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Consolidating Europe's Past with its Present:

An overview on Voter Preferences in Germany & Sweden

Leen Abdel Qader

1.0 Introduction

Colonialism and postcolonial power dynamics have contributed to much of the ideological foundations of political structures and institutions in European countries. The basis of colonialism was the concept of Other-ing and the superior-inferior complex that was founded on the basis of Europe being inherently civilized, democratic and therefore had the right to further its interests abroad in the name of civilizing and uplifting weaker autocratic states. This continues to be directly relevant to political parties and voting preferences today because it constitutes a pivotal indicator of resentment toward immigrants, fear of them abusing the welfare state and the general differing attitudes between natives and immigrants on redistribution policy. This paper will focus on two European countries, Germany and Sweden, to highlight how their historical past plays out into their present, in terms of mapping preferences and analyzing racialized forms of inclusion and exclusion. More precisely, this paper takes Germany as an example of states that are far more xenophobic than Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, where political participation even prior to the Voting Reform of 1975 was significantly higher. In addition to increased political activism and inclusion, immigrants and noncitizens in Sweden showed higher voter turnout in contrast to their German counterparts, who are yet to extend the right to vote to non-citizens. As such, this essay is primarily focused on drawing attention to how colonial power dynamics influence social cohesion and immigrant resentment, or inclusion, in varying European countries. To do so, this paper contextualizes Germany and Sweden, in attempt to consolidate their pasts with their present and to reflect on how this contextualization in turn maps onto voter preferences and the indicators used to measure them. The findings of this paper will illustrate that voter turnout and participation is low in Germany (in contrast to Sweden) while reaffirming that immigrant voter preferences, using socioeconomic standard as an indicator, do not vary distinctively from natives' preferences. Sweden however is characterized by higher political participation, engagement, turnout and this

increased political participation has in turn increased spending on social services such as health care, education and social insurance by a statistically significant proportion. In essence, this paper shifts attention to the ironic contrast between the xenophobic Germany, whose immigrant voters cannot possibly pose a threat to social cohesion or their political future; and Sweden, where xenophobia is far less but noncitizens and immigrants are indeed causing policy shifts in the distribution of welfare.

2.0 Contextualizing Europe: A historical analysis

The following sections will expand on (a) racialized forms of inclusion and exclusion as a continuum to colonial and postcolonial power dynamics and; (b) the effects of a booming immigration and/or asylum seeking (Syrian refugee crisis) on voting tendencies with reference to specific examples and theories, to analyze the mobilization of voter support for radical right-wing parties. The expansion on the above factors will relatively account for the immigrant versus native voting preference variation in Germany, and to a lesser extent, Sweden.

2.1 Colonial & Postcolonial Power Dynamics

The colonial and imperialist past of many European countries, namely Britain and France, has been premised on the idea of recreating interests abroad and expanding power through economic (transfer of wealth, resources, labor, etc.) and territorial control of foreign states¹. Colonialism, however, was a leverage gain for European countries whom were icons of civilizations and superiority, and have therefore used this power to other autocratic countries with weak leaderships such as Algeria and India, as suggested by the Structural Dependency Theory². Justifications such as ‘primitive’, ‘barbaric’ and uncivilized were pivotal in recreating and affirming the superior vs. inferior power dynamic that European countries remain largely influenced by today, with the exceptions of a few countries such as New Zealand³. This is particularly important because this continuum is ultimately built into social scientific contexts and is central for the development of a complete understanding of today’s racialized forms of inclusion and exclusion⁴. More precisely, this accounts for the concurrence of neoliberalism and populism,

¹ Loomba, A. (2005). *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. London: Routledge. Page 105-7.

² Lehmann, J. (2012, March 13). *Bridging the 21st Century's North-South Divide - The Globalist*. Retrieved March 30, 2016, from <http://www.theglobalist.com/bridging-the-21st-century-north-south-divide/>

³ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden’s Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 15-29. do:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

⁴ Kremer, M. (2016). Earned Citizenship: Labour Migrants’ Views on the Welfare State. *Journal of Social Policy*, 45(3), 415;395;-415. do:10.1017/S0047279416000088

which are almost dependent on one another due to ongoing patterns of disregard toward immigrant voting preference, political activism and views on redistribution⁵. Germany is a prime example of the above, with right-wing parties gaining more momentum after the influx of Syrian refugees into the country and their fear of losing control over the future of this state; an ideology that is very much rooted in the colonial power dynamics of the white European settler the primitive Other (immigrant)⁶.

Likely, this contextual understanding also accounts for the natives' view of immigrants and asylum seekers as 'undeserving welfare abusers' and the subsequent racialized exclusion of the latter⁷. Such ideologies are further confirmed when observing the mobilization of voter support by radical right-wing parties in Germany (and more generally Europe) through the linkage of immigration to social instability, economic hardships and criminality⁸. An example of this is the turnaround of political and social attitudes from Willkommenskultur (welcome culture) to hostility and renewed immigration policy post the accusations of harassment by an immigrant⁹. The focus on such cases as opposed to social cohesion and the integration of immigrants are concrete evidence that immigrants remain 'primitive' and 'undeserving' in many countries across Europe –regardless of their status, and due to their race. As such, the ongoing failure to adequately and effectively address race and immigration play into much of the voter preference turnout of these European countries.

2.2 International migrants & the Syrian refugee crisis

Another important variable to factor in, on the analysis of immigrant view of redistribution and of social policies, is the culture accompanying international migrants and asylum-seekers. The general disregard and/or disapproval that native Europeans have toward immigrant preferences on social welfare and redistribution do not solely stem from racial biases, through interrelated; but

⁵ Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Careja, R. (2017). Institutions, culture and migrants' preferences for state-provided welfare. Longitudinal evidence from Germany. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 27(2), 197-212. doi:10.1177/09588928716681463

⁶ Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & EBSCO Publishing (Firm). (2013). *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. London: Profile.

⁷ Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Careja, R. (2017). Institutions, culture and migrants' preferences for state-provided welfare. Longitudinal evidence from Germany. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 27(2), 197-212. doi:10.1177/09588928716681463

⁸ Valenta, M. (2014). The Nexus of Asylum Seeker Migrations and asylum policy: Longitudinal analysis of migration trends. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 21(3), 371-394. Doi:10.1163/15718115-02103003

⁹ Fekete, L. (2009;2015). *A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe*. (1st ed.). London: Pluto. Doi:10.2307/jett183p2jr

also has to do with the differing cultural values, particularly when linked to religion, that many immigrants and refugees may hold onto after their settlement in European countries¹⁰. These values and understanding could potentially be responsible for the preferences of immigrants and may therefore be contributing to the shaping of social policies in their country of residence¹¹. The ability of these values to transmit through generations could also signal a threat to natives' whom do not want the social and political policies to be informed by generations carrying different values¹².

However, despite the importance of the above in accounting for variation across voting preference, it is crucial to note that immigrants (even in countries with the highest number of immigrants) remain a minority that cannot possibly substantially alter a state's socioeconomic and political policies as a result of their differentiated opinion on welfare and redistribution¹³. That said, the Syrian refugee crisis nevertheless gave birth to a renewed sense of radical nationalism in countries such as Germany and, to a lesser extent in Britain, who seemed far less enthusiastic about accepting a large number of asylum-seeking applications. Moreover, since European countries, generally, do not allow residing non-citizens the right to vote, regardless of their status (immigrant, refugee, etc.), factors into the different redistribution preferences of immigrants and natives¹⁴.

3.0 Overview of voter preference in Germany & Sweden

I would like to note the reason for choosing Germany and Sweden as my focal cases of interest in this paper. Due to this paper's interest in the role of colonial and postcolonial power dynamics in the shaping of social cohesion, acceptance and/or refusal of migrant workers and refugees, this paper was particularly interested in studying two very different European countries, which reflect distinctively on the political participation and redistribution preferences of noncitizens, migrant workers and refugees. As such, while Germany, Britain and France share quantitatively and qualitatively similar histories and voting patterns with regard to immigrant political alignment, participation and preferences for redistribution, Sweden is more reflective of

¹⁰ Lisa M. La Fornara. (2018). Islam's (in)Compatibility with the West?. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 25(1), 463-494. Doi:10.2979/indjglolegstu.25.1.04.63

¹¹ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 15-29. do:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

¹² Erzo, F. P. Luttmer, & Singhal, M. (2011). Culture, Context, and the taste for redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), 157-179. do:10.1257/pol.3.1.157

¹³ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 15-29. do:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

¹⁴ *ibid.*

social cohesion, integration and an increased focus on minimizing noncitizen suffrage; which quantitatively translated into extending them the right to vote and therefore achieving statistically significant differences in spending¹⁵.

3.1 Germany: Migrant Workers, Xenophobia & Culture

In the German scenario, it is of particular importance to draw attention to the German migration needs to further contextualize current voting patterns and native behaviors toward immigration policies. Post the Second World War, Germany's dire need to reconstruct facilities, develop its manufacturing sector and boost the economy required extensive labor that was brought in the form of immigration¹⁶. Up until 1973, Germany accepted a large and growing number of migrant applications and allocated jobs for them in return to further their domestic interests of better cycling the economy¹⁷. Labor migrants had access to social services, housing, wages and training –though disputable to what extent these amenities were in line with international labor standards. However, these migrant workers remained under the same status they arrived with, and the vast majority, were not granted citizenship or the right to vote. Since this trade off presented a win-win situation to Germany's economic drive and the migrants search for a better quality of life, native hatred and/or resentment toward immigration did not largely increase up until the 1980s and 1990s when Germany continued to accept further migrant laborers, particularly from Southern Europe, North Africa and Turkey, increasing the number of migrants dramatically in Germany¹⁸. In addition to that, many of the family members of migrants joined them after their migration to Germany, to the extent where it was almost impossible to ignore migrants and refugees politically, or to exclude them from the sociopolitical realm of the country¹⁹. The dire need to politically be inclusive of immigrants, regardless of whether or not they are migrant workers or refugees, translated into a need to collect data on the political and social preferences that immigrants are expected to hold.

Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of immigrants who responded to surveys pertaining to their political alignment, showed particular admiration for the Social Democrats Party (SDP) as

¹⁵ Kremer, M. (2016). Earned Citizenship: Labour Migrants' Views on the Welfare State. *Journal of Social Policy*, 45(3), 415;395;-415. doi:10.1017/S0047279416000088

¹⁶ Dancygier, R., & Saunders, E. N. (2006). A new electorate comparing preferences and partisanship between immigrants and natives. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 962-981. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

opposed to a more conservative leaning²⁰. The suggested reason for this leaning was initially their socioeconomic standing and how that contributed to much of their policy preferences when asked. However, more recently, and particularly post the Syrian refugee crisis, it is becoming more apparent that the socioeconomic conditions of migrants and refugees are not necessary a variable that adequately reflects their socioeconomic backgrounds and/or living conditions; rather, these views could potentially be resemble their preferences based on their country's of origin form of government²¹. As such, country of origin needed to be considered as well, in addition to the direction of the political party in terms of their immigrant policy views and tendencies to address migrant concerns. In concrete terms, the mechanism developed here pertains to symbolic politics and revolves around the concept of linking voting preferences and views on redistribution to the *political ideology* of individuals (whether native or immigrant) 'pre-adulthood'²². According to this model, it is then understandable that immigrants whom showed political tendencies to the SDP did so due to the inherit understanding of left-wing parties of minority concerns, needs and therefore mediate them far more than right-wing parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)²³.

Most importantly however, although socioeconomic factors do indeed partially shape the attitude to migrants toward increasing social spending and redistribution, it does so for natives' whom share similar socioeconomic factors as well. That said, a case study pertaining to political preferences on increased social spending and redistribution in Germany showed that while pre-adulthood, native resentment, and racist/sexist concerns accounts for the relative cross-national variation, natives' and immigrants seems to have very similar attitudes and polarization trends thoroughly. This means that voting tendencies may differ more depending on the geographic location (i.e. East Germany and West Germany), as opposed to systematic differences between the native and immigrant political tendencies²⁴. The greatest variation is then that between the part of

²⁰ Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Careja, R. (2017). Institutions, culture and migrants' preferences for state-provided welfare. Longitudinal evidence from Germany. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 27(2), 197-212. doi:10.1177/09588928716681463

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Luttmer, P., & Singhal, M. (2011). Culture, Context, and the taste for redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), 157-179. doi:10.1257/pol.3.1.157-79.

²³ Dancygier, R., & Saunders, E. N. (2006). A new electorate comparing preferences and partisanship between immigrants and natives. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 962-981. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x

²⁴ Erzo, F. P. Luttmer, & Singhal, M. (2011). Culture, Context, and the taste for redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), 157-179. doi:10.1257/pol.3.1.157

Germany that previously held far greater communist ideologies and remained therefore heavily influenced politically by that, post Germany's reunification²⁵. The findings of this case study similarly show that the native fear of immigrants 'abusing the welfare state' and/or shaping the political future of the country according to their preferences is ill-founded, since immigrants surveyed in Germany did not show heightened enthusiasm for increase welfare spending or redistribution than the average German native²⁶. That said, the *motivation* for their political preferences as they stand, and despite the empirical similarity between natives and immigrants, nevertheless differ tremendously due to effects of culture, colonial legacies, xenophobia and other relevant factors.

Sweden: The Voting Reform of 1975 & Voter Turnout

The case is substantially different for Sweden, which has been distinct from other European countries particularly after the Swedish Voting Rights Reform of 1975²⁷. Scandinavian countries including Sweden generally have similar social and political policies of integration and inclusion. Likely, these countries have not been intensively influenced by colonialism, in contrast to other European powers such as Germany, Britain and France, whom show similar qualitative data on voter support, or lack thereof, for redistribution between natives and immigrants²⁸. More precisely, my argument for the Swedish case is twofold: (a) increased social cohesion and integration policies in Sweden increased political participation and; (b) the municipal makeup of the country and the proportion of foreign school-age children resulted, in conflation with the former argument, in statistically significant positive results for increased social spending, particularly on education, social insurance and health care.

In practice, the Swedish Voting Rights Reform of 1975 extended the right to vote to all foreign citizens whom have resided in Sweden for a duration totaling and/or exceeding three years²⁹. However, existing literature and case studies on Sweden, and Scandinavian countries more generally, show a significantly higher acceptance of foreign workers and immigrants, while

²⁵ Erzo, F. P. Luttmer, & Singhal, M. (2011). Culture, Context, and the taste for redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), 157-179. doi:10.1257/pol.3.1.157

²⁶ Dancygier, R., & Saunders, E. N. (2006). A new electorate comparing preferences and partisanship between immigrants and natives. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 962-981. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00227.x

²⁷ Eger, M.A. (2010), Even in Sweden: The effect of immigration on support for welfare state spending. *European Sociological Review*, 26, 2, 203-217.

²⁸ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 15-29. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

²⁹ *ibid.* 20.

showing far less resentment or fear (in contrast to their German, British and French counterparts) of immigrants shaping the future of their welfare state through the extension of the right to vote. The social cohesion present in Sweden therefore accounts for the heightened numbers of political activity and participation, even prior the enactment of this reform, and help in explaining the largely substantial data proving the quantifiable effects of this reform on increased spending in Sweden³⁰. More concretely, a case study on inclusion and public policy in Sweden discusses the historical context of the voting reform and the Immigrant Commission of 1968 to elaborate on the country's contextual background in contrast to Germany, which was far less concerned with the wellbeing and/or general satisfaction and quality of life of immigrants and migrant workers³¹. This is particularly important because Sweden's dedication and publicized efforts to accommodate foreign workers (non-citizens) reflected in higher political participation, inclusion and activism. Likely, an approximate 60 percent of eligible voters exercise their right to vote since the reform in 1975, and they have been particularly successful in terms of increasing welfare spending on education, health care and social insurance –implicitly indicating their commitment to the country, as opposed to Germany, where migrant workers were more temporary and therefore less connected and politically engaged.³²

The governmental desire to decrease noncitizen and/or immigrant suffrage in Sweden also reflected proportionally on different municipalities in Sweden. Quantitatively, the voting reform in Sweden meant that the voter turnout would increase as a new bloc of voters is granted this right, becoming actively capable of shaping redistribution policies in the country. The first set of municipal elections post the reform was held in 1976, with an approximate 200,000 newly eligible voters having the right to participate in the elections³³. However, the spatial distribution of immigrants and noncitizens across Sweden was reflected in the, somewhat polar, municipal voter turnout of newly eligible voters. This can be particularly illustrated in the example of two Swedish municipalities, Västerbotten that saw a turnout of 0.2 percent of newly eligible voters, and Olöfstrom, which contrasted the former with a surprising 13 percent turnout of newly eligible

³⁰ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 15-29. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

³¹ *ibid.* 17.

³² Reeskens, T., & Van Oorschot, W. (2015). Immigrants' attitudes towards welfare redistribution. An exploration of role of government references among immigrants and natives across 18 European Welfare states. *European Sociological Review*, 31(4), 433-445. doi:10.1093/esr/jcv003

³³ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 17. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

voters³⁴. Nevertheless, these polarized turnouts are mainly reflective of immigrant and/or noncitizen dispersion across the country, rather than other indicators. These turnout rates however *did* generate exogenous changes between municipalities, particularly highlighted in the quantitative data which used saw increased spending on education in municipalities where eligible voters were school-aged, in contrast to municipalities where eligible voters and/or noncitizens were preschool aged and therefore increased spending on health care and social insurance³⁵.

Likely, other Scandinavian countries such as Norway show similar voting patterns and forms of inclusion. More precisely, a case study concerned with voting preferences in Norway find that immigrants and noncitizens can be loosely grouped into (a) a group unaffected by their culture, politics of country of origin, etc., and whom vote depending on socioeconomic indicators and are therefore more likely to vote for leftwing parties and; (b) a group that remains influenced by their origin and culture or religion and as a result are more likely to vote for candidates that share a similar set of beliefs or ethnicity as the noncitizen voter³⁶. That said, there are similar voting patterns in European countries in general, but a particularly differentiating factor is the reason for admission of noncitizen individual (i.e. purely materialistic labor, etc.) and the contextual historical lead up to today (i.e. colonialism, xenophobia, exclusion, etc.). These differences accounted first and foremost in the political engagement, inclusion, participation and turnout of noncitizens, migrant workers or refugees in the country and in turn also affected their policy tendencies and reflected their view of the welfare state. The argument that noncitizens and immigrants abuse the welfare state proved ill-founded even in countries such as Germany and France, where xenophobia and fear of immigration is particularly high, and rather reflected different degrees of cultural influence, inferiority and therefore lack of participation, or increased desire for political engagement and spending on public services such as education, health care and social insurance.

Findings & concluding Remarks

In sum, the voting preferences of immigrants versus natives are geographically and historically informed, before being politically and socially implemented. This paper has drawn

³⁴ Vernby, K. (2013). Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden's Introduction of noncitizen suffrage. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1), 19. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00612.x

³⁵ Eger, M.A. (2010), Even in Sweden: The effect of immigration on support for welfare state spending. *European Sociological Review*, 26, 2, 203–217.

³⁶ Klaus Desmet, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Romain Wacziarg. 2017. Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity. *American Economic Review*, 107 :9, 2479-2513.

attention to a particular idea that I believe is central to the study of voting patterns regardless of the geographical location but more necessary in the context of countries with a colonial and/or imperialist past. As such, this essay draws upon the power dynamics instituted by European countries during colonialism, ideologically placing themselves superior to the vast majority of African and Asian countries and which reflected on their treatment and attitude toward immigration. The concept of otherness seems to remain alive today, particularly in countries such as Germany, Britain and France, where migration proved to be an economic mechanism to stimulate the economy through the admission of migrant workers. This reflected on migrant attitudes and lack of political engagement, even when entitled to, but did not cause a statistically significant shift of policy as a result, in the German scenario. Sweden and other Scandinavian countries have different histories that are far less influenced by colonialism and the superior-inferior complex. This paper further proved this argument using case studies on Sweden's Immigration Commission, which was vastly concerned with minimizing noncitizen suffrage and their inclusion, translating into the Rights Reform of 1975 and featuring a high number of newly eligible voter turnout that resulted in increased welfare spending on education, social insurance and health care. In the future, this essay strongly believes in the incorporation of ideological and sociological factors, though difficult to measure and quantify, but that nevertheless is central to voting preference studies.

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Canadian and Australian Residential Schools, State Apologies, and Methods of Reconciliation

Adnan Ali

This paper focuses on the Indian Residential School systems that were part of the colonial assimilation policies in Canada and Australia. Residential schools incorporated Indigenous children into a 'White' socio-economic way of life and forcefully placed them in state-collaborated, Church-run establishments. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) clarifies that the severity of residential schools was no less than a physical, biological, and cultural genocide, with a painful and dark legacy of unrepairable damages (TRC, 2015, p.1). In Australia, forcefully removed Indigenous children ended up in child holding educational institutes, such as gender-segregated boarding schools, foster care institutes, and with adoptive parents or in adoptive placements – all with an end goal to prepare children for domestic and labour work (Bringing them Home, 1997). In residential schools, the government's mandate was "to kill the Indian within the child" (TRC, 2012, p. 81); where killing the *aboriginality* of Indigenous children was evident³⁷. "Killing the Indian" or aboriginality was part of a civilizing mission based on a belief of European, or early settlers, racial and cultural superiority to those beneath them, including Asians, Africans, and the Indigenous, to be in need of socio-cultural and religious salvation (TRC, 2015, pp. 46-47). As this paper argues, residential schools or child-holding institutes had a clear mandate for assimilation, had a two-pronged civilizational and integrationist agenda, and have accounted for physical and emotional suffering for over a century.

In 2008, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, apologized for past injustices towards Indigenous people in their respective countries, with a particular reference to residential schools. However, state apologies were not an end goal within themselves. The end goal was reconciliation which includes concrete actions, both symbolic and material. As Bob Carr, the Premier of New South Wales said in the Australian parliament in 1996,

³⁷ Indigenous people are also referred to as Natives, Indians, Aborigines, Aborigine, or First Nations in academic literature.

“I extend this apology as an essential step in the process of reconciliation” (Bringing them Home, 1997, p.249). The TRC defines reconciliation as, “coming to terms with events of the past in a manner that overcomes conflict and establishes a respectful and healthy relationship among people, going forward” (2015, p. 6). Isabelle Auguste (2010) further mentions that apologies are central to reconciliation, and apologies should include four ingredients, “acknowledgment, explanation, remorse, and reparation” (p.11). *This paper asks, how far-reaching were state-level apologies in attaining reconciliation with Indigenous communities?* More centrally, this paper questions if the processes of reconciliation have considered the unique pains inflicted by residential schools in Canada and Australia? The inspiration of this research stems from solidarity with Indigenous children robbed of their childhood, and, as a father, in harmony with the many Indigenous parents whose children never returned. The inspiration also comes from Lee Maracle’s oration at the University of Waterloo, the message of which was, ‘we are all here to stay, so let us acknowledge the past and move forward collectively³⁸.’ The Commission shares the same message that “there can be no movement toward reconciliation, however, without an understanding of the rationale, operation, and overall impact of the schools” (TRC, 2012, p. 85).

