



Japan's Future Global Role

SYMPOSIUM REPORT

Japan as a 'Normal Country'? Retrospect and Prospect

There is an ongoing debate about whether Japan is – and if not, whether it can or should become – a 'normal country.' For decades the received wisdom has been that Japan – at least in its international presence – lacked something vitally necessary for it to be taken seriously and treated with the respect befitting a country of its size and sophistication. Is Japan a 'normal' country? If not, in what sense is it not, and what are the prospects for Japan's 'normalization'?

A New Dawn for the Land of the Rising Sun?

The world is entering a period of great geopolitical uncertainty and potential instability. Amidst worrying trends and developments, Japan stands as a beacon of prosperity and stability. Can it assume a global role commensurate with its wealth and power? What would a Japan-led international order look like?

EVENT 1 – BALSILLIE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Japan as a 'Normal Country'? Retrospect and Prospect

On the afternoon of November 22, 2018, Professors Yoshihide Soeya and Masayuki Tadokoro (Professors of Political Science and International Relations at Keio University) and David A. Welch (CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Relations and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation) gave presentations at the Balsillie School of International Affairs under the title 'Japan as "Normal Country"? Retrospect and Prospect.'

Before the presentations, Consul General of Japan in Toronto Ms. Takako Ito welcomed the two Japanese professors and introduced them to the audience as highly distinguished experts on Japanese security and foreign policy. She remarked that the title of the event—'Japan as "Normal Country"'—is both timely and provocative. If Japan could be said to be 'abnormal,' in what way might this be the case? Many debates and discussions start with the assumption that post-World War II Japan has indeed been abnormal, which is why Japan is now either becoming, or trying to become, 'normal.' Such claims often carry a certain negative connotation regarding the idea of Japan as a normal country.

Japan is unique in many ways. Japan did not experience colonialism in the 19th century, unlike most non-Western countries, and since World War II it has embraced a unique constitution that includes the now-famous Article 9, the Peace Clause. Japan is now truly a pacifist country and is also one of the world's largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) donors. It is the only Asian G7 member state, and shares with the liberal West common values such as the rule of law, democracy, freedom, and liberty. For the Japanese government that is responsible for protecting its territory and its people, a crucial question now is whether Japan can truly uphold peace without being able to undertake certain kinds of actions.

The first presenter, Professor Soeya, started his talk with the historical origin of the debate surrounding Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution. As is well known, Article 9 states that Japan will not maintain any military force. It was, however, written by the General Headquarters (GHQ) before the Cold War became a harsh reality. From the standpoint of pure

international relations logic, the newly-emerging reality of the Cold War meant that the United Nations (UN) would not be able to function as was originally intended; it would, therefore, have been obvious to everyone that Article 9 was not a realistic option for Japan's security from the beginning. While on one hand the Cold War thus gave birth to a realist argument in Japan that the Constitution must be revised to be in harmony with the security environment, on the other hand the experiences of World War II embedded in the psyche of the Japanese people had created a strong aversion towards anything related to the military. This discrepancy between the reality of Japan's security situation and the ideals of the Constitution supported by the general public led various political camps to try and address the gap, and the trend quickly turned into domestic debates and disputes that continue to this day.

The debate has progressed largely unrelated to developments in world politics, being based rather on dogmatic ideological divisions within Japanese society. If the Constitutional revision issue were approached from a rational international relations perspective, it would have been obvious for Japan to pursue certain changes to Article 9 in order to truly become an internationalist and middle power country that would actively contribute to international peace. However, the domestic context in which the discourse of constitutional revision unfolded throughout the postwar period led to the framing of any argument in favour of revision as a nationalistic one portraying Japan as an assertive war-making country.

Under such circumstances, it makes sense that Japan has been forced to perform legal acrobatics—inventing ingenious ways to keep reinterpreting Article 9 at its margins—in order to maintain the Constitution as is in order to appease liberal pacifists, while still finding justifications to expand the scope of Japan's international activity in peacekeeping. Currently, however, it is widely agreed within Japan that this formula is no longer sustainable. Having a productive debate is therefore important, and the liberal pacifist camp must also be able to propose its own version of revision, rather than always dogmatically refusing any discussion at all, whether of a Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) version or not. The liberal camp still seems unready for it at this point, and Japan's road to becoming normal is still not an easy one.

