CHAPTER 2

USING THE CONCEPT OF DISTANCE TO BROADEN THE HORIZONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

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ABSTRACT

In the present chapter, we draw on the construal-level theory of psychological distance (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) to highlight new avenues in the study of organizational justice. The chapter comprises three main parts. First, we review the central tenets of CLT and associated research. In the second part, we summarize our own and others’ recent justice research, which has already begun to draw on CLT findings. Finally, in the main part of the chapter, we draw on Parts I and II to derive a number of novel propositions concerning justice-related phenomena. In particular, we consider implications that the concept of psychological distance has for justice research from three perspectives: recipients (victims) of injustice, third-party observers of injustice, and agents who enact justice. Our overarching goal in the chapter is to broaden the horizons of organizational justice phenomena by incorporating the concept of psychological distance.

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PART I: CENTRAL TENETS OF CONSTRUAL-LEVEL THEORY

According to construal-level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010), people’s mental representations of events (activities, other people) differ as a function of the psychological distance between the event and the self. Psychological distance refers to the subjective experience that an event or target is close to, or far from, the self. There are four psychological distance dimensions: (a) spatial: the physical distance between the event and oneself; (b) temporal: how much time separates the event from oneself; (c) social: the similarity or dissimilarity between a target and oneself; and (d) hypothetical: how likely the event is to occur or how close is it to the perceiver’s reality (Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007). Each of the four psychological distance dimensions represents a distinct way in which an event or target can be removed from the self (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2010). People traverse these dimensions by using similar mental construal processes, as all are anchored at the same point of the self, which is here and now. As a result, the distance dimensions are held to be associated automatically, such that distance of an event on one dimension influences perceived distance on another dimension.

Psychological distance is associated with how abstractly an event is construed or mentally represented. Individuals represent psychologically distant events with high-level construals and psychologically near events with low-level construals (Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009). As summarized in Table 2.1, high-level construals are abstract, schematic, and decontextualized representations. They include superordinate features of the event and omit incidental and peripheral details. Further, they are associated with broad and global processing (see Liberman & Forster, 2009) in which people attend to information as a gestalt (e.g., Mok & Morris, 2012). When processing globally, people extract the gist or the primary facets of information about an event, which provides deeper meaning (Smith & Trope, 2006). Global processing increases interpersonal sensitivity (e.g., Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009), which is defined as correctly assessing other people with regard to their personalities, emotions, thoughts, or intentions (Hall & Bernieri, 2001).

In contrast, low-level construals are concrete, unstructured, contextualized representations that include subordinate and incidental features of a stimulus. They involve narrow and individuating processing, where people think on the surface and focus on concrete details (e.g., Darwen, Fujita, & Wakslar, 2010). To illustrate high-level and low-level construals, Trope, Liberman, and Waksler (2007) give an example of two children who are playing catch in a backyard. They state that “a low-level construal of this activity might include such details as the age of the children, the color of the balls, and the temperature outside. In contrast, a high-level construal of this activity might simply be having fun” (p. 84).

It is important to note that Trope and colleagues (e.g., Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, & Liberman, 2008) have argued for the independence of the distinction between high-level and low-level construals in construal-level theory, and the distinction between automatic/effortless versus controlled/effortful cognitive processing made in many dual-processing models (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006, for a review of automaticity). Thus, automatic and controlled processing can occur at both levels of mental representation. Construal level refers to whether a person mentally represents an event/target abstractly or concretely and whether he/she engages in global or local processing.

The effects of psychological distance on construal level have been demonstrated in many studies, across all four dimensions of psychological distance (for a review, see Trope & Liberman, 2003). For example, Liberman and Trope (1998) showed that people used more high-level, “why” restatements (e.g., “maintaining a place to live”) than low-level “how” restatements (e.g., “writing a check”) when target activities (e.g., “paying the rent”) were described to occur in the distant future rather than in the near future. Similarly, Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, and Liberman (2006) found that when participants imagined engaging in behaviors at a spatially distant vs. near location, they identified behaviors (e.g., “locking a door”) in terms of their superordinate end (e.g., “securing the house”) states rather than the subordinate means (“putting a key in the lock”) by which the action is performed.

In more recent research, Magee, Miliiken, and Lurie (2010) found that position power (which induces social distance) was positively related to the use of language that was more abstract (vs. concrete) and positive (vs. negative) in their verbatim reactions to the events of September 11, 2001, at New York’s World Trade Center. Of note, the positive valence observed in distant conditions corroborates CLT’s prediction that details of an event are less accessible as distance increases. Thus, when events are negative, a high-level construal, which abstracts up from the relevant details, should be

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.1 Mental Representation of an Event as a Function of Construal Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-Level Construal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstructured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextualized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate (means to end) features</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incidental features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local processing (focus on detail and thinking on the surface)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger valence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the Concept of Distance to Broaden the Horizons • 39
less negative. Similarly, when events are very positive, a high-level construal should be less positive, again because details are less accessible (Magee et al., 2010).

