

Keeping Pace with Modernity: Fifty Years of Iranian Intellectual Encounter with Modernity

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I

Like any other cultural change, Iranians' intellectual encounter with modernity cannot be traced to a single event or cause as its starting point. However, a roughly fifty-year history can be ascribed to this encounter. Owing to the strong history of rationalism in Shi'ah Islam, Iranian scholars took the initiative to meet the challenges at the level they were posed by modernity. Seen from this angle, two phases are detectable in this encounter. In the first phase, beginning with the early 1950s, the encounter took place at the level of epistemology. In the second phase, which began in the early 1960s, it was extended far beyond the philosophical concerns and took on a hermeneutical character. Ever since then, epistemology and hermeneutics have been the main components of religious discourse in Iran. This paper explores the last fifty years of Shi'ite response in Iran to modernity. Before getting down to the main discussion, I wish to briefly elaborate upon two major determining factors in this response.

1. The substantial encounter between Iran and modernity started, as commonly understood, from the two Perso-Russian wars caused by the Russian invasion of Iran's northern border in the early nineteenth century. The wars ended in 1813 and 1828 with the victory of Russia. The aftermath for Iran was two humiliating peace treaties according to which Iran lost extensive parts of its territory, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ever since then, the relationship between Iran and the West has never been equal; it has rather been one in which one side, the West, has always sought domination over and exploitation of the other, Iran. Therefore, Iran first met the West as an expansionistic, colonialist, and imperialist power, through which it consequently encountered modernity. This has been exacerbated since the

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1930s when the West took on supporting an oppressive domestic dictatorship until the victory of the Islamic Revolution (1979). Only in the last decade have Iranians looked beyond the unpleasant face of the West directly into the face of modernity. This means that any study of the Iranian Shi'ite¹ response to modernity runs the risk of abstractness if it does not take into consideration the Iranian experience of the West since Russia's invasion.

2. Up until the mid-nineteenth century the clerical institution (*rouhaniyyat*) was much more than just a religious institution. It was the only cultural force responsible for education and thought-producing activities in Iran. The nineteenth-century encounter with imperialism, coupled with the severe feebleness of Qajar kings (shahs) in the face of this grave threat, added to the clerics' duties the leadership of anti-imperialist resistance in the country. The top clerics (*ulama*) became the national leaders who led people in their resistance against the political, economic, and cultural domination of the West. They even became the leading figures in defending the territorial integrity of the country against foreign military attacks.

Among the first impacts of contact with the West on Iran's intellectual and cultural texture was the emergence of a new type of thinker who became known as *roushanfikrs* (a term literally meaning "the enlightened"). These were people who had more direct contact with the West, often by traveling to a Western country. They usually knew at least one European language — French, English, Russian, or German. Therefore, the *roushanfikrs* were relatively familiar with Western culture and thought. The huge gap they saw between their country and Western countries in terms of science, technology, economy, effectiveness of governments, and so on left them with two tough questions: Why are we so backward? and How can we get out of this misery, to become a developed nation?

Roushanfikrs typically believed that the way to achieve progress was to imitate its prototype, the West. Accordingly, religion was regarded as an obstacle to modernizing Iran and should be eliminated. After all, from their perspective, this was the way the West had progressed. As to their personal confessions they included agnostics, deists, or materialists. In the early twentieth century some *roushanfikrs* emerged who kept their Islamic convictions but looked for a way to put together Islam and the achievements of modernity. Initially the *roushanfikrs* were not accepted by the clerics and

people, but after the subsequent modernization of the education system and the expansion of contacts with the West, this new intellectual force was strengthened. In view of the huge differences between this new force and its traditional counterpart, the cleric, the inception of debate between them was inevitable. Despite this, there have been some chapters in the recent history of Iran that have been written by their uneasy alliance. The Iranian response to modernity is shaped mostly by the debates, dialogues, and the moments of divergence and convergence between these two forces, *roushanfikrs* representing modernity and *rouhaniyyun* representing Islamic tradition.