For the time being, the recent 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security was the best that the Japanese government has been able to achieve in enabling further Japanese contributions to international and regional security in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, since it finally legitimized the controversial right of collective self-defence through another reinterpretation of Article 9 short of revision. This 'Situations Threatening Japan's Survival' clause in the legislation has been explained by the Japanese government to the United States by arguing that, despite the limitations imposed by Article 9, Japan is doing its utmost to support U.S. operations in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, Japan can still say to the countries concerned about the issue of its constitutional revision as a prelude to potential rearmament (meaning South Korea and China) that the article is still intact.

One final point Professor Soeya emphasized is that, although the 2015 legislation and the legitimization of potential Japanese use of force in the name of collective self-defence has been widely publicized by some as a drastic departure from the ideals of the Constitution, legal justification for Japan to embrace collective self-defence has always been available; it is simply that Japan has chosen not to exercise it so far. For example, Japan has always interpreted Article 51 of the UN Charter Chapter VII as endowing it with the right, even in the past. Moreover, Articles 5 and 6 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, which address the defence of Japan and the U.S. bases it hosts, have also been interpreted as *de facto* statements on collective self-defence.

The second presenter, Professor Tadokoro, also started his presentation by explaining the significance of Japan's two major postwar institutions, the 1947 Constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, first signed in 1952. While the former was written under the assumption that the UN would function well, the latter was based on the opposite assumption: that the Cold War would prevail in Asia, and that Japan must therefore become a useful ally of the United States. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, often seen as the founder of 'abnormal Japan,' tried to reconcile the contradictory underlying assumptions upon which Japan's most important security strategy would be based by embracing both institutions through the policy known as the 'Yoshida Doctrine.' Japan has since conducted numerous legal acrobatics to maintain the Constitution as it while simultaneously both trying to make the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) compatible with Article 9 and upholding Japan's responsibilities under its alliance commitment.

Throughout most of the postwar period, this domestic situ-

ation has produced two sharply opposing positions within Japan, left-leaning liberal and right-leaning nationalist. The majority of moderate Japanese, however, have preferred to focus on rebuilding the national economy, which has forced both camps to forego chronic political deadlock and instead reach what is known as 'postwar consensus' in order to accommodate the needs of an otherwise apolitical public.

In the post-Cold War era, public opinion polls have shown that support for amendment to the Constitution has generally risen, although the trend has reversed somewhat since 2015. Regardless, increasing public support is mainly due to the fact that people feel further reinterpretation of Article 9 would be too confusing and are fed up by constant stretching of the clause in endless domestic legal debates without sufficiently rational policy-level discussions. Surveys show that the majority of the Japanese public would like to see more policy-level discussions regarding the issue of constitutional revision, and that they strongly support both the U.S.-Japan alliance and the JSDF. For now, the only big question facing Japan under such circumstances is the reliability and the commitment of the Trump-era United States to the alliance. This is the context in which some Japanese decision-makers are asking themselves what Japan would really need to do in case one of the various worst-case scenarios that can be envisioned becomes a reality.

The third presenter, Professor Welch, agreed with the Japanese guest speakers that Article 9 is unique in the world and that this is what makes Japan 'abnormal.' Article 9 originated in the Allies' fear that Japan might one day resurge as an imperial menace and the belief that a good way to prevent this was to deny Japan the rights to maintain military forces and to wage war. Very quickly, however, almost everyone realized that this was a solution to a non-problem, and that it would, in fact, contribute to regional peace and stability if Japan possessed at least some capability for self-defence. Only in three countries—South Korea, China, and Japan itself—does one find any suspicion of Japanese military capability. Ironically, the most strident opponents of Japan's 'normalization' are elderly Japanese who have internalized anti-militarism as a core element of Japan's postwar identity.

Opponents to revision, however, overlook that Japanese behaviour has been 'normal' since the 1990s, when it began playing a larger global role, increasing its contribution to peace and security. Japan has been—and is—a constructive, non-threatening member of the international community. In fact, Japan is more of a status-quo power than many other Western countries: there is no populist movement in Japan, and it remains a strong supporter of an open, liberal world order and the rule of law. It is also an active proponent of global governance and multilateralism, as we see in its support of the UN, the G7, the

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP; also known as TPP-11).