Other research demonstrates that shifts in mental representations have an effect on judgment and behavior. For example, Trope and Liberman (2003) reasoned that desirability judgments involve the value of the action’s end state (a high-level construal feature), whereas feasibility issues involve the means used to reach the end state (a low-level construal feature). As predicted, the researchers found that desirability concerns received greater weight over feasibility concerns in psychologically distant versus near conditions. For example, as temporal distance from an activity (e.g., attending a guest lecture) increased, the attractiveness of that activity to participants was determined more by its desirability (e.g., how interesting the lecture was) and less by its feasibility (e.g., how convenient the timing of the lecture was).

In a similar vein, Eyal, Liberman, Trope, and Walther (2004) found that, as temporal distance increased, participants generated more “pros” or reasons for taking an action and fewer “cons” or reasons against the action. This is because pros are superior to cons when deciding to undertake an action—People only consider the reasons not to take (cons) an action if there are sufficient reasons to take the action (pros). Given this, pros should be more salient in psychologically distant conditions, whereas cons will be more salient in psychologically near conditions (Trope & Liberman, 2003).

Finally, Eyal and Liberman (2010) suggested that because of their general and decontextualized nature, moral values and principles are high-level constructs and are more likely to be activated when a person considers remote versus proximal events. Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) found that actions in temporally and socially distant (vs. near) situations were judged as more offensive if they violated moral principles and as more virtuous if they followed them. Taken together with the other findings just described, construal-level theory is well supported in the literature.

PART II: INITIAL INTEGRATION OF CONSTRUAL-LEVEL THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

Over the last several decades, researchers have examined organizational justice from a number of perspectives. Justice-related questions have been explored from the perspective of the recipient (victim) of injustice, from the perspective of those who observe injustice but who are not directly affected by the event (third parties), and from the perspective of organizational agents who must uphold justice. We propose that construal-level theory has implications for the study of organizational justice from each of these perspectives.

Drawing on CLT, we begin with the premise that increasing psychological distance between an unfair event and the self will lead to a more abstract, high-level construal of the event. This should then elicit a number of thought processes, which could in turn lessen negative reactions by recipients and third-party observers of injustice, as well as promote the enactment of justice by organizational authorities. Although we highlight a few of the changes in thought processes that may be involved at higher levels of construal, our analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. We also begin with the broad assumption that psychological distance will affect victim and observer reactions to all types of justice violations similarly, whether they be distributive, procedural, or interactional in nature. This is because any event, regardless of the type of injustice involved, can be construed at a low level (i.e., more concretely in terms of specific details) or at a high level (i.e., more abstractly or globally). Insofar as organizational agents have greater control over the enactment of interactional justice as compared to procedural and distributive justice (which may be determined by organizational policies), psychological distance may promote the enactment of interactional justice by organizational agents to a greater degree than it promotes procedural and distributive justice. However, to the extent that agents are free to enact procedural and distributive justice, our assumptions concerning the role of psychological distance on the enactment of interactional justice generalize to these dimensions as well. In Part III, we elaborate on the logic for these basic ideas and develop nine specific research propositions for the study of organizational justice. Before this, however, in the remainder of this section, we review recent research that has begun to examine some of the implications of the construal-level theory of psychological distance for the study of organizational justice.

In one set of studies, Covhurencio, Patient, and Bashour (2011) investigated the influence of temporal distance on how people think about unfairness from the perspective of construal-level theory. The researchers examined whether distributive versus interactional elements of fairness are differentially salient as a function of the temporal perspective that people use to bring an unjust event to mind. Covhurencio et al. (2011) argued that in temporally distant conditions (e.g., when asked to think about an event in the distant future), people should construe the employment relationship at a high level. They argued that information about outcome allocations is a prototypical aspect of the employment relationship, and therefore distributive injustice should be particularly salient to employees when they think about a temporally distant unjust event. In contrast, in temporally near conditions (e.g., when asked to think about
an event in the near future), the employment relation should be construed at a low level. They argued that information about interpersonal treatment is less definitional and a more contextually specific aspect of the employment relationship, therefore the interactional injustice should be particularly salient when thinking about a temporally near unjust event. The results of three studies confirmed these predictions.

