@inproceedings{21,
  author = {Carlos Moreno and Sebastian Fischmeister},
  title = {Sender Authentication for Automotive In-Vehicle Networks through Dual Analog Measurements to Determine the Location of the Transmitter},
  abstract = {<p>Controller Area Network (CAN) is a fundamentally insecure communications bus. Its intrinsic lack of sender<br />
authentication makes impersonation attacks a severe threat to the security of systems that rely on CAN for<br />
communication between devices. In this paper, we propose a novel technique to enforce sender authenticity<br />
on a CAN bus. The technique is reliable, robust, and reasonably easy and inexpensive to implement, as it relies<br />
on non-clonable physical characteristics of the transmitted signals. In particular, we measure the analog signal<br />
at two different locations on the CAN bus physical wire; the signal corresponding to the transmitted message<br />
travels through the wire at a certain speed, which allows us to determine the physical location (i.e., position<br />
along the wire) of the transmitter as a function of the relative delay between the two analog measurements.<br />
Our work includes an experimental evaluation on an actual vehicle, with results that suggest that the technique<br />
is effective and practical.</p>
},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {5th International Conference on  Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP)},
  address = {Prague, Czech Republic},
}