East Asia – Arctic Relations

Boundary, Security, and International Politics

Part I: Academic Workshop

March 2-3, 2013
Yukon College, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada
Preface

This report is a summary of the workshop, *East Asia – Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics, Part I - Academic Workshop*, which was held at Yukon College, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada, March 2-3, 2013.

Global climate change is reshaping the Arctic region, both physically and in terms of international politics. The dramatic reduction in sea ice cover has provoked sweeping images of increasingly viable transpolar shipping and accessible resources, generating significant commentary within and between the circumpolar states (Canada, the USA, Greenland, Iceland, Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway). As a rising chorus of international voices remind us, changes to the region concern more than the Arctic states. For example, three East Asian countries – Japan, Korea and China – are more attentive to and interested in Arctic developments than ever before.

East Asian nations depend upon global resources, fund scientific research, and move their goods through sea lanes the world over. Accordingly, Asian commentators have expressed concern about Arctic states blocking them from participation in discussions about the future of the circumpolar world. They indicate that East Asian nations are highly motivated to engage in Arctic affairs. Recent developments such as the great earthquake and the nuclear disaster in Japan, oil price volatility and supply issues flowing from the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, and subsequent policy reviews for alternative energy sources, supply routes, and security remind East Asian governments about the value of safe and secure shipping routes, access to natural resources, and environmental and scientific knowledge to inform decision-making.

Canada, Russia and the United States have extensive commitments to the Far North and long histories of Arctic engagement. As the major polar nations with the gateways to the Asia-Pacific, they have lengthy experience with East Asia. Their northern responsibilities, geography and Trans-Pacific engagement, combined with East Asia’s growing interest in the Far North, make the nations of both regions key stakeholders in current deliberations on the future of Arctic governance. Furthermore, the evolving situation in the Arctic could influence relations amongst East Asian nations, providing new opportunities for cooperation or additional sources of conflict.

This project is designed to launch a focused and detailed conversation about the historic, contemporary and future dimensions of East Asian countries’ relationships with and interests in the Arctic. Bringing together leading experts from Japan, China, South Korea, Russia, the United States and Canada, the project workshop draws scholarly and policy-making attention to East Asia’s growing interests in the
Far North and identifies political, economic, legal and security connections between East Asia and the Arctic.

As major phases of the project, two workshops were held in March 2013.


The Whitehorse workshop provided an opportunity for 16 scholars to reflect on the issues at hand. Intensive discussions took place over two days on 13 papers submitted and circulated prior to the workshop. Those papers examine roles and impacts of East Asian interests on Arctic politics and diplomacy and those of contemporary Arctic on East Asian affairs. There were also exchanges of views with local politicians in Yukon.

Part II Policy Workshop, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, ON, March 5, 2013

This policy-focused workshop built on the work concluded in Whitehorse. The participants in this workshop included 9 scholars who attended the Whitehorse workshop, and additional 12 individuals who are Arctic experts, foreign affairs specialists, and government representatives. The workshop consisted of a series of facilitated discussions in greater detail on Arctic policy alternatives available to Canada, the Arctic Council and East Asian nations. The focus was to identify potential points of conflict and cooperation.

At both workshops, there were lively exchanges among the participants, who gathered from Japan, China, Korea, Russia, the United States, Norway and across Canada. The workshop also generated significant personal and collective discoveries and inspired participants to consider anew the fundamental political and economic relationships in the Arctic. Research outputs of this project will include workshop papers, policy briefs and a major research monograph (edited volume). While their productions are underway, this report serves as Part I of an interim output for the project. (There is a separate report of Part II).

This workshop was made possible with the generous funding of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIG) and the Japan Foundation, as well as the kind support of Yukon College; Balsillie School of International Affairs, the Japan Futures Initiative, St. Jermes University, and Renison University College at the University of Waterloo; and the University of Saskatchewan, Canada.

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Opening Session

Introduction: Kimie Hara and Ken Coates

Upon welcoming the participants, thanking the sponsors and going over logistics the conference organizers reiterated the purpose of the conference. The Whitehorse workshop was the first part of a two part workshop. It provided the opportunity for leading scholars from Japan, Korea, China, Russia, the United States, and Canada to critique papers prepared and circulated in advance and have extensive discussion on the historic, contemporary and future development for East Asia – Arctic relations. The goal was to draw scholarly and policy-making attention to East Asia’s growing interests in the Far North and to identify major themes in the political, economic, legal and security connections between East Asia and the Arctic that will contribute to discussion for part two of the workshop, future policy briefs, and publications of the papers. More importantly, they asked that this conference be seen as the start of a network and ongoing project on East Asia – Arctic relations that will continue into the future. Each author was then asked to briefly introduce themselves.