In a second set of studies, these researchers (Cocjuharenco, Patient, & Bashur, 2013) argued that the elements of justice that are salient to people will also depend on whether they are thinking about fair rather than unfair events, due to systematic differences in how fair and unfair events are construed. The researchers drew on prior research by Labroo and Patrick (2009), demonstrating that positive emotions induce high-level, abstract construals of events, whereas negative emotions trigger low-level construals and attention to concrete detail. Cocjuharenco and Patient (2013) argued that fair treatment is generally expected and likely to be associated with positive emotions, whereas unfair treatment is unexpected and negatively valenced. Thus, building on Cocjuharenco et al.’s (2011) findings, they assumed that when people recall fair events, the events should be construed at a high level. Therefore, their memories of fair events should contain more distributive elements and fewer interactional elements. They suggested that the reverse should be true when people recall unfair events—unfair events, being negative, should be construed at a low level. As such, people’s memories of unfair events should contain more interactional elements of fairness and fewer distributive elements. Again, their results supported their predictions. Although this research did not manipulate psychological distance, the results are nevertheless relevant. They suggest that different elements of justice are salient when people think about unfair rather than fair events, due to relatively lower level construal of unfair events and higher level construal of fair events.

Cocjuharenco and colleagues’ (2011, 2013) research has focused on the elements of justice that people spontaneously bring to mind as a function of temporal distance and construal level. In our recent research, we have taken a different tack by examining whether psychological distance changes people’s proximal reactions to unfair events. More specifically, we have examined the effect of psychological distance on victim forgiveness of interpersonal wrongs and on perpetrator repentance (offering an apology) for interpersonal wrongs (Rizvi & Bobocel, 2012). Drawing on CLT findings, we have reasoned that psychological distance should enhance both forgiveness (by victims) and repentance (by offenders). As events become subjectively removed from the self, people should construe the event at a higher and more abstract level. When the event is construed at a higher level, specific details of the offense should be less accessible, and both the perpetrator and the victim should be engaged in global processing. For victims, this may involve generating alternative interpretations of the transgressor’s actions, making salient the pros (vs. cons) of forgiveness. For perpetrators, it may involve considering the victim’s perspective, making salient the pros (vs. cons) of repentance.

In contrast to a distant transgression, when the transgression is subjectively close to the self, people should construe the event at a lower and more concrete level. In turn, for victims, details of the transgression should be salient, as well as the injury to themselves and negative emotions such as anger. Similarly, perpetrators should be focused on the details and on rationalizing their specific actions. Thus, all else being equal, we reasoned that both forgiveness and repentance should be hindered for psychologically near events relative to far events, and this effect should be due to a more concrete mental representation of the transgression when the event is psychologically near.

**Victim-Perspective Study**

In one study, we examined these ideas from the victim perspective. We manipulated psychological distance (far vs. near) and expected a main effect such that a victim would be more likely to forgive in the far versus near condition. As noted above, construal-level theory predicts that psychological distance leads to a more abstract (high-level construal) mental representation of the event, whereas near events are represented concretely (low-level construal). Thus, following prior CLT research, we crossed our manipulation of psychological distance with a manipulation of abstract versus concrete mindset to examine directly whether the effect of distance on forgiveness is due to construal level. We hypothesized that the effect of psychological distance on forgiveness will be evident within the abstract mindset conditions, but eliminated within the concrete mindset conditions (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).

We used a standard procedure from the prior literature to manipulate mindset (abstract or concrete). In brief, participants in the abstract mindset condition complete structured exercises requiring them to think of reasons why they would pursue a goal, such as improving their health, whereas for those in the concrete condition, the exercises required thinking of how they would pursue the same goal (see Fietas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004). Participants then read a vignette where an acquaintance transgressed against them (a classmate plagiarized their work for which the victim was reprimanded; from Berry, Worthington, Parrott, O’Connor, & Wade, 2001). The event was said to have occurred either one month ago (psychologically near) or 2 years ago (psychologically far). Participants then indicated their intentions to forgive. As expected, forgiveness was greater in the psychologically
distant condition relative to the psychologically near condition; however, the simple effect of distance was significant only in the abstract mindset conditions. In contrast, the effect of psychological distance on forgiveness was eliminated within the concrete mindset conditions. These data support the idea that psychological distance increased victim forgiveness via abstract reasoning.

Perpetrator-Perspective Study

As in the victim study, participants first completed a manipulation of mindset (abstract or concrete). Then they read a vignette in which they were asked to imagine that they had transgressed against a co-worker who was either geographically close to (psychologically near condition) or far from (psychologically distant condition) themselves. In this case, participants imagined that they had taken more credit than was due on a joint project at work. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate their intentions to apologize. As expected, participants were more likely to apologize in the psychologically distant conditions relative to the psychologically near conditions. But again, we observed the predicted interaction such that the simple effect of distance was significant in the abstract mindset condition but was eliminated in the concrete mindset condition.