It is evident that Prime Minister Abe would like to claim the historical legacy of being the one who regularized the existence of the JSDF and made it easier for Japan to play a greater role in providing global and regional security. But he appreciates the domestic political constraints he faces. As a result, he may seek a minor, largely inconsequential amendment to Article 9. It would be embarrassing and potentially harmful, however, if a minor amendment were to fail, as it would further call into question the legitimacy of the JSDF. Arguably, if there is amending to be done, it would be better if it were significant, and if there were no questions of success. For these reasons, it would be wise to wait until circumstances were more auspicious than they are at present.



In the Q&A session that followed, the moderator of the event, Prof. Kimie Hara of Renison University College, University of Waterloo, asked the presenters what they would change in the book if they were to revise it now, and what the reactions to the book were like when it was published. Professor Welch said that readers found it helpful that the book clarified the concept of 'normalcy' in the context of Japanese security. If he were to revise the book, he would include the issues of populist movements in the West and possible post-Trump scenarios. Professor Soeya agreed that people found it useful that important concepts were clarified, especially from multinational perspectives. It is important because the concept of 'normalcy' is not often used in Japan, despite the fact that Ozawa Ichiro first introduced the term from the context of enabling Japan's international contributions. Nowadays, the same concept is more often regarded as nationalistic, and this trend is identical both inside and outside Japan. Professor Tadokoro said that if he were to revise the book, he would add that the term 'normal country' has become less catchy than when the book was first published, and the concept itself might undergo further change.

The second question concerned reasons for the relative lack of pro-revision movements during the Cold War period, when the security reality was obviously dangerous, as well as the current procedure for constitutional amendment. The two Japanese presenters answered that during the early Cold War period, many Japanese thought that their own military, if there were to be any, would be a bigger danger for Japan itself. This is certainly a legacy of World War II, which bred in the postwar Japanese psyche a strong resistance to anything linked to the military or war. Although the government tried to align the

Constitution with the Cold War reality, it failed, and that is why it had to settle for legal acrobatics through which the existence of the JSDF could be justified without touching Article 9. For many Japanese, alliance with the United States was considered more important, since it was assumed that the United States would protect Japan. The Japanese public has seen that the security environment in the region after the Cold War has become more unpredictable and volatile, hence the rising support for the amendment. In addition, continuing the history-related debate with Japan's neighbours in the post-Cold War period, along with generational change in Japanese politics and society, has made more Japanese support revising the Constitution and enhancing Japan's security as they see themselves surrounded by unfriendly neighbours. Regarding the procedure for constitutional amendment, there must first be a two-thirds vote in both the Upper and Lower Houses, followed by a national referendum. Only a majority vote in the referendum will result in any amendment to the Constitution.

The next question by the audience was whether the Japanese government would be able to make its revision proposal more acceptable to the general public by adjusting the process or changing wording. Professor Soeya answered that the general public who are pro-revision support it for various reasons, but the most prominent one is Japan's need to make a greater international contribution. In this regard, the openly autonomist (right-wing) rationale for revision is not widely supported. Professor Tadokoro added that the current trend of decreasing support for constitutional revision again among the general public is due to suspicion of Prime Minister Abe's true agenda. While the public still supports some kind of change to the Constitution in principle, and this has been the consistent trend in the post-Cold War period, the rise of Abe in Japanese politics has made the general public desire more institutional checks and balances as well as more domestic debates on the budget, the nature of missions, etc., regarding the Japanese international military contribution, so that the current cabinet will not simply get a blank cheque. Professor Welch suggested that, if deleting or revising a current clause is difficult, adding a new article to realistically support the existing one could be a possibility as well, and that the most important point here was that nothing should undermine Japan's right to contribute to international peace.

The final question/comment from the audience pointed out to the presenters that it is not always easy to understand from the Canadian perspective why Japan regards either revising or maintaining Article 9 as such an important national issue, when the danger of interstate war or large-scale conflict in East Asia has lessened after the Cold War, and international interventions for UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and other

international contributions for stability are so risky for Japanese lives. Professor Tadokoro answered that Japanese people believe otherwise, meaning that the possibility of interstate war has certainly not lessened in East Asia since the Cold War. That is why priority is being given to territorial defence and the right of collective self-defence in wording a potentially-revised article. He agreed that PKO operations are indeed risky and

demanding, and the Japanese public, despite their support for international contributions in principle, might not be ready to think about this possible risk yet. For now, the 2015 legislation enabled the Japanese government to acquire what it had always wanted legally (collective self-defence), and therefore it could be said that there is less immediate motivation for the cabinet to amend the Constitution now than prior to 2015.

