Please join us for a talk by Dave DeVidi on Bottom-Up Logical Pluralism, from 3:30-5:00 on January 17th, in HH 336.
Abstract: Philosophical defences of logical pluralism often derive it as a corollary to some other highly abstract philosophical view. In particular, it is commonly suggested that different logics are appropriate for reasoning about domains with different metaphysical or ontological statuses, e.g. that classical logic is appropriate for reasoning about real things, while some other logic(s) are appropriate for domains that are human constructions (or for other reason are not really real).
The point of this paper is to try to draw a similar lesson about the tight relationship between different logics and metaphysics, but starting from a different place — namely by starting from particular inferences and working upwards. The virtues of the approach, I will suggest, include: making more evident why metaphysical status and what sort of reasoning is correct should be related (e.g., by reducing the need to rely on metaphors); relocating the source of logical variation from the philosophically problematic and hard to interpret level of “domains”; and helping to solve longstanding challenges for logical pluralism like the mixed-inference problem.
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