Locating Accountability

Conceptual and categorical challenges in the literature

A literature review with an annotated bibliography

by Anna Drake (University of Waterloo)

Foreword by Mark Halle
(International Institute for Sustainable Development)

Preface by Robert Wolfe (Queen’s University)

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Robert Wolfe is Professor in the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston, Canada, and an IISD Associate in the Trade and Investment Program. He was a foreign service officer for many years, serving in Dhaka, Bangladesh and in the Canadian Delegation to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris. In Ottawa, he worked in the National Security Section; the U.S. Trade and Economic Relations Division; as Executive Assistant to the Ambassador for Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Prime Minister’s Personal Representative, Economic Summit; and in the International Economic Relations Division. Since joining Queen’s in 1995, where he teaches policy analysis and trade policy, Dr Wolfe has published widely on trade policy and institutions, and on public opinion about trade. He is the coordinator of Canadian participation in the Canada-UK Colloquium, and a member of the Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Research Network.

Anna Drake is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. She completed her Ph.D. at Queen’s University in 2008. Her dissertation, now a manuscript titled *Protest and Democracy*, focuses upon issues of inclusion and efficacy in deliberative democratic theory, particularly as deliberative democracy intersects with protest. Prior to joining Waterloo, Dr. Drake taught at the University of Victoria and at Queen’s University, where she was also a researcher at the Centre for Studies on Democracy and Diversity. Her current research examines the “empirical turn” in deliberative theory and, specifically, analyzes issues of inclusion, exclusion, and protest in deliberative mini-publics. An additional research project on deliberative consociationalism, undertaken with Allison McCulloch at Brandon University, takes up the question of how to facilitate substantive inclusion in deeply divided societies.

Mark Halle is Executive Director at the International Institute for Sustainable Development-Europe (IISD-Europe) and is also Director of IISD’s global program on Trade and Investment. Born in the United States, Mark grew up in Switzerland, taking degrees from Tufts University (USA) and Cambridge University (UK). He began his career in the Diplomatic Secretariat of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At the close of the conference, he joined the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) where he worked on the cycle of “State of Environment” reports. He was one of two UNEP members of the team that drafted the World Conservation Strategy, launched in 1980. From UNEP he joined the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) from which he managed the new conservation program in China and served as conservation assistant to the WWF President, HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. He then joined the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), working successively as Director of Field Operations, Director of Development and, finally, Director of Global Policy and Partnerships. He left IUCN in 1998 to establish the European office of IISD in Geneva.

Mark works and writes on a range of topics linking economic policy and sustainable development, in particular trade, investment and subsidy policy. He is currently setting up a new initiative on accountability, focused on the WTO and on the international environmental governance regime. He also works on the link between natural resources management, conflict and peace building.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Accommodating the goals of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system with those of international environmental cooperation is an enduring challenge. This objective is acknowledged in the preamble of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and repeated in stronger terms in the negotiating mandate for the now stalled Doha Development Agenda, launched in 2001. Yet it has rarely been given more than aspirational value. In the trade community, sustainability is too often an afterthought to the commercial imperatives of mercantilist national objectives, while in the environmental community, maintaining an open, non-discriminatory trading system is too often thought to be an obstacle to necessary environmental action.

The increasingly urgent call for greening the economy, moving towards more sustainable patterns of consumption, vastly lowering our ecological footprint and making a rapid transition to a low-carbon economy all call for a shared framework within which both trade and environment are subsumed to the wider goal of sustainable development. The goal of IISD’s research within ENTWINED is to consider the role of transparency and accountability in advancing toward the goal of a trading system that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This preambular goal of sustainable development remains hard to define in legal obligations, but we think Members can nevertheless hold themselves accountable for progress in this direction—and Members can be held accountable by civil society organizations. We see accountability, which can celebrate achievement as well as omissions, as an alternative to dispute settlement, which is focused on breaches, not success.

A LITTLE HISTORY
Both the trade and environment regimes, in their present forms, emerged from a peak of political interest and support in the first half of the 1990s, at a time when the Cold War had ended, the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the scope for redesigning the world on more globally based criteria seemed not only right but necessary. The international environment movement peaked in 1992 with the Earth Summit in Rio and the signature of the Rio Conventions on climate change and biodiversity, soon to be followed by desertification and land degradation. For all the fanfare at Rio, the environmental regime consisted largely of a broad set of unfulfilled promises, with compliance left to the notoriously unreliable goodwill of States.