II

The 1920s and 1930s mark events that brought the clerics into direct contact with the anti-Islamic manifestations of Western culture. These events followed the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79) in line with the desires and plans of Britain after a period of turmoil in Iran. This was the official end of the Qajar dynasty which, although dictatorial and severely impotent, was not dependent in its existence and subsistence to a foreign power as the Pahlavi dynasty was. Reza Shah (1878-1944), the first king of the dynasty, started modernizing Iran according to his poor understanding of modernity: in 1928 he passed a “dress law” which restricted the use of the clerical robe to a limited number of the clerics; in 1929 he banned the Muharram celebration; in 1936 he ordered women unveiled, and so forth. This left no doubt in the clerics’ mind that modernity meant secularization not just of politics but of all aspects of life. Thus the rouhanniyun were seeing first hand what their intellectual counterparts spoke of.

The first intellectual response to this phase of modernization was Ayatollah Khomeini’s *Kash-fal-Asrar* [The Unveiling of the Mysteries] (1944). The book responded to the anti-Islamic assertions of some roushanfikrs and severely criticized the then-existing trend of secularization in Iran. To this point, the philosophical foundations of modernity had not been addressed, mostly because the staunch proponents of modernity, the roushanfikrs, were not philosophically informed.

A full confrontation with modern philosophical thinking was stimulated by a Marxist party named Tudeh (the mass), but this did not start until the

early 1950s. Tudeh was established in 1941 when the Allies, including Russia, occupied Iran, forcing Reza Shah to abdicate his power, and placed Muhammad Reza, his son, on the throne. The party blatantly supported the interests of the Soviet Union, but its importance in the history of Iran lies elsewhere. Tudeh propagated various tenets of Marxism such as dialectical materialism, socialism, and historical materialism. Understandably, clerics were surprised by the explosion of a deeply anti-Islamic ideology boosted by the socialist slogans that were extremely alluring to the youth. Above all, most of the ideas were unfamiliar to the clerics at the time.

Almost a decade was spent in dogmatic defense, simply because no philosophical response was available. That this line of defense gave way in just one decade to a philosophical response can be accounted for by the presence of Shi'ah rationalism in Qom seminary at the time. This rationalism was equipped with, and informed by, scholastic Islamic philosophy, which was to be invoked in this battle. Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaei (1903-81), the most prominent master of Islamic philosophy at the time, and his distinguished student, Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (1920-79), took on the burdensome task of an intellectual confrontation with Marxism.

The scholastic Islamic philosophy as it stood, however, could be of little help. It was a highly scholarly discipline with a technical language restricted to a few professors and students in the seminaries. The battleground, however, was much larger than that, since the anti-Islamic publications of the Tudeh party and other roushanfikrs were circulated in many cities. They were read and understood by a large number of the educated youth. Thus an updated translation of Islamic philosophy was urgently needed. Despite the hardship this translation task involved, it was not the hardest one; another much more demanding task was yet to be undertaken. The latter task was concerned with the shortcomings of Islamic philosophy in epistemology, which was going to be methodologically the first and most crucial battle in this dispute.

III

A short introduction to scholastic Islamic philosophy is in order here. Islamic philosophy is a system of metaphysics which arose shortly after translations into Arabic of such Greek philosophers as Plato and Aristotle were made in

the ninth century. Greek philosophical ideas underwent a drastic change in the hands of Muslim philosophers inspired by the Qur'an and the hadith (tradition). This system had continued as one current of thought alongside theology, mysticism, and jurisprudence. At times scholastic Islamic philosophy struggled with them and occasionally allied with some of them. Scholastic Islamic philosophy is the product of immense changes made in the imported germinal Greek philosophy and the outcome of the different kinds of relationship it had with the other Islamic strands of thought. Of particular significance was its merger with theology in the thirteenth century by Khwajeh Nasir Tusi (1201-74) and its combination with Islamic mysticism in the seventeenth century by Sadr al-Din Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra (1572-1641). Mulla Sadra put an end to a long dispute between the two main philosophical trends that existed before him: peripatetic philosophy (*mashsha'i*) and illuminationism (*hikmat al-ishraq*). The embodiment of all these innovations was what he named "transcendent philosophy" (*al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah*), which has been prevailing ever since. Transcendent philosophy can be seen as a system of rational theology arranged in two main parts: "theology in the general sense" and "theology in the specific sense."