EVENT 2 – CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION

A New Dawn for the Land of the Rising Sun?

In the evening, Professors Soeya, Tadokoro, and Welch participated in a public event in the CIGI auditorium titled ‘Japan’s Future Global Role: A New Dawn for the Land of the Rising Sun?’ Professors Soeya and Tadokoro made initial remarks, and then Professor Welch joined them in a panel discussion, moderated by Professor John Ravenill, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs.

Prior to the two Japanese professors’ presentations, CIGI President Rohinton Medhora emphasized the importance of Japan in the current international order in which the question of where a new world leadership should come from is becoming increasingly important, adding that the world must continue to maintain interest in Japan. The talk provided the audience with valuable lessons on Japan’s position in this context.

The first speaker, Professor Soeya, stated that it is true there are some indicators, such as population decrease and changes in the economy, that raise certain potential concerns for the future. With respect to Japan’s national security, despite increased concerns regarding the rise of China, bilateral relations are not as bad as some experts claim. It is crucial that Japan accept the reality of the region, and in this regard, the matter of how to co-exist with China by focusing on mutual prosperity is currently shared domestically.

The ‘Japan standing alone against China’ narrative is not realistic, nor is it helpful for the region. If Japan were to emphasize the so-called ‘China threat’ too much, it would lead to Japan rely even more on the United States than it is currently. Furthermore, Japan would be criticized for trying to establish an anti-China coalition that could threaten regional co-existence. Although it must be admitted that, at present, Japan’s willingness to cooperate and coordinate with China is limited, there are positive signs, such as Prime Minister Abe’s scheduled visit to China, along with a joint Sino-Japan Official Development Assistance (ODA) proposal.

For Japan, U.S.-China relations are also a crucial issue. Japan wants to be a major player at the forefront of all Asia-Pacific regional issues in which China and the United States are involved. There is an aspiration among certain elements within China’s central government that East Asia be ordered according to a China-centred hegemony. But as no neighbour of China wants it to be the sole order-building country in the region, the role of the United States is obviously vital. The current president of the United States is, however, now seen by many Japanese as problematic for the United States fulfilling such a role, as he seems uninterested in protecting the liberal and rule-based regional order which both the United States and Japan have historically upheld. President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy assumes that nobody should challenge the United States, and it is therefore likely that the Washington will still counter any move by China to undermine U.S. influence in the region. That being said, the U.S. president’s end goal is unclear, and a source of concern for Japan’s experts. Such concern is not limited to Japan.

All countries in the region are being influenced by this development. Japan should therefore cooperate with like-minded countries. Japan can take a leading role on this. Ideally, these countries should be able to present a unified voice towards both China and United States through institutions and agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP; also known as TPP-11).

The second speaker, Professor Tadokoro, argued that Japanese people have become more realistic in their perspective on regional security in the almost thirty years since the end of the Cold War. Although many had thought that free-market-based liberal democracy had triumphed in 1991, this optimism has waned. However, he also emphasized that we do not need to be overly pessimistic either. What can Japan do, and what are the most important tasks it faces?

First, Japan must address the question of how to stay engaged with the United States. U.S.-Japan relations look more unstable from the Japanese perspective. Shared values in bilateral relations have been in question since the inauguration of President Trump. Will the United States fundamentally change after Trump? It has exercised leadership in establishing many multilateral institutions, but now the United States seems to be the biggest threat for the future of these institutions. What the current situation has taught the international community is that perhaps the world has indeed been too overly dependent on the United States for too long.

Second, and related to the first, Japan must continue to argue that international institution building based on shared values is still important, even without the United States. Japan took the lead, for example, in rescuing the TPP, in the form of the CPTPP, after the United States pulled out. Japan has also been a strong defender of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its safeguards for freedom of navigation. Japan is also a particularly strong champion of the G7 and does what it can through the G20, although the latter is hampered by its unwieldy consensus norm. For now, however, it must be recognized that Japan is still hesitant on taking a leadership role in building international security institutions.

Third, Japan has to keep dealing with China and Russia in a constructive way. Japan accumulated experience investing in China's modernization project until the 1980s, and it seems that China-Japan relations have been improving recently. With regards to Russia, Japan still does not have a peace treaty because of the ongoing territorial dispute regarding the Northern Territories. But in the end, although Japan regards shared identity and common values highly, this does not mean that it would want a new Cold War with China or Russia simply because they do not share main values with Japan.