The overall objective of this paper is two-fold. First, it is to understand the residential school system in detail and the unique pain and legacy inflicted on Indigenous communities, especially children. Secondly, it is to look into post-apology reconciliatory efforts, or the progress of reconciliation, between the governments of Canada and Australia, and the Indigenous people that live within these countries. The United Nations has made this an international issue of consideration and with the *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People*, has called upon Canada and Australia to fix their houses (TRC, 2015, p.187).

Sources and framework

For effective reconciliation, we need to understand the ‘nature of injury’ inflicted by residential schools. To this end, two major governmental works are consulted. First, we look at two reports produced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC). The first, is the 2012 interim report, *They Came for the Children* (hereafter - TRC, 2012). The second is the final report from 2015, *Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future* (hereafter - TRC, 2015).

³⁸ Lee Maracle gave an oration and a performance with Bill Coleman at the Theatre of the Arts Modern Languages Building in the University of Waterloo on October 4th, 2018. Her message was that all three groups of people in Canada: Indigenous, early settlers, and new immigrants should move forward collectively.

The TRC Commission was established as a result of the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement in 2008, to create a “comprehensive historical record on the residential schools” (Marshall, 2016, para. 7). The second governmental work is the Australian National Inquiry into the *Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*. The Inquiry was launched in 1995 by the Attorney-General of Australia Michael Lavarch, and subsequently a lengthy report titled, *Bringing them Home* was produced in 1997. As the Australian Inquiry is older, this paper draws from Reconciliation Australia (www.reconciliation.org.au), the official site that promotes the reconciliation progress with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People.

The first three sections of this paper elaborate on, the history of residential school systems, the two-pronged civilizational agenda, and two extensive sections detailing the experiences of children in residential school or other institutes in which they were forcefully held in Canada and Australia. These three sections are based on the final TRC Commission (2015) report that draws upon the testimony of over 6,000 witnesses to the residential school system, most of whom were former students (p.7); and, the Australian Commission Inquiry, *Bringing them Home*, that draws upon confidential testimonies of over 530 people (1997, p. 3). Examining individual accounts within the Commissions point towards psychological injuries, such as feeling frightened, lonely, dirty, poor, and inferior, in addition to physical, sexual, and socioeconomic injuries. Therefore, it is imperative to understand how Indigenous peoples experienced residential schools and the pains they live with today. This leads into our fourth section on reconciliation and conclusory remarks. The aim here is to examine reconciliation and the reparations made by Canada and Australia. As the TRC (2015) Commission sees it, “reconciliation not only requires apologies, reparations, the relearning of Canada’s national history, and public commemoration, but also needs real social, political, and economic change” (p. 184).

History of residential school systems

Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department.

Duncan C. Scott, the Indian Affairs Deputy Minister, in 1920. (TRC, 2015, p. 54)

The ultimate purpose of removal was to control the reproduction of Indigenous people with a view to ‘merging’ or ‘absorbing’ them into the non-Indigenous population, Indigenous girls were targeted for removal and sent to work as domestics.

(Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 26)

The history of residential school systems in Canada can be dated back to the failed attempts by French missionaries in the 1620s. The 1830s Mohawk Institute in Brantford, Ontario, and, the 1850s Mount Elgin school in Munceytown, Ontario, were two of the first Church-led initiatives funded by the federal government for assimilating Indigenous children (TRC, 2012, pp. 5-6)³⁹. By 1879, Canada had dispatched Sir Nicholas F. Davin to the United States to investigate boarding schools there. Based on his report that concluded a need for residential schools, in 1883, Sir John A. Macdonald, the first Canadian Prime Minister and Minister of Indian Affairs, authorized three residential schools in the Western territories (TRC, 2012, pp. 5-12). Twenty-five years later in 1908, the Indian Affairs Minister Frank Oliver concluded, “the attempt to elevate the Indian by separating the child from his parents and educating him as a white man has turned out to be a deplorable failure” (TRC, 2012, p. 17). Nevertheless, in the 1920s attending residential schools were made compulsory for all status Indians under the *Indian Act*, and by the 1930s, there were over eighty residential schools in full swing across Canada. For residential schools to be still be operating during the 1990s is astonishing, given their apparent failure during the 1930s where only three per cent of residential school students made it past grade-six, compared to 33 per cent of other Canadians (TRC, 2012, pp.12-19). Operating with a success rate of 3 per cent clarifies that the motive of residential schools was not schooling, but the physical and mental occupation of children from their Indigenous habitual way of life. By the 1940s, one third of all school-aged Indigenous children were enrolled in residential schools (TRC, 2015, p. 62), and by the mid-1960s, serving as child-welfare facilities, residential schools held 75 per cent of Indigenous children who were deemed ‘neglected by parents,’ or belonging to homes ‘unfit for school children’ (TRC, 2012, p. 20). Child welfare agencies of the 1960s were institutes with more or less the same functions as residential schools, in keeping children separated from their parents and with little personal and emotional care towards them (TRC, 2015, p. 69). The number of Indigenous students in provincial welfare institutes accounted for 44 per cent in Alberta, 51 percent in Saskatchewan, and a staggering 60 per cent in Manitoba (TRC, 2015, p. 69). All said, from the establishment of the Mohawk Institute in Brantford, over 150,000 Indigenous children have attended Canadian residential schools. The horrific history of human rights abuses by these institutes came to a closure in the 1990s (TRC, 2015, p.3).

³⁹ Munceytown, Ontario is Modern Day London, Ontario.

In Australia, residential schools were more like child detention centers, in the form of foster and adoptive institutes. The goal was similar, to keep Indigenous children away from their families and to assimilate them into - European style socio-economic communities. However, a parallel agenda was underway in Australia, for an explicit assimilation policy to breed the Indigenous out, by courting full-descent and half-descent Indigenous women and girls⁴⁰. The long-term aim was to dilute the full-descent Indigenous into half-descent, and then to create further offspring with the half-descent with less Indigenous blood - known as octoroons and quadroons (Cassidy, 2006, pp. 3-6). It was octoroons and quadroons that were the main focus of assimilation and integration. As Australia Indigenous assimilation policies differ from one area to another, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all territories. However, New South Wales (NSW) and Australia's southern island of Tasmania will be discussed, but the overall framework of assimilation, or absorption in the first half of the 20th century has remained the same throughout Australia.

In NSW, the first Indigenous school, the Native Institution at Parramatta opened in 1814 and closed in 1820 when the Indigenous communities found the real motive behind the educational curtain (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 33). In Australia, whole communities were subjected to assimilation policies. For example, in 1883, over 9,000 Indigenous people came under the rule of the Aborigines Protection Board in NSW, where the Board controlled over 180 reserves by 1939 (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 34). By 1890, policies to remove mixed-descent children for merger into non-Indigenous communities were live; by 1909 the *Aborigines Protection Act* allowed for neglected children to be taken away at will; by 1915, the *Aborigines Protection Amending Act* dismissed court order requirements for child removal along with the age limitation at which Indigenous children could be taken; and by 1914, courts ruled mandatory for boys and girls age 14 and above to be working (Bringing them Home, 1997, pp. 34-35). Other reasons for removal included, “‘To send to service’, ‘Being 14 years’, ‘At risk of immorality’, ‘Neglected’, ‘To get her away from surroundings of Aboriginal station/ Removal from idle reserve life’ and ‘Orphan’ (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 35). Note the emphasis on “to get [her] away.” Among the many atrocities committed against Indigenous children in NSW, abhorrence were crimes against girls. By 1921, over 80 per cent children removed were girls, the proportion of which dropped little by 1936. Most of these girls were later on sent into domestic service, where they got

⁴⁰ A full-descent, or full-blood persons – are pure natives of Australia, obviously of very dark complexions, and not crossed with Europeans. A half-descent or mixed-descent or half-caste is a person who has some European blood.

pregnant by their white masters, and their children were once again removed and further institutionalized (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 37).

In Tasmania, then known as Van Dieman's Land, since the early nineteenth century, children were willfully abducted 'kidnaped' and used as labour. By 1820, the Indigenous and non-Indigenous people were in a state of war, called the Black War (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 79). Over the next century, Indigenous communities were moved from one settlement to another, where many died from disease. By 1920s, the government proposed to remove children based on their impoverished living conditions and by 1935, under the *Infants Welfare Act*, children were removed – from a community whose population was 106 people in 1944 (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 82). Children taken were segregated, even siblings that the Department of Community Welfare specified to be kept in touch, and family communication was discouraged (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 84). Things only changed for the better in 1984, with the incorporation of the *Aboriginal Child Placement Principle* into the *Aboriginal Child Welfare Act* (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 85). All said, government policies in Canada and Australia were explicit in removing Indigenous children and for their complete assimilation into white societies. Never were parents consulted on the wellbeing or decision-making concerning their children; it is for these reasons, they are appropriately referred to as the 'stolen generations.'

The two-pronged civilizational agenda

The TRC reports and the Australian Inquiry shows residential schools had a two-pronged agenda: civilization and Christianization. The first was state-led and political in nature, to end the 'Indian' identity via complete assimilation. Complete assimilation was seen as a prerequisite for national security purposes, as the Indian Affairs school inspector, Andsell Macrae, in 1886 had said, "It is unlikely that any tribe or tribes would give trouble of a serious nature to the government whose members had children completely under government control" (TRC, 2012, p.13). The severity of government-control is evident when intimate aspects of Indigenous children's lives, as whom they married was controlled (TRC, 2015, pp.84-85). The Australian Commission mentions this political aspect: "Assimilation means in practical terms, that, in the course of time, it is expected that all persons of aboriginal blood or mixed blood in Australia will live like other white Australians do" (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 28). In short, the first prong of the civilizational mandate for Indigenous children was government-led in their complete removal from their origins.

The second part of the agenda was led by Churches, often by voluntary missionaries, in a bid to Christianize the ‘heathen.’ Indigenous people’s characters were considered to be dirty and the Indian nature to have evil tendencies (TRC, 2015, p.73). The TRC (2015) report notes that in Canada, the Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Presbyterian, and the United Church were among the top denominations administering residential schools until 1969, all whom considered establishing a fear of God in children more important than conventional education (p. 3). In Australia, Roman Catholic Churches the same goals in mind, and in 1996 they apologized for their role in the implementation of governments assimilationist policies and practices (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 251) The Churches role, often as the soft hand to imperialism and European assimilation policies, impacted Indigenous religion, language, practices and social customs (TRC, 2015, p. 48). From the Church’s perspective, the war was on the Indigenous culture, not the child. Both the Catholic and Protestant Churches administered residential schools as a sacred call and viewed “Aboriginal culture as a barrier to both spiritual salvation and the ongoing existence of Aboriginal people” (TRC, 2015, p. 49). This was especially the case, given missionaries misconceptions of Indigenous practices and spirituality to be no more than devil-worshiping. The Churches initiative can be deemed successful, given 70,000 out of 100,000 Indigenous identified as Christians in the 1899 census (TRC, 2012, p.15). At the very least, the residential school era was one of spiritual violence for the First Nations, Inuit, Metis, Torres Strait Islander people, and many other Indigenous communities. In sum, from the one side, governments wanted to assimilate children into good citizens on European standards, and on the other side, Churches had the Indigenous ‘godless’ children learn about the Christian God and morals.

There was also a third civilizational agenda evident from studying the Commission reports. The third prong, more evident in the Australian case, was to train a generation of blue-collar or domestic workers serving the White European class domestically and in the general labor market. The operations of Industrial schools in Canada, such as providing vocational training to Indigenous children, is an example of the third prong. The Australian Commission notes, “*The Aborigines Protection Act* 1886 and its regulations provided that at the age of 13 years ‘half-caste’ boys were to be apprenticed or sent to work on farms and girls were to work as servants” (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 51). Here the conditions were nothing less than slavery, as the Commission further notes, “the greatest advantage of young Aboriginal servants was that they came cheap and were never paid beyond the provision of variable quantities of food and clothing” (1997, p. 22). The

Commission further notes, “Their aim would be to train the residents in industrial work, such as carpentry, agriculture and stock work for males and domestic work and gardening for females” (1997, p. 115). However, where preparing children for working in certain roles held high importance, it was poorly implemented, resulting in Indigenous children not being able to find or retain appropriate jobs. As the TRC report notes, “[Indigenous children] lack not only the skills required for most permanent wage employment but also those necessary for the traditional economy” (TRC, 2015, p. 75).

Put simply, it helps to visualize the residential school systems as a clamping tool, in which Indigenous children were clamped-in firmly by the government and the Church. Children were then chiseled at with the ‘two-pronged civilizational agenda,’ to emerge as good Samaritans that think and worked like white people and knew their Christian values to be true. For this reason, Canadian courts in settling Indigenous grievances have referred to the government-Church relationship as a ‘joint-venture’ (Cassidy, 2006, p.11). There is no question this practice was highly immoral; but more devastating were the long-term consequences for Indigenous children. For example, a ‘long-stay care’ study in 1972 found that, Indigenous children in *inter alia*, health, educational progress, emotional wellbeing, employment opportunities, social skills, and understanding personal identity were at a disadvantage compared to other child populations (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 164). The most alarming impairment is probably the weakness of emotional attachments and not being able to hold relationships, as this writer believes that, based on this attribute, can cultures, traditions and nations in general rebuilt themselves (1997, p. 164). The TRC (2015) report agrees with this view, as a collective enterprise of Indigenous nations is needed for their own nation reconstruction (p. 206). It is of these ills, that reconciliation needs to be reflective. *Bringing them Home* (1997) mentions that, when most colonist in the late 19th century saw the half-casts as going through a “racial and cultural limbo” (p.24); post-assimilation, Indigenous children saw themselves as being, neither black or white, not fully accepted by the Europeans or Indigenous, and just simply a generation that is lost (p.131).

The case of residential schools in Canada

At the heart of the assimilation process was the willful intent to wipeout the cultural, religious social, legal and racial distinction of Indigenous peoples (TRC, 2015 p. 1). Residential schools were regulated by the *Indian Act* of 1876, to which a single residential school regulations section based on four-pages was added in 1953. In comparison, the *Manitoba Public Schools Act*

of 1954 expanded on ninety-one pages and adopted nineteen regulations (TRC, 2015, p. 62). In Canada, residential schools were distant facilities often located far away from what the Archbishop of St. Boniface in 1912 called, “a degenerating influence of their home environment” (TRC, 2012, p. 11). Administering residential schools with no printed regulations, principals held absolute authority over the affairs of all staff and students (TRC, 2015, p. 63). Boys were given trade-training in carpentry and farming, and, girls were given home-training in cooking and cleaning (TRC, 2012, p. 85). This is a classic example of how Europeans understood gender-roles at the time, subsequently overriding long developed Indigenous ways of societal life, especially the Indigenous matriarchal system. The following sections are built on the specific emotional and physical abuse that have emerged in examining the recollections of residential school survivors from the TRC Commissions.

Frightened and Lonely: In residential schools, Indigenous children felt lonely and homesick due to the lack of physical and emotional care, the separation of sibling, and, prolonged isolations from home (TRC, 2012, p. 25). Peter Ross, who attended the Immaculate Conception school in the Northwest Territories with his sisters, remembers he spoke to them only on special occasions such as Christmas and Catholic fest days (TRC, 2015, p. 42). In northern Québec, Betsy Annahatak recalls children weeping silently and crying until they slept, longing for their families (TRC, 2015, p. 42). Visits were discouraged, talking to siblings was forbidden, and as Jack Anawak a student at the Chesterfield Inlet, recalls “there was no love, there was no feelings, it was just supervisory” (TRC, 2015, p. 42). The TRC Commission confirms that residential schools were at best sites of institutionalized child neglect and emotional abuse (TRC, 2015, p. 43).

Overwork and Undereducation: Many reasons can be attributed to why children were overworked in residential schools, but the most prominent was the governments misunderstanding that cheap labor and unpaid missionaries would make residential school operations a cost-free enterprise (TRC, 2015, p. 59). After federal budgetary cuts in 1891, and a switch to per-capita funding in 1911, the Churches enrolled maximum numbers of pupils, making the children do most of the manual labor under a ‘half-day’ work system (TRC, 2012, p. 17). There is no institutional memory of how the half-day system was managed, in which all students were compelled to work gender-specific roles – much long after the practices’ theoretical abolishing in the 1950s (TRC, 2015, p. 80). In 1937 residential schools received \$180 per student per year, compared to other educational institutes that received on average \$550 per student per year (TRC, 2015, p. 59). For

this reason, the Commission reports gather that students had too many responsibilities including, manual labor and farm-work. Indigenous children also recall that the little education they did receive was, belittling, racist, bewildering, alienating, and the content of educational material was hard to identify with (TRC, 2015, p. 76). Additionally, residential schools as institutions were understaffed and the staff were underfunded, classes were large, and children mostly memorized and copied information with no written exams (TRC, 2012, pp. 25-27).

Hunger: Hunger was another such injury that George Manuel, from the Kamloops School days, recalls as, “both the first and last thing I can remember about that school...every Indian student smelled of hunger” (TRC, 2012, p. 31). Residential schools had limited supplies of food, and undernourishment was common. Attending British Columbia’s Fraser Lake, Mary John recalls, “meals were dull and monotonous...weeks might go by without any fish or meat...and sugar and jams were reserved for special occasions” (TRC, 2015, p. 87). It is not the case that food was always scarce, as Inez Dieter from her Saskatchewan school notes, “the staff used to eat like kings, kings and queens” (TRC, 2015, p. 89). In other cases, as the Commission notes, “milk was separated, with the skimmed milk served to the children. The milk fat was turned to butter and cream, which was frequently sold to raise funds for the schools” (TRC, 2015, p. 88). Milk, cream, fish, meat, eggs and other essential dilatory supplies were always chronically short. Even when hunger issues were noted by government officials, little was done to curb the problem. In short, food supplies were seldomly adequate or nutritious and children were often hungry and resorted to stealing. The practice of withholding food from children was used as an assimilation tactic by school staff (TRC, 2012, p.37).

Death, punishments and identity: Testimonies in the TRC Commission mention widespread death and disease. Dr. Peter Bryce, in 1907 conducted a survey on fifteen residential schools between the years of 1888 and 1905, and the findings were alarming. Almost 25 per cent of the total number of children enrolled in these schools had died, and in some schools, individually over 60 per cent died (TRC, 2012, p. 29). These deaths mostly occurred due to tuberculosis, but it should be noted that medical care, due to budgetary issues, was only permitted in extreme conditions. Indigenous children’s relationship with their Aboriginal-identity was curbed with harsh assimilation techniques. For example, corporal punishments, such as flogging and whipping, chaining and strapping, and the belittling act of head shaving were common (TRC, 2012, pp. 35-40). One rather surprising method used for erasing identities was to number Indigenous children.

Attending the Pointe Bleue school, Gilles Petiquay recalls, “I remember that the first number that I had at the residential school was 95. ...The second number was number 4. ...The third number was 56. ...We walked with the numbers on us” (TRC, 2015, p. 40). It is this writer’s opinion that, when people think about themselves, there are certain subconscious elements present, such as who you are, where you live, the people around you, and, your work-family life etc. How are children to develop decision-making skills and uphold lasting relationships if they are reduced to understanding themselves as a number? Identities were also attacked by restricting Indigenous children from speaking in their own languages, and if caught speaking in Cree for example, severe punishments were given (TRC, 2012, p. 39). Raymond Hill, who lost his native language during his time at the Mohawk Institute recalls, strapping as the punishment for speaking in the native tongue, and Mary Angus recalls the embarrassment of students who had their hair closely cut when caught speaking Indigenous languages (TRC, 2015, pp. 80-81). Oblate Superior General Théodore Labouré on his 1935 Canada tour noted, children were punished harshly so they understood it was a serious offense to not speak English (TRC, 2015, p. 81). Indigenous students were warned against identifying-with and attending cultural ceremonies/festivals, such as the Sun Dance ‘Thirst Dance’ or potlatches, to be nothing more than devil worshiping and superstition (TRC, 2015, p. 83).

Sexual abuse: Then there was the outright cruelty of sexual exploitation. Indigenous girls were the prime targets, but boys were not spared either. In 1990, the Grand Chief of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Phil Fontaine, was asked how extensive sexual abuses had been, he answered, “If we took an example, my Grade 3 class, if there were twenty boys in this particular class, every single one of the twenty would have experienced what I experienced” (TRC, 2012, p. 41). Jean L’Heureux, hired by the Oblates in 1884, was accused by a pastor to be “practicing immorality of a most beastly type’ while he was the school recruiter” (TRC, 2012, p. 42). The final TRC (2015) report mentions that there were no actions taken or criminal investigations conducted, against Jean L’Heureux, even though his sexual predatory nature was well known to the Indian Affairs and Roman Catholic Church (p. 105). It was not uncommon for Churches to remain quite on the immoral misconduct of fathers and priests, to cover up the victimization of children, to silence children from speaking, and falsely reassuring parents that all was well (TRC, 2015, P.105; TRC, 2012, pp. 43-44). On the sexual exploitation of Indigenous children, the Commission is clear that, those sexually abused bore the most-heavy of burdens, and sexual abuses were the “most extreme failings of the residential school system” (TRC, 2012, p. 45). The government of Canada

has acknowledged and addressed sexual-abuse to some satisfaction. For example, in 2015, 37,951 complaints of physical and sexual abuse were made to the Independent Assessment Process (IAP), of which 30,939 cases have been resolved with a total compensation allotment of \$2.69 billion (TRC, 2015, p. 106).

Resistance: Indigenous people did resist against government policies. In the Commission's 2012 intern report, *They Came for the Children*, examples are plentiful of children involved in burning down schools, fighting staff, and in most cases running away (pp. 60-62). As the Commission notes, "the refusal to be assimilated - was shown in the community, in the classroom, in the playground, in the kitchen, and in the fields. It was a central force in driving federal officials finally to recognize that residential schooling had been an irredeemable failure" (TRC, 2012, p. 53). All said, it is not surprising that Indigenous peoples do not have any faith in the federal government considering their experiences residing in inhumane conditions and being victims to regular sexual abuses. The ongoing distrust presents significant hardships to reconciliation, but the Commission is positive that, "the passion of resistance that validates the survival and resiliency of First Nations people and communities provides hope for healing and reconciliation over the next seven generations" (TRC, 2015, p. 241).