When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1995, it struck a chord of fear in the environmental community. This seemingly powerful juggernaut, with its binding dispute settlement system and its improved ability to impose economic sanctions on those who transgressed its draconian rules, might prove unstoppable as it challenged every obstacle to neo-liberal commercial interests. We now know that the WTO has not done much of anything for the environment, good or bad. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body did not as a rule strike down environmental measures that restrict trade. Environmental laws, regulations, standards, labels and certification schemes have not been ruled against except where they were grossly more discriminatory than needed to meet the environmental objective. Relevant environmental legislation—and especially multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)—is seen as part of the body of international law within which WTO law must be understood to be situated.

While the trading system has not attacked environmental rules and norms per se, it has done little to make the preambular dedication to sustainable development a reality. Things have not worked out as planned for the environmental mandate any more than for the rest of the Doha Round. Not having enunciated a guiding environmental objective at the outset, Members find themselves unable to agree on a definition of what constitutes an environmental good. The negotiation has advanced little in a decade, and even an ambitious outcome would have only a very limited influence on trade’s overall impact on the environment, much less sustainable development. Disciplining fish subsidies proved no easier. Even though the topic represents a nearly ideal approach to new public-interest topics in the WTO, with a purpose-built coalition of countries (Friends of Fish) pushing the subject and active participation at both the technical and political levels of key non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), it is far from clear that there will be any outcome whatsoever.

Understanding the mechanisms through which accountability is exercised in the WTO—and the role for third parties and the wider stakeholder groups—will be central in determining how multilateral trade policy can begin to serve the wider purpose set out in the WTO and to working out how we address policy coherence and policy hierarchy in the search for sustainable development.

WHY WE WORK ON TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IISD began its work under the ENTWINED program by looking at transparency mechanisms in the WTO—what measures exist, how well they function, and what might be done to improve them. Transparency is often seen by environmentalists in the context of access to information or a basic right to know, a principle that has become more important, especially in the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over the last 30 years, notably with respect to environmental governance. This trend is exemplified in Europe in the 1998 Aarhus Convention.

FOR E WO R D

Foreword by Mark Halle, Executive Director, IISD-Europe
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. But we have a different angle, looking at transparency as a policy tool. The purpose of transparency, in this context, is not simply to render the functioning of the trading system more limpid, but to allow Members to ensure that the rules are being applied in a way compatible with the goals they have adopted. Transparency, as is the case for other areas of good governance like democratic participation, is a foundation for the exercise of accountability. So the second step in IISD’s research in this area was to seek to understand how accountability plays out in the trading system—not just who is accountable to whom and for what, but to map out the complete range of accountability relationships in their full complexity and to identify which of these is significant in seeking to harness both the trade and the environment regimes to the sustainable development goal.

If accountability (and in particular accountability to a wider public good-related goal) is to be strengthened in the WTO, it is essential to understand the mechanisms that are available, how well they function, and what new mechanisms might be required. Only then can recommendations be made on how accountability in and of the WTO may be improved and its ability to contribute to its longer-term preambular goal strengthened.

Our project started from an enquiry into the challenge of how to make progress towards the WTO’s sustainable development goal operational and measurable, and how to hold the WTO accountable for this progress. We quickly realized that we needed a better understanding of “accountability” in theory, which is why we commissioned Anna Drake to prepare this analytic review of the literature on accountability and the accompanying annotated, online bibliography of the literature on accountability in global governance.

What we conclude from this literature review is that the most promising focus in our empirical work is analysis of whether states actually do what they said they would do.
The notion of accountability as measures to ensure that people keep their promises is the frame of the empirical analysis of the trade and environment regimes in this IISD project with ENTWINED. We quickly discovered, however, that the term is slippery, and that usages in the context of global governance sometimes seem to be trying to stretch a domestic concept to an international realm. We needed to clarify the concept for ourselves before we could make much progress.