Taken together, our studies (Rizvi & Bobocel, 2012) suggest that increasing psychological distance can facilitate both forgiveness and repentance via greater mental abstraction of the event. In Part III, we draw on Parts I and II to develop a set of novel propositions pertaining to organizational justice phenomena.

PART III: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL-JUSTICE RESEARCH

Our goal in Part III is to draw on the preceding sections to delineate ways in which considerations of psychological distance may extend the current justice literature on questions pertaining to how employees respond to injustice, how third-party observers react toward the perpetrators of injustice, and how organizational agents enact justice in the workplace. Again, our coverage is not exhaustive; rather, we hope to stimulate new ideas by elaborating a few possibilities. Also, whereas unquestionably there are moderators of the effects we suggest, we do not focus on these in this chapter.

A Extending Research on Recipient Reactions to Unfair Events

A.1 Constructive Versus Destructive Responses

Ample research has demonstrated that employees react destructively to perceived injustice (e.g., negative attitudes, deviance, and retaliation; for a review, see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Such reactions have been shown to impact negatively employees' working relationships with others and ultimately the effectiveness of organizations. Accordingly, researchers have become interested in factors that lead employees to respond to unjust events in ways that are interpersonally constructive. Our research described earlier suggests that people may respond more constructively toward perpetrators when they are psychologically distant from the event rather than near. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine whether our initial results generalize to workplace settings.

To illustrate our ideas, consider this example. Imagine that you work for a multinational organization. The headquarters is located either in the same city as your office (psychologically near) or in a different city from your office (psychologically distant). You learn that a co-worker took credit for your work at a meeting at headquarters. Relative to the near condition, when the transgression is psychologically distant (headquarters is in a different city), the event will be construed at a higher and more abstract level. As such, you may be more likely to consider multiple reasons for why the co-worker did what he/she did, details and negativity of the offense should be less accessible, and you may be less focused on blaming the co-worker. Accordingly, you should respond less destructively and more constructively. In contrast, when the transgression is subjectively close to the self (headquarters is in the same city), you will construe the event at a lower and more concrete level. As such, you will be more likely to focus on the details of the transgression and the injury, and negative emotions should be salient. All of this should lead to you react more destructively and less constructively.

Proposition 1: Employees will react less destructively (e.g., be less punitive) and more constructively (e.g., be more forgiving) to an unjust event when the event occurs in psychologically distant vs. near conditions.

As previously stated, Cougharenco et al. (2011) found that distributive justice was more salient when the employment relationship was construed at a high level (psychologically distant), whereas interactional justice was more salient when the employment was construed at a low level (psychologically near). Given their findings, one might wonder whether Proposition 1 will hold true only when the unjust event is a violation of distributive justice and indeed whether the reverse might hold for interactional injustice.
(i.e., that employees will react more destructively and less constructively to an interpersonal injustice in psychologically near rather than far conditions). Although these competing ideas require empirical examination, we suggest that Proposition 1 will hold regardless of the type of justice violation (distributive, procedural, or interactional). This is because Proposition 1 pertains to employees’ proximal reactions to unjust events, whereas Cojuharenco et al.’s (2011) findings pertain to the types of justice that people bring to mind when recalling injustice in temporally distant rather than near conditions. As noted earlier, we started with the assumption that all types of injustice can be construed both broadly and in a more detailed way.

As mentioned in Part II, and drawing on our research findings to date, we suggest that increasing psychological distance affects victim reactions via greater mental abstraction of an event and a higher level of construal. And, as above, we offer possible thought processes that may mediate the effects of distance manipulations on the dependent variables. However, other thought processes are of course possible. For example, in the situation described above, victims may respond less negatively toward perpetrators when physically distant rather than near because the victims perceive that they will have less opportunity to confront transgressors in the distant condition relative to the near condition. Or the victims may respond less negatively in the distant condition because they assume that they and the transgressor communicated less when in physically distant conditions. Thus, as both of these examples illustrate, participants may rationalize the unjust event in distant versus near conditions. These are alternative thought processes that may come into play as an event is construed at a higher level; it is indeed likely that the specific thought processes induced by a higher level of construal will differ depending on the dimension used to induce psychological distance (e.g., physical space vs. social distance).