The case of residential schools in Australia

Centuries ago, based on a concept of the Doctrine of Discovery, *terra nullius*, or no man's land, the British made a claim for all of the Australia continent (TRC, 2015, p. 46). Australian assimilation policies were much more severe than those in Canada; as in addition to children, explicit policies pushed for merging and absorbing whole Indigenous communities into non-Indigenous communities (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 25). Lack of government funds was a constant hurdle in operating institutes, and within institutes the effects were mostly felt by resident Indigenous children. As one testimony notes, "Sometimes at night time we'd cry with hunger, no food ... We had to scrounge in the town dump, eating old bread, smashing tomato sauce bottles, licking them. Half of the time the food we got was from the rubbish dump" (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 138). In the Australian Commission (1997), other experiences of students include, being placed in solitary confinement, expressions of extreme loneliness, and being treated like caged animals (pp. 134-139); another testimony notes, "They changed our names, they changed our religion, they changed our date of birth, they did all that. That's why today, a lot of them don't know who they are, where they're from" (1997, p. 134). Name changes just like the practice of

numbering children was meant to be dehumanization and a reminder of Aboriginality being racially inferior. Some of the unique pain and suffering experienced by Indigenous children in Australia are documented in the Commissions *Bringing them Home* (1997) report. All of the quotations in the following section are from this report and are quoted by year and page number only (e.g., 1997, p. x), to avoid constant repetition of the title.

Cruelty: It was astonishing to note that, many individual testimonies described their time in residential schools or foster institutes, as nothing less than being a criminal in jail. In the Commission report, one testimony notes, “They were very cruel to us, very cruel. I’ve done things in that home that I don’t think prisoners in a jail would do today” (1997, p. 139); another notes, “You play chasing, you had to drop your pants, lie across the bed and get 3-5 whacks. If you pissed the bed – another 3-5” (1997, p. 139). Mary Bennett, an activist who raised concerns for the Indigenous children at the domestic and international level, noted, “They are captured at all ages, as infants in arms, perhaps not until they are grown up, they are not safe until they are dead” (1997, p. 94). Parliamentarian, the Honorable P. McGarry, also voiced his concern against cruelty in 1915, when he said, “This ‘act of cruelty’ was a scheme to take the children ‘prisoners’ and ‘to gain absolute control of the child and use him as a slave without paying wages’” (1997, p.36). Another confidential evidence notes, “The girls who went to Cootamundra and the boys who went to Kinchela – we were all prisoners. Even today they have our file number so we’re still prisoners you know” (1997, p. 145). Just like principals in Canadian residential school held absolute power, so did managers at most child-holding institutes in Australia. In 1935, after repeated complaints against the manager of the Kinchela Boys Home in NSW, the Aborigines Protection Board did not dismiss him and issued a warning instead that stated, “on no account must he tie a boy up to a fence or tree, or anything else of that nature, to inflict punishment on him, that such instruments as lengths of hosepipe or a stockwhip must not be used in chastising a boy, that no dietary punishments shall be inflicted on any inmate in the Home” (1997, p. 140). Take note of the term ‘inmate’ in the previous quotation. It is no wonder that the Chief Protector of Western Australia, A.O. Neville, dismissed many staff members during the 1930s for administering degrading punishments, such as strapping girls to chairs and head shaving them (1997, p. 140).

Language, family and identity: Just like in Canada, Indigenous languages were restricted and forbidden not only by government officials but by foster and adoptive families as well. For example, one testimony notes, “they used to tell us not to talk that language, that it’s devil’s

language. And they'd wash our mouths with soap. We sorta had to sit down with Bible language all the time" (1997, p. 133). Ties to family, cultural festivals and celebrations were also discriminately severed. For example, children were lied to about the wellbeing of their parents and kept away from the letters their families wrote them. As one testimony notes, "I remember this woman saying to me, 'Your mother's dead, you've got no mother now. That's why you're here with us.' Then about two years after that my mother and my mother's sister all came to The Bungalow but they weren't allowed to visit us because they were black" (1997, p. 134). Children were also made to believe that their parents, mostly drunken, were worthless and uncaring. Children were repeatedly reminded of their inferior indigenous identity and it was drummed into them psychologically to believe that they were whites, not Indigenous (1997, p. 144). As the Commission notes, "Culture, language, land and identity were to be stripped from the children in the hope that the traditional law and culture would die by losing their claim on them and sustenance of them" (1997, p. 175). The Commission further notes that, effects of identity crisis due to removal and institutionalization are found in adulthood. For example, Indigenous people lack the sense of personal identity, have trust issues and unstable relationships, are depressed and resort to drugs, and "They see themselves as so worthless that they are easily exploited laying themselves open to be recruited into prostitution and other forms of victimisation" (1997, p. 164).

Education: 54 percent of Indigenous children were moved between multiple placement institutions and then sent mostly on work placements. Bounced around from institute to institute meant that children never completed their primary education, and the little education they did receive was to become domestic servants and rural laborers (1997, p. 132-134). The children that did show some skill were blocked on racial terms from pursue further education. For example, as one confidential submission notes, "I strived every year ... to get that perfect 100% mark ... which I did succeed in, only to be knocked back by saying that I wasn't fit to do these things ... Our education was really to train us to be domestics and to take orders" (1997, p. 148); another notes, "I was 15 when I got into 2nd year and I wanted to ... continue in school, but I wasn't allowed to, because they didn't think I had the brains" (1997, p. 149); yet another notes, "he [my father] told her of my ambitions to study medicine, and she [teacher] responded that I didn't have the brains to go on to high school" (1997, p. 149). Upon leaving reserves and foster care, Indigenous children had to mandatory work at young ages, where the conditions pay were equally bad.

Sexual abuse: Indigenous children, especially girls were treated as sexual toys. The Australian Inquiry counts one in ten boys, and three in ten girls, as being sexually abused, however this number seems very conservative (1997, p. 142). These numbers are conservative for three reasons: The inquiry is clear that hundreds of testimonies were not documented (1997, p. 5); those Indigenous children who did raise their voice were called liars, uncontrollable, and lacking in intelligence (1997, p. 142); and, it is also the case that people out of shame do not voice sexual abuses. For example, a confidential testimony notes, “I ran away because my foster father used to tamper with me and I’d just had enough. I went to the police but they didn’t believe me. So she [foster mother] just thought I was a wild child and she put me in one of those hostels and none of them believed me – I was the liar. So I’ve never talked about it to anyone” (1997, p. 142); another notes “the people who would come in to work with the children, they would grab the boys’ penises, play around with them and kiss them and things like this. ... It was seen to be the white man’s way of lookin’ after you. It never happened with an Aboriginal” (1997, p. 141). It was not uncommon for girls under the age of 15, as domestic workers, to be pregnant. As the Archbishop Donaldson noted in 1915, 90 per cent of girls sent out to service “came back pregnant to a white man” (1997, p.66). Even when sexual assaults were reported to the Aborigines Protection Board, the girls were often blamed for being ‘sexual maniac’ and have been living with ‘dozens of men’ (1997, p. 143). It is not possible to capture the full extent of sexual abuses in this paper. However, it is worth mentioning that 62.1 per cent of the 483 people sampled by the WA Aboriginal Legal Services reported sexual abuse. Two-third of the time on missions and one-third of the time in government institutions (1997, p. 168). All said, the legacy of sexual abuses is sure to continue as childhood sexual abuses have major psychological effects, such as impacts to one’s sexual identity, difficulty to concentrate or sleep, proneness to being an abusive parent, and living with stress disorders (1997, p.168-169).

*Full-descent and mixed-descent*⁴¹: The political purpose behind the widespread sexual abuse of female Indigenous children, was to breed the pure-Aboriginals to extinction. For example, in 1937 the Chief Protector of Western Australia, Mr. Neville remarks were that, “within one hundred years the pure black will be extinct. ... Sixty years ago, he said, there were over 60,000

⁴¹ Historically, pure Australian Indigenous persons were referred to as ‘full-blooded’ and ones mixed with European blood were termed as ‘half-blooded’, but as these are offensive terms, the Australian Commission, employs the terms ‘full and mixed descents’ (1997, p. 22).

full-blooded natives in Western Australia. Today there are only 20,000” (1997, p. 24). Mr. Neville and other Chief Protectors strongly believed that, excluding full-descent people, all official efforts are to be directed to the absorption of mixed-descent people (1997, p.26). For this reason, as Julie Cassidy in *Stolen Generations* (2006) notes, child complexion, such as being full-blooded, half-caste, quadroon, or, octoroon, added to the severity of assimilation and determined their place in society (pp. 2-6). There was the odd Chief Protector, like J W Bleakly of Queensland, that believed in segregating Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples, - in order to save ‘the Aborigine’ from contamination and extinction, and to keep the purity of European blood (1997, p.63). However, in most cases the government policy was explicit, as one testimony notes, “I was a half-caste and I would automatically live with a white person and get married. Because the system would make sure that no-one would marry an Aborigine person anyhow. And then my children would automatically be fairer, quarter-caste, and then the next generation would be white and we would be bred out” (1997, p. 136). Almost 40,000 Indigenous children have been forcibly removed in the previous century (Cassidy, 2006, p.18). In sum, the residential school system and forcible child removal and separation policies destroyed and constituted an assault on the cultural, moral, psychological, religious and ethnic wellbeing of the Indigenous people. More importantly, the identity crisis of Indigenous people, such as, Who they are? Why them? Where do they belong? Their History? Their country and language? And, questions about their religious beliefs have been asked, questions whose answers are demanded from both Canada and Australia. How is it that, this long legacy of pain and oppression can be reconciled?

What is meant by reconciliation?

The TRC Commission defines ‘reconciliation’ as “coming to terms with events of the past in a manner that overcomes conflict and establishes a respectful and healthy relationship among people, going forward” (2015, p. 6). The key concept here is the ‘relationship’ between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. In 1966 Australia’s Governor-General Sir William Deane said that true reconciliation was not achievable without the nation’s acknowledgment of the past abuses, oppression, and degradation of Indigenous people. Said differently, truth first and then reconciliation. He further said that reconciliation should, “appropriate redress for present disadvantage flowing from past injustice and oppression is a pre-requisite of reconciliation” (Bringing them Home, 1997, p. 4). Reconciliation in the Indigenous sense is best described by Anishinaabe Elder, Mary Deleary, as “the work of reconciliation must continue in ways that honor

the ancestors, respect the land, and rebalance relationships” (TRC, 2015, p. 9); and, in the words of Elder, Barney Williams, who believes “we need to go back to ceremony and embrace ceremony as part of moving forward. We need to understand the laws of our people” (TRC, 2015, p. 17). Further, Chief Ian Campbell in 2014 said, “Our history is your history, as Canada ... until Canada accepts that ... this society will never flourish to its full potential” (TRC, 2015, p. 183). The best description was offered by Honorary Witness Wab Kinew who said, “The truth about reconciliation is this: It is not a second chance at assimilation. ... rather, true reconciliation is a second chance at building a mutually respectful relationship” (TRC, 2015, p. 210). Put simply, reconciliation is between two parties on equal footing, respect, and acknowledgment. This is not a forgone concept, as historically, Indigenous peoples entered alliances with Europeans by way of treaties, like that of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (TRC, 2015, p.212). As Treaty People, there is no reason why new relationships and mutual co-existence cannot be attained.

Progress of reconciliation and concluding remarks

At the beginning of this paper, we asked if the process of reconciliation was reflective of the pains that Indigenous people suffered in Canada and Australia. In other words, is reconciliation in the right spirit and direction? As elaborated on in the following concluding section, first on Canada and then on Australia, reconciliation does seem to be in the right spirit and direction.

In Canada, reconciliation has a long history and is a multigenerational journey that will continue to involve many Canadians (TRC, 2015, p.209). The TRC Commission's mandating itself was a reconciliatory measure towards finding, acknowledging and hearing the truth. It's true that a national reconciliation process was agreed upon by the government and Indigenous people; its implementation in practice has been an issue of contestation, given socio-cultural differences and finding mutual grounds (TRC, 2015, p.217). For example, Canada objected to the section on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in the *Outcome Document* of the World Conference on Indigenous People in 2014. Where Canada maintained that the FPIC provided a clear veto to Indigenous people over states' developmental aspiration on their lands; the Indigenous people believed for it to be a historic and just treaty right (TRC, 2015, p. 189). To discuss all the history and actors involved in reconciliation is beyond our scope; nevertheless, the progress on reconciliation has been impressive and reflective of the needs of Indigenous people.

Cultural, Identity, and Self-determination: Canada has acknowledged that survivors of residential schools are ‘Treaty People’ and have constitutional and human rights. The Royal

Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) in the 1990s, emphasized Indigenous rights to self-determination and placed the onus on Canada for taking steps towards that end (TRC, 2015, p. 186). Rights to political self-determination were concluded as key-rights by the UN Expert Mechanism's 2013 study, *Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous People* (TRC, 2015, p. 204). The Commission adheres to these rights and urges the Canadian government, a signatory of the UN declaration, for adopting them promptly. Political self-determination can also be understood as self-governance. The TRC Commission acknowledges that based on the right of self-determination other rights can flourish. For example, the cultural rights of Indigenous people; their own justice systems; their own customs and languages; access to their lands and resources; and, their own truth-seeking processes and mechanisms of dispute resolution (TRC, 2015, p. 204). Self-determination is the potion that can repair Indigenous identity lost during the residential school system era. This leaves the question of those unreturned children buried in unmarked graves, unanswered. Through the TRC's *Missing Children Project*, provinces and territories are committed in relocating files of missing children and developing national strategies for protecting and tracing cemeteries, to bring peace to those families who children never returned (TRC, 2015, p. 258).

The Legal System: Indigenous people regarded the Canadian legal system and courts as government-arms that have systematically suppressed them, and until the law does not become an instrument of Indigenous empowerment, it will be regarded as a malignant force (TRC, 2015, pp. 202-205). However, this has changed with the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982, where section 35(1) recognized *Treaty and Aboriginal Rights*, especially collective and individual aspirations (TRC, 2015, p. 203). Since, Canada has dealt with the thousands of lawsuits filed against her honorably, has agreed for general compensation including common experience payments and support for Indigenous health foundations, and the Supreme Court has allowed for the legacy of residential schools to be considered in settling any and all Indigenous matters (TRC, 2015, pp.130-136). Canada openness is also evident in the cases of, *Mowatt and A(TWN) v Clarke* and *Blackwater v Plint* (for details see, Cassidy, 2006). Further work is needed in understanding the importance of Indigenous communities to revitalize their own laws. For example, a 2012 project *Assessing Justice and Reconciliation* (AJR), by the TRC and University of Victoria stressed that "Doing so would enable First Nations, Inuit, and Métis communities to remedy

community harms and resolve internal conflicts as well as external conflicts with governments more effectively” (TRC, 2015, p. 206).

Role of Churches: Through four different settlement agreements from 1986 to 1998, Churches apologized and admitted their guilt for attempting to destroy Indigenous cultural and spirituality. Showing inclusiveness, the Anglican Church in 2007 appointed Mark Macdonald as their first National Bishop of Indigenous origin; and, in 2013 the Presbyterian Church developed a vision in which self-governing Indigenous Churches could coexist with their traditional institutional structures (TRC, 2015, p. 229). In 2010, Pope Benedict XVI expressed his sorrow and addressed Indigenous children directly, saying “I know that nothing can undo the wrong you have endured. Your trust has been betrayed and your dignity has been violated” (TRC, 2015, p. 221). The TRC (2015) report clarifies that post-apology churches of all denominations initiated reconciliatory programs. These include, *inter alia*, healing programme targeting Indigenous people in distress, such as in hospitals, shelters, and jails (p.232); language and culture revitalization programmes, such as funding Indigenous children to learn the Hesquiah language in Vancouver (p.233); and, bringing communities together, churches have initiated relationship building and training programmes that aim to eliminate stereotypes and racist understanding of Indigenous people through education (p.233).

On Education: The most important piece in reconciliation is that of education. Education of non-Indigenous people on the history and rightful place of Indigenous people in Canadian society, and education of upcoming Indigenous generation on their own history, rights, and responsibilities. One of TRC’s recommendation was for Canada to adopt provincial and territorial age-appropriate educational curriculums on Aboriginal-histories. This has been taken in the practical sense by some institutes. For example, the University of Waterloo is Indigenizing their campus and have initiated educational program courses on Indigenous history. This very paper on residential schools is a result of Indigenous educational programs held at the master’s level. In addition, Northwest Territories have implemented mandatory curriculums. Yukon has followed suit, along with Alberta and Ontario and other provinces (TRC, 2015, p. 237). This is a great success, as going forward upcoming Canadian generations will be better equipped to watch out for the rights of those systematically marginalized in the past. However, for such aspirations to materialize fully, there is a need for ‘national education frameworks’ that promote ‘respectful learning environments.’ We cannot elaborate further on educational programs, but the work of the

government of Canada in establishing, public education forums; stepping-up the role of Museums and Archives in education for reconciliation; and sharing Indigenous history through national archives is commendable, in the right direction, and respectful of Indigenous sensitivities and needs (see, TRC, 2015, p.240-265).

In Australia, reconciliation between the government and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, started with the 1967 Referendum which aimed to remove sections 127 & 51(26) from the Constitution; however, it was not until the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act in 1991 that enacted a formal process of reconciliation (Auguste, 2010, p.1-5)⁴². The Australian government has acknowledged historical legislation that regulated the affairs of Indigenous families as a crime against humanity; and have recognized reparations as an integral part of reconciliation, approving reparations under four main categories. These include, the deprivation of liberty as children were confined in institutes against their will; the deprivation of parents of their right over their children; the deprivation by the abusive use of legislative power in forceful removals; and, reparations were to be given in all instances of a breach of fiduciary and guardianship duties (Bringing them Home, 1997, pp.216-230). No amount of money or any number of apologies and reparations will ever be enough to repair the damage of child removal practices by compulsion; however, the reparations mentioned, and their practical implication explained in the next paragraph are reflective of the pains that Indigenous children have suffered in child holding facilities.

The Commission's *Bringing them Home* (1997) report adopts certain criterion for evaluating government led reconciliatory programs and call for their inclusion in other initiatives and obligations. These criteria are, Inclusion of *self-determination* as a fundamental right; Services to be of a *non-discriminatory* nature; create conditions for *Indigenous culture* to thrive with zero state interfere; and, to increase the *resources and service accessibility* with increased funding to Indigenous people (pp. 275-280). Where it beyond the scope here to discuss the evaluation of these programs, two such programs are mentioned. First, *Funding for Reunion Assistance* has been made available in almost all Australian provinces and has been a successful program in reestablishing contact between Indigenous people separated at childhood (1997, p.310). However, as one can imagine, in most cases reunification has devastating consequences for both parties, which implies

⁴² Section 127 does not count Aboriginal natives as part of the Commonwealth, and section 51(26) given the Commonwealth authority to legislate for the Aboriginal people.

that further social support mechanisms and counseling services are needed and should exist in assisting Indigenous people. Secondly, *Mental Health Services* for Indigenous people have been recognized at the national level; however, there exists widespread criticism of discrimination in health services, including traditional forms of medicine and practices (1997, p.320). As the *Bringing them Home* report is two decades old, we refer to the official Australian website, Reconciliation Australia that highlights the current progress on reconciliation between the wider Australian community and the Torres Strait Islander People. As all aspects of the website cannot be discussed, we focus on the main legislative reason behind forceful child separation - Education. (<https://www.reconciliation.org.au/narragunnawali/>).

The first thing greeting readers is the *Acknowledgment of Country*, that pays tribute to the history, cultural, spiritual and educational practices of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People (Reconciliation Australia, 2018). The Acknowledgment further reads, “Ancestors have walked this country and we acknowledge their special and unique place in our nation’s historical, cultural and linguistic identity” (Reconciliation Australia, 2018). *Narragunnawali* is an Indigenous term that means ‘alive, wellbeing, coming together and peace’ and is adapted for reconciliation in the educational sector’ schools and early learning section (RA, 2018). The website is clear on its mandate of establishing professional learning resources, including making staff more aware of Indigenous history and contributions. It is also clear on building relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous children in the classroom, around the school and within the community. The website also has Action Plan agendas for promoting respect and opportunities for Indigenous people, in the class and in the community. For example, among the five action plans under opportunities, that is employment strategies and supporting Aboriginal owned businesses (Reconciliation Australia, 2018). All said, both Canada and Australia have openly admitted to the systematic atrocities committed against Indigenous children, have officially apologized, have made legal and social amends, and are continuing the process of reconciliation. The programs initiated by both countries take into account the history and wellbeing of the Indigenous people. The biggest achievement and true aim of reconciliation is to educate both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people on this dark history, to ensure that it never happens again.

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The Journey of Eradication Poverty:

From MDGs to SDGs and Beyond

Adnan Ali

In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution A/RES/55/2 that stated, “We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected” (United Nations General Assembly, 2000, para.2). In practise, Resolution A/RES/55/2 became the Millennium Development Goals (hereafter – MDGs) to reduce extreme poverty. This was not, however, the first-time extreme poverty was being addressed by the international community. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) dates the international fight against poverty to the 1988 UNGA adaptation of Resolution A/RES/43/195. By 1996, the UNGA had declared that the eradication of poverty was an “ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind,” subsequently identifying the following period from 1997 - 2006 as the first UN decade of poverty eradication (UNDESA, n.d.-a, para. 2). In 2007, the UNGA adopted Resolution A/RES/62/205 which retained that “eradicating poverty was the greatest global challenge facing the world and a core requirement for sustainable development,” subsequently identifying the period of 2008 - 2017 as the second UN decade for the eradication of poverty (UNDESA, n.d.-b, para. 3). In 2015, the MDG era (2000-2015) had concluded with some considerable progress in eradicating poverty, but by no means was poverty completely eradicated. Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary General for UNDESA, noted, “the experience of the MDGs offers numerous lessons, and they will serve as the springboard for our next steps” (UN, 2015, p. 9).

Led by the United Nations, the normative and institutionalized push against poverty and hunger ensued⁴³. Post-2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (hereafter - SDGs) came into effect when all 193-member states of the United Nations (UN) adopted Resolution A/RES/70/1,

⁴³ States and International Organisations (e.g. UN), did not just convene on the MDGs and SDGs, but interacted on multiple occasions to address poverty and sustainable development. Notable multilateral conferences and negotiations are, the 1990-World Conference on Education for All; the 1992-Rio Earth Summit; 1994-International Conference on Population and Development; 1995-World Summit on Social Development; 2012-UN conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20); and the UN Open Working Group (OWG) 2013-2014, among others (Kamau, et al., 2018).

titled, “*Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*,” which come to be known as the Sustainable Development Goals (hereafter - SDGs). The innovative and inclusive nature of the SDGs in involving over 70 countries, civil society and NGOs, funds and agencies, and agreeing on 169 targets was mainly due to the years long labor of expert inter-agency and multi-actor negotiations, and creative problem solving of the 2012 UN mandated Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals (Kamau, Chasek, & O’Connor, 2016, pp. 2-73). It seems the OWG had taken Kate Bedford’s (2010) work on effective framing of ideas ‘integrationist tactics’ and reaching consensus by employing inclusive language. The SDGs picked up where the MDGs had left off, but this time with some major changes and a firm determination to leave no one behind, discussed in the subsequent sections.