1. Forces for Change in the Arctic: Ken Coates (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)

The Arctic is experiencing a time of unprecedented change. The mobilization and empowerment of Indigenous groups brought dramatic shifts in political structures and demands for autonomy at precisely the time that governments around the world clamoured for greater access to Arctic resources and a greater say in the management of the region. Few places in the world have faced such dramatic and comprehensive pressures for change in such a short period of time, challenging the region's residents and area and national governments to develop strategies appropriate for the era of the globalized Arctic. This paper addressed the following fifteen forces for change in the Arctic: 1) climate change, 2) untapped resource potential, 3) empowerment of Indigenous peoples, 4) development of circumpolar connections and mindsets, 4) conflicting models of applying resource rents, 6) innovations in northern governance, 7) Arctic poverty, 8) Arctic boundaries, 9) the collapse of the USSR and the Russia “wildcard”, 10) the militarization of the Arctic, 11) emerging models of resource extraction, 12) the globalization of Arctic science and technology, 13) the southern imperative of contemporary society, 14) the culture of consultation, and 15) the internationalization of the Arctic.
Discussant: Whitney Lackenbauer (St. Jerome’s / University of Waterloo, Canada)

Lackenbauer expressed the need to identify the audience for the output of this work and the discussions. The intended audience, whether it will be national, East Asian, or global, will shape the introduction and determine how detailed it should be and if we should outline major themes in northern literature to provide non specialists with a background of the field. Instead of making truth claims about the Arctic, as the current paper makes with his list of fifteen points, we should set up the introduction as a set of debates (if the output will be for academics or policy makers) that subsequent papers will address.

Other participants expressed such concerns as the need to outline theoretical frameworks and how this introduction will fit within the existing literature, how to integrate key policy questions into the introduction, and how to address the differences between rhetoric, reality, and political will in the Arctic. This was the only paper that mentioned the Indigenous aspect of Arctic development so this needs to be fleshed out more, especially in terms of the direct and indirect connections between East Asian development initiatives, labour and tourism and Indigenous peoples. More broadly, it was suggested that polling and bringing in people from other academic fields such as sociology would help ensure that the northern perspectives are accurately represented.

Session One: Asian Interests and Involvement in the Arctic
Chair: Kimie Hara (University of Waterloo, Canada)

2. Japan & the Arctic: Fujio Ohnishi (Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan)

The Arctic Ocean is rapidly globalizing as it becomes more integrated into the market economy. Globalization brings new global players into the Arctic, thus affecting the nature of Arctic politics. Since the Cold War era, the nature of Arctic politics has been largely determined by the pursuit of a legitimate framework for Arctic governance between Arctic coastal states (the Arctic Five) and Arctic Circle states (the Arctic Eight). The stewards’ efforts to achieve a legitimate Arctic governance framework have revolved around conservation and protection of the environment and sustainable development in the Arctic region. However, integration of the Arctic into the global economy would gradually add new political realities which need to take into account the relationships between ‘steward’ states and ‘user’ states. ‘User’ states are non-Arctic states whose interests lie mainly in utilizing the natural resources and shipping routes of the Arctic, and are basically market-driven in nature. East Asian States such as China, Japan, and Korea are the best examples of ‘user’ states. This paper first describes the transition of Arctic politics since the post-War period. It then turns to examine why Japan falls into the category of
'user' states by showing its involvement and interests in the Arctic. In conclusion, it discusses prospects for Japan’s roles in globalizing Arctic politics.

3. **China & the Arctic: Kai Sun (Ocean University of China, PRC)**

The main purpose of this paper is to clarify why China is interested in the Arctic, what China is doing to join the Arctic play, what the future trajectory of Chinese engagement with the region might be. The paper begins with a discussion of China’s recent “Arctic capacity building” and “Arctic diplomacy,” and the surge of interest in Arctic affairs by Chinese social scientists and strategists in recent years. China looks to the north for four reasons: China is influenced by environmental changes in the Arctic; business opportunities for China may emerge from the opening of the Arctic passages; there is the possibility of using resources from the Arctic; and it is clearly important to maintain good governance in the Arctic, which is also in China's interest. China is coming to the north through a variety of ways. This includes China’s formal and informal participation in various activities in the Arctic Council; China’s activities in other Arctic Regional Organizations; China’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with Arctic countries, and the coming of Chinese companies in the Arctic. At the present stage, China’s participation in Arctic affairs is limited but China is preparing to make more contributions to good governance and economic development in the Arctic.