What is of key interest is that such higher-order cognitive rationalizations occur in the psychologically distant (but not near) conditions. Thus, whereas in the present chapter we outline some possible changes in people’s thought processes as a function of psychological distance, research will need to delve into understanding the precise nature of these mental changes that occur as events are construed at a higher versus a lower level. Also it is important to note that we recognize that some victim behaviors are actually more possible when they and the transgressor are in physically near rather than distant locations, regardless of the level of psychological construal. For example, victims may actually be unable to confront a transgressor when they are in remote rather than near locations. Such effects are not of interest in this chapter, and research to examine the ideas presented here would need to use dependent variables not open to such alternative explanations.

A.2 Integrating the Event Justice and Social-Entity Justice Paradigms

Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) distinguished between two paradigms in the study of organizational justice regarding the objects of employees’ fairness assessments. In the event paradigm, employees focus on the fairness of a specific event, whereas in the social entity paradigm, employees focus on perceptions of the fairness of a social entity, such as the supervisor or the organization as a whole. Entity justice is exemplified in the concept of overall justice (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009).

Overall justice is a global or holistic assessment of the fairness of a social entity, which extracts information from procedural, distributive, and interactional elements (e.g., Lind, 2001). According to fairness-heuristic theory (e.g., Lind, 2001), people use perceptions of overall justice as a decision heuristic to decide how to behave in social situations, for example, cooperatively or in a self-interested manner. Indeed, overall fairness has been demonstrated to be a more proximal driver of people’s responses to justice than are the specific facets of justice evaluation (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Jones & Martens, 2009).

Recently, research in organizational justice has made attempts to integrate the event and entity approaches (e.g., Bobocel, 2013; Choi, 2008). We believe this line of research can be advanced by examining the effects of psychological distance. Specifically, given its global and broadly applicable nature, we propose that overall justice is a high-level construct. In contrast, relative to overall justice, event-justice perceptions are lower-level constructs as they focus on concrete information related to outcome distributions, elements of the decision-making process, interpersonal treatment, and communication style (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Thus, we predict that, compared to event details, overall justice perceptions will be a more influential predictor of reactions to an unjust event when the event is psychologically distant (vs. near). This is because, in psychologically distant conditions, other higher-order mental representations should come into play in terms of driving employees’ reactions to an event. One such high-order mental representation is employees’ beliefs about how fair the organization is as a whole (overall justice).

All in all then, the greater the distance between the self and the event, the more overall justice should guide reactions to the event in question such that employees who perceive the organization as generally fair will react less negatively to the event, regardless of event details. Note that although Cojuharenco et al. (2011) argue that event-distributive injustice is salient at a high level of construal, we suggest that overall (entity) justice perceptions will be even more accessible because they constitute holistic or gestalt judgment. In contrast, in psychologically near conditions, people should rely more on their event-justice perceptions due to the accessibility of concrete event details.
Proposition 2: In psychologically distant conditions, overall justice perceptions will be a stronger predictor of reactions to an event compared to event-justice perceptions; in psychologically near conditions, event-justice perceptions will be a stronger predictor than overall justice perceptions.

To illustrate, let us return to the earlier example of the multinational organization. Again, imagine that your headquarters is either located in the same city as your office (near) or in a different city (distant). The headquarters is implementing a companywide pay cut. In the near condition, the event will be construed at a lower level, and your reactions will be predicted by the distributive, procedural, or interactional fairness of the event. In the distant condition, the event will be construed at a high level, where higher-order mental representations, such as overall justice perceptions, should come into play. Accordingly, in the distant condition, your reactions will be shaped by overall justice perceptions (higher-level summary judgment), such that when you perceive the organization as generally fair, you will react less negatively to the event, regardless of the event details; similarly, when you perceive the organization as generally unfair, you will react more negatively regardless of the event details.

In other recent research on overall justice, Rodell and Colquitt (2009) found that employees’ global sense of their supervisor’s fairness (overall justice of supervisor) predicted anticipatory justice, which is defined as the expectations of whether one will or will not experience justice in some future event (Shapiro & Kirkman, 1999). Because overall justice is a global, high-level construct in which details are less accessible, anticipatory justice should also be a high-level construct. Thus, we predict that within psychologically distant conditions employees will be influenced by their anticipatory-justice perceptions more than by their event-justice perceptions, whereas the reverse should be true within psychologically near conditions.

Imagine that your organization is to implement a smoking ban (e.g., Rodell & Colquitt, 2009) either today (psychologically near) or 2 years from now (psychologically distant). When the smoking ban is implemented today, your reactions to it will be shaped by your event-justice perceptions. In contrast, when the implementation of the ban is to take place 2 years from today, your anticipated-justice perceptions will predict your reactions to it.