Divided into seven sections, this paper looks into what has transpired from implementing the aforementioned resolutions. The first section discusses poverty and the SDGs in further detail. The second section provides statistics on poverty and how it is measured. The third section explains poverty as multidimensional, followed by a visual diagram of multidimensional poverty. The fourth section explains the relationship between poverty, sustainability and development. Section five focuses on poverty in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Section six explains global partnerships and the paper concludes with call for action in section seven.

Poverty, from MDGs to SDGs

It is much beyond the scope of this essay to address all the MDGs and SDGs that are connected to the theme of poverty and hunger. For example, goals like SDG 5 that aim to *Achieve gender equality* and SDG 10 which aims to *Reduce inequality within and among countries*, will not be directly discussed. Immediately related to extreme poverty and hunger, the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG-1) - *Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger*; the first Sustainable Development Goal (SDG-1) - *End poverty in all its forms everywhere*; and SDG-2, that aims to *End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture*, are a focus of this paper. The preamble of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development clarifies that the interlinked and integrated nature of the SDGs was deliberately designed to address poverty and hunger as the core elements of the entire Agenda (UNGA, 2015).

What is poverty? The World Bank defines poverty as a “pronounced deprivation in well-being,” where well-being is mostly measured in monetary terms but can also be understood as a deprivation of basic capabilities, like inadequate income or education (Rohwerder, 2016, p.

3). *Absolute poverty* or *extreme poverty* is defined as “poverty below a set line of what is required to access minimum needs for survival” where *relative poverty* is defined as “[poverty] in relation to other people in that society at the same time” (Rohwerder, 2016, p. 3). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) explains that absolute poverty is not concerned with broader social and cultural needs of people, where poverty is measured only against the basic needs of life as food and shelter (UNESCO, n.d.). *Chronic poverty* or being chronically poor means to be living in poverty for an extended period of time (Rohwerder, 2016, p. 4), which also leads into intergenerational poverty that is passed down from parents to children.

The SDGs are a considerable upgrade on the MDGs in three key areas: SDGs have a universal approach to be achieved by developed and developing countries alike; SDGs were crafted not just by UN experts, rather were developed through an inclusive process involving millions of people, governments, and civil society; and SDGs have a broader agenda with 169 targets that include promoting social inclusion, environmental protection and justice for all (Kamau, et al., 2018, p. 5). Where the MDGs had focused on targeting extreme poverty in low-income countries, the SDGs universal approach strives for poverty to be addressed in an ‘irreversible’ manner. As Kamau et al., (2018) explain it, irreversibility has two dimensions: first, to ensure that short term poverty eradication is not undermined by long term factors as climate change, and secondly, to make sure those lifted from poverty remain lifted by emplacing strong social and economic foundations (p.162). On hunger, SDG-2 stresses the importance of improving agricultural productivity, practices and technologies, improving the access of the poor to land and finances, and to year-round food accessibility (Kamau, 2018, p. 164). The universality of SDGs is important to Liu Qian and colleagues, who assert that 75 per cent of poor people post-2007 resided in middle-income countries (Qian, Man, & Xiao-Lin, 2015, p.70). This is precisely true, as rapid urbanization has increased the number of poor in mega cities around the developing world, where over 880 million people live in slum-like condition (Kamau, 2018, p. 28). In short, the SDGs are a blend of socio-economic goals that are environmentally friendly, and that draw on a multi-dimensional collaboration between international, national and domestic actors.

Statistical overview of poverty eradication, and measuring techniques

Statistical data on poverty differs across regions, the era in question, and can fluctuate on the methodology used in determining poverty. In this section, the data presented ranges from the period of 1980 to 2015. For most data pertaining to poverty, it is crucial to understand the concept

of a poverty line. A national poverty line is based on the sum of: the cost needed to acquire adequate nutrition (1800 to 2300 calories per day), and the cost of essential nonfood items such as housing and clothing. Based on a sample of 33 national poverty lines, the World Bank estimated in 1991 that US \$1/day was the absolute International Poverty Line (IPL), that currently stands at US \$1.90 (UNSC, 2018, pp. 5-9). Put simply, the poverty line can be understood as “the income needed to avoid being hungry” (Sundaram, 2016, p. 32). Starting with official UN data, the number of people living on less than \$1.25 in the developing world dropped from 50 per cent to 14 per cent from 1990 to 2015, where the headcount of undernourished people fell from 23.3 per cent (1990 – 1992) to 12.9 per cent in (2014 – 2016) in developing regions (UN, 2015, p. 4). The report further counts 825 million people living in extreme poverty and an estimated 800 million suffering from hunger in 2015 (p. 23). Rohwerder (2016) notes, from 1981 to 2008 extreme poverty fell by 650 million, but relative poverty increased by 360 million (p. 25).

Jomo Sundaram (2016) notes that, in the period from 1981 to 2010, 56 per cent of the extremely poor lived in East and Pacific Asia (including China) that declined to 18 per cent in 2010. However, with a rise of extreme poor in India, the global share of South Asia rose from 21 to 35 per cent; where, the percentage of extreme poor in sub-Saharan Africa also rose from 11 to 36 during the same period (pp. 26-27). Furthermore, in 2013 the World Bank estimated that people living below the \$1.25 threshold decreased globally from 53 per cent in 1981 to 21 per cent in 2010 (Sundaram, 2016, pp. 26-27). Between 1990 and 2008, people living on a poverty line of \$2.50 only dropped 5.3 per cent compared to 32 per cent on \$1.25, which hints that escaping relative poverty is much more challenging (Rogers & Balázs, 2016, p. 54).

Measuring inequalities, the Gini coefficient (Gini) is a widely used method, where zero is perfect equality and 1 or 100 is perfect inequality. Applying Gini to gauge national inequalities between 1990 and 2011, China rose from 32.4 to 42.1, India increased from 30.8 to 33.9, and by international standards, the equality situation in Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and Sub-Saharan Africa remains highly unequal (Rogers & Balázs, 2016, p. 56).

A frequent debate in academic literature concerns the feasibility of the IPL being established at US \$1/day on 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP), and revised at \$1.25 post-2008. With the exception of the UN that upholds defining the poverty line at \$1.25, almost all others disagree given that the poverty line misrepresents the actual existence of poverty worldwide (Qian, 2015; Hickel, 2015; Sundaram, 2016). Sundaram (2016) believes the World Bank has failed to

correct the poverty line against inflation in the US dollar from 1985 to 2005, that will make the \$1.25 figure rise to \$1.815. Adjusting for inflation alone, the numbers of extreme poor worldwide will rise from 1923 to 2698 million in 1990, and from 1128 to 2146 million in 2010 – invalidating the UN claim of having reduced extreme poverty by 40 per cent at the end of 2015 (p. 32).

Policies geared towards poverty eradication from the international and regional, to national and domestic levels are dependent on the availability of qualitative and quantitative data. Better data leads towards better policy formulation. *The Millennium Development Goals Report* claims that measuring data is fundamental to, policy making, monitoring, tracking performance, development, improving accountability, and the quality and timeliness of data has to drastically improve for sustainable development going forward (2015, p.10). The UN Statistical Commission further stresses the need for disaggregating data into subgroups like gender, age, geography and employment as a crucial undertaking for ‘leaving no one behind.’ Nevertheless, there exists major discrepancies in data measurement techniques and methods across regions and countries (UNSC, 2018, p. 2).

There are three common data sources employed in collecting poverty related statistics that are then employed in poverty reductionist policies. The most important data source is ‘household surveys,’ that includes gathering information on household food and goods consumption patterns, education, employment income, health, fertility, and may include collecting data on children (UNSC, 2018, p. 7). The second data source is ‘price data,’ that mostly adjusts price disparities across space, e.g. urban vs. rural, towards accurately determining the correct poverty line. Thirdly, there is ‘census and population data’ that collects information on the number of people in a given country, region, or sub-region, providing a clearer headcount on the number of poor and hungry (UNSC, 2018, p. 8).

The GSDRC⁴⁴ Topic Guide titled, *Poverty and Inequality* by Brigitte Rohwerder (2016) notes problems with all these data collection strategies. First, household surveys ignore intra-household poverty, as women and girls might be at a further disadvantage than men and boys within the same household (p.13). Secondly, as measurements are based on rural poverty, this makes urban poverty a misunderstood and under-estimated phenomenon. For example, poor people living in urban settings have greater non-food needs, as shelter, transportation and access


⁴⁴ A partnership of research institutes producing knowledge services for international organization and other agencies.

to amenities. Drawing upon the findings from the Poverty Analysis Discussion Group, Rohwerder (2016) also notes that urban social inequalities and the low social status and informal livelihood of the urban-poor have a toll on their psychological wellbeing (p. 13). A major obstacle for the international community in eradicating poverty is a lack of consensus on its measurement (UNESCO, n.d., para.1).

Understanding poverty as multidimensional

Poverty is evolving into a multidimensional concept, meaning it exists beyond the basic tenet of economic (monetary) wellbeing and can exist in different forms, such as being deprived of health and educational facilities, social inclusion, and self-determination and capabilities (Rogers & Balázs, 2016, p. 54). With the economic element at center, other manifestations of poverty, like not being able to politically participate, a lack of sustainable income, increased morbidity and mortality, and unsafe environments are factors of multidimensional poverty (World Bank, 2010, p. 157). For example, being a social minority or living in a geographically remote or unstable area. The method of measuring multidimensional poverty is different than measuring extreme poverty. As Rohwerder (2016) explains, the Multidimensional Poverty Index has 10 indicators and three dimensions, taking into account other socio-economic deprivations like child mortality, years of education, child enrolment, drinking water, lack of electricity etc. that are then added to the base poverty line of \$1.90 (Rohwerder, 2016, p. 10). Measuring poverty multidimensionally, the results drastically change, for example, measured at \$1.25 the poverty headcount for South Asia is 30.6 per cent, but the same sample measured against multidimensional poverty increases to 53.4 per cent (Rohwerder, 2016, p. 11). The below diagram serves as a visual of multidimensional Poverty.

**The Multidimensional effects of poverty
Addressed by SDGs 1 through 6**



The UNDP report titled, *Concept and Measurement of Poverty*, argues that understanding poverty as multidimensional is essential in meeting the interlinked SDGs targets for the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development (UNDP 2016).

Poverty, environmental sustainability and economic development

The relationship

The headcount of people living in poverty and hunger is not a static phenomenon. As populations increase, climate related issues worsen, disasters occur, and natural resources like water and fisheries deplete, the number of poor people consequently increase. Furthermore, environmentally-unfriendly rapid economic growth like that experienced in China, does not help the cause of poverty eradication because it is not socially sustainable. For example, as Kamau, et al., note, ‘the abysmal air quality’ of megacities in Asia have a profound negative effect on people’s health (2018, p. 7). Bad health can result in unemployment that leads to income loss and the potential of being plunged into multidimensional and relative poverty, if not extreme poverty. As Kamau et al., note, the policy of “grow now, clean up later,” is not sustainable any longer (2018, p. 8).

Noting the MDG progress on environmental sustainability since the 1990s, the UN report claims for 1.9 billion people to have secured access to piped drinking water, for 2.1 billion people to have improved sanitation, and the number of those who practice open defecation has been reduced by half (UN, 2015, p. 7). However, natural disasters and extreme weather events increase global food insecurity and the mass displacement of people, which further exacerbates the developmental progress on poverty reduction. The situation of the poor is further deteriorated by civil unrest, economic and political upheavals, rising food prices, and the increase in refugees (UN, 2015). In sum, climate change has the potential to undo decades of developmental work in developing countries and risk the reemergence of poverty, as climate change reduces access to clean water, threaten food security, that further effect the health of poor people (Qian et al., 2015).

How can the problem of increasing poverty be addressed given unfriendly economic development and an unpredictable worsening climate? One solution will be to promote environmentally sustainable policies of development. Where ‘sustainability’ was realized by MDG-7 *ensure environmental sustainability*, the term has been effectively and deliberately enshrined into the Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. SDGs, 3,6,7,8,9,11,12,14,15,16 & 17). The interdependent link between sustainability and lasting economic development in relation to poverty and hunger is therefore important to understand and crucial to attain. SDGs, as a greener type of growth will create incentives and opportunities towards a sustainable livelihood for all people (Cimadamore, et al., 2016, p. 14). This was also realized by EU leaders who wanted to

move beyond a fossil fuel based ‘brown economy’ to a renewable energy based ‘green economy,’ but the idea was rejected by the newly industrialized BRICS states whose economies were not ready from a brown to green transition (Kamau, 2018, p. 36). In line with the UN (2014) report titled, *The Road to Dignity by 2030*, it is clear that climate change, poverty eradication, and sustainable development are inseparable phenomenon, as they place people and the environment at the core of sustainability. For example, one of the associated objectives to poverty eradication outlined in the UNGA 70th Session on SGDs (Resolution A/RES/70/1) was to build, “the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters” (UNGA, 2015, p. 15).

Tracking poverty reduction through Asia and sub-Saharan Africa

In 2015, a final report on MDGs titled *The Millennium Development Goals Report* was produced by the United Nations that claimed the MDGs had achieved lifting over a billion people out of extreme poverty five years ahead of schedule. However, the report also mentions that inequalities are persistent between the richest and poorest classes and between urban and rural populations. Children of the poor are twice as likely to be affected by stunted growth and under-five mortality rates, four times as likely to miss primary school, and 16,000 children die daily from preventable causes (p. 8). It is again beyond the scope of this paper to track poverty reduction efforts in all regions, however, two regions: Asia and sub-Saharan Africa will be considered as they house 80 per cent of the extreme poor and where chronic malnutrition is the highest (UN, 2015, p. 15).

A major success of the MDGs is attributed to China successfully elevating millions out of extreme poverty. According to Qian et al., (2015), the implementation of the *Development-Oriented Poverty Alleviation Program in Rural China* (2000-2010), reduced the number of poor people living on \$1.25 from 690 million in 1990 to 84.17 million in 2011; and the same program from (2011-2020) with pro-poor strategies, had accomplished great success in halving poverty (p. 71). The \$1.25 a day poverty line according to Qian et al., was established by looking at rural poverty in the poorest countries yet given urbanization and movement of people to urban centers, by 2030 the population of extremely poor would have doubled, reaffirming that even the recalculated \$1.90 international poverty line need revision. When the Asian Development Bank (ADB) adopted an Asia-specific poverty line of \$1.51, the headcount of extreme poor regionally

increased by 1017 million in 2010, or (Rohwerder, 2016, p. 23). As Rohwerder (2016) notes, South Asia holds 53 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa holds 32 per cent of the 1.6 billion people that are living in multidimensional poverty (p. 24). 90 million children under-five (one in seven) worldwide remain underweight, where again 90 per cent of such children are in Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (UN, 2015, p. 22). Southern Asia houses 281 million undernourished people, whereas almost a quarter (23 per cent) people in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Central Africa, are undernourished (UN, 2015, p. 21).

In sub-Saharan Africa, over 40 per cent of people live in extreme poverty as of 2015, with the highest concentration in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. (UN, 2015, p. 15). The widespread HIV/AIDS pandemics in sub-Saharan Africa not only affected 25 million people in an intergenerational way, but also hindered economic growth for two decades (Kamau, et al., 2018, p. 23). Gary Humphrey's (2011) bulletin report for the World Health Organization (WHO), titled *Turning in to Secure Food*, claims that, MDG-1 could be addressed by technological adaptations on small farms in Africa. This is mandatory as, in Uganda the number of undernourished people from 1990 to 2000 dropped only slightly from 16 to 14 per cent; whereas, from 2000 to 2011, the headcount of hungry people dropped a meager 'half per cent' from 14 to 13.5 (Humphreys, 2011, p. 86). For Humphreys (2011), this progress was unacceptable in achieving the MDG-1 target on time and will be a challenge for SDGs 1 and 2, given more production will be needed due to high growth rates and scarcity of water and fertilizers in Uganda and Africa in general. In their report for Public Health titled *Cutting World Hunger in Half*, Sanchez and Swaminathan (2005) convey similar findings claiming that low agricultural productivity was the main reason for hunger in tropical Africa. Of the 14-16 per cent people worldwide with malnutrition, 30 per cent reside in sub-Saharan Africa - of whom 90 per cent are chronically malnourished (p. 357). Half of the hungry worldwide are small-scale farming families, of whom three-quarters live in Africa, where 57 per cent of the deaths caused by malaria were also due to malnutrition and a weak immune system (p. 357). Africa and Southern Asia need better domestic policies and measurement techniques towards poverty and hunger eradication.

Enhanced global partnerships towards global poverty eradication

MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development.

SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

MDG-8 and SDG-17 are explicit in their quest for ‘global partnership’ and ‘development’. Section 3 of the Millennium Declaration clarifies global partnerships as a call for developed countries to provide debt-relief to heavily indebted countries, increase the flow of developmental assistance to developing and the least developed countries (LDCs), and to grant imports from these countries a duty-free access (UNGA, 2000, para. 15). Emphasizing these tenets, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development further calls for a revitalized global partnership, including, *inter alia*, strengthening the tax and revenue capacity of developing countries, and cooperation on environmentally sound technologies (UNGA, 2015). Understood simply, both resolutions call for a bargain of assistance between the north and south. The international community has addressed global partnership via three main avenues: Official Development Assistance (ODA), preferential treatment of imports from developing countries, and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives (MDRI). ODA is given under four categories: Net debt relief grants, humanitarian aid, multilateral ODA, and via bilateral development projects, programmes and technical cooperation (UN, 2015, p. 62).

As Kamau et al., (2018) note, developed and developing countries formed a global partnership in the 1992 Earth Summit for increased ODA assistance in return for environmentally sustainable development. However, this bargain did not materialize and, “ODA flows fell from \$79.3 billion in 1992 to \$71 billion in 2000” (Kamau, et al., 2018, p.20). ODA flows from the global North have been the most important factor in driving global development-partnerships, mostly OCED-DAC member countries⁴⁵, to the global South’s developing countries and LDCs. From 2000 to 2014, net ODA assistance increased by 66 per cent totaling 135 billion in 2014, with roughly 26 per cent of all aid in 2012-2013 directed towards gender equality and women’s empowerment (UN, 2015, p. 62). Where 135 billion in 2014 may seem as a huge allotment, it only represents 0.29 per cent of donor states’ Gross National Income (GNI), against the UN’s official target of .7 per cent of GNI. As per the UN progress monitoring, net ODA reached 131.6 billion in 2015, 142.6 billion in 2016, and 146.6 billion in 2017, representing .30, .32, and .31 per cent of donor states GNI respectively (UN, 2018). In 2014, 84 per cent of imports from LDCs and 79 per cent from developing countries were admitted duty free by developed states mostly consisting of agricultural products; however, apparel exports mostly from LDCs in Asia were not given duty-free access to United States markets (UN, 2015, p. 65).

⁴⁵ Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) (UN, 2015, p. 64).

Developed countries applied an average tariff of .9 per cent to agricultural products, 3.2 per cent to textiles, and 6.5 per cent to apparel in 2015 (UN, 2018). By 1995, the least developed countries had a total external debt of \$136 billion (Kamau, et al., 2018, p. 19). To assist the most indebted countries with extreme poverty, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank along with other creditors as the Paris Club initiated the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative as a structural program in 1996 (World Bank, 2018). The MDRI program was established following the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit, with an aim to further decrease the total debt owed by eligible countries under the HIPC program. For example, Canada contributed \$321 million in MDRI payments alone since 2011, with a total allotment of 2.5 billion to be paid over 50 years (Department of Finance Canada, 2012). To date, the HIPC and other MDRI programs have relieved 36 countries of a total debt of 99 billion. The HIPC program is based on tough standards of eligibility determination and to receive full debt relief, eligible countries have to complete certain reforms in poverty eradication. As the World bank has realized for long-term debt sustainability, there has to be greater emphasis placed on prudent borrowing by both borrowers and donors and developed countries should allow for greater market access (World Bank, 2018). Finally, diaspora communities play a huge role in poverty eradication by sending remittances from developed to developing countries that have a profound impact on the overall wellbeing of poor peoples. Remittance to developing countries totaled 429 billion in 2016, that is three times the amount of net ODA in 2016 (UN, 2018).

Pointers towards eradicating poverty in a sustainable manner

Call for action

In the standards set by the international community, mostly intergovernmental agreements led by the UN, the eradication of poverty has been insufficient over the past three decades. However, what has been a great success is the normative and institutional undertaking of poverty by the international community based on a humanitarian agenda with great vigor and ambition.

Better data quality: The unavailability of disaggregated, quality and timely data was a major challenge for subnational and local governments to produce evidence-based decision-making; where this problem is most acute in sub-Saharan Africa given 61 per cent of countries lacked adequate data for monitoring basic poverty (UN, 2015, p. 11). Most data measuring poverty in LDCs is conducted at the household level which does not allow for knowing the ration of poor women and girls to men. A solution given for the post-2015 development agenda includes, the

accumulation of real-time and geospatial data and to strengthen the statistical capacity of data at the national level – as a combined responsibility of IOs, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector (UN, 2015, pp. 12-13).

Meet official development assistance targets: Developed countries have to honor ODA targets towards developing countries at the 0.7 per cent of GNI standard set by the United Nations. The trend of ODA assistance has hovered around the .3 mark and if the .7 mark is realized this will double ODA flows. For example, the 2017 ODA totaled at 146 billion at .31 per cent, doubling will mean 292 billion – the effects of which on poverty and hunger will be staggering. Qian et al., (2015) brings out a great point. They state that if three quarters of the extremely poor are living in middle-income countries and most ODA is going towards lower-developed countries that house a quarter of the extremely poor, then how can poverty be eradicated effectively? Sanchez and Swaminathan (2011) note that, it will cost every person in the developed world 60 U.S. cents per month, to combat extreme poverty and hunger (p. 359). If framed correctly and channeled effectively, this is an achievable target as 60 cents is one third of the price of a single coffee.