"Theology in the general sense" tackles "the properties of existence *qua* existence." It comprises such issues as "existence" and "quiddity" and how they are connected in the makeup of each individual being; causation and different types of cause and effect; change and motion; and so on. It also includes subsections in which human knowledge is mainly ontologically investigated. The output of "theology in the general sense" is to be utilized in "theology in specific sense," which investigates issues concerning God, such as proofs of the existence of God, the divine attributes, and the relation between God's nature and his attributes.

Unlike Islamic philosophy, the materialist philosophy disseminated by the Tudeh party was upheld by an already developed epistemology, allegedly based on modern science and grounded in empiricism, and a Marxist sociology of knowledge. Allamah Tabatabaei and Ayatollah Mutahhari were quick to understand that if they were to seriously challenge this philosophy they had to face it first at the level of epistemology. However, Islamic philosophy was mostly ontology. Thus, they had to pave the way from ontology to epistemology.

IV**Epistemological Development**

Allamah Tabatabaei and Ayatollah Mutahhari started to actualize the epistemological potential of the Islamic philosophy. This epistemology, which is still in the process of becoming, was expanded later on by the above-named sages and other philosophers like Ayatollah Mahdi Haeri Yazdi, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, and Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi 'Amoli. The very title of the five-volume book, *Usul-i Falsafeh wa Rawesh-i Realism* [The Principles of Philosophy and the Methodology of Realism] (1953-58), that marks the start of this era indicates this increasing epistemological preoccupation. Authored by Allamah Tabatabaei, this book was the first philosophical challenge to Marxism. It included Ayatollah Mutahhari's extensive commentaries, which not only capably fulfilled the translation task but also effectively expanded Allamah Tabatabaei's insights.

The first six essays in the collection of fourteen essays explored epistemological themes and bore such titles as What is Philosophy?, Realism and Idealism, and Knowledge and Perception. These essays refuted sensationalism and empiricism while building up a rationalist epistemology supportive of metaphysics. This epistemology, which embraced the methodological primacy of reason to faith, was in good company with modernity. However, beyond that the authors disagreed. The remaining essays were ontological in subject, belonging to theology in both the general sense and the specific sense. As time passed, epistemology increasingly received attention, but unlike in the West, ontology remained highly valued.

Understanding Shari'ah

While the epistemological reaction to modernity was still unfolding, another frontier in the encounter with modernity emerged in the 1960s. What was at stake here was not the doctrinal dimension of Islam but its social, practical motif. Islam as an utter and comprehensive submission to Allah draws no distinction between the sacred and the secular; that is, in Islam the sacred permeates the secular. It is against the background of this non-distinction principle that Shari'ah, the Islamic law, should be understood. Shari'ah is the body of codes prescribed by Allah to shape Muslims' life, both individually and socially, to conform to the divine will. Given the imperialistic tendency of

modernity, the non-distinction principle of Islam and its embodiment, Shari'ah, has been a source of tension between Islam and modernity all over the Islamic world. Iran has been no exception.

In early 60's, the rouhaniyyun (the traditionalists) came to realize that a merely negating attitude to Western approaches in such categories as politics, economy, and law was far from adequate to validate the superiority of Islam. To show this superiority they needed to spell out alternative Islamic approaches in these categories and demonstrate their capabilities. A shift in how clerics envisioned the political future of the country added to the urgency of this need. In the early sixties, the rouhaniyyun came to believe that there was no realistic hope of saving the Muslim country and Islam while the Shah was in power. They were now convinced that a regime change was inevitable. But they could not afford repeating the experience of the "Constitutional Revolution" by focusing exclusively on overthrowing the regime without developing an Islamic alternative. Therefore, they felt obligated to articulate Islamic views on politics, economy, the judiciary, and so on.

Traditionally, it was *fiqh* (jurisprudence) that dealt with understanding Shari'ah. Hence it was naturally expected that *fiqh* would take on the responsibility of developing the Islamic alternative. However, this was the first time that Shi'ah *Fiqh* faced this concern. Hitherto, Shi'ah *Fuqaha* (jurists) had not been involved in government; thus, understandably enough, they had not investigated the Shari'ah's social aspects. Accordingly, the *fiqh* worked out by them did not meet the new demand. It was imperative to reread the scriptures in view of the present circumstances in Iran and the modern world to find answers to new problems. This can be seen as the beginning of a hermeneutical phase in Iranian religious thought.