Fourth, Japan can act as a useful model for the world without preaching. Japan is at the forefront of experiencing many challenges that other developed countries will also go through in the near future. Japan's experiments in overcoming demographic, gender, and immigration challenges could function as precious examples. Having said that, it is not always the case that indicators only show negative signs for the future of Japan. Although it is undoubtedly a problem, the current demographic crisis Japan is going through might be a bit exaggerated from a historical perspective. Moreover, although Japanese have traditionally been considered chronically unhappy, people are now seen as consistently happier, even with the stagnant economy, based on the World Happiness Index for the past twenty years.



In the panel discussion following the two Japanese speakers' presentations, Professor John Ravenhill, Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs, began by asking whether there would be a way for Canada to engage the Asia-Pacific without having to 'choose' between China or Japan. Professor Tadokoro asserted that, although it is true that the increased influence of China in the Asia-Pacific has forced many countries in the region to be concerned about its behaviour and future, it is important to say that there is no need for excessive concern. China is, after all, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the current international order, including open international markets and sea lanes, and what Japan is doing multilaterally in the region is not an attempt to contain China.

Professor Soeya contended that the concern raised by Professor Ravenhill is widely shared among mainstream Western intellectuals. He also understood Canada's position that, if possible, it would not want to be put into a position in which it had to choose between China or Japan. The concern, however, is not really a correct reflection of the reality unfolding in the region. What Japan is doing, again, is not an attempt to contain China. For example, the joint military and disaster relief exercises Japan is conducting in the region as part of capacity building efforts in Asia have little to do with balancing China, and have no strategic element, being rather part of a new future vision for the Indo-Pacific region.

Professor Welch agreed with the Japanese experts but noted that Canada is having difficulty finding its own voice in the Asia-Pacific. Traditionally, Canada has always sought to play a constructive role in building and supporting regional order in Asia. It was one of the pioneers of regional cooperative security efforts, but, beginning in the Chrétien era and continuing through the Harper years, Canada more or less disappeared. Prime Minister Trudeau has promised that 'Canada is back,' but other countries in the region are still waiting to see what Canada will do and whether it will have the stamina to stay engaged. Most likely, this will depend upon domestic politics and budgetary issues.

Like Canada, Japan is in theory well-positioned to play a leading role. Often the most important governance innovations come from second-tier or middle powers. Japan has significant 'soft power' resources, and is well-positioned to actively engage with other small like-minded countries towards a common goal. A coalition of small countries under Japan's leadership would certainly be able to make a difference in regional governance. The main problem here would be what one might call Japan's national culture of humility, which makes it difficult for the Japanese themselves to believe that they might fulfill such a role.

Professor Ravenhill followed up by asking whether Japanese

diplomacy was then going through a maturing process. Professor Soeya replied that if 'maturation' meant active leadership, it is still the case that Japan's national mood is not necessarily in favour of it. As is well known, Japan definitely and exclusively pursued low-profile middle power diplomacy up until the 1990s. Currently, because of the unpredictability regarding the future of the United States strategy in the region and the rise of China, it is true that countries such as Japan and Australia, among other middle powers, have become more open to the idea of coming together for more cooperation, and Japan is indeed participating more actively, although such a stance cannot be defined as a conscious, deliberate, and consistent national strategy yet. A good example is the case of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the institution established by the joint initiative of Japan and Australia by convincing ASEAN countries to support it as instrumental to their own national interests.



After the panel discussion, the floor was opened for a Q&A session with the audience. The first question concerned whether the panelists thought CPTPP was working and, if so, what would be the next step that could be expected. Professor Tadokoro answered that he was surprised about Japan's leadership in this particular case, and would be interested to observe whether it will mark a new pattern of Japanese leadership. For now, the United Kingdom has expressed interest in joining after Brexit, but it may or may not be able to ratify depending on the conditions of Brexit. At the same time, it is possible that Japan might sign a separate bilateral trade agreement with the United States. Professor Soeya noted that the trajectory Japan will take is still unclear: Japan has always preferred multilateral agreements such as the WTO to bilateral FTAs, and such a preference still stands. In the era of President Trump, Japan continuing to show serious interest to global trade institutions would, in the president's mind, be a true test of its dedication to multilateralism. Professor Welch added that, unless a more internationally-minded president gets elected in the United States, the WTO could not be the main scene of action on international trade.