The poor amidst the rich: The proportion of poor people are rising in urban settings. Within urban populations, Rohwerder believes that between 30 to 50 per cent are living in poverty (2016, p. 24). This calls for better measurement techniques and major innovations in designing tailored poverty reductionist policies. Therefore, it is empirical for countries to set their own national and local agendas, towards reducing inequality gaps. Further, in agreement with Sanchez and Swaminathan (2011) on the question of eradicating hunger, good governance policies in poor countries that include nutritional and agricultural intervention programs can radically change the balance between hunger and no hunger (p. 357).

Monitoring states: During numerous discussions held at the, Global Social Policy Seminar with Dr. Rianne Mahon at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, from September to December 2018, many fellow colleagues agreed that states were the most important and influential action in solving problems for the poorest and most vulnerable class. As countries are at different pace of development and economic wellbeing, all countries should adhere to common but differential responsibilities in achieving the SDG targets – and states have to be regulated on SDG indicators for compliance. Additionally, there has to be effective mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the SDG indicators and governments macroeconomic and social policies, as lessons arising from the ineffective poverty reduction strategies of the MDGs era. SDGs will only have a superficial

effect and repeat the shortcomings of the MDGs if we fail to understand the paradigms that perpetuate poverty and unsustainability (Cimadamore, et al., 2016, pp. 16-17).

Consulting the poor on poverty reductionist discourse:

Rogers and Balázs (2016), have done great work on looking at different types of research that consult the poorest lot on their wellbeing, leading with ‘Voices of the Poor’ project that conducted over 60,000 interviews in 1990 (p. 54). What was interesting, is that the findings conducted from different countries and populations, were surprisingly similar. Common findings from how the poor felt and understood their condition were, their inequalities are growing, the rich class is selfish and dictate terms, there is corruption, there exists paternalistic relationships, and among other grievances, there was a lack of self-confidence in the participants. The Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) gave a true picture of the real problems within societies of the extremely poor. For the most part, it was the rich puppeteering the lives of the poor, and this is more possible in countries of the south, especially the least developed countries, that have poor law enforcement and justice system. The poor need to be consulted on their own problems, and solutions should be catered to their wellbeing. If most of the policies relevant to poverty and hunger are shaped in the grand halls of the United Nations, then the UN will need to device a new Open Working Group for a post-2030 Agenda for [a new] Sustainable Development.

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Biased Security? National Priorities and Regional Intervention in the Gambian and Burundian Election Crises

Yolaine Frossard de Saugy

Regional organizations have been touted as the best instruments to promote regional stability, and recent history seems to confirm their superiority over larger continental bodies in enabling speedy intervention in tense political contexts. However, a more detailed comparison between recent intervention shows that despite sizeable changes in normative frameworks, the defining factor triggering action remains national interest. Due in part to their particular history, some regional formations constitute more convenient vehicles for the defence of domestic priorities than larger, more cumbersome bodies, which explains their apparent readiness to intervene; when such interest is lacking, such institutions are much more reluctant to take action. The recent political unrest in Burundi and the Gambia, and the international response to it provides very interesting case studies for this dynamic and allows for a deeper understanding of the politics behind democratization efforts in Africa and elsewhere.

Can regional organizations play an effective role in fostering security in Africa? Regional formations have been touted as the latest favourite instruments to promote political stability, seen as a weak spot of larger formations such as the African Union. A cursory look at recent interventions seems to confirm that they are better suited for this purpose: on the 9th of December 2016, President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia denounced the result of the presidential election he had recently lost and refused to recognize the legitimacy of his elected opponent, Adama Barrow; on the 19th of January 2017, forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led by Senegal crossed the border into the Gambia and allowed for the exile of Jammeh and the arrival in Banjul of President Barrow. In a comparable case in April 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi announced that he would seek a third mandate despite being prevented to do so by the Burundian Constitution and facing massive opposition and protests; as of October 2018, the African Union (AU) has renounced any plan to send a

peacekeeping force despite continuing unrest and human rights abuses, Nkurunziza has been re-elected, and the Burundian Constitution has been amended to allow him to run for at least two additional seven-year terms.

These two cases seem to indicate that regional formations are indeed more efficient than the AU in dealing with security threats. However, it must be highlighted that there was another regional formation involved, the East African Community (EAC), which failed to play a significant role in Burundi. Moreover, the ECOWAS intervention was particularly swift because of Senegal's major involvement at the political and military levels – an involvement which can be traced to Senegal's national interest in this particular area, a key element missing from the Burundi case. Indeed, in many cases, the outcome of security-related interventions can still be linked to the national interests of the states involved, despite undeniable progress in terms of norm-setting and intervention. Using Burundi and the Gambia as case studies, this article will demonstrate that some regional formations, ECOWAS in particular, have indeed evolved to be more effective in dealing with some kinds of security threats, but that in all settings decisive enforcement of norms and agreements remains contingent upon domestic priorities.

The definition of security and security threats in African politics has considerably changed since the creation of the OAU. First used to design external aggression, the meaning of these terms has been progressively extended to encompass any attack on the rule of law, democracy, and constitutionality. As any intervention by regional or subregional actors is justified and made possible by the normative frameworks under which they operate, a study of how these norms and definitions came to be is essential to understand the ability of these organizations to intervene. This is why this article will first retrace the evolution of the AU's normative framework, the

trajectory of the security agenda of ECOWAS and the limited security prerogatives of the EAC before studying the Burundian and Gambian cases.

Beyond sovereignty?

The AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, was notoriously ineffective in the area of security because it had profoundly enshrined the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention and could not overcome this normative barrier (Abou, 2012; Dokken, 2008; Welz, 2012). By the end of the 1990s, it was largely perceived as having become irrelevant (Koga, 2017). The rising instability caused by superpower disengagement at the end of the Cold War, the fear of seeing Africa marginalized in the globalization process, the increased number of conflict spilling over borders and the failure of international bodies to help effectively created the necessary context for an overhaul of the continental organization (Abou, 2012; Bergholm, 2007; Koga, 2017; Kuwali, 2014). It would, however, not have happened without the intervention of three key actors and their respective agendas.

In South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki was eager to promote the country's international standing after apartheid and present it, and its region, as an attractive market for foreign investments. He devised a project termed the African Renaissance to push for a renewal of African institutions and identity through the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – the tenants of international liberalism and the values shared by potential investors. In Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo was eager to increase his influence and erase the military past of the Nigerian regime. He saw the security and development of all African countries as interlinked and promoted a framework of good governance and human security to foster stability. He also faced contestations at home because of the cost of the Nigerian peacekeeping involvement in Sierra Leone and Liberia and was eager to share the cost while avoiding to lose his leadership role or

compromise regional balance. In Libya, on the other hand, Colonel Gaddafi was looking for ways to bolster his credentials as a pan-Africanist and involve his country further south of the Sahara to compensate for his regime's isolation. Gaddafi succeeded in holding the AU foundational meeting in his hometown of Sirte in 1999, but his radical version of African Unity framed as a political union was sidelined in favour of a less radical emphasis on coordination and cooperation (Abou, 2012; Dokken, 2008; Tiekou, 2004).

Following the successful efforts of Mbeki and Obasanjo, the normative framework of the new organization included the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Constitutive Act of the AU, signed in 2000, enshrined the idea that the AU is empowered to intervene to protect populations if their governments fail to do so: Article 4(h) establishes “the right of the [AU] to intervene in a Member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (emphasis added). Though focusing on a narrow definition of human security, it is a consequential breakthrough as it stands in clear contradiction to the principle of nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty. It must be noted that Article 4(g) reiterates “noninterference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another” meaning that the AU is explicitly given supranational rights, and prerogatives denied to individual states.

The Constitutive Act made no mention of the question of legitimate government, but during its transformation the AU-in-becoming adopted the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU Response to unconstitutional changes of government, which listed common democratic values and principles, condemned unconstitutional changes of government (precisely defined and including the “refusal by an incumbent to relinquish power after free and fair elections”) and listed sanctions. These principles were reiterated in the Protocol on Peace and

Security adopted in 2003, which established the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC has the power to send fact-finding missions, and authorize and legitimate AU intervention in internal crises – establishing a clear chain of reaction including in case of unconstitutional changes of government (Souaré, 2012). The final touches were added through the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which added the prohibition of unconstitutional revision or amendment of a Constitution (precisely to prevent leaders from seeking re-election past their term limits) to the list of actions warranting sanctions (Ayangafac and Cilliers, 2011). The AU, therefore, stood in stark contrast with the OAU, at least in terms of norms and prerogatives, and its new norm aligned with the hopes and ambitions of Mbeki and Obasanjo.

This, however, does not mean that all states were on board; Thomas Tieku mentions that at the creation of the AU “the majority of the African leaders adopted this position because they saw it as the best possible way of avoiding a division among them (Tieku, 2004: 262). The AU did take a principled stance in opposition to attempted coups and fraudulent elections after 2004 (Souaré, 2012), but the fact that it did not trigger Article 4(h) in cases that seem to warrant it, including in Darfur (Abass, 2014) also suggests that there is still a long way to go to see a full use of the AU’s security arsenal, and that its position as a supranational body is not as secure as its frameworks seems to imply. Chrysantus Ayangafac and Jakkie Cilliers go as far as stating that “while on paper AU policy is often in line with international norms and standards that espouse democracy, respect for human rights, and equity, in practice it promotes regime security at virtually all costs (Ayangafac and Cilliers, 2011: 117). Added to the fact that the AU was at the time “join[ing] an ever-increasing number of international organizations that have recently decided to incorporate ‘democracy clauses’ in their constitutive instruments” (Naldi, 2002: 417) seems to

accredit the idea put forward by Söderbaum, Gibb and Taylor that norms might have been officially adopted for the international profile rather than truly institutionalize by member states.

It must be mentioned that the AU's security architecture relies on the Regional Economic Communities (such as ECOWAS and the EAC) and the support of the member states (Dokken, 2008). This means that the AU is particularly vulnerable to actors with a varying degree of commitment to its ambitions. Another key challenge for the AU remains funding: it is chronically underfunded by member states and relies on external funding for most of its tasks (Ayangafac and Cilliers, 2011; Murithi, 2005). This also hampers its ability to act independently and weakens the position of the AU as an organization when it could act as a unifying force. The AU, therefore, has an interesting record in norm settings, very distinct from its predecessor, but it seems to owe more to the determination and interests of some than to a wide consensus. Maintaining unity mattered enough to generate official support for some ideas without leading the way to actual endorsement. Whether this normative evolution led to an actual difference in enforcement is widely disputed – and disputable.

Does proximity breed solidarity?

Things took a different turn in West Africa. In 1975, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo came together to form ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, which despite its name would not focus on economic matters for long. The region was notoriously unstable, and it became quickly clear that any economic integration would fail without taking action in the area of security to ensure stability (Nkrumah and Viljoen, 2014). Nigeria is often perceived as having played a key role in this evolution: following the 1967-70 civil war during which some Francophone West African States, and France, supported the Biafra

rebellion against the Nigerian government, Nigeria was eager to ensure support from its region and drive the French out, not to mention counter the trend of instability and external incursions that threatened economic cooperation. The regional alliance was, therefore, part of a larger plan involving loans, grants and infrastructure projects led by Abuja to promote its own security (Adejumobi, 2016; Gambari, 1991). Francophone states were skeptical of Nigerian intentions at first, but the disengagement of France in the second half of the 1970s threatened to leave them isolated and vulnerable and led them to see regional cooperation as the best path to stability (Gambari, 1991; Koga, 2017).

This growing consensus led to the adoption of the organization's first normative standards in security and conflict prevention, which remained within the normative framework of the OAU, respecting the seven principles of national sovereignty, and did not mean the end of debates on the means to achieve regional security. They, however, attested that members of ECOWAS shared awareness of the security risks they faced, and were willing to use ECOWAS as a tool to address them and achieve their goals (Adejumobi, 2016; Koga, 2017). It is therefore clear that since its inception, the ECOWAS security framework was supported by states as it fitted their interests, rather than contradicted them.

The 1990s were a notably rough decade for the region, including because of the 1989-97 civil war in Liberia and the related conflict in Sierra Leone beginning in 1991. Most authors agree that the disengagement of the superpowers following the end of the Cold War, the inaction of the OAU and other international bodies in Liberia and the rising tensions in West Africa caused in part by support of some countries to rival factions in the Liberian civil war, as well as the direct consequences of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts for neighbouring states, including through the important influx of refugees, and the fear of further propagation of the violence led to

a new wave of normative and behavioural change within ECOWAS. These changes happened gradually at the structural level, with the elaboration of a security architecture within the organization, at the normative level, with the extension of the definition of security to include human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, and at the operational level, with the deployment of ECOWAS peacekeeping forces in various countries. (Adejumobi, 2016; Bolaji, 2015; Koga, 2017).

The first consequential step came in 1993 with the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty which gave the organization the means to impose sanctions, send peacekeeping forces, and set up an observation system for elections; in short turning the Economic Community into a fully political organization oriented towards the promotion of democratic norms (Adejumobi, 2016; Koga, 2017; Nkrumah and Viljoen, 2014). Interestingly, these steps towards interventionism were taken with the idea of preserving national integrity and fostering regime security – preventing states from fueling domestic conflicts within their neighbours and avoiding the spillover of violence, effectively promoting interventionism for domestic reasons (Bolaji, 2015).

Another important step was taken in 1999 with the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which not only instituted security 8 mechanisms and emphasized the question of democracy but also allowed for intervention to protect “human security”, including in the case of the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government – a stark departure from the OAU stance, and a decisive step towards a normative evolution allowing for intervention within states (Koga, 2017; Nkrumah and Viljoen, 2014; Kuwali, 2014). This document established the right to intervene, similarly to what the AU would do a year later (arguably following ECOWAS’s lead). In 2001 the organization took a step further and adopted a normative framework for democracy promotion,

which listed democratic standards to which members should ascribe, including constitutional principles such as the separation of powers (Adejumobi, 2016). Most importantly, this document for the first time states that ECOWAS had “Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. This commitment gave ECOWAS the possibility to act not only in case of conflict but also in case of a coup or fraudulent election.

None of these steps were taken easily, and the adoption of these instruments does not mean that all countries had reached a simultaneous consensus on their terms. However, the literature insists on a growing consensus around most of them, and the gradual nature of the changes in norms and the fact that these were adopted in response to threats faced by all ECOWAS members – including a remarkable number of coups and counter-coups – and with a view of protecting their interests means that they were more easily institutionalized. In addition, as evoked by Nkrumah and Viljoen, proximity and the convergence of interests made the subregional organization an easier instrument for states to use in case of threat – they even suggest that the 1999 Protocol was adopted to give a legal basis to interventions already happening at the behest of member states (Nkrumah and Viljoen, 2014). Koga suggests that this was actually a defensive move from some members of the organization worried that others were masquerading their own intervention as an ECOWAS endeavour. For instance, Nigeria was accused by a number of West African states of intervening without a framework in Liberia, despite officially being under ECOWAS mandate, because it suited its own foreign policy priorities. This would suggest that the actual determinants of action might sometimes be located in the capitals rather than in regional headquarters (Adibe, 1998; Koga, 2017, Tavares, 2011).

It seems therefore that the normative changes were widely accepted and even exploited within ECOWAS, but this did not erase all difficulties, especially as the organization still had

limited capacity on its own: “aside from sanctions and leveraging on [sic] the support and goodwill of the international community, ECOWAS does not have much weight in compelling member states to rapidly reverse undemocratic acts” (Bolaji, 2015: 205).

ECOWAS presided to important normative changes as well, mainly prompted by the interests and needs of a majority of its members. The proximity of interests within the organization made it an easy tool for intervention, though these might have been motivated more by national interests than by true institutionalization of democratic norms.

It must be highlighted that not all regional formations are equal when it comes to security. In 2000 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda reformed the East African Community, joined by Burundi and Rwanda in 2007. The new iteration of the EAC is a neofunctionalist dream come true, its aim being to ultimately become a political union through the implementation of a Customs Union, a Common Market, and a Monetary Union (Drummond, Wajid and Williams 2014). The EAC is first and foremost a tool of economic cooperation (Kaahwa, 2017) and if security is mentioned in its institutional framework, it is not a high priority : political matters only appear at Article 123 of its establishment treaty, and in its “Vision 2050” document published in 2016 there are no stated objectives or targets for governance questions. In addition, Leonard Oburra Aloo notes that though two protocols on peace, security and defence have been adopted in 2012 and 2013 “these two protocols call for collaboration and do not themselves cede any decision-making or action to the Community itself” (Aloo, 2017: 190). Unconstitutional changes of government are not mentioned in those documents. This rather different approach to security might be related to the fact that some of the prominent leaders of the region have been engaged in the promotion of regime security over constitutional norms, and had less of an interest in promoting these norms. The case of Kenya is more ambiguous, but President Museveni of Uganda himself had already managed in 2005 to

modify the Constitution to erase the term limit, and on December 2017 his party's majority voted to eliminate the age limit, allowing him to run again after 5 re-elections (le Monde, 21st of December 2017).

Considering the sizeable difference between the normative frameworks and behaviour of the EAC and ECOWAS, the regional formations involved in Burundi and the Gambia crises respectively, it seems obvious that regional organizations cannot be considered as a uniform breed and that their efficiency in dealing with security threats must vary greatly. This, in turn, impacts the role of the African Union as well, since its architecture is designed to involve regional entities in security intervention. This helps explain why it took a more prominent role in Burundi than in The Gambia, though the widely different outcomes of those two cases are also determined by other factors.

Burundi

Following numerous episodes of violence beginning in 1972 and culminating in the mid-1990s Burundi's constitutional arrangements were dictated by the Arusha Peace accords, which among other things aimed to ensure ethnic balance in government to avoid further exactions. It was, therefore, a sensitive terrain when the 2015 events began. In January of that year, protests started in the capital Bujumbura after rumours had begun to circulate that President Pierre Nkurunziza would seek a third mandate despite being forbidden to do so by the Constitution and the Arusha Agreements. Protests and their repression worsened in April after Nkurunziza's candidature was officialized. There was an attempted coup to stop him on the 13th of May, but it failed. Following international concern, Nkurunziza accepted to postpone the elections to 11th of July 2015, but he won them anyway and refused to step down. Since then, the Constitution has been amended to allow him to run for another seven-year term (FIDH, 3rd of November 2017).

These events seem to fit all the requirements for an unconstitutional change of government under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, not to mention the potential for regional instability considering the region's history – Nkurunziza's position was perceived as endangering the Arusha Agreements (Le Point, 13th of May 2015). However, not all these aspects attracted condemnation from the AU. The organization was relatively slow to intervene, with the PSC only calling for the deployment of an observatory mission in June 2015, a mission that had not been fully deployed by the end of 2017. In addition, the aim of this mission was the disarmament of armed groups and the assessment of the conditions for the elections; its mandate, as well as declarations and communiqués from the AU, failed to highlight the unconstitutionality of Nkurunziza's actions, focusing instead on the violence and emphasizing mostly the need for renewed the dialogue. Most revealingly, it took almost a year to take the decision to send a peacekeeping force (after repeated reports of human rights violations), approved by the PSC in December 2015. Despite the available evidence, the idea was abandoned as soon as Burundi refused it – though Article 4(h) would have allowed for the deployment anyway, especially in a region as sensitive as this one (Le Monde, 29th of December 2015, Foreign Policy, 2nd of February 2016).

The limits of the normative changes undergone by the AU were well summarized by Al-Jazeera: “Analysts say other African nations are wary of setting a precedent of deploying troops against the government's wishes” (Al-Jazeera, 1st of February 2016). Beyond this lack of engagement, the AU supported the EAC's efforts, but as demonstrated the EAC previously does not have a basis for condemning unconstitutional changes of government. Its first strong condemnation was instead for the perpetrators of the coup (EAC Statement, 13th of May 2015). The EAC and the AU did succeed in pushing for a postponement of the elections (EAC

Communiqué, 31st of May 2015; PSC Communiqué, 7th of July 2015), but this did not change the outcome. Moreover, the mediator appointed by the EAC (who was endorsed by the AU) was President Museveni, whose own situation (as previously outlined) means that he was unlikely to highlight Nkurunziza's lack of constitutional standing and instead predictably condemned the violence and preconized rounds of talk, which by the end of 2017 had not yet been successful (France 24, 9th of December 2017).

With limited regional engagement, the AU, therefore, failed to leverage its security instruments and was unable to stop Nkurunziza or quell the violence. The fact that it renounced sending a peacekeeping force that had already been approved shows that in the absence of determined individual actors, its normative framework is not enough to supersede national sovereignty.

The Gambia

The Gambian intervention could not present a more different profile. On the 9th of December 2016, President Yahya Jammeh announced that he did not recognize the results of the presidential election he had recently lost, following the announcement by the electoral commission that errors had been committed but that they did not impact the results. The following day the AU and ECOWAS published communiqués criticizing this position, and on the 13th of December, a joint ECOWAS/UN delegation was sent to Banjul. On the 17th of December, the first decision in the matter was taken by ECOWAS, recognizing the election results. On the 13th of January 2017, the PSC declared that Jammeh would no longer be recognized after the 19th of January, the end of his term, and on the 19th of January, his opponent, Adama Barrow was sworn in as President at the Gambian embassy in Dakar. Hours later, after a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning Jammeh had been approved, ECOWAS forces entered into the Gambia. The

operations were suspended the next day to allow for mediation by Guinean President Alpha Condé, at the end of which Jammeh left the country and Barrow came back to Banjul as President (Africa News, 19th of January 2017; Ouest-France, 20th of January 2017).

This seems to be a textbook procedure, with clear statements being put forward by key regional actors, endorsement by the international community and collective action. However, it must be mentioned that this whole process overlooked the fact that Jammeh had asked the Supreme Court to render a verdict in this case, and that Parliament had granted him a three-month extension of his term in the meantime (Le Monde, 13th of December 2016). Considering that the PSC gives countries six months to return to constitutional order (according to the Lomé Declaration), nothing called for such haste – the legality of the intervention, in the absence of a clear call from Barrow, has even been called into question (Williams, 2017). More significantly, it was Dakar that drafted and presented the UNSC resolution (Security Council Report, 19th of January 2017) and the PSC resolution, Dakar that welcomed Barrow and had him sworn in (BBC, 19th of January), Dakar that led the armed forces on the 19th of January – armed forces which remained in the Gambia at least beyond April 2017. The study of available accounts leaves no doubt as to the extent of Senegal's involvement in the operation (Le Monde, 13th of December 2016; Jeune Afrique, 18th of January 2017). It must also be mentioned that Jammeh is not a neutral actor for Senegal: he is suspected of supporting rebels in the Casamance area of Senegal since 1982, ties that have been outlined multiple times in the reports (Ouest-France, 20th of January; Marut in Le Monde, 20th of January 2017; Williams, 2017). Some analysts even see him as an obstacle to Dakar's ambitions of reconstituting the Senegambia Federation (Marut in Le Monde, 20th of January 2017), and state that this had been planned before ECOWAS got involved, as stated by Moussa Coulibaly, director of the Bamako's School of Peacekeeping: "the intervention was facilitated by the fact that the

forces were already available. ECOWAS only relied on a scenario that Senegal had prepared for a long time [...] ECOWAS brought the legitimacy needed to a plan that had already been made”. Even putting aside these considerations, it remains undeniable that ECOWAS’s intervention owed largely to the commitment of Senegal.