Hermeneutical Reason

Endemic to this phase was an over-riding hermeneutical question. The ever-changing nature of individual and social life poses to any concept of implementing Shari'ah the question of how, and with what mechanism, a system of eternal law can keep pace with ever-altering time. As a matter of fact, such a mechanism was already implanted in Shi'ism: *ijtihad*. *Ijtihad* is the delicate art of continuous reading of the scriptures to discover the religious obligation of people here and now so that neither the principles of Shari'ah nor the changing reality of human life are ignored. This concept presupposes

some sense or degree of changeability in Shari'ah; otherwise it would be impossible for Shari'ah to catch up with the flux of time. On the other hand, belief in the eternality of Islam presupposes stability. Many had no problem ascribing both stability and changeability to Shari'ah; however, the most demanding question of this hermeneutical phase was where to draw the line between what was stable/stationary and what was changeable.

Ijtihad, as defined, is unique to Shi'ism, as opposed to Sunnism, and has been practiced by Shi'ahs at least since the twelfth Shi'ah Imam went into the occultation. But, for the reason mentioned above, ijtihad had concerned itself primarily with the individual codes of Shari'ah. In the wake of the new changes, the rouhaniyyun set about applying ijtihad with its full capacity to such subjects as politics, economy, the judiciary, human rights, and the rights of women. Needless to say, the application of ijtihad to the areas more or less untouched by the previous fuqaha amounted to making innovations in ijtihad itself and its techniques. Ayatollah Muttahari and other clerics were quick to turn to the concept of 'aql (reason/intellect), to which ijtihad owed all its power.

Intrinsic to ijtihad is a concept of reason that could be called "hermeneutical reason." Ijtihad as defined above necessitates studious exertion on the part of a mujtahed (the scholar who exercises ijtihad) to comprehend divine legislative will in the current state of affairs. This capacity of going beyond words and comprehending their signification for us here and now, the capacity to read and reread the text in view of changing circumstances, is what I label as hermeneutical reason. Therefore, this "reason" is responsible for drawing the line between the stationary and variable/changeable, and for determining the contemporary application of Shari'ah. This concept of reason attracted attention from the heroes of the hermeneutical phase, particularly Ayatollah Mutahhari. Depending on this concept, the rouhaniyyun embarked on authoring books and articles on such topics as the Islamic economy, women's rights in Islam, human rights in Islam, and the like. One of the most influential books in this context was *Hukumat'i Islami* [Islamic Government] written by Ayatullah Khomeini in 1972. The book outlined the theory of Islamic government that would be realized eight years later as the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The hermeneutical aspect of Iranian religious discourse gained great momentum with an unprecedented turn to Islam by some prominent roushanfikrs in the 1960s. Until then, they had sought cures for their nation's

sufferings in Western schools of thought. Witnessing all the ramifications that Western involvement, particularly that of Britain and the U.S., had caused in the last forty years resulted in most roushanfikrs becoming deeply disillusioned with the West. They came to believe that any solution for Iran's chronic problems should be sought in their own cultural resources. Thus they began to reflect seriously on Iranian identity to see who they, as Iranians, were. Regarding the West as the *other* helped them shape their Iranian *self*. Now being Iranian meant *not* being a Westerner, but what being Iranian positively signified had yet to be determined. Many roushanfikrs turned to Islam as the main element of Iranian identity.

The first step in this direction was taken by Jalal-e 'Al-e Ahmad (1923-69), who wrote *Gharbzadegi* (The Westoxication, 1962), a very influential book in resolving the identity crisis in which the roushanfikrs were entangled. 'Al-e Ahmad, a prominent roushanfikir who had membership in the Tudeh party on his record, here criticized the Iranian roushanfikrs for "westoxication," which means being pathetically preoccupied by the West. He regarded obsessive preoccupation with the West as a disease that could be cured only by a return to the self. This self, in his view, was an eastern-Islamic one. Therefore, he invited his fellow roushanfikrs to offer their hand of friendship toward the clerics as embodiments of the values and thoughts essential to the Iranian identity. Likewise, he invited the clerics to read the signs of the times more carefully in order to apprehend the new cultural and intellectual demands before it was too late.

