A pluralist thesis about logic, in its most general formulation, is the claim that more than one logic is correct. Recently several variations of the general pluralist thesis have been proposed (Beall and Restall 2005, DeVidi 2011, Shapiro 2011). There are two problems that have not been adequately addressed facing all of these different versions of logical pluralism. The first problem is one raised by Graham Priest (2001) and Stephen Read (2006). Priest and Read ask how it is possible to settle the truth-value of a proposition that follows from true premises in one correct logic but not in another. I address this problem by developing a more nuanced version of logical pluralism that has a clear answer to the Priest-Read question. The second problem facing recent accounts of logical pluralism is that there has been no investigation into the downstream implications that logical pluralism has on other areas of philosophy. I address this problem by illustrating one implication that the version of pluralism I propose has on the epistemology of disagreement.

Friday, November 23, 2012
Hagey Hall, room 373
3:30 p.m.