The key factor in the Gambia, therefore, seems to have been the direct national interest and resolute action of one member state. The AU had the same instruments at its disposal in both cases but was unable to fully mobilize on its own whereas ECOWAS afforded Senegal the right mechanism to further what could be seen as a primarily domestic agenda. Dakar also benefitted from the relative isolation and unpopularity of the Gambian regime, which meant that this change was not perceived as a security liability in the wider region (Hartmann, 2017).

Conclusion

The African Union has seen great changes in terms of the normative framework, but these still have not been institutionalized enough to be exploited beyond political rhetoric. On the other hand, physical and psychological proximity between ECOWAS members seems to have made normative change more palatable and intervention more easily accepted, but it might also have led to other excesses – with national interests overriding the original purpose of the framework. As shown by the contrasting example of the EAC, ECOWAS remains an exception in regional formations – due in part to its specific history nonetheless. It seems therefore that some regional organizations are more effective in tackling certain types of security threats, but only if their members have agreed on the risk posed by these threats to their own interest – and this, in turn, might not always mean greater stability. In the absence of overzealous governments, neither the AU nor ECOWAS have the capacity to truly act on their own, meaning that they seem to remain for now at the level of cooperation rather than integration. The future of security might, therefore,

lie in a collaboration in which the AU could help empower regional communities and export its frameworks, while balancing in the influence of their more prominent members.

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Precarity of Statelessness in the Palestinian Context

Jacqueline Harber

In the migration field, precarity reveals the “conditions of vulnerability and insecurity that refugees and migrants confront, including their differing ability to access legal documentation, social rights, humanitarian assistance and protection and stable and legal employment”⁴⁶. Palestinians are the largest population of displaced people in the world to date. The dispute between Israel and Palestine over territory that began over seventy years ago broke out into a deadly war causing 700 000 Palestinians to flee. This led to the displacement of Palestinians in states all over the world and their descendants spending generations living in refugee camps and spaces that are not labelled as their own. This is why they are labeled as stateless – “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”⁴⁷. Statelessness, especially in the Palestinian context, can no longer be ignored as the international community and migration system have a duty to protect vulnerable individuals. I argue that inclusion from a state is the only means for individuals to guarantee protection by analyzing the precarity of status and the precarity of space and belonging, along with exploring the reality of a state-centric world. By providing some context about Palestinians statelessness we can see international efforts are not enough. We need to address the precarities of stateless populations as there is an international duty to protect all individuals.

⁴⁶ Suzan Ilcan, Kim Rygiel & Feyzi Baban, “The Ambiguous Architecture of Precarity: Temporary Protection, Everyday Living, and Migrant Journeys of Syrian Refugees,” *International Journal of Migration and Borders* 4 no.1/2 (2017): 55.

⁴⁷ United Nations. "Ending Statelessness." UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency. 3.

In the event known as the “nakba”, Palestinians lost their homes, their lands and their status as a population. Since this event, Palestinians have faced over seventy years of statelessness since they lack a formal citizenship. The immediate loss and continued absence of citizenship has drastically impacted the lives of Palestinians⁴⁸. Not only in an emotional or psychological way, but also physically in the sense that they lost what once was their own territory. This leads to the precarity of Palestinians as they lack protection from a state. Other countries have attempted to help Palestinians, yet even these efforts further contribute to their precarity. For example, Lebanon hosts approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees, yet Palestinians are suffering from overcrowding, poor housing conditions and unstable living conditions in these camps⁴⁹. The international community is not doing enough to protect this vulnerable population.

The migration system needs to become more effective in protecting Palestinians and they need to continue to improve their international efforts to ensure their protection. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established in 1948 states that everyone has the right to a nationality⁵⁰. Although, stateless people have no entitlement to this right. It is clear that Palestinians do not have a nationality, as they hold no citizenship. This is one of the many gaps in the enforcement of international law that needs to be closed to ensure the protection of all people. Additionally, despite the creation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees, established specifically to address Palestinian statelessness, the problem still persists and still affects the lives of thousands of people.

Furthermore, due to the lack of state protection and lack of inclusion from other states in the international community, Palestinians are extremely vulnerable. This can lead to situations where individuals are unable to seek basic rights. The root of the problem goes back to when Palestinians lost their homeland, which was extremely detrimental to the protection of their population. The homeland, “which has remained central to conceptualizations and theorizations of diasporic identity – is often as central to understandings of statelessness, and at times even more so, than the loss of the state or nationality”⁵¹. Holding a status or citizenship represents an identity

⁴⁸ Ilana Feldman, “Waiting for Palestine: refracted citizenship and latent sovereignty in Gaza,” *Citizenship Studies* 12 no. 5 (2008): 448-449.

⁴⁹ Maissaa Almustafa, “Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian Refugees: Governing through exclusion,” *Social and Legal Studies* 27 no. 2 (2018): 172.

⁵⁰ The United Nations. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Article 15, 1948.

⁵¹ Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, “On the threshold of statelessness: Palestinian narratives of loss and erasure,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 no. 2 (2016): 307-308.

that embodies legitimate political power⁵². Johnson explains how the “argument about noncitizen politics ultimately becomes that noncitizens do not, or perhaps cannot, exercise political agency until they have achieved citizenship”⁵³. This reality of losing their state which had the responsibility to protect them, creates precarious situations in the Palestinian context as they are now “noncitizens”. Rygiel elaborates on the importance of labels by stating how “Citizenship is commonly understood as being about rights and responsibilities, membership, and legal and political status”⁵⁴. This leads to a discussion on citizenship being necessary for guaranteeing human rights.

Hannah Arendt, a political philosopher, discusses every person has a “right to have rights” simply due to the idea that human rights are inalienable for all human beings. However, as soon as there was no state to guarantee rights, individuals were left in a state of ambiguous protection. The “right to have rights” is ultimately dependent on a political community that will recognize an individual. This is where stateless populations suffer because it is not simply “the loss of specific rights...but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever”⁵⁵. It is clear that precarity captures a condition of vulnerability but also a characteristic of ambiguity⁵⁶. All individuals should have the identity of a political being since we live in a Westphalian international system ruled by states. Thus, in order to address the precarity of statelessness and protect all individuals, the foundation needs to be ensuring all individuals have some form of recognized status acknowledged and accepted by states.

The precarity of status is the main vulnerability stateless people experience in their everyday lives. If a state grants an individual citizenship, the state then becomes responsible for guaranteeing their human rights and protection. Ilcan et al. describe how precarity of status “refers to vulnerable and insecure conditions that derive from refugees being assigned a certain socio-legal status by governing authorities such as states”⁵⁷. In the Palestinian case, Palestine is not universally accepted as a state which is why they are still deemed a stateless population in the

⁵² Heather Johnson, “These Fine Lines: Locating Noncitizenship in Political Protest in Europe.” *Citizenship Studies* 19 no.8 (2016): 951. 953.

⁵³ Ibid: 954.

⁵⁴ Kim Rygiel, “Dying to Live: Migrant Deaths and Citizenship Politics along European Borders – Transgressions, Disruptions, and Mobilizations.” *Citizenship Studies* 20 no.5 (2016): 548.

⁵⁵ Ibid: 548.

⁵⁶ Suzan Ilcan, Kim Rygiel & Feyzi Baban, “The Ambiguous Architecture of Precarity: Temporary Protection, Everyday Living, and Migrant Journeys of Syrian Refugees,” *International Journal of Migration and Borders* 4 no.1/2 (2017): 55.

⁵⁷ Ibid: 55.

twenty-first century. Even if a state recognizes a Palestinian as a refugee, they may have more protection than stateless people as they are recognized by a state as a refugee, yet they still suffer precariousness. Thus, one's status can reveal "gradations" of precarity due to either possessing a status and or not possessing a status⁵⁸. When an individual is not included by a state due to an ambiguous or undefined status, the state does not hold an obligation to protect them.

This framework of exclusion is state-centric making it difficult for international efforts such as Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to effectively protect Palestinians. A precarity of status cements Palestinians in ambiguous situations with respect to protection and rights, along with everyday living⁵⁹. One could argue that citizenship is essential for ensuring no one falls through the cracks of state protection. In D'Aoust's work, she discusses how we need to move beyond simply an institutional view of citizenship and look at citizenship as "both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity"⁶⁰. Citizenship is a relationship between sociology and legality. Furthermore, citizenship is "a governing practice, one in need of constant reaffirmation through specific practices or acts"⁶¹. This further demonstrates the importance of a state in guaranteeing the inclusion of individuals both legally and socially. Molavi relates this to the Palestinian context by explaining how identifying the Israeli state as "Jewish", denies the citizenship of the Palestinian-Arab community⁶². Therefore, the way a state characterizes its identity, affects the precarity of individuals. The control states possess over individuals extends to providing a physical identification as well.

Palestinians often lack physical identification, thereby further contributing to their lack of protection. Precarity of status is often referenced in terms of being acknowledged within the boundaries of a state. However, it is essential to consider a supranational precarity of status and what it means for stateless people to be mobile in a world controlled by borders. Khosravi identifies that a passport is the most important item required for travelling⁶³. Salter agrees by saying "the

⁵⁸ Ibid: 55.

⁵⁹ Suzan Ilcan, Kim Rygiel & Feyzi Baban, "The Ambiguous Architecture of Precarity: Temporary Protection, Everyday Living, and Migrant Journeys of Syrian Refugees," *International Journal of Migration and Borders* 4 no.1/2 (2017): 66.

⁶⁰ Anne-Marie D'Aoust, "In the Name of Love: Marriage Migration, Governmentality, and Technologies of Love," *International Political Sociology* 7 no.3 (2013): 265.

⁶¹ Ibid: 265.

⁶² Shourideh Molavi, "Stateless Citizenship and the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel." *Refuge* 26, no. 2 (2009): 19.

⁶³ Shahram Khosravi, "The 'Illegal' Traveler: An Autoethnography of Borders". *Social Anthropology* 15 no.3 (2007): 329.

passport is the primary document by which mobile individuals are identified tracked, and regulated”⁶⁴. Palestinians no longer have a recognizable identity to be tracked or regulated. The global mobility regime is not universal, meaning that every state has different procedures for identifying legitimate forms of identity which is a constraint for border technology⁶⁵. A passport is the most convenient way to prove one’s citizenship, yet in the case of a stateless person, they do not have a citizenship to prove.

It is evident that a physical piece of identification proving one’s status is essential to move between states. This is why after World War I, Torpey describes how the League of Nations created the Nansen passport. This passport assisted with the facilitation of “international movement by people whose states had abandoned them in the upheavals of that tumultuous era”⁶⁶. Can the international community look at this possibility to protect stateless populations today? The problem of identification for the stateless in a world dominated by states remains a pressing concern. From a security standpoint, the need to classify “who is who” becomes key when states regulate movement across their external borders”⁶⁷. Although, states should not be using this security narrative to exclude individuals they want to neglect from having a duty to protect.

Furthermore, the exclusionary tools a state uses impacts the precarity of Palestinians. Goodwin-Gill describes how “The movement of people between states, whether refugees or ‘migrants’, takes place in a context in which sovereignty remains important, and specifically that aspect of sovereign competence which entitles the state to exercise prima facie exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and to decide who among non-citizens shall be allowed to enter and remain....”⁶⁸. This framework of exclusion based on status is not a new framework as Hannah Arendt wrote in 1943 that “passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction”⁶⁹. The precarity of movement is all about controlling people through governing practices ultimately grounded in one’s status.

⁶⁴ Mark Salter, “Passports, Mobility and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?” *International Studies Perspective* 5 (2004): 72.

⁶⁵ Ibid: 86.

⁶⁶ John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” *Sociological Theory* 16 no.3 (1998): 253.

⁶⁷ Ibid: 245.

⁶⁸ Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., “The International Law of Refugee Protection,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 36.

⁶⁹ Monika Krause, “Undocumented migrants: An Arendtian perspective,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 7 no. 3 (2008): 331.

Although, the precarity of movement can also shape social status and where they are “included”⁷⁰. Hannah Arendt believes that inclusion from a state is key in guaranteeing human rights – thus ultimately stateless populations are “outlaws” by definition⁷¹. The status of an individual relates to their protection in an exclusionary international community. The precarity of a status, ultimately an identification, then leads to the precarity of space and belonging for Palestinian populations.

The Palestinian conflict is unique in its longevity, which has drastic implications for individuals in relation to a space one can identify as their own, thus leading to a lack of belonging in a state-centric world. Stateless people do not have a state protecting them, which means there is no space responsible for upholding and guaranteeing protection. Ilcan et al. explains how the precarity of space is demonstrated through “restrictive mobility...which force[s] refugees to live in neighbourhoods beyond their choosing....”⁷². This directly impacts not only the space of how stateless people can move, but also the belonging they can feel living in a status of ambiguity. Space in this paper refers to the physical and emotional area individuals identify themselves within, which directly relates to an attributed sense of belonging. Belonging refers to the feeling of being welcomed, accepted and wanted, which arguably can only occur within a space.

An example of a space Palestinians have occupied since their mass displacement has been refugee camps. Feldman explains how camps have played an important role in the Palestinian national imagination and national struggle⁷³. If a Palestinian has lived in a refugee space for so long, they might feel like there is no escape since the camp as their “space” ultimately shapes their lives. Feldman discusses how some Palestinians believe that “Camps are not partial places in the way envisaged by either humanitarianism or some political positions. Rather, they experience them as legitimate sites for full, complex lives”⁷⁴. Due to the reality that thousands of Palestinians cannot return to their homeland, this creates poor conditions in the places they live. The physical space of a refugee camp can lead to further precarities as there is overcrowding. It is clear that “Vertical

⁷⁰ Suzan Ilcan, Kim Rygiel & Feyzi Baban, “The Ambiguous Architecture of Precarity: Temporary Protection, Everyday Living, and Migrant Journeys of Syrian Refugees,” *International Journal of Migration and Borders* 4 no.1/2 (2017): 56.

⁷¹ Monika Krause, “Undocumented migrants: An Arendtian perspective,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 7 no. 3 (2008): 333.

⁷² Suzan Ilcan, Kim Rygiel & Feyzi Baban, “The Ambiguous Architecture of Precarity: Temporary Protection, Everyday Living, and Migrant Journeys of Syrian Refugees,” *International Journal of Migration and Borders* 4 no.1/2 (2017): 66.

⁷³ Ilana Feldman, “What is a Camp? Legitimate Refugee Lives in Spaces of Long-Term Displacement,” *Geoforum* 66 (2015): 245.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*: 249.

growth in camps has been significant, as expansion of camp boundaries is not allowed. In many places, camps have effectively spilled beyond their borders, and in some places these boundaries are entirely unmarked⁷⁵. Therefore, using refugee camps as a solution to this problem of statelessness actually exposes Palestinian populations to further precarities. Also, states may be reluctant in guaranteeing refugees full protection as they are still not true citizens.

Additionally, the fundamental deprivation for the stateless, “is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinion significant and actions effective”⁷⁶. This lack of space can connect to Agamben’s conceptualization of a space of exception. DeLeon et al. draws on Agamben’s “state of exception” when arguing that “the concepts of citizenship, sovereignty, and materiality are key to understanding how migrants both resist and succumb to the power of the state to exclude them”⁷⁷. However, this threshold of inclusion and exclusion is often determined by a space or territory. Inclusion from a state in the sense of a physical space is needed to uphold human rights and guarantee protection for individuals. To elaborate, McNevin states that “on this basis, a specific spatial phenomenon (territory) has been conceptually linked to a specific community (the state) and a specific identity (the citizen) as a frame of reference for legitimate political practice”⁷⁸. The world is structured by the relationships between states, territory and citizenship. This inclusion within a physical space then leads to a sense of belonging for individuals.

Moreover, political belonging quantifies who is a member and nonmember in a community. The distinction between members and nonmembers contributes to states adopting frameworks of exclusion. When it comes to exploring belonging “citizenship does not necessarily imply formal membership of, say, a nation-state (though this is clearly one form of citizenship), but rather a position of inclusion in any measure of political community and the necessary exclusion of others from that same unit”⁷⁹. Thus, inclusion from a political community can be described as the type of belonging in a refugee camp. However, some individuals in refugee camps

⁷⁵ Ibid: 256.

⁷⁶ Monika Krause, “Undocumented migrants: An Arendtian perspective,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 7 no. 3 (2008): 336.

⁷⁷ Jason De Leon, Cameron Gokee, and Asley Schubert 2015. “By the Time I get to Arizona: Citizenship, Materiality, and Contested Identities along the US-Mexico Border.” *Anthropological Quarterly* 88(2): 445.

⁷⁸ Anne McNevin, “Irregular migrants, neoliberal geographies and spatial frontiers of the ‘political’,” *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 656.

⁷⁹ Anne McNevin, “Political belonging in a Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-papiers,” *Citizenship Studies* 10 no.2 (2006): 137.

refuse to accept the camp as a site of permanence. Some Palestinians view the camp as temporary because they long to go back to their homeland. Although, regardless of longing to return home, the space one currently occupies contributes to their belonging. Feldman shares the story of Abu Firas and how even though he wanted to leave the camp, he is attached to the camp and “much of his sense of self and community is bound up with this place”⁸⁰. A sense of a space is attached to the belonging an individual experiences or does not experience. For Palestinians in camps, they feel some form of belonging. Yet this will never replace their feelings of belonging to Palestine.

The international migration system needs to focus more on how international efforts can help the problem of Palestinian statelessness and statelessness at large. Belonging for precarious populations can stem from the international efforts committed to helping them as well. This is because “Palestinians’ statelessness does indeed require a ‘political solution’, and yet categorizing it as a ‘very specific situation’ reiterates the extent to which Palestinians ‘do not belong,’ but continue to be positioned as ‘exceptions’ to be excluded from the international statelessness agenda”⁸¹. The stateless Palestinians were not included in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees established to protect refugees. Thus, there is a sense of exclusion that Palestinians did not belong within these international legal frameworks contributing to further precariousness⁸². This is why Palestinians can be framed as “victims” that need more protection from global efforts⁸³. This is difficult because we live in a state-centric world where the Westphalian state system prevails as the dominant frame of reference⁸⁴. Therefore, states control the dialogue and how the precarity of stateless populations are addressed.

The reality of statelessness in a state-centric world disrupts “the integrity of the framework of belonging based on a fixed relationship between state, citizen and territory”⁸⁵. In the Westphalian era, this framework of identity and belonging in the world provided states with a “raison d’être” and ultimate sovereign authority among individuals. Molavi describes how the

⁸⁰ Ilana Feldman, “What is a Camp? Legitimate Refugee Lives in Spaces of Long-Term Displacement,” *Geoforum* 66 (2015): 250.

⁸¹ Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, “On the threshold of statelessness: Palestinian narratives of loss and erasure,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 no. 2 (2016): 306.

⁸² Maissaa Almustafa, “Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian Refugees: Governing through exclusion,” *Social and Legal Studies* 27 no. 2 (2018): 165

⁸³ Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, “On the threshold of statelessness: Palestinian narratives of loss and erasure,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 no. 2 (2016): 303.

⁸⁴ Anne McNevin, “Political belonging in a Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-papiers,” *Citizenship Studies* 10 no.2 (2006): 136.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*: 140.

conceptualization of a world of nation-states is predicated on citizenship as the principle organization⁸⁶. This is why it is clear when mass stateless populations like Palestinians do not have this organizing authority, they lack protection. We are living in a time period of globalization where many actors are beginning to challenge the authority and identity of the state as a central unit of global political life, however it will take years to perhaps abolish the sovereign authority of a state⁸⁷. States agreed to the foundation of international organizations and are accepting of the international migration system because they can still uphold their sovereignty.

Moreover, Johnson discusses the idea of non-citizenship and the implications of this status in a world controlled by states. Borders play a role in the lives of irregular migrants which includes stateless populations due to their lack of identity. She describes how borders are “social borders between legal and illegal, allowed and disallowed”⁸⁸. Borders are political as they label who is a citizen and who is not. Khosravi elaborates about the role borders play with statelessness as he states that “Borders are no longer simple edges of a state...[they] shape our perception of the world...Borders are essential reference of communal sense, of identity”⁸⁹. Therefore, it is clear that border politics and the reality of state sovereignty contributes to precarities of identity, space and belonging for Palestinians. States focus on establishing security frameworks that highlight who is included and who is ultimately excluded. This results in borders existing anywhere and everywhere⁹⁰. For states, the importance of their borders is to identify who is inside the state’s responsibility and who is outside of their responsibility⁹¹. This logic contributes to the legitimization of states being selective as to who they protect.

Previously, this paper looked at the precarity of Palestinians in refugee camps and how it impacts their status, space and belonging. Molavi uses Salter’s metaphor of the border to reflect on the political and legal realities of Palestinian citizens in Israel as well. These Palestinians may not be living in refugee camps, yet they are in a permanent state of border exception⁹². These

⁸⁶ Shourideh Molavi, "Stateless Citizenship and the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel." *Refuge* 26, no. 2 (2009): 20.

⁸⁷ Anne McNevin, “Irregular migrants, neoliberal geographies and spatial frontiers of the ‘political’,” *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 659.

⁸⁸ Heather Johnson, “These Fine Lines: Locating Noncitizenship in Political Protest in Europe.” *Citizenship Studies* 19 no.8 (2016): 951.

⁸⁹ Shahram Khosravi, “The ‘Illegal’ Traveler: An Autoethnography of Borders”. *Social Anthropology* 15 no.3 (2007): 322.

⁹⁰ Ibid: 333.

⁹¹ Kim Rygiel, “Dying to Live: Migrant Deaths and Citizenship Politics along European Borders – Transgressions, Disruptions, and Mobilizations.” *Citizenship Studies* 20 no.5 (2016): 548.

