Comparing War Prerogative Reform in Canada and the United Kingdom
In Canada and the United Kingdom, the legal authority to deploy armed forces is an executive prerogative. The Canadian and British Parliaments have no formal role in military deployments decisions. Over the past decade, however, both states have given the House of Commons an informal role in military deployment decisions. Their lower houses of Parliament have been asked to vote on military missions involving combat. In the United Kingdom, this reform has acted as a check on the executive. In Canada, however, the reform has benefited and enabled the executive. Using the theory of gradual institutional change proposed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), this paper analyses why the war prerogative reforms in Canada and the United Kingdom resulted in different outcomes. The paper argues that the variation is explained by whether the legislature or executive pushed for the reform, and by the motives of the change agents.
Friday March 11th 2016
11:30 – 1:00pm
Hagey Hall 341 – PSCI Lounge