-0.036 (0.179)	190.782* (98.997)
Pilot_reg_rural	0.369 (1.158)	-0.523 (0.581)	-10.559 (291.344)
WWOC_aft_ruralal	-1.215* (0.656)	0.100 (0.374)	-415.273** (176.293)
WWOC_aft_reg_rural	0.145 (0.471)	0.239 (0.258)	275.980** (128.265)
Pilot_reg_urban	-0.059 (1.079)	-0.587 (0.541)	30.888 (271.003)
WWOC_aft_urban	-0.187 (0.571)	0.298 (0.330)	-234.296 (154.627)
WWOC_aft_reg_urban	-0.583 (0.374)	1.051*** (0.217)	-173.907* (100.285)
Constant	1.798 (1.470)	-1.981*** (0.765)	-2,016.027*** (366.101)
Observations	42,153	42,154	42,154
R-squared	0.324	0.086	0.342

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Estimations also include dummy indicators for insured hours, months and for EI regions.