The emergence of a new class of roushanfikrs known as "religious roushanfikrs" in the '60s indicates how successful 'Al-e Ahmad's work was. Thanks to it many roushanfikrs broke the spell of the West and thus started thinking of a self of their own. Moreover, he effectively drew their attention to Islam as their authentic self. It was no surprise that he barely went beyond this to explain what that Islamic self really was, for he saw it as the rouhaniyyun's responsibility, not his, to articulate that self. Later on, there emerged some religious roushanfikrs who were not pleased with this division of labor. Among them was 'Ali Shari'ati (1933-78).

Shari'ati took over the unfinished project of 'Al-e Ahmad and set about providing his own idea of the Islamic self. Shari'ati, like almost all other religious roushanfikrs, had no official religious education, and obtained his knowledge

of Islam through personal studies. He graduated from the University of Paris in hagiography. However, it was not his studies there but his enthusiastic reading of some renowned Western thinkers that contributed substantially to his later career as a revolutionary and reformist figure. Shari'ati read Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, George Gorwich (1894-1965, a new-Marxist sociologist), Franz Fanon, Levi Masinnon (1888-1962), Ramon Aron (1905-84), and others while in France. In the meantime, he came into contact with the Algerian Liberation Front that fought France.

Intensely preoccupied by the need for a radical change in Iran's political system, Shari'ati put forward a highly revolutionary and political reading of Islam in which the influence of all the thinkers mentioned above can be easily distinguished. This was exactly what agitated the rouhaniyyun, even those who favored him in the beginning, against Shari'ati's work. It also caused some tense debates between rouhaniyyun on the one hand and Shari'ati and his followers on the other. The traditionalist rouhaniyyun saw Shari'ati's work as reflecting the thoughts of the Western thinkers, rather than Islam as represented in the scriptures.

The divergence, even antagonism, between the rouhaniyyun and religious roushanfikrs in their understanding of Islam can partly be explained by the differences in their education and educational environments. Even more influential was the main goal each was striving to reach here. The roushanfikrs were always obsessed with Iran's backwardness and the remedy for it. Up until the '60s they had placed their hope in the West, and only after disenchantment with it did they turn to Islam to form a national identity. Besides, Islam provided them with a rich source of inspiration for resistance and revolution in the face of imperialism and the Shah's regime. Therefore, a nativist or nationalistic agenda was working behind their appeal to Islam. This instrumentalist approach to Islam could barely be found among the rouhaniyyun, who looked at their enterprise as an intellectual *jihad* to protect Islam and the Islamic country against the West's severe threat. This difference in goals, in my view, generated different natures for their work. Thus, while the rouhaniyyun were looking for answers to contemporary questions in the scriptures, the roushanfikrs were actually constructing the answers by reference to the same texts and by adopting what could be of help from the Western thinkers.

The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1980 further intensified this hermeneutical debate. Until then the religious thinkers had produced a sizable body of literature to the effect that Islam could provide effective plans for both the social and individual aspects of life. Now they were in a position to show the veracity of that claim in practice, but they faced a host of problems. For example, what exactly is the economic system approved by Islam? Is it more like a capitalist system or a communist one, or something totally different from both? Is the government allowed to decide what the relationship between an employer and an employee should be, or is that to be left completely to the mutual agreement of the two? Is it permissible for the government to collect tax beyond what is stipulated in the religious sources? A brief discussion of the tax question may be illuminating.

The Tax Question

According to the Qur'an, Muslims should pay two kinds of religious taxes, zakah (almsgiving) and Khums (one fifth). The tradition specifies as taxable items like wheat, barley, dates, gold, silver, sheep, the surplus of the yearly income, and so on. Before the establishment of the government, this item of law was not subject to debate, but after that it aroused a big controversy. Obviously the amount levied from these items does not adequately provide for the needs of a government. On the other hand, private ownership has been recognized and respected by Shari'ah. This means that unless Shari'ah itself has given permission, it is forbidden to take possession of people's property. The conclusion would be that the government is not allowed to levy tax from properties other than those specifically itemized in the scriptures.