Proposition 3: Anticipatory-justice perceptions will be a stronger predictor of employee reactions toward an event in psychologically distant conditions; event-justice perceptions will be a stronger predictor of employee reactions toward an event in psychologically near conditions.

Propositions 2 and 3 highlight the importance for managers to enact fairness on a regular basis rather than only at the time that a questionable event is occurring. Such fair behaviors will lead employees to form an impression of the organization (and manager) as just overall, which in turn will lead to anticipatory-justice perceptions. Given our predictions that overall justice perceptions and anticipatory-justice perceptions are more salient in psychologically distant rather than near conditions, employees’ reactions to psychologically distant events will therefore be determined by managers’ past everyday behaviors.

B Observer Perspective: Third-Party Judgments of the Perpetrators of Injustice

B.1 Observer Deontic Reactions

In addition to affecting those who are its direct victims, workplace injustice also influences the reactions of third parties, that is, people who observe an exchange but are not directly involved in it (e.g., co-workers, customers, the public; for reviews, see Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Increasingly, research demonstrates that how third parties consider and respond to injustices that they observe has significant theoretical and practical implications.

The deontic model of justice (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003, 2005; Folger, 2001) states that people often experience a sense of moral unease when they see others being treated unfairly. They feel strong negative emotions (Lerner & Goldberg, 1999), which in turn prompt them to seek retribution toward perpetrators (Rupp & Bell, 2010). This deontic response is automatic and is expected to be observed even in third parties who are not connected to or who do not identify with the victim or the perpetrator and who are not personally injured by the event (Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010). In relation to the argument that we are developing, we suggest that the automatic tendency of third parties to punish transgressors who violate normative standards of appropriate conduct may be more pronounced in psychologically near versus distant conditions.

Consider the transgression described by Skarlicki and Rupp (2010). You read about a situation where your co-worker, whose name is Marc, learned that someone other than himself was selected to lead an important project. Marc felt he deserved the promotion, and he met with the senior manager to discuss the situation. The supervisor told Marc rather harshly that he could only meet with him for a few minutes, and was rude and discourteous with Marc. Further, the supervisor did not provide information regarding how the decision was made or any rationale for the decision. (p. 947)
Imagine further that this incident occurred either two years ago (psychologically distant) or one month ago (psychologically near). According to CLT, you will construe the event at a low level in the psychologically near condition. As a consequence, you should focus on the details and negativity of the transgression, and your deontic emotions (e.g., anger, contempt) should guide your reactions toward Marc’s supervisor. In contrast, in the psychologically distant condition, you will construe the event at a high level, where details are less accessible, the event is more positively valenced, and deontic emotions are less salient. Accordingly, CLT would predict that you would be more punitive toward Marc’s supervisor in the psychologically near condition compared to the distant condition.

**Proposition 4:** Observers will have stronger deontic responses (more anger, punitive/retributive responses toward perpetrator) to an unjust event when the event occurs in psychologically near vs. distant conditions.

As mentioned earlier, Eyal and Liberman (2010) suggested that because moral principles are general and decontextualized, they can be considered high-level constructs and therefore should be activated to a greater extent when a person considers remote versus proximal events. At first glance, the Eyal and Liberman (2010) findings appear to be at odds with Proposition 4, which predicts that observers will experience a deontic response to near versus distant events. However, as noted earlier, the deontic response is proposed to be the result of the experience of moral unease, which is largely a function of the automatic negative emotions that are elicited when witnessing injustice. Such reactions should be salient when an event is construed at a low level. Indeed, it is possible that, for distal transgressions, moral reasoning or moral principles may guide observers to conclude that the most moral decision is to forgo punishing the perpetrator. This is consistent with work by Rupp and Bell (2010), which demonstrated that the motive to punish a perpetrator is attenuated among observers who endorse the principle “first do no harm.”

**B.2 Differences in Observer and Victim Reactions**

Despite the prediction and related findings stemming from deonance theory that third-party observers often react punitively toward transgressors (e.g., Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010), other research has demonstrated that observers can sometimes respond to injustice less intensely relative to victims. Some have argued that this is because observers are not motivated by self-interest, a factor that contributes to more intense reactions among victims (e.g., Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). Construal-level theory may shed new light on these findings.

Considered from the standpoint of CLT, observers of a transgression are inherently more psychologically distant from the event relative to recipients. Thus, compared to victims, observers should be expected to construe the unjust event more abstractly and to focus less on details of the event. Consistent with this idea, Libby and Eibach (2004) found that when individuals take a third-person perspective (which aligns with the observer perspective), as opposed to a first-person perspective, they construe their actions at a more abstract level. Thus, CLT offers the literature a new cognitive mechanism that can explain observer-victim differences in reactions to injustice.