4. **Korea & the Arctic: Young-Kil Park (Korea Maritime Institute, ROK) presented on behalf of Keun-Gwan Lee (Seoul National University, ROK)**

East Asian countries’ interests are connected to the “Arctic boom.” In this region, one can find heightened media interest, active academic research, and substantial increase in the governments’ involvement in the Arctic. Korea has been involved in polar research since the 1980’s when it joined the Antarctic Treaty and its related processes. Its interest in the Arctic began in earnest in the early 2000’s when Korea opened a research station on the island of Spitsbergen. It tends to regard the Arctic as a new “blue ocean” for the Korean business community, in particular the shipbuilding industry that has a substantial competitive edge in the construction of ice-breaking bulk carriers, tankers and drill ships. Korea’s keen interest in the Arctic has been demonstrated by its accession to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. It is trying hard to become a permanent observer of the Arctic Council (this will be decided on at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in May 2013). The new administration that came to power in late February 2013 also gave prominence to the Arctic Sea Route and other related matters. Before dealing with the recent developments in Korea, this paper addresses some general questions relating to the Arctic that include; 1) obstacles to the use of the Arctic; 2) the existing governance over the Arctic with particular reference to the Arctic Council; and 3) suggestions for normative and institutional reconfigurations. As a general recommendation for Korea, it is advised to expand its epistemological
horizon beyond immediate economic benefits to issues of general concern such as environmental protection, the sustainable development of local communities and the rights of Indigenous peoples.

**Discussant: Doug Goold (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada)**

Goold started the discussion by commenting that it was hardly a surprise that all three papers called for international cooperation. These three papers expressed scepticism on the viability of northern commerce and northern development prospects, and raised questions about the current state of northern governance. He asked whether or not observer status in the Arctic Council would be adequate for Asian countries and if the Arctic Council is equipped to play the increasingly important role in the Arctic that East Asian states think it does. Is the Arctic Council powerful enough to deal with the addition of East Asian countries? East Asian countries are not new to polar science so we should not treat them as new to the region. For example, Japan has been involved in polar science for 50 years, Korea since the 1980s, and China for almost twenty years. Before the floor opened up to the rest of the participants, he concluded with the proposal that other Asian countries, such as Singapore and India, should be included when we speak of Asia and the Arctic.

Other comments included the need to talk about Taiwan and North Korea since the former has interests in the Arctic and the latter affects regional geopolitics. Each of the authors were encouraged to further explain options available to governments and explain what they think are the best ones. They should also address East Asian fishing interests in the Arctic, such as Japanese whaling, and the image of the Arctic in East Asia. For example, it is important to address how the Arctic fits within national priorities within domestic and foreign policy of each East Asian country, because this will shed light on how likely governments will be to push to forward in the Arctic. In this regard it will help to compare differences in Antarctica and Arctic budgets. This will give us perspective and how the Arctic compares to polar interests and judge whether or not the Arctic is a side show compared to the Antarctica. It was also suggested that at least one of the papers should discuss possibilities and opportunities to strengthen East Asia cooperation as a bloc in relation to the Arctic.

From a western perspective Korea is generally not internationally feared like Japan or China as an expansionary or geopolitical power. Therefore, some participants asked if the paper on Korea should comment on this because their soft power is much different than that of China or Japan and may create more, or at least different, opportunities for Korea. The papers also need to further discuss the role of science in foreign policy and address if East Asian countries perceive science as relational to their status, if they intend to use it to show commitment to public good to get a foot in the door, or if it is a tool to mask concrete aspirations for territorial or resource acquisition. The papers should also further clarify
if there is a difference between the viewpoint on observer status between the Arctic Council and East Asian countries.

The last round of comments addressed East Asian – Indigenous relations. One participant noted how a university in Beijing has a program to train government business personnel for dealing with Indigenous self governance so they can more effectively negotiate with Indigenous peoples. In this regard they noted it would be helpful to explain how close universities in China are to national businesses and their role in understanding indigenous rights in the Arctic. Japan’s November 2012 submission for observer status mentioned that given their historic relations with the Ainu, they are positively positioned to take a role in the Arctic Council. This might not be a positive history to be touting, but perhaps one of these papers should address the issue. It would be good if each of these papers could at least briefly raise indigenous – East Asian government relations because if only Aileen Epiritu’s paper addresses indigenous issues a reader could interpret the limited coverage as a sign that the three East Asian authors neglected these issues.