The next two questions from the audience were about Japan-China relations. The first questioner asserted that it is not necessarily that China was not adhering to international rules, but that China has justifiable reasons to feel concern about Japan's expanding military spending. The questioner also asked whether it was not the case that it was in fact the United States exercising unilateralism more often. Professor Tadokoro answered that, despite the image of Prime Minister Abe as right-wing, his security policy has been moderate and consistent.

Japanese military spending is about one-third that of China, and the amount of spending is in fact currently decreasing. Regarding China's respect for the rule of law, one must be careful to distinguish rhetoric from behaviour. For example, although it is true that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it still observes it. In case of China, however, it is the opposite; although it has signed, China does not always act according to the agreement. Professor Welch concurred in part, noting that the United States considers most of UNCLOS to be settled (and therefore binding) customary international law; but popular perceptions of China as an UNCLOS scofflaw are largely unfounded. In the South China Sea, for example, China has been quietly complying with the findings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal's ruling in *Philippines v. China* while publicly insisting that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. This is to placate China's mobilized, highly-nationalistic domestic audience without alienating foreign countries. For perfectly understandable reasons, the international audience is missing the latter signal. There is, of course, one important point on which China and most of the rest of the world disagree: namely, on whether littoral states can, under UNCLOS, regulate other countries' military activities in their Exclusive Economic Zone. This would appear to be an honest disagreement in interpretation, and China is not alone (Brazil, for example, agrees); but a careful reading of UNCLOS leaves no doubt that the China position is incorrect.

The second question regarding Japan-China relations concerned the possible field of cooperation, and whether the two countries could work together, for example, on issues regarding North Korea or Iran. The Japanese professors answered by emphasizing that cooperation and competition are an inevitable dilemma for any states' relations. In case of Japan and China, the nature of bilateral relations is further complicated by conflicting self-images. But there is no denying that Japan contributed to China's development through ODA in the post-World War II period, and also supported China's integration into modern international society. In order to facilitate bilateral cooperation, China must reflect more deeply on this history of cooperation and update its image of Japan.

Regarding the current U.S.-North Korea negotiations: if Kim Jong-un were serious, and if North Korea were to feel safe in its own security at the end of the process even without nuclear weapons, the current negotiating track might eventually work, although we must expect it to go on for some time. Meanwhile, Japan has a limited role to play, but Kim Jong-un probably has a 'Japan card' up his sleeve and will likely play it toward the end of the game. Until then, it is unlikely that Japan-North Korea relations will evolve. Meanwhile, the Japanese government should resist the temptation simply to tell the

domestic audience that 'one simply cannot trust North Korea.' This does not lead to anything.

Regarding Iran, Professor Tadokoro contended that although potential Japan-China cooperation in the Middle East is not widely discussed, Japan-Iran relations have been generally very good even since the 1979 Revolution, and Japanese investment

in Iran has always been considerable as well. In this regard, the future of U.S.-Iran relations is a source of concern for Japan.



The complete video for the evening event is available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGYW75xlDV8>

About the Speakers



Yoshihide Soeya is Professor of political science and international relations at the Faculty of Law of Keio University. His areas of interest are politics and security in East Asia, and Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy. He has served as Director both of Keio University's Institute of East Asian Studies and Center for Contemporary Korean Studies. He was Japan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. from September 2013 to January 2014, and a Korea Foundation Fellow affiliated with the ASAN Institute in Seoul from March to May 2014. His most recent publications in English include 'The Rise of China in Asia: Japan at the Nexus,' in Asle Toje, ed., *Will China's Rise be Peaceful? Security, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), and 'The Case for an Alternative Strategy for Japan: Beyond the Article 9-Alliance Regime,' in Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper, eds., *Postwar Japan: Growth, Security and Uncertainty since 1945* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017). He received Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1987

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David A. Welch is CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, where he has recently been working on Asia-Pacific Security. His 2005 book *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton University Press) is the inaugural winner of the International Studies Association ISSS Book Award for the best book published in 2005 or 2006, and his 1993 book *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge University Press) is the winner of the 1994 Edgar S. Furniss Award for an Outstanding Contribution to National Security Studies. He is co-author of *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 10th ed. (Pearson Longman), with Joseph S. Nye, Jr. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1990.