**Proposition 5:** Relative to victims, observers will construe an unjust event more abstractly.

Interestingly, the propositions in this section (4 and 5) imply that the difference in reactions between observers and victims to unjust events may be reduced via psychological distance, such that victims will react more similarly to observers (i.e., move beyond details, hold a less negatively valenced, more high-level representation) in psychologically distant conditions. In contrast, observers will react more similarly to victims (i.e., focus on details, negative emotions) in psychologically near conditions. Of course, it may well not be possible to eliminate entirely the difference between victims and observers given that victims are victimized and observers are not.

**Proposition 6:** Differences in punitive reactions between observers and victims of an unjust event should be reduced by manipulating psychological distance.

An important practical implication of this section for victims of injustice in the workplace is that adopting a third-person perspective should help parties cope more constructively. Looking at the self from an outsider’s perspective will enable victims to move away from their concrete construal, where details are emphasized and actions are defined in isolation (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), to a more abstract one.

**C Agent Perspective: The Enactment of Justice**

**C.1 Offering Explanations or Apology**

In the last 15 years, organizational-justice researchers have begun to examine factors that influence how organizational agents (supervisors, managers) enact justice (e.g., Chapter 7 by Jouilard & Steiner, in this volume). Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding factors that influence the enactment of interactional fairness; that is, being interpersonally...
sensitive and adequately explaining decisions that are subjectively or objectively unfair (e.g., Molinsky & Margolis, 2005; Patienti & Skarlicki, 2010). In this section, we outline several possible implications of the concept of psychological distance for the study of agent enactment of interactional justice. Our study from the perpetrator perspective described earlier suggests that greater psychological distance may facilitate apology-granting by the offender when the victim is a co-worker. In this section, we suggest that greater psychological distance may play a similar role when considering the enactment of interactional justice by higher-ranking authorities.

Folger and Skarlicki (2001; see also Folger & Skarlicki, 1998) argued that organizational agents are often perceived as interactionally unfair when explaining undesirable or unfair decisions to employees. They and other researchers have argued that delivering negative news can be psychologically threatening for the agent; for example, it can threaten agents' feelings of positive self-regard (see Brockner, Wiesenfeld, & Diekmann, 2009). As a result, managers often engage in what Folger and Skarlicki (2001) labelled “managerial distancing” behaviors, which diminish the display of interactional fairness. For example, managers may fail to provide adequate explanations and may appear unsympathetic, in part because they are preoccupied with regulating their own negative emotions and psychological discomfort.

We suggest that the need for agents to engage in managerial distancing is more pronounced when the agent is psychologically near rather than distant to the recipient. Thus, increasing psychological distance between the agent and the recipient should reduce managerial distancing behaviors, which in turn should enable the display of interactional fairness. Interestingly, construal-level theorists have argued that power creates social distance (e.g., Smith & Trope, 2006). Thus, by virtue of their higher (power) position in the hierarchy, organizational agents are to some degree inherently socially distant from employees. Nevertheless, psychological distance can vary depending on the agent's level of power relative to the employee (e.g., immediate supervisor vs. CEO) or as a function of other dimensions of distance, such as physical space and time.

Increasing psychological distance should lead agents to construe the event to be explained at a high rather than low level. At higher levels of construal, agents should be thinking abstractly and engaging in global processing. As a result, they should consider the recipient's perspective and focus on superordinate ends of explaining (e.g., restoring recipient self-worth, maintaining the relationship), which should promote respectful treatment of the recipient. Moreover, the pros (vs. cons) and the desirability (vs. feasibility) of providing recipients with an explanation or apology should be salient. Therefore, distance should promote agents' use of explanations and apologies when they are implementing negative decisions.

**Proposition 7:** Decision-making agents will be more likely to explain decisions and to apologize to recipients when implementing negative decisions when the two parties are in psychologically distant (vs. near) conditions.

### C.2 Components of Explanations

Taking this a step further, we suggest that the content of explanations will be influenced by psychological distance. With greater distance, explanations should be more abstract (vs. concrete) and more positively valenced, and should contain central high-level features of the event to be explained, rather than peripheral lower-level details. Researchers have distinguished between excuses, ideological justifications, and referential justifications (e.g., Bies, 1987; Greenberg, 1990). Ideological and referential justifications require higher-order cognitive processes, in which agents reframe the event, or its consequences, by focusing on superordinate values and goals (ideological account), or by providing a more positive benchmark from which to assess the situation (referential account). In contrast to the higher-order justifications, the goal of an excuse is to shift personal responsibility for the negative event by referring to mitigating situational factors. Given their concrete nature, excuses may be more salient when the event is construed at a low level compared to a high level. Thus, relative to excuses, agents may use more ideological and referential justification when explaining distant versus near events. Moreover, as distance increases, explanations may be more “complex” (e.g., contain both ideological and referential components), which has been shown to increase their effectiveness (see Bobocel & Zdanik, 2005, for a review).