Session Two: Arctic Powers with Gateways to the Pacific on East Asia – Arctic Relations
Chair: Ken Coates (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)

5. USA: Gerald McBeath (University of Alaska, USA)

The global competition for natural resources and diminishing sea ice have increased international interest in the Arctic. This paper asks how the state of Alaska, the only Arctic state of the United States, and the United States itself view East Asian involvement. Is there an Alaskan (considered an American region) or an American position on East Asian engagement? Is the participation of East Asia in Arctic development a political issue or a matter of public debate? To answer these questions, the paper treats the role of Alaska and the United States in five substantive areas: oil and gas exploration and development; marine transportation; fisheries; investment; and governance. In each area, we examine the challenges and opportunities to the state and nation, and consider in this respect whether attitudes toward East Asian participation are welcoming or hostile.

6. Canada: Whitney Lackenbauer (St. Jerome’s / University of Waterloo, Canada)

This paper examines Canadian perceptions of East Asia’s Arctic interests. Whereas popular commentaries conceptualize Asian states (particularly China) as potential threats to Canada’s interests in the Arctic, the basis for this alarmism -- apart from more generalized discourses of alarmism associated with the “rise of China” – is speculative and imprecise. Using Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and Arctic Foreign Policy Statement (2010) as filters, the papers shows where Asia’s Arctic
interests may converge or diverge with those of Canada. This study recommends various messages that Canada may wish to emphasize in its interactions with Asian states to safeguard its national interests, promote sustainable development for the benefit of Northerners, and enhance cooperation and constructive dialogue in the circumpolar world.

7. **Russia: Tamara Troyakova (Far Eastern National University, Russia)**

The importance of the Arctic region to the international community has grown by virtue of its potential recoverable energy holdings and the prospects of increased navigation due to climate change. Northeast Asia’s interest in the Arctic region is driven primarily by economic motives. This paper examines whether or not Russia would benefit from economic cooperation with China, Japan, and Republic of Korea in the Arctic. It also considers the disparity between Russia’s Arctic policy and its implementation, the possibility of using the Northern Sea Route for extensive international shipping, and the development of energy resources in the north. The paper makes several conclusions. First that Russian ambitions in the Arctic are quite real, but they are still far from being realized. Second, the Northern Sea Route will continue to remain little more than Russia’s internal navigation passage for the foreseeable future. And finally that the future development of Russia will reflect the interplay of a number of factors, including energy prices, technological advances, and the need for foreign investment. Russia’s cooperation with Northeast countries may be a good option in meeting challenges emerging in the evolving Arctic environment. The Arctic potential will continue to attract the attention of the Northeast Asian countries and inspire them to work together with Russia.

**Discussant: James Manicom (Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada)**

The discussion began with Manicom’s comments on McBeath’s paper. His paper was the only one of these three that raised the question of fisheries. If you are going to have a discussion about Arctic resources and East Asian states we need to address fisheries. If his paper will be the only place to deal with fisheries then it will need added depth. But the fisheries issue could also be raised in the introduction or conclusion of the publication. China, Japan, and Korea are already Alaska’s top three trading partners. How, if at all, will this influence Canada’s attempt to increase resource exports to East Asia? Can Canada build off Alaska’s existing infrastructure and trade structures? Examining these question could lead to interesting policy recommendations.

In response to asking why McBeath did not mention security, with the Bering Strait becoming a potential choke point, McBeath responded that locally economic concerns outweigh those of security because defence is a federal, rather than state concern. Other participants asked if McBeath should
comment on why there are relatively weak relations between Alaska and northern Canada compared to those throughout Scandinavia. Colleagues also asked how indigenous peoples governance in Alaska plays in Alaska’s relations with East Asia and the flexibility Alaska has in dealing with East Asia, given the state’s relationship with the federal government.

Manicom thought that Lackenbauer’s paper contained three papers in one. There is one about expelling myths, one about theoretical frameworks and the Calgary school, and finally one about Canada’s northern strategy and where East Asian countries can find opportunities. This last one will be most interesting for future publication and this project because it is policy relevant. This last part should be expanded on. Within this expansion, the paper could also address the relationship between northerners and East Asian states.