⁹² Shourideh Molavi, "Stateless Citizenship and the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel." *Refuge* 26, no. 2 (2009): 25.

invisible borders exist in Israel and they label Palestinian populations as “the other”. Palestinians are trapped in sentiments of exclusion – “the borders of the state of Israel are enacted on and through the bodies of Palestinian-Arabs as stateless citizens”⁹³. Due to the reality that Palestinians are living in Israel, it demonstrates how the territory of Palestine is no longer there like it once was, which results in emotional and psychological repercussions. Israel has established a security discourse ultimately denying the Palestinian population access to full social, political, and economic benefits⁹⁴. The way the state has constructed their identity leads to a lack of protection for Palestinians living in Israel.

Furthermore, Torpey reflects upon the state-centric world as one of exclusion exercised through the state’s construction of citizenship. He states that “the very institution of citizenship, tying particular persons to particular states by virtue of the morally arbitrary accidents of birth, serves as a powerful instrument of social closure and a profoundly illiberal determinant of life chances”⁹⁵. Due to the reality that the protection of individuals is connected to states, international law and organizations cannot effectively impede on state sovereignty to enforce standards. Thus, the Westphalian system of international order has further contributed to the problem of statelessness despite progress in international efforts. The international migration system needs to focus on the realities of who controls and governs the world⁹⁶. This relates to powerful countries who are ignoring the conflict of Palestinian statelessness and allowing the exclusion to continue. Torpey agrees by stating that “the prosperous and peaceful states of the world remain powerfully exclusionary”⁹⁷. Hannah Arendt experienced what it was like to live in a state of ambiguity post-World War II and argues that political suffering is continuously created by the international system comprised of nation states⁹⁸. Protection cannot be effectively enforced by international organizations impeding over state’s frameworks of inclusion, thus Palestinian stateless populations continues to experience precarities.

⁹³ Ibid: 25.

⁹⁴ Shourideh Molavi, "Stateless Citizenship and the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel." *Refuge* 26, no. 2 (2009): 26.

⁹⁵ John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” *Sociological Theory* 16 no.3 (1998): 257.

⁹⁶ Sabeel K. Rahman, “Construction citizenship: Exclusion and inclusion through the governance of basic necessities,” *Columbia Law Review* 118 no. 8 (2018): 2453.

⁹⁷ John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” *Sociological Theory* 16 no.3 (1998): 257.

⁹⁸ Monika Krause, “Undocumented migrants: An Arendtian perspective,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 7 no. 3 (2008): 344.

In conclusion, it is essential to look to the future and brainstorm possible solutions for Palestinian statelessness. The Palestinian problem of statelessness has existed for decades, however it has mostly been ignored by international agendas. If attention shifts to focusing on the precarity of protection for the stateless and analyzing how to improve the enforcement of international law, we might begin to see some progress. Statelessness contributes to the precarity of status and the precarity of space and belonging – all because of a state-centric world. Individuals are protected and guaranteed human rights due to inclusion from a state. Therefore, the reality of exclusion by states leads to thousands of individuals being left in precarious situations. All in all, this encourages us to think about the following question: Can human rights and protection exist in meaningful way without being guaranteed by a state? This question calls upon the discipline of migration to reflect upon current international efforts and whether they are effective in addressing the problem of statelessness, especially in a Palestinian context.

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The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC):

Relevance in Today's Politicized Humanitarianism?

Violette Khammad

Introduction

In the contemporary study of international organization, the field of humanitarianism illustrates a longstanding debate on the moral objectives of humanitarian aid delivery and its relationship to internal and international politics.⁹⁹ The dilemma remains that humanitarian actors are to be classified between those that (1) use politics to increase their leverage in negotiations and/or shed light on human rights violations or (2) present themselves as apolitical aid providers to gain access to communities in need, and to conduct relief and detention visits. Given the adaptations which humanitarian actors have made to adequately respond to the sufferings of victims - it is timely and of interest to analyze the work of one of the oldest and most respected humanitarian organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At its 150th anniversary, the ICRC continues to maintain its unwavering commitment to humanitarian action that is neutral, impartial, and independent. Arguably, the ICRC asserts that its apolitical approach is fundamental to its success in providing aid to populations, gaining acceptance of state and non-state parties in conflict, and maintaining a presence in regions that the United Nations (UN) or other humanitarian actors are unable to enter.¹⁰⁰ In an attempt to understand ICRC's relevance and adaptability to contemporary humanitarianism, this paper investigates the following: with the transformation of humanitarian action, the politicization and militarization of aid, and the complexity of international armed conflicts, does the ICRC's role remain relevant today and its response to these ongoing changes and challenges in humanitarianism? To unpack this question, I

⁹⁹ F. Weissman, "Crisis and humanitarian containment," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. T. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (Milton: Routledge, 2018), 547.

¹⁰⁰ B. Ki-moon, "The ICRC and the changing humanitarian landscape," *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no. 888 (2012): 1252.

utilize the Constructivist theoretical framework that can help explain how humanitarianism itself has been socially constructed by shared agreements among state, non-state, and humanitarian actors based on changing norms in the field, organizational cultures and personalities.¹⁰¹ In a similar manner, the ICRC's role and distinct values are shaped by its work with other humanitarian and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially in an era of a 'rights-based' new humanitarianism. With the increasing complexity of armed conflict and the prevalence of radical human rights/development NGOs today, this paper examines the present and future of Red Cross's neutrality (and more traditional organizational principles, generally) through a literature review and organizational evolution. Ultimately, the purpose of the paper is to uncover ICRC's unique historical and contemporary position in humanitarian aid by outlining snapshots of case studies, especially as they relate to principles of neutrality and impartiality.

ICRC's Commitment to the Principles of Impartiality and Neutrality

Classified as a 'Dunantist' organization, the ICRC's legitimacy is maintained through its provision of neutral, independent and impartial aid to victims with the fear that a relaxation of these founding principles may endanger humanitarianism through potential political interference.¹⁰² Among seven of its fundamental principles, both impartiality and neutrality remain under scrutiny by the public and especially by other humanitarian agencies in the Wilsonian camp (i.e. organizations that seek to tackle the root causes of conflict while radically transforming the structures responsible for failed states/broken societies). Before delving too deeply into the question of ICRC's humanitarianism, I employ its interpretations of both terms to allow for a fair evaluation of its mission and mandate's values. According to the ICRC, 'impartiality' calls for non-discrimination and prioritization of its activities based on the degree of urgency and the types of needs that are impacted; 'neutrality' ensures that the Red Cross maintains the confidence of all parties, and refrains from taking sides in hostilities or controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.¹⁰³

Impartiality's application can span the global level evaluating needs assessments from states in question and accordingly allocating resources to Red Cross national societies, and a local

¹⁰¹ S. Park, "Constructivism," in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. T. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (Milton: Routledge, 2018), 146.

¹⁰² M. Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 4 (2005): 728.

¹⁰³ "The ICRC: Its Mission and Work," *ICRC*, accessed December 09, 2018, <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0963-icrc-its-mission-and-work>

agency's context – decisions on where within the confines of a conflict to provide material resources and which activities/relief efforts to concentrate on. ICRC's institutional understanding of impartiality has evolved to include not only wounded and sick combatants but also victims of armed conflict and organized violence (in terms of categories of persons in need of protection), and types of needs that are to be protected from 'danger, suffering or abuse of power' perpetuated by any legal authorities or participating state/non-state actors in conflict.¹⁰⁴ To avoid the situations of a government not sending the ICRC to communities with urgent needs, the ICRC approach to impartial presence is as follows: ability to undertake conflict analysis; build trust with communities and armed groups; collect first-hand information from communities in the form of needs assessments; and ability to present this collected evidence to armed groups for a change in behaviour.¹⁰⁵ In response, other non-state actors including the United Nations (UN) and numerous private relief groups adopted the humanitarian Code of Conduct endorsed by the Red Cross Movement (ICRC, IFRC, and RC National Societies) which has a particular focus on independence and impartiality.¹⁰⁶ Due to general widespread acceptance of impartiality by the international humanitarian community, it is a more accepted concept as neutrality though there may have been instances of bias toward countries that have operational humanitarian agencies that can provide on-the-ground needs assessments.

ICRC's strong stance toward upholding neutrality comes from its specific role as an intermediary between all parties in a conflict and its responsibility of treating all victims of violence equally. Before deciding whether to put forward a public denunciation of alleged violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), the ICRC first and foremost considers the implications such an appeal would have on 'los[ing] the confidence of governments and no longer be[ing] able to help victims.'¹⁰⁷ The ICRC's approach is simple in that it does not impact its neutral stance given that other humanitarian and human rights partners can afford to do the grunt work of naming and shaming/going public in its place. In other words, the ICRC's commitment to neutrality and confidentiality does not equate to 'a vow of silence', rather as the guardian of IHL

¹⁰⁴ M. Bradley, "Principles of Humanitarian Action," in *Protecting Civilians in War: The ICRC, UNHRC, and Their Limitations in Internal Armed Conflicts* (London, Oxford University Press, 2016), 5.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁶ D. P. Forsythe, "On Contested Concepts: Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and the Notion of Neutrality," *Journal of Human Rights* 12 (2013): 63.

¹⁰⁷ D. Warner, "Naming and Shaming: The ICRC and the Public/Private Divide," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (2005): 452.

with its diplomatic personality – the ICRC can choose to make a public declaration to ensure that warring parties respect their treaty obligations, and if need-be, it can call out guilty parties and instances of atrocities without explicitly naming them (i.e. discreetly).¹⁰⁸ The literature points out that this sense of commitment to neutrality amid decades of criticism comes from the provision of aid to wounded soldiers on the battlefield and its delivery of humanitarian operations without supporting/advantaging one side over the other, such as belligerent or military parties and ICRC’s close historical ties to the Swiss government and its norms of neutrality in the context of international politics, which can be translated in a state-context to a duty of abstention from military assistance and impartiality to all sides of a conflict.¹⁰⁹

Changing Dynamics of Conflict and Humanitarianism

The aftermath of the World Humanitarian Summit uncovers the direction of contemporary aid provision with ideas of merging the humanitarian-development nexus, especially after the passage of the “Grand Bargain” and the possibility of local actors further politicizing the provision of aid.¹¹⁰ Due to the changing dynamics of armed conflict today, the decreasing respect for IHL, the growth in asymmetrical warfare, increasing deliberate targeting of civilian populations and attacks on humanitarian aid providers, thus we see that the concept of a ‘humanitarian space’ is shrinking.¹¹¹ Simply put, the above trends in contemporary conflict have restricted the ability of humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) to uphold their mandate in securely delivering food, medication, and shelter, and to attend to the needs of suffering populations. We see a dramatic increase in the number of fatalities in contemporary armed conflicts from 56,000 (as a result of a global total of 63 armed conflicts in 2008) to 180,000 fatalities (caused by 42 armed conflicts in 2014), illustrating the humanitarian consequences that both organizations and victims are navigating.¹¹² These striking figures call into question the relevance of IHL (and perhaps by virtue the ICRC’s designated role of its interpretation) and

¹⁰⁸ R. Brauman, “Médecins sans Frontières and the ICRC: Matters of Principle,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no. 888 (2012): 5.

¹⁰⁹ M. Bradley, “Principles of Humanitarian Action,” in *Protecting Civilians in War: The ICRC, UNHRC, and Their Limitations in Internal Armed Conflicts* (London, Oxford University Press, 2016), 13.

¹¹⁰ M. Dubois, “Don’t Blur the Lines between Development and Humanitarian Work,” *The Guardian*, accessed December 06, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/may/12/dont-blur-the-lines-between-development-and-humanitarian-work>

¹¹¹ C. Brassard-Boudreau and D. Hubert, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2010): 2.

¹¹² C. McGoldrick, “The state of conflicts today: Can humanitarian action adapt?” *International Review of the Red Cross* 97, no. 900 (2015): 1185.

whether it is able to strike a balance between humanity and military necessity in today's context, when there have been numerous instances of blatant violations of the 'prohibitions' section. For example, in the case of the Syrian Civil War, the methods and means of warfare used bring to light the complexity and multi-layered nature of both the conflict and actors employing the weaponry – conventional weapons, mass use of chemical weapons, toxic chemicals such as chlorine gas, shelling and aerial bombardment, and armed drones.¹¹³ It is evident that the principal notions of IHL are ignored, such as the 'principle of proportionality' and 'precaution', which makes more difficult for humanitarian actors to operate on-the-ground with non-state actors that are not bound to IHL to the same degree as state parties.

Within humanitarian agencies, there have been further paradigm shifts with questions on the ethics of military use and their contribution to relief efforts. In Afghanistan, aid was constructed as part of counter-insurgency strategies emphasizing that humanitarian assistance was contributing to the long-term win on the 'fight against terrorism'.¹¹⁴ However, this creates an inconsistent image on the work of humanitarian organizations, including the ICRC, when they are now associated with parallel political and/or military goals that can quickly become a risk to aid workers and the legitimacy of their relief efforts. The notion of community/party trust weakens when armed forces are asked to reach populations at one instance, and then are in turn criticized for 'blurring the lines'. The militarization and politicization of aid have altered the playing field for humanitarian organizations revealing the vulnerability causing these groups to pull out or cut back on their activities, and also to reconsider their operational strategies in specific regions – Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.¹¹⁵ For the Red Cross Movement, the use of military force as an instrument for gaining access to communities jeopardizes its principles of independence and impartiality, which creates a security risk for both civilians and personnel, and advances political, military or economic objectives (and not humanitarian needs, primarily).¹¹⁶

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 1181-1182.

¹¹⁴ P. Krahenbuhl, "The militarization of aid and its perils," *ICRC*, accessed December 06, 2018, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/editorial/humanitarians-danger-article-2011-02-01.htm>

¹¹⁵ P. Hazan and JF Berger, "Humanitarian action: From risk to real danger," *The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*, accessed December 09, 2018, http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2004_1/4-9.html

¹¹⁶ J. A. Williamson, "Using humanitarian aid to 'win hearts and minds': a costly failure?" *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (2011): 1043.

Given the evolution of armed conflict and the changing dynamics in the provision of aid, humanitarianism itself as a field has been adjusting to shifting values, norms, and debates on ethics and politics over the years. With the golden standard of withstanding change and challenges in humanitarianism, the ICRC has had to make room for more radical actors to share their collective responsibility with, namely the ‘new humanitarians’. At the end of the 1990s, a movement of officials from NGOs, UN agencies, donors, academics and practitioners came together with humanitarian actors to join in the fight for human rights, critiquing emergency aid policies that merely fuel conflict and repression into the war economy of governments and rebel groups.¹¹⁷ Advancing a human rights-based agenda, we see new humanitarians championing the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine, supporting the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and radically transforming the root causes of humanitarian crises. Beyond alleviating human suffering and meeting their basic needs, new humanitarianism’s additional criterion demands that aid contribute to promoting human rights – implying that the provision of aid itself is no longer a sufficient response to a humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁸ What becomes their priority is upholding victims’ human rights rather than gaining access to provide humanitarian aid to communities. In their interpretation of ‘humanitarian space’, organizations such as MSF view political actors as responsible for the creation and maintenance of relief activities in the field with a primary focus on the suffering and needs of the population in danger before the principle of neutrality.¹¹⁹ A step further than MSF and as anticipated, Oxfam International’s philosophy views humanitarian actors as unconstrained and freely able to make their individual choices, on the basis of need.

ICRC’s Relevance and Response through a Constructivist Lens

The words ‘confidence, certainty, and consistency’ certainly speak to the institutional culture and personality of the ICRC. In addition to an international organization’s (IO) formal historical trajectory and official structures, it is vital to consider the informal traditions, customs, and cultures that constitute an organization as durable as the ICRC, in line with the Constructivist school of thought. As described by its employees, a certainty about this Dunantist organization is

¹¹⁷ F. Weissman, “Crisis and humanitarian containment,” in *International Organization and Global Governance*, ed. T. Weiss and R. Wilkinson (Milton: Routledge, 2018), 552.

¹¹⁸ F. Fox, “New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?” *Disasters* 25, no. 4 (2001): 278.

¹¹⁹ C. Brassard-Boudreau and D. Hubert, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2010): 2.

that it does not really change; there is a sense of a shared understanding of the rationale for its institutional policies; and it has a coherent *modus operandi*/policy framework within and across countries and their national societies.¹²⁰ The described characteristics of certainty and consistency within the ICRC can also be summed up in the following words - institutional inertia. This means that the institutional culture of the ICRC is rather conservative with a strong adherence to traditional values, with an adversity or slowness to change.¹²¹ However, merely examining the ICRC in this context does not give this humanitarian actor its due justice with its centuries of impartial, neutral, and independent provision of aid to global communities in need.

Although cautious in its development of policy, the ICRC continues to be innovative in its implementation and interpretation of IHL and its ability to expand its scope of operation/responsibility since its creation. In terms of organizational changes, and especially after its controversial performance in the Nigerian/Biafra Civil War (1967-70), the resulting Tansley Report of recommendations encouraged the ICRC to: firstly, to cooperate more among its Movement members - the ICRC, the Federation, and the national Red Cross societies and lastly, to reduce its organization's excessive secrecy.¹²² Another key event within the same timeline is the Six Day War in 1967 which also led to significant changes to how the ICRC conducts its internal operations as well as its perception of the international community – a more proactive approach and a concrete action plan before the eruption of a conflict.¹²³ Before becoming the humanitarian *enterprise* we see today as the ICRC, it has had to go through years of internal restructuring to accommodate its increasing practical experience from humanitarian missions and to allow for its continuous organizational development and growth. This includes restructuring its financial system beyond emergency/temporary aid funds to more permanent relief efforts; and establishing geographic operational regions headed by the Directorate (now known as the Federation/IFRC responsible for managing the national societies). Even when confronted with questions on its independence and neutrality for the future, it is reminded by ties to its Christian heritage and the West. In response to these claims, despite the ICRC's origins in the Western

¹²⁰ M. Bradley, "The ICRC and UNHCR," in *Protecting Civilians in War: The ICRC, UNHRC, and Their Limitations in Internal Armed Conflicts* (London, Oxford University Press, 2016), 12.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹²² D. P. Forsythe and B. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross: A neutral humanitarian actor* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23.

¹²³ D. Palmieri, "An institution standing the test of time? A review of 150 years of the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross," *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no. 888 (2012): 1288.

world, this has not kept the Red Cross from speaking out against Western states, providing assistance or allocating its budgetary lines to non-Western states in need, mostly on the African continent.¹²⁴ It is clear that the ICRC has overcome numerous challenges related to its neutral identity, legitimacy, authority within humanitarianism over the course of its history, and potential for adaptability. Although the outlined contemporary challenges within humanitarianism and international armed conflicts may seem new and complex to adapt to, those are similar issues that the ICRC has had to tackle over the years, especially with the introduction of competitors within the aid world, such as ‘new humanitarians’. Constructivism has shown us that ICRC’s traditional values can work within the parameters of an ever-changing humanitarian arena, since it is the ICRC’s negotiations (trust, confidence, and access to vulnerable populations) that have allowed other actors to provide their advocacy and human rights perspectives to be amplified. Neutrality comes with its own internal debates within the ICRC and within the field of humanitarianism, but it is safe to say that it is an ingrained component of ICRC’s personality that has evolved with the organization’s structure and missions.

¹²⁴ D. P. Forsythe and B. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross: A neutral humanitarian actor* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 102.

Envisioning the Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

Security and Regional Cooperation

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Introduction

The world has entered a renewed era of great power rivalry and geopolitics, with epitomizing events such as the rise of China, Russia's reemergence as major global geopolitical player and the election of populist leaders around the world. Economically, China has put forward its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aiming to create a Eurasia that are better connected and integrated, thus facilitating a China-led economic order and indirectly diminishing the US influence, or at least, so is the perception from the west (United States 2017). Among the many pillars of a new continental order, the security aspect is one of the most important. The countries traversed by the Road are among some of the most unstable and crisis-prone nations in the world, as such, security is crucial not only during the implantation of the BRI but also is one of the main objectives. To provide security by promoting economic development and cooperation has been a long-held belief by China and has been advertised as the "new path" to fundamentally eradicate the "soil" extremism and terrorism (Wu 2016). There are many international organizations which have security provision in their mandates, but one with unique Chinese characteristic is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The organization currently has eight official member states and encompasses some 80% of the Eurasia landmass. Since its founding in 2001, the scope of the SCO has expanded significantly, from mutual trust building, to regional security coordination and now to promoting economic and cultural exchange. But the core of the organization remains the regional security concerns. Challenges such as terrorism, extremism and separatism (the three evils) are at the top of the SCO's priority list. Many have called the organization the anti-west bloc or the group of authoritarian states (Aris 2009), as opposed to other regional security frameworks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper provides an overview of the journey of the SCO till this day and examine its recent activities. The main theoretical framework taken by the author is from the realist camp, with significant emphasis on geopolitics and power dynamics; but upon examining the actors and behaviors of states, one

could also find constructivism at play. I intend to show that more and more economic visions of the SCO overlaps with that of the BRI while its security mandates might be deepening with the possible ascension of new member states such as Iran. I envision an intertwined relationship between the BRI and the SCO, and it is possible the SCO—along with other regional organizations such as the Eurasia Economic Union—would be somehow, in some form, linked to the overarching brand of the BRI. Therefore, the role of the SCO is that it would be the security arm under the BRI, reorienting back to its founding purposes to safeguard the BRI projects and to expand deeper into other aspects in the realm of security. Eventually, under the auspice of the BRI and other regional initiatives, Eurasia would be a much more integrated continent with SCO as its main security pillar.

The History and Overview of the SCO

The SCO was formally established as a permanent international organization in 2001 after absorbing Uzbekistan into the “Shanghai Five” group. The organization charter was adopted in June 2002, and is headquartered in Beijing, China. Currently, the organization has eight formal members, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and India. The member states cover the majority of Eurasia landmass and around 3.2 billion people (United Nations Population Division 2017). Four of the member states are de facto nuclear powers and two of them, Russia and China, are permanent members of the UN security council. The SCO operates based on the “Shanghai Spirit” which states, mutual trust, mutual respect, equality, respect for diverse civilization and pursuit of shared development (Kembayev 2017).