To be effective, explanations should be thorough and detailed (e.g., Greenberg, 1990). Thus, one might ask whether, given the abstraction process, explanations in distant conditions will meet this criterion. We believe this to be possible because, despite their abstract nature, explanations in psychologically distant conditions would contain central high-level features rather than low-level details of the event, and the focus would be on providing information regarding why the event occurred (i.e., superordinate ends). This is in contrast to psychologically near conditions where explanations would contain secondary and irrelevant details. In fact, the presence of peripheral details in explanations may exacerbate, rather than assuage, negative reactions of recipients, a possibility well worthy of exploration.

**Proposition 8:** Explanations will be more abstract and more positively valenced and will contain essential (rather than incidental) features in psychologically distant conditions rather than in psychologically near conditions. With greater psychological distance, ideological and referential justifications should also be offered to a greater extent than excuses.
C.3 Components of Apologies

Apologies also comprise a number of components (for reviews, see Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Schumann & Ross, 2010). Fehr and Gelfand (2010) highlight three of them: expressions of empathy, acknowledgment of violated rules/norms, and compensation. Similar to explanations, it is possible to conceptualize different components of an apology as more or less abstract. For example, according to Fehr and Gelfand, expressions of empathy are a reflection of relational concerns. Thus, the expression of empathy requires perspective-taking, which is evident when people are processing globally. Similarly, to acknowledge that rules/norms were violated, one must apply moral principles, which are salient when events are mentally represented at a high level. In contrast, compensation refers to the offer of tangible goods in exchange for harm. Given the focus on concrete details, and local processing, compensation might be more salient when an event is construed at a low level.

**Proposition 9**: Apologies will contain more abstract components such as expressing empathy and acknowledging the violation of rules compared to offers of compensation in psychologically distant conditions relative to near conditions.

To summarize this section, CLT research suggests that by increasing psychological distance between agents and recipients, it may somewhat paradoxically be possible to reduce actual distancing behaviors. One interesting implication then is that managers may be better communicators of negative news when they are physically distant from the recipient than when they are near. This prediction runs counter to media-richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984), which predicts that richer media, such as face-to-face communication, are more effective than leaner media, such as written memos. This is because face-to-face communication is presumed to help recipients better understand ambiguous or equivocal messages due to the presence of multiple cues (e.g., gestures, vocal inflection). Future research is necessary to examine the possibility that, whereas most recipients may prefer face-to-face communication as opposed to distal modes of communication, managers may actually provide better explanations for negative news when they are in remote locations compared to when they are near (face-to-face) because they feel less threatened in the former than in the latter conditions.

**SUMMARY**

Our goal in the present chapter was to broaden the horizons of organizational justice-research by incorporating the concept of psychological distance. To do so, we briefly reviewed the tenets of the construal-level theory of psychological distance, and we summarized recent studies that have begun to examine some of the possible implications for the study of justice. In the bulk of the chapter, we focused on highlighting several novel ways in which to expand justice research by incorporating construal-level theory and the concept of psychological distance. We suggested avenues for justice research from three perspectives: those of victims, of third-party observers, and of agents who enact justice. Altogether, we developed nine new propositions to advance research in organizational justice, suggesting the richness of this new perspective.

As noted earlier, our propositions are by no means exhaustive of the research possibilities, nor did we discuss possible mediating and moderating variables. For example, we proposed that recipients would be more forgiving of an injustice in the workplace as distance increases. However, this may depend on the quality of the relationship between the victim and the transgressor. In addition, it is quite likely that our propositions will not hold equally for all four distance dimensions (time, space, social similarity, and hypotheticality). As an illustration, Proposition 1 states that employees will respond more constructively (e.g., greater forgiveness) to an unjust event when the event is psychologically distant versus near. However, this might not be the case if we were to operationalize psychological distance using social distance. Indeed, there is prior research that demonstrates that social distance hinders, rather than fosters, benevolent behaviors, such as forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1998). Research will need to examine both similarities and differences in how the different distance dimensions operate in the context of justice phenomena.

As is true for any new theoretical perspective, our ideas require empirical examination, and certainly more conceptual work remains to be done. But that was, in fact, our aim in linking construal-level theory to the study of organizational justice. We believe that the present analysis holds the promise of expanding our understanding of the central role that justice plays in organizations and that it also has significant implications for managing fairness at work.

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