To what extent does the Calgary school reflect federal government policy? Are they two sides of the same coin? Lackenbauer thought that the federal government moved its policy away from military and the “use it or lose it” mentality a few years ago to a focus on northerners but the debates in the Calgary school have not. Others thought that the respect for northerners will not likely hold in the future because it is unlikely that the government will favour small northern populations and allow them to hold up development. For East Asian readers of Canadian northern policy the subtleties on sovereignty may be hard to understand so Canada needs to do a better job at clearly signalling that Canada is conforming with international law and distinguishing between domestic and regional / global priorities. Discussion also included looking at the need to disseminate Arctic Council discussions in policy ready formats that individual states can use and implement and at what the Arctic Council has to gain from East Asian participation. We also need to look at what we mean by the North. For example, why should we interpret the Canadian Arctic in terms of the territories when the provincial norths are so similar. Such a definition marginalizes the regions of the north with the largest populations and misrepresents Canada’s position in the north and limits northerners’ perspectives and diversity.

Moving on to Troyakova’s paper, Manicom suggested that she further explain how the debate on the Northern Sea Route will differ from other Northeast Asian economic cooperation, offer suggestions on how to overcome problems over the “Northern Territories” issue because it will be tied to development of northern shipping, and focus more on the interests of the local populations. Discussion then moved toward group discussion on Russian security and military dimensions in the north and the difference between state rhetoric and reality, relations between Vladivostok and Murmansk, and viability of northern shipping because of corruption and the lack of an ice free passage in Russia as it relates to northern shipping. The session finished with an observation that a major theme of these and prior papers has been on dispelling myths. This should be one of the main themes of the group’s future work.
Session Three: The Changing Arctic and its Implications to East Asia
Chair: David Welch (Balsillie School of International Affairs / University of Waterloo, Canada)

8. Changing Arctic and its Security Implications to East Asia: Kimie Hara (Renison / University of Waterloo, Canada)

East Asia today is closely connected by economics but still deeply divided by politics. Unlike Europe, where the Yalta System collapsed over twenty years ago, the structure of confrontation since the Cold War era remains in East Asia. China and Korea are still divided, with their Communist or authoritarian parts still perceived as threats by their neighbours. The territorial problems continue to provide additional sources of instability. Accordingly, the US military presence through its hub-and-spokes security arrangements with regional allies and associated issues, such as the “Okinawa problem,” also remain in this region. The year 2012 provided strong reminders of these divisions, especially over the territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbours, and China and its neighbours. There have been “thaws” and transformations, reflecting changes in the global political environment, from time to time. Yet, with its foundation laid over six decades ago, the “San Francisco System” and the US-led post-World War II regional order, essentially continues to dominate in East Asia. In the meantime, the new environmental changes in the North have been reshaping the world, both physically and in international politics, generating heated discussions on such issues as border disputes, Arctic sovereignty, resource exploitation, and the security of new maritime transportation routes. What are the political and security implications of the evolving situation of the Arctic region to East Asia? How will the Arctic “thaw” bring changes to this region? Are there, or will there be, new opportunities for cooperation and/or additional sources of conflict emerging? Will the Arctic “thaw” bring fundamental change in terms of political and security order/structure in East Asia? Taking the “San Francisco System” as its conceptual grounding, this paper (1) traces the major development of post-WWII regional political and security relations in East Asia, and (2) considers emerging and possible impacts of the Arctic “Thaw” to the current status quo.

9. Changing Arctic and its Economic Implications to East Asia: Carin Holroyd (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)

East Asian countries and companies have shown increased interest and activity in the Arctic, leading to extensive speculation about the long-term significance of these actions. Rarely are East Asia’s Arctic endeavours seen in an appropriately global context. East Asian countries, like many others, appreciate the Arctic’s potential in terms of resources and the opening of navigable waters in the Far North that global warming may bring. It is scarcely surprising that East Asian nations are keeping an eye on developments and investment opportunities in the Arctic. But the Arctic is only a small part of East Asia’s large and intense search for long-term supplies of natural resources, including oil, gas, and
minerals. When the Arctic engagement is measured against East Asian activities in the sub-Arctic, Australia, much of Asia and Africa, it soon becomes clear that the Far North is not central to East Asian resource exploration and development strategies. There are possibilities for East Asia in the Arctic, and these are being looked into aggressively. But for the foreseeable future, East Asian countries will continue to devote most of their attention, effort and investments to more southerly and accessible regions, save for those rare occasions where geography and opportunity create a truly important development opportunity.