The need to establish a regional security framework reflected the converging interests among the independent republics after the breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China in late 1990s. The two main proponent countries of the SCO were China and Russia, which both faced security concerns in their borders around the Central Asia at the time and the establishment of such security framework was to both countries’ benefit. For China, the stability in its northwestern province of Xinjiang has always preoccupied the leadership. The province has large amount of ethnically non-Han Chinese population and have been historically distant from central governments’ control. Upon the breakup of the USSR, China’s western border became uncertain and less stable, so it is in China’s strategic interest to coordinate with Russia and Central Asia Republics (CARs) to deal with issues such as border delineation and spread of terrorism and separatist movements. One of the most prominent threats has been the East Turkestan Independent Movement (ETIM), which aims to create an independent state that largely

incorporates China's Xinjiang province. To exert effective control of the province, China needs the cooperation from the Central Asia Republics because of their religious and ethnic proximity the Uighur population. The Muslim Uighur minority had better access to ammunition since the Central Asian Republic's independence and the instability ensued after it. Swanstrom pointed out that in the year 2000, over 4000 kg of dynamite and 2700 kg of other explosives were confiscated by the Chinese authority (Swanstrom 2005). In addition to this acute terrorist problem, China hopes to eliminate geopolitical threats from its north and west, meaning to create a friendly neighborhood in Central Asia and with Russia. And preemptively, China regards the Central Asia as an untapped territory for superpowers, albeit it is traditional regarded as a Russian sphere of influence (M. V. Danilovich 2013), so China aimed to expand its influence in the region to negate potential superpower encroachment, as it would show after the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

As for Russia, the security concern at its southern border suddenly became a priority in the latter half of the 1990s, fearing the vacuum might be filled by western actors. Therefore, by "allowing" China to participate in regional security framework was a compromise but a necessary one. Countries like Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were tilting toward the US and NATO alliance and, in addition, Russia's weak economic position in the late 1990s made it difficult to sustain the traditional sphere of influence and Central Asian Republics and other members of the CIS countries actively sought cooperation from the west (M. V. Danilovich 2013). After the Russia Federation replaced the USSR, both China and Russia recognized the world was entering a "multipolar" reality, with the US as the only superpower. In fact, in their joint declaration, not only did the two countries identified such reality, they also laid out the foundation of the SCO stating the following:

the Parties [Russia and China] ...stressed that the Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on confidence building in the military field in the border area, as well as the Agreement on the mutual reduction of their armed forces in the border area are of great importance and can serve as a model for the achievement of regional, security and stability in the post-cold-war era. (Russia Federation and People's Republic of China 1997)

For the Central Asia Republics, the security threat is also serious. Not only there are multiple border disputes among these countries, but also there are terrorist organizations and separatist

movements that threatened the stability of the fledgling governments. For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan led by the notorious Juma Namangani, an organization that received substantial support from the Taliban, routinely launched attacks and sent in jihadist combatants toward Uzbekistan from their strongholds in Tajikistan and mountain villages in Kyrgyzstan (Turarbekava 2013). The inability of individual government to deal with the threats posed by terrorism, religious extremism and separatism movements (the three evils) was epitomized in 1999, where multiple incidents occurred resulted in 17 casualties including military personnel and foreigners. The lack of coordination between the three governments spoke to the need for a regional security structure, hence the transformation from a loosely organized “Shanghai Five” to a more rigid and formal organization, the SCO (Turarbekava 2013).

In terms of organization’s structure, the SCO Heads of States Council, which meets annually, is the supreme decision-making body that deals with fundamental issues such as the direction of the organization and major areas of cooperation. The Heads of Government Council deals mainly with economic issues and approves budget for the organization. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs deals with the day-to-day business, consults on international issues with the organization and lays groundwork in preparation for the meeting between heads of states. The most prominent security branch—the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS)—is based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,. Its responsibilities include coordinating member states’ intelligence and “competent institutions” to fight the three evils and preparing counter-terrorism exercises at the request of member states and maintain the joint data bank on threats. RATS is also responsible hosting various of workshops and drafting legal documents regarding the fight against the three evils (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2017). On the economic side, the organization has a Business Council of the SCO and Interbank Consortium. These were established to facilitate trade and to implement the WTO’s Multilateral Trade and Development Program (Norling and Swanstrom 2007). With infrastructure projects in energy and transport sectors being implemented quickly under the auspice of the SCO, as well as the Business Council trying to address soft barriers and coordinate efforts from major companies. This promoted the notion of “re-integration” along the Silk Road and the trade route from China to Europe via Central Asia had once again became viable (Norling and Swanstrom 2007), effectively forecasting the BRI.

Such was a brief background for the founding and overview of the SCO, and as one could clearly see, that security was the paramount concern and many of the threats have persisted or

transformed into other forms, till today. The rise of global jihadism and destabilization wars in Afghanistan and Iraq further exacerbated the “three evils” in the region. In addition to cooperation in the security realm, the economic engagement between the member states also followed closely. However, the picture is complicated by the co-existence of multiple regional organizations that have their focus on security and economic development, the most prominent ones are the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU), for security and economic cooperation, respectively. At the end of this section, it is appropriate to examine how SCO’s formation and development reflect some contemporary international relation theories. Much of the discourse on SCO falls into the realist camp, where many regard the organization as an anti-western bloc. Geopolitics is a significant part of SCO’s rationale, however, the practicality and actual need to combat the three evils should not be discredited. As Stephen Aris pointed out, the SCO is an internal-focused framework that mainly addresses non-traditional threats (Aris 2009). Some scholars pointed out that the SCO is a coalition of authoritarian states and indeed, the organization comprises some of the most oppressive and corrupt regimes in the world. It is easy to attribute this grouping to the theory of realism, especially the English school, where common norms and ideas (in this case, authoritarianism and anti-west ideals) help to form international structures (Bull 1977). But in this way, one is prone to be cynical and worry about every action the “adversary” takes mean to damage the security of one’s own, thus discredit even legitimate actions. Such thinking, albeit prevalent in the world (increasingly in the US), is not conducive to facilitate a cooperative world order.

The BRI and the SCO: Dilemma of Economic Integration

China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to create a more interconnected Eurasia via massively investing in infrastructure such as roads, railways and power plants. According to the Asian Development Bank’s estimate, the region requires \$26 trillion between 2016-2030 to maintain “growth momentum”. The gap between the demand and supply of investment is estimated to be 2.4% of projected GDP and will reach to 5% without China’s contribution (Asian Development Bank 2017). China is not the only country that has vision for this region, it is not even the first country to coin the term Silk Road in its modern sense. Kazakhstan’s Bright Road plan, Uzbekistan’s Action Strategy (M. Danilovich 2018) and even Russia’s vision of a Eurasia Economic Union has their roots in the ancient trade routes. The Silk Road Economic Belt (SERB) swings through Central Asia and one of the main economic corridors, China-Mongolia-Russia

Economic Corridor links the two propellers in the SCO. China's engagement with CARs especially in energy infrastructure is not new and the BRI further stressed its importance. In 2009, a pipeline between Turkmenistan and officially opened and this pipeline passed Uzbekistan, a SCO member state. In addition, China-Kazakhstan pipeline as well as future Iran-China pipeline will likely occur under the auspice of the BRI, or at least in concert with other infrastructure initiatives. Since the commencement of the BRI in 2013, almost all of China's overseas infrastructure investments (public and private alike) are labeled with the title, to get either support from the central government or approval for loans from policy banks. In the transport sector, highways and freight trains are of particular importance to China's ambition of connecting the continent. So far, three railroads funded by China have been completed under the BRI brand and a highway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was recently launched. Tajikistan also received investment on a 350-km highway connecting Chanak to the country's capital Dushanbe (Hashimova 2018). This does not yet include the Chinese investment in Pakistan which is a project entirely on its own.

The complex composition of SCO membership and the internal geopolitical struggles are the main reasons why the economic integration would not, and perhaps should not occur under the brand of the SCO. CARs such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Russia-led EAEU, and in addition, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has also established their own free trade area in 2012 (Laanatza 2013). China, as the largest trading partner and a major source of investment, will throw the power balance off within those organizations and is a serious threat to a Russia that is already struggling to maintain its influence. Strategically speaking, it would be a very provocative move if China were to suggest merging the organization with the SCO to form a supranational structure. This is also reflective of realist thinking, the geopolitical balance of power even within the cooperation is what many have focused on, and rightfully so. Even seemingly close allies such as Russia and China, cannot escape this lack of trust, echoing neorealism theory. On the other hand, China does not have the incentive to join these organizations either, precisely because it could easily promote trade and investment through the BRI, without formally exerting itself onto traditional Russian sphere of influence, which is also consistent with Kremlin's agenda for the SCO (Facon 2013). In addition, the CIS FTA could face serious internal challenges with the Ukraine (Ukraine is part of the CIS FTA) and a five-member EAEU is hardly worth angering Russia over, especially considering a much more economically valuable China-Japan-Korea FTA and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership would occupy much of

China's economic attention. Therefore, while the SCO could have substantial economic components, it is both less provocative and more convenient for China to pursue a loose regional structure to govern economic engagements, namely the BRI. Some scholars have pointed out that China uses the SCO platform to advance bilateral economic engagements, resembling a hub and spoke system with China at the center (Kembayev 2017). Kembayev pointed out the flexibility presented by the SCO structure is to China's benefit and I also agree that this approach is consistent with China's diplomatic tradition.

China's trade activities have long dominated the region and are alarming to Moscow as well as the Central Asian Republics, but comparing with a potential intrusion from the West, Russia could at least tolerate Chinese presence. A closer economic tie with China, to relatively authoritarian CARs, is also less threatening than with the western countries, which are perceived to be behind several color revolutions in the 2000s, given that China itself has always be vigilant about potential subversive activities supported by the West (Boland 2011) (Shambough 2008). The energy sector is an exception, where large western oil and gas companies have been engaging extensively in extraction and commercializations of Central Asia's abundant fossil fuel reserves. The BRI puts significant emphasis on promoting trade in the region, but this "policy-led trade facilitation" initiative has also stirred up many questions from participating countries (Arase 2015). However, the misgiving is mutual. China has also expressed doubts about the efficiency and sustainability of the EAEU, given it is a heavily subsidized program (by Russia). Many have regarded it as an "economic blood transfusion" and will further drain Russia's weakening economy, considering the sanctions and deteriorating relationship with the West (Wilson 2016).

In addition to the infrastructure construction happening the CARs, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the BRI, aims not only upgrade Pakistan's infrastructure, but more significantly, it offers the CARs a way to warm sea port through Gwadar Port located in southwest of the province of Baluchistan. The common interests of China and Pakistan in the success of the CPEC projects determine that both countries would try to influence the regional framework such as the SCO to their benefit, such a "bottom-up" approach is said to be consistent with Pakistan's foreign policy (Ali Hadi 2017). Therefore, Pakistan's entry to the SCO is in large part trying to safeguard the success of CPEC and to lend its abundant experience combating Taliban-affiliated groups to other members of the SCO. Pakistan itself also faces separatist movements in many provinces and by coordinating with other CARs could significantly

enhance its ability to protect national integrity. Economic integration on the other hand, is less important to Pakistan, as it already has comprehensive ties with China. This is also a key consideration for Pakistan's membership in the SCO. This is a natural transition to the discussion of security in the region.

Regional Security: SCO's Paramount Mission

The SCO's paramount mission is to maintain regional security and stability. As mentioned before, security and the success of the BRI are inseparable, so China and other regional partners have their interests aligned with this regard. Undeniably, the BRI is a strategic maneuver to expand China's influence further beyond its borders, and whether it truly is a win-win scenario remains to be seen. But to achieve such goal, mutual trust and respect are key factors. Many, including Russia and CARs, have deep suspicion over China's true intention. Therefore, in addition to closer economic ties achieved through the BRI, the SCO, albeit a security organization, is instrumental for building the mutual trust between China and other member states, especially when their security interests align. The SCO hailed its founding principle, the Shanghai Spirit, as a new path for international cooperation. The Shanghai Spirit emphasizes mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in other countries domestic affairs. Such principles are consistent with China's foreign policy, and at the same time, reassure the CARs that, at least on paper, China will not interfere with their domestic affairs unlike the US, which is always portrayed as the culprit behind subversive movements. The Shanghai Spirit is also particularly attractive to states with a strong sense of sovereignty that abhors intervention (particularly US intervention). The recent ascension of Pakistan and India shows that the spirit is something even long-time adversaries could sign on to. Both India and Pakistan have serious security concerns about the three evils, and that might have been the main motivation behind their membership bid. The admittance of India and Pakistan further proves that the economic aspect is not the organization's main concern and the prospect SCO-wide free trade area would be even harder to achieve. This signifies that economic cooperation would remain superficial compared to deepening security cooperation. The prospective admission of the Islamic Republic of Iran would demonstrate that transition of the SCO from a two-prong (security and economic) organization to a security-minded one, dealing with threats from both traditional and non-traditional realms.

The security threats can be categorized into traditional and non-traditional types. Traditional security threats are the derivatives from geopolitics and great power rivalry. Many

have viewed the SCO as an anti-west bloc or an “Eastern NATO”, this rhetoric can easily catch the attention of the media and is indeed molded into many realists’ mindset, including many policy makers. To be fair, there is strong evidence that the military exercises and shows of armed forces are aimed at the West (Facon 2013). The rejection of the US’s application in 2005 for observer status further advanced the image that the SCO is China and Russia’s answer for growing US regional influence, especially in Afghanistan. Geopolitical tension between the SCO and the US was further shown through Uzbekistan’s decision to evict US military from the K2 base (Boland 2011). It is likely that the traditional threats and a possible eastern alliance is far from maturation. China and Russia, despite close relationship, are still geopolitical rivals in many arenas, especially in central Asia. Russia is the leading actor in the CSTO which does endorse collective defense and China does not seem to show any interests in joining such mechanism. China’s vision for regional security is slightly different from Russia’s. Swanstrom pointed out two important Chinese considerations, one is to secure oil and natural gas supply from CARs and the other is the domestic integrity, especially concerning the unrest in Xinjiang Province (Swanstrom 2005). Both considerations fall mainly in the non-traditional security realm, however China does show vigilance toward potential US influence in the region. As the BRI progresses, the US will likely to shift its attention to the region, adding the fact that the US still has military presence in Afghanistan, traditional security will likely to have a much more important position on China’s agenda in the future. As stated in Article 5 of the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, one of the purposes of the SCO is to transform borders into frontiers of “eternal peace and friendship” (Kembayev 2017). This article can be viewed as not only a call for intra-SCO unity, but also a proposal to form a federation-like regional structure. The Treaty was signed in 2007, and since then, the power dynamic of the world has changed significantly, with China gradually becomes more assertive and wealthier, and Russia increasingly alienated yet more militarily aggressive. This transition might very well be indication that the bloc might take on a more military character, hence the emphasis on security remains the paramount concern. Neither China or Russia has expressed the desire to dominate the region, but that is also precisely the suspicion many in the west have raised. The natural suspicion against China’s military rise and Russia’s resurgence could remind the CARs of the tradition offensive realism thinking where major powers would pursue regional hegemony to ensure its influence and power not be

undermined by other great powers. This can also be reflected in regional discourse among experts, that one can never trust Russia or China's true intention (M. Danilovich 2018).

Another interesting and preoccupying aspect of traditional security is the great power games within the SCO, but mainly between China and India. Among the member states, India is the only country that has not expressed its support for China's BRI, as shown in the most recent joint declaration following the Qingdao Summit in June 2018 (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2018). In addition, India, often described as the only true democracy in the SCO, has a rather close relationship with the US and is a part of "Quad" group (with US, Australia and Japan) to support America's new Indo-Pacific strategy, which from a realist perspective, aims at containing China. One thing to note is that India considers China's Maritime Silk Road to be a huge threat and is actively engaging in deterrence strategy (Liu 2017). It is hard to imagine mutual respect and trust existing between the India and its neighbouring SCO members. Furthermore, the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan could also sow discord within SCO members and hinder collective efforts. Such complicated composition is held together by the common interest of fighting the three evils and economic cooperation would be relatively secondary. Behind the ascension of the two countries, are the competing influence of China and Russia. Pakistan is China's traditional ally while India its natural adversary. While for Russia, Pakistan was its main opponent during the Afghan war in the 1980s, while India has been a major buyer of arms. The balancing act shows the unwillingness of Russia to let China take the reins on the direction of the SCO, but China's accommodation of Russia's ambition is also essential for the advancement of their mutual interests. This is also consistent with a main tenet of neorealism, where states are rational players and will strategize to maximize their power, even when it means a short-term accommodation of the other's ambition.

The non-traditional threats, namely terrorism and extremism and separatism, have plagued the region for decades. Currently, major groups such as the ETIM, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic State and more than 100 other terrorist groups are on the List of terrorist and separatist and extremist organizations (the European Times 2017). The main organ dealing with anti-terrorist issue is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), and in recent years, it has produced remarkable results in terms of averted attacks, neutralized personnel and confiscated weapons and explosives. Table 1 shows the some of the results from RATS activities. From the most recent joint declaration, over half of the ten-page document is dedicated to security

related issues. The provisions for security issues are also most substantive, detailed and actionable, ranging from a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, from countering financial terrorism to adopt a Joint Appeal to Youth aiming to dissuade young people from joining terrorist groups (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2018). The substance of the security-related content is surprisingly comprehensive and well-thought of. There are also significant portion of economic, cultural and educational related content, but it was clear, from the order of its presentation and depth of content, that these are still secondary objectives. From a theoretical point of view, a common threat that are inherent from countries' history, forming perception of their own identities is consistent with constructivist view on international relation. China's Xinjiang province has been historically distant and restless toward the central governments, while since the partition in 1947, both India and Pakistan have been struggling with reconcile marginal groups in their frontiers and heartland in order to maintain territorial integrity. The constant threats to the legitimacy and independence also have lingered in the back of CARs' leaders mind. Hence the common desire for regional security framework.

Table 1. RATS activities from 2011-2015, data from the UN chronicle (Alimov 2017)

Item	Quantity
# of averted attacks in planning stage	20
# of averted crimes of terrorist/extremist nature	650
# of neutralized training camps/personnel	440/1700
# of arrested/extradited terrorist criminals	2700+ /213
# of suspects put on wanted list	180
# of undercover bases revealed	600
# of confiscated weapons/ammunitions/explosives	10,000/450,000 (pc)/52t

Envisioning SCO's Future and Conclusion

For over 17 years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has developed significantly from a 5-member regional organization focusing solely on security and border stability to an organization that covers more than 20% of the worlds surface and almost half of the world's population. Its members and strategic dialogue partners are key stake holders in the peace and stability in the Eurasia Supercontinent and gradually, world started to pay close attention to this

previously low-key organization. With expanding membership, the organization also expanded its mandates to economic and cultural realms. While it is a commendable attempt for further regional integration, I envision the future of the SCO would remain committed to regional security and stability, reaffirming it as its core mission and serve as the security arm safeguarding the smooth implementation of BRI and other regional initiatives; while other economic, cultural and social activities under its brand would continue to flourish, but a possible “shift” of branding might happen, namely under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Officially, deepening economic cooperation remains one of the most important objectives, but in my opinion, many aspects of it are complicated by the ascension of new members such as Pakistan and India, and possibly Iran in the future. Both President Xi of China and President Putin from Russia have explicitly supported Iranian membership, but its non-mention in the latest joint declaration is indeed puzzling and possibly has to do with the renewed sanctions unilaterally placed by the US. A potential SCO FTA was proposed by China but postponed by the CARs, fearing further expansion of Chinese economic influence and trade imbalance. But China is known for its preference for free trade zones (at least in name) and has pushed for bilateral FTZ experiments at its borders with Kazakhstan (Rakhimov 2013). In addition, Rakhimov made the point that since the SCO charter does not require a member state to participate in certain projects in order to obtain or maintain their membership, so even bilateral agreements regarding an FTA could be carried out in SCO format. I agree with this point and think that it is consistent with the Shanghai Spirit and the flexibility preferred by China. In such case, the SCO’s security function would stay intact while the economic functions are only nominally attaching to it, supporting the argument that SCO would re-orient itself to be a security-focused institution.

As for the economic interaction with other regional organizations, the SCO and the CSTO might have overlapping membership, but the goals and drivers are different, China would not and should not risk triggering Russian suspicion by suggesting a merge of the two regional security organizations. Moreover, it is not to China’s benefit to be perceived as a legal military ally of Russia, showing unnecessary hostility toward the West. But it is noteworthy that CSTO and SCO have held joint military exercises in the past (Rakhimov 2013). Economically, the EAEU is the most likely partner for the SCO in the region, but a couple of factors determines that their cooperation will be limited in scope. First, the internal coherence of the EAEU is not yet optimal, with Russia at its center and heavily subsidizing member states. Secondly, deeper interaction

between the two organizations necessarily means a deeper interaction between EAEU and China, which coming back to the geopolitical sensitivity of Russia, a realist puzzle. Other players in the EAEU such as Kazakhstan and Belarus (despite their support for China's BRI) are still nervous about the potential entrance of China into the organization, and this concern for China's economic domination spread throughout EAEU member states (Wilson 2016). But prospective cooperation has been discussed by scholars. One interesting aspect is a potential common currency for EAEU members to adopt so that trade with SCO members would be much more efficient. The strategic impact of this proposal also resides at the challenge for the petrodollar system which many regional countries regard it as a financial weapon for the US, citing the new Russia-China \$400 billion natural gas contract was not denominated US dollars (Gatev and Diesen 2016). Clearly, the SCO and other regional organizations could have substantive cooperation, but it is still too early to see this potential cooperation would materialize any time soon. Keenly aware of this fact, China's main security focus within the SCO remains fighting the three evils, especially the ETIM separatists in Xinjiang Province, since domestic integrity forms the legitimacy of Communist Party's rule, therefore trumps every other concern. Economically, it is not likely that cooperation between the SCO and EAEU would result anything but superficial statements or gestures, China would do better by prudently pursue steady bilateral relationship with Russia, and promote economic cooperation under the BRI, which has received overwhelming support from regional partners.

Comparing with cooperation in the security realm, economic cooperation has been slow to materialize. In 2007, the SCO Secretary General expressed concerns over the potential for economic cooperation between members states, designating it "the most serious challenge" facing the organization (Norling and Swanstrom 2007). In hindsight, he might not have foreseen the 2008 financial crisis, the rapid deterioration of the relationship between Russia and the West, or the assertiveness of China and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, but nonetheless, his comment could be interpreted in a different way, that economic cooperation poses an identity issue for the SCO and a potential conflict of national strategies among its member states. There is too much to disagree on when it comes to economic issues such as trade and investment, but far less on combating the three evils. And for over 17 years, common interests on fighting the three evils and resisting western influences have bound the SCO together, even the unlikely partners such as India

and Pakistan. It is also the attraction for other countries such as Iran to join, albeit economic reasons.

A return of great power politics is upon the world and the SCO member states should be aware of that. So, it beckons the question: what is the most efficient way to achieve both economic cooperation and regional security using the existing framework of the SCO? The SCO should focus on its security functionality because 1) it is the founding principle, 2) it has the best foundation for cooperation and has produced remarkable results and 3) future geopolitical struggle and complex regional, non-traditional threats must be addressed by a dedicated and focused organization. The economic aspect should be gradually transferred to BRI-related institutions (existing or new ones), and bilateral engagements should be conducted with the overarching goal of regional integration, to best reflect China's and regional interests.

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