University of British Columbia
The Social Virtue of Science: Motivating the Structural Objectivity of Early Logical Empiricism
This talk begins from the account of structural objectivity offered in Lorraine Daston's and Peter Galison's monumental book, Objectivity, but it offers a different motivation for the structural objectivity of early logical empiricism than is found there. Instead of locating the "unruly subjectivity" to be tamed in epistemic solipsism, I argue that Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach were motivated by the social context of knowledge-making in the sciences and its superiority to the implicit epistemology of philosophical knowledge they saw in the metaphysics of their time. Implicit within the talk is part of an answer to the social project of logical empiricism: epistemic life demands its own virtuous deployment of the will and the co-ordination of the goals of society.
Co-hosted with Science and Technology in Society.
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