10. Arctic Thaw & Border Regions in East Asia: Aki Iwashita (Hokkaido University, Japan)

Borderlands security and stability have gained new momentum on the Eurasian continent since the start of Sino-Russian border cooperation and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Central Eurasia in 2001. Compared to the previous century, the trends of inland cooperation proceeded beyond the former Soviet-China zone toward other regions, including the Vietnam-China reconciliation of the inland border and the Gulf of Tonkin. Some border challenges such as the one between India and China have yet to be settled, but relations between the two countries are stable at least.

In contrast, border issues arising from sea zones around the Eurasian continent have come into focus. The conflict zone is apparently shifting from the middle tier to the southern tier. Tensions over the South China Sea are growing. The clash between China and Japan over the East China Sea since 2010 has been notable. East Asia also faces challenges on the maritime issues such as in Japan-Korean, Korean-Chinese and Japan-Russian relations. However, the northern tier on Eurasia will also be highlighted as a potential conflict zone in East Asian. The paper features the Arctic as one part of the “Eurasian Sea” and particularly discusses the future competition and cooperation among East Asian countries with Russia.

Discussant: Young-Kil Park (Korea Maritime Institute, ROK)

Group discussion on Hara’s paper focused on implications and policy recommendations barriers to security cooperation in East Asia. It is more about addressing why anyone does not want to build confidence in the region rather than the recognition of the need for confidence building. This puts limits on what Canada can do. If Canada or other governments outside of East Asia are not really interested or visibly affected by the territorial questions in the Asia-Pacific it may be difficult to get these countries involved in regional security. By framing these issues as North Pacific issues, it pulls the territorial issues into Arctic policy that could bring about a variety of unintended consequences that could include cooperation in policing northern fisheries. If the Northern Sea Route opens to more traffic then it is likely
that China would use ports in Southern Korea. There would then be an increase in commercial and military traffic in the waters throughout the Asia-Pacific. The group had mixed views on how to bring North Korea into the discussion on the Arctic but the topic fits within finding ways for East Asian stability. Discussion on this paper concluded with thoughts on how to define “Arctic” as well as time periods to be used to shape what is to be included in future conversation, papers, and policy recommendations.

Discussion on Holroyd’s paper began with the suggestion that graphs that represent East Asian investments in the Arctic be included, that it use citations from Mamdough Salameh with caution, and that it should further engage with myth dispelling, especially on the idea that the Arctic lacks strong institutions, except for perhaps in Greenland. Discussion then moved toward how domestic politics and business interests come to play in economic development. For example, instead of focusing on government policies and cooperation it would be interesting to look at how businesses are cooperating with each other to further economic development in the north and the role of state/ministerial policies within these. Lastly, it was questioned if East Asian interest in the Arctic is not new but part of a long-standing pattern of states expanding their resource development to sustain their standard of living. If this is the case, then we should incorporate this broad view into the interpretation of East Asian economic development in the Arctic.

Comments on the last paper in this session began with remarks on how the concepts were refreshing, but that the views on Canada seem extreme so it will require more familiarity with the extensive literature on Canada. The author should expand on the Arctic Monroe Doctrine idea. Others saw the paper as an extension of the Mackinder school of thought and wondered how this paper differs or improves on the earlier literature in this field. More work should be done on explicitly connecting the Shanghai Cooperation to the Arctic and clarifying between maritime and coastal states. The paper should pay more attention to the Law of the Sea for resolving territorial issues in the Arctic. This paper could address the possibility of East Asia cooperating as a bloc to assert East Asian interests in the Arctic.

Session Four: East Asian – Arctic Affairs in Global Perspective
Chair: Whitney Lackenbauer (St. Jerome’s / University of Waterloo, Canada)

11. Indigenous Peoples and Asian Engagement in the Arctic: Aileen A. Epiritu (Barents Institute, Norway)

The rapid economic, political and social development of Asian countries, and thus the need for more energy and raw materials, concurrent with the anticipated Arctic Sea ice-melt and the opening of shipping routes, have led to intensified Asian interest in the Arctic. Indeed, attention from actors who have traditionally not concerned themselves with Arctic affairs have grown exponentially just in the last
three to five years. To this end, the People’s Republic of China, the State of Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Singapore, and Republic of India, as well as the European Union, have requested full observer status in the Arctic Council, the only governing and region-building institution in the Arctic. The question for the less than 13 million people, both indigenous and non-indigenous, living in the Arctic is what full observer status for Asian countries will mean vis-a-vis the needs of billions of people living in Asia? More pointedly, what will it mean for the indigenous peoples in the Arctic who number less than 1.5% of the total Arctic population? This paper explores this question within the complex and heterogeneous ambitions and desires of indigenous peoples in the Circumpolar Arctic. By surveying the Arctic strategies of the key Asian countries, China and Japan, set against the multiplicity of voices of indigenous peoples, I attempt to advance an understanding of the place of indigenous peoples in an expanding international relations arena in the Arctic, and suggest ways of moving forward to protect the interests of Northern indigenous communities.