Dilemmas like this intensified the core issue of the hermeneutical phase, namely how to hold both the stability of Shari'ah and its flexibility. Some came to believe that the root of the problem lay not in Shari'ah but in the traditional fiqh that was, in their view, too rigid and static to adequately reflect the flexible, dynamic nature of Shari'ah and was thus unable to meet the demands of the time. To give more flexibility to fiqh they turned to what I referred to as "hermeneutical reason." An outline of how some scholars treated the taxation issue throws light on the debate and on hermeneutical reason. (Solutions could be and have been found in ways other than those discussed here. This is not the only or necessarily the correct solution.)

The scholars maintained that the difficulty as to the taxation system

came from a literalistic approach to the text which was foreign to *ijtihad*. Literalism suffered some deplorable failures. First, it failed to read the text in its historical context. Secondly, it did not fully grasp the social character of the religious taxes, since it could not understand the social character of *Shari'ah* as a whole. It looked at *Shari'ah* as a set of injunctions with only personal spiritual significance. The literalistic approach to the scriptures missed the point that these taxes were to form a system aimed at fulfilling the financial needs of the Muslim society and government. The only reason that those specific items had been named as taxable properties was that they were the common capital of people in the early history of Islam in the Peninsula. Therefore, there is no credibility to a literalistic reading that restricts what is taxable to the properties itemized in the scriptures.

Theoretical Contraction and Expansion

The inevitability of an all-encompassing flexibility and change, not only in *Shari'ah* but in Islam as a whole, was the thrust of a series of articles entitled “The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of *Shari'ah*” published in a magazine consecutively since April 1988. But the flexibility these articles were advocating went far beyond what exponents of the dynamic *fiqh* were promoting. The author, Hasan Haj Faraj Dabbaq, known as 'Abdukarim Soroush, graduated from the University of Tehran as a pharmacist and had studied philosophy of science at the University of London. He maintained in the articles that the debate between traditional *fiqh* and dynamic *fiqh* would be futile if the issue was not tackled at a more fundamental hermeneutical level. First one has to find out why and how religious people's understanding of their scriptures changes and differs. This question was Soroush's point of departure in the theory of theoretical contraction and expansion.

The theory first makes a Kantian distinction between the religion in itself, which Soroush defines as the scripture (the meaning of which we have no direct access to) and our understanding of religion, which is all we have at our disposal. The former is eternally stable but the latter is constantly changing. Soroush maintains that all areas of knowledge, with the exception of religious knowledge, are symmetrically related to each other so that change anywhere in any of these areas causes changes in all other areas. Religious knowledge, however, needs other disciplines as the consumer of their products. This is so because the religious texts, as the source of religious knowledge, are totally

silent and can be only made to speak by the reader who brings to the texts his or her whole body of knowledge. Therefore, it is the reader's knowledge of other sciences that, in the final analysis, makes the text speak and consequently generates his or her religious knowledge. In this way, any change in human knowledge translates inevitably into a change in religious knowledge. Hence, given the incessant change in the former, the latter incessantly changes. Accordingly, Soroush recommends that clerics and all other religious thinkers refresh their knowledge of other subjects than religion in order for their religious knowledge to be refreshed.

Soroush actually erased the problem rather than solve it. He gets rid of one horn of the hermeneutical dilemma, namely "stability," and then puts religion, or the understanding of religion, at the mercy of the ever-changing sciences. Quite predictably, the extremely reductionistic nature of this theory could not go unnoticed by the religious thinkers, both *rouhaniyyun* and *roushanfikrs*, who were not ready to see Islamic thought and theology as simply a consumer of secular sciences. The dispute over Soroush's theory dominated religious discourse for years after its publication.

The theory of "theoretical contraction and expansion" must nevertheless be given credit for evolving hermeneutical discourse in Iran to a philosophical level. It was the first systematic attempt to explain the mechanism of understanding the religious texts. However, something about the theory is even more relevant to the subject at hand. One might say that it betrays a confusion between hermeneutics and epistemology, leading to a fallacious combination of them. It is not difficult to see how the theory has drawn results of a hermeneutical character from premises of an epistemological character. This unveils the degree to which both epistemology and hermeneutics are, not necessarily fallaciously in all cases, intertwined in the current religious discourse of Iran. The future of religious discourse, in my view, hinges on the future of these two sub-discourses, epistemology and hermeneutics.

Note

¹ Henceforth, for the purpose of brevity the term "Shi'ite" will be used, but it is only indicating Shiite response from within the Iranian religious establishment.