12. Arctic & Global Geo-Politics: David Welch (Balsillie School of International Affairs / University of Waterloo, Canada)

As the field of international security changes, so also does our understanding of “geopolitics.” On a traditional understanding of security of the kind used by most (and mostly “realist”) scholars of international politics, geopolitics is the art and science of promoting national interest defined in terms of power by manoeuvring for territorial advantage. During the Cold War, the Arctic had geopolitical value as a result of the premium the superpowers placed on early warning of transpolar ballistic missile or strategic bomber attack. Now that the Cold War is over, however -- and in view of technological advances that release the former superpowers and rising powers alike from having to rely upon ground-based sensors and communications systems -- the Arctic has lost its “hard” security value. But post-Cold War conceptions of security are much broader. They concern themselves with a wider variety of security referents, and also a wider array of threats. While the language of geopolitics has yet to establish more than a marginal foothold on the new security agenda, geography still matters. This paper surveys non-traditional security issues for which geopolitical rivalry over the Arctic is, or conceivably will soon become, matters of importance to Arctic countries and those who aspire to play a role in Arctic governance. It argues that two such issues stand out: environmental security and human security. Fortunately, security so conceived is far less likely to be zero-sum than traditional hard security, and cooperative solutions to security problems easier to identify. Nevertheless, there remain significant tensions between short term myopic conceptions of national interest and long term non-myopic conceptions, as well as between established Arctic players and various aspirants. The jockeying for advantage on these two dimensions will be the future “Great Game” of Arctic geopolitics, and the fate of both environmental and human security hangs in the balance.
13. East Asian Nations, the Arctic Council and International Relations in the Arctic: James Manicom (Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada)

This paper will examine the applications by East Asian nations for observer status at the Arctic Council. It will begin with a general reflection on East Asian nations’ interests in the Arctic, followed by a brief background on the Arctic Council and observer status (including the criteria laid out in the 2012 Nuuk declaration) and the formal applications by China, Japan, and South Korea. While explicit state justifications or rationales for observer status are largely absent, academic and media commentators in Asian nations have suggested why this status should be extended. Their viewpoints will be critically analyzed in the context of the Nuuk criteria and the interests of the Arctic Council member states (the Arctic 8) and the permanent participants. Furthermore, the paper will assess Western academic, media, and think-tank commentary on East Asian nations’ applications and anticipated implications for the future of the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance more generally.

Discussant: Eva Busza (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada)

These three papers highlight the need to further define what observer status means and what the implications of observer status would be for affecting policy in different sectors. Does observer status provide leverage of any kind, and, if so, do we have examples of this? The three papers also mentioned the likelihood of countries wanting to move from having observer status to permanent member status but they should expand on what they think will happen with this and address what the time frames for such a movement might be. Busza also asked if the authors could expand on what kind of agenda items are likely to come up in the future and the diversity of the positions of countries seeking observer status. Are there other international organizations that have gone through similar dynamics that we could compare to the Arctic Council? Specifically on Espiritu’s paper, Busza questioned the usefulness of the rational actor model. If it used in a later draft, the paper will have to show an alternative to it and show how and why the model worked. She liked the focus on different indigenous views but can the paper expand on these views and how they will interact with an expanded Arctic Council. Manicom’s paper should expand more on the differences and motivations of the involved states and further expand on it if there are any alternatives to the Arctic Council for Arctic governance. If none exist, is a new type of institution needed? Lastly, the paper could benefit from a richer discussion on the East Asian countries’ perspectives and attitudes on indigenous peoples. The floor then opened up to the rest of the participants. Discussion revolved around debating various issues related to indigenous peoples such as interregional indigenous relations, the role of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, which country has the best overall approach to indigenous peoples, and the scale of nation-building and indigenous peoples in the
Arctic. The session finished with discussion on asking if the Arctic Council is the most appropriate institution for dealing with East Asia’s interest in the region, and if it will be able to deal with future governance issues.
Appendix A: Part I Participants

**Eva Busza**, Vice President, Knowledge and Research, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

**Ken Coates**, Canada Research Chair in Regional Innovation at the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy / Professor, University of Saskatchewan, Canada

**Aileen Espiritu**, Director, The Barents Institute at the University of Tromsø

**Douglas Goold**, Director, National Conversation on Asia, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

**Kimie Hara**, Director of East Asian Studies at Renison University College, Professor and the Renison Research Professor at the University of Waterloo, Canada

**Scott Harrison**, PhD Candidate (A.B.D.) in History, University of Waterloo, Canada

**Carin Holroyd**, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Saskatchewan, Canada

**Akihiro Iwashita**, Professor, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan

**Whitney Lackenbauer**, Associate Professor, St. Jerome’s University, University of Waterloo, Canada

**Keun-Gwan Lee**, Professor of International Law, School of Law, Seoul University, ROK

**James Manicom**, Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada

**Gerald McBeath**, Professor of Political Science, University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA

**Fujio Ohnishi**, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, ROK

**Young-Kii Park**, Senior Researcher, Korea Maritime Institute, ROK

**Kai Sun**, Associate Professor, Ocean University of China, PRC

**Tamara Troyakova**, Associate Professor, Head of International Studies Department at the School of International and Regional Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, Russia

**David Welch**, CIGI Chair of Global Security and Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Canada

**Elizabeth Hanson**, Leader of the Official Opposition, Yukon Legislative Assembly, New Democratic party

**Piers McDonald**, Partner at McDonald Management Consulting
Appendix B: Part I Agenda

Venue: Yukon College
500 College Drive, Whitehorse, YT, Y1A5K4 Canada

MARCH 2, 2013 (Saturday)

09:00 Hotel Departure by Shuttle Bus. Breakfast at the Yukon College.

10:00 OPENING SESSION
   Introduction: Kimie Hara and Ken Coates
   1. Forces for Change in the Arctic: Ken Coates (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)
      Discussant: Whitney Lackenbauer (Univ. of Waterloo/St. Jeromes, Canada)

10:30 SESSION ONE: Asian Interests and Involvement in the Arctic
   Chair: Kimie Hara
   2. Japan & the Arctic: Fujio Ohnishi (Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan)
   3. China & the Arctic: Kai Sun (Ocean University of China, PRC)
   4. Korea & the Arctic: Keun-Gwan Lee (Seoul National University, ROK)
      Discussant: Doug Goold (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada)

12:00 Lunch

13:30 Northern Experience

19:00 Dinner

MARCH 3, 2013 (Sunday)

08:30 Hotel Departure by Shuttle Bus

09:00 SESSION TWO: Arctic Powers with Gateways to the Pacific on East Asia-Arctic Relations
   Chair: Ken Coates
   5. USA: Gerald McBeath (University of Alaska, USA)
   6. Canada: Whitney Lackenbauer (Univ. of Waterloo/St. Jerome’s, Canada)
   7. Russia: Tamara Troyakova (Far Eastern National University, Russia)
      Discussant: James Manicom (CIGI, Canada)

10:30 Coffee Break

10:45 SESSION THREE: The Changing Arctic and Its Implications to East Asia
   Chair: David Welch (BSIA/Univ. of Waterloo, Canada)
   8. Changing Arctic and Its Security Implications to East Asia: Kimie Hara (Univ. of Waterloo/Renison, Canada)
   9. Changing Arctic and Its Economic Implications to East Asia: Carin Holroyd (Univ. of Sask., Canada)
   10. Arctic Thaw & border regions in East Asia: Aki Iwashita (Hokkaido University, Japan)
      Discussant: Young-ki Park (Korea Maritime Institute, ROK)

12:15 Lunch

13:15 SESSION FOUR: East Asian-Arctic Affairs in Global Perspective
   Chair: Whitney Lackenbauer (Univ. of Waterloo/St. Jerome’s, Canada)
   11. Indigenous Peoples and Asian Engagement in the Arctic: Aileen Espíritu (Barents Institute, Norway)
   12. Arctic & Global Geo-Politics: David Welch, (BSIA/Univ. of Waterloo, Canada)
   13. East Asian Nations, the Arctic Council and International Relations in the Arctic: James Manicom (CIGI, Canada)
      Discussant: Eva Busza (Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada)

14:45 Coffee Break

15:00 CONCLUDING SESSION: Next Steps and Publication Plans
   -16:00 Chairs: Ken Coates and Kimie Hara

17:30 Hotel Departure for Dinner

18:00 Dinner
East Asia – Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security, and International Politics
Part I: Academic Workshop
- Workshop Report

Prepared by Scott Harrison
Edited and Prefaced by Kimie Hara, Ken Coates

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