Accountability seems to be ubiquitous in 21st century scholarly discourse, but perhaps when we become interested in something, we see it everywhere (Borowiak, 2011). I do not remember hearing the word much as a public servant in the 1980s, nor do I recall noticing it in the scholarly literature as a graduate student in the early 1990s. After the creation of the WTO in 1995, I do recall a left-wing NGO critique of decisions being made by “unaccountable bureaucrats” in Geneva, and around 2000, some right-wing politicians in Canada started making noises about requiring greater accountability of bureaucrats, which I interpreted as a lack of trust in officials to follow instructions from politicians.

The concept is hardly new in political theory. Borowiak finds it in ancient Athens and in 18th century constitutional debates in the United States (Borowiak, 2011). Others trace its roots in thinking about liberal democracy at least to Jeremy Bentham (Baume, 2011). In the 19th century, the great English jurist A.V. Dicey saw the main threat to the rule of law in the development of administrative agencies, which could not be neatly fitted into a stylized separation of powers between legislature, courts, and an executive or administration supposed to be confined to implementing determinate law (Dicey, 1885; Dyzenhaus, 1999, p. 11). Law, for Dicey, was a “bridle for leviathan,” a device to hold the administration accountable and protect citizens’ rights (Arthurs, 1979). But despite its ancient lineage, the term is in fact much more ubiquitous now, at least in popular discourse.

A search on the title of articles in the New York Times since 1860 found 434 records, the first a story on “Cabinet Accountability” in 1861. That decade had nine articles; the decade of the 1960s only two. The decade with the most occurrences was the 1870s, with 20 records, followed by the second decade of the 20th century, with 15. It all changed in the 1970s, with 106 records. The term declined in titles of articles in the New York Times, but 86 were published in the first decade of this century. The online database of the Toronto Globe and Mail does not go back as far, and the pattern is similar, but Canadians seem more interested in accountability than Americans—337 articles since 1977 compared to 228 in the New York Times during the same period, with the highest number in the first decade of this century, when the Globe and Mail published 165 articles with accountability in the title.

I then wondered if the pattern of academic interest was correlated with the newspaper pattern. I first searched on “accountability” in the title or topic in both the Social Science Citation Index and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index for the period covered by the database, 1898 until 2011. This search returned 13,661 records, with only a few articles a year at first, gradually increasing after 1950 and again after 1970. The number of articles appearing every year trended sharply upwards in the 1990s, increasing to close to 500 a year by 2000, then doubling to over 1,000 a year by 2009. Searching on “accountability” as a keyword in Medline shows a similar trend in the medical literature. In both databases the share of records with the term accountability as a share of all records added during the year also increased at the same time.

Since that search was rather broad, I tried searching only on “accountability” in the title of the article in the Social Science Citation Index and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index, which found 4,833 records since 1898. Given the focus of our project, I further refined this search by adding “international” as a topic and “Government Law or International Relations or Public Administration” as the subject, which returned only 94 records. The first article appeared in 1994, with five to nine articles a year appearing this century, except for 20 in 2010.

That search was perhaps too limited, so I tried two more. Figure 1 shows the results of a search on accountability refined by “policy” in the categories most relevant for our project. That search found 262 records, with the same patterns: not many articles were published before 1991, with the number increasing steadily every year to a high of 32 in 2010.
Finally, I thought it would be interesting to try a more expansive search, this time on “accountability” as a topic or in a title in literatures categorized as environmental studies or sciences. This search, shown in Figure 2, returned 428 records, with the bulk published since 1990, and the number trending upwards every year to a peak of 59 in 2009. This figure shows an interesting temporal correlation with the rapid increase in the number of environmental treaties, and the number of parties ratifying such treaties, as shown in Figure 3.

FIGURE 1. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE POLICY LITERATURE, 1898–2011


FIGURE 2. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE, 1898–2011

In sum, accountability is a much more common topic now than it was a couple of decades ago. What caused the change? That question deserves further research, but some speculation is possible. As government becomes more complex, accountability is more challenging. Where once we could imagine that citizens could monitor politicians and sanction them effectively through voting in elections, such simple delegation models no longer describe political reality, let alone the reality of multilateral governance. One solution is more scrutiny of government action, which requires more information. In 1980, only eight OECD member countries had legislation on access to information, but by 2004 only two of the then-30 members did not have such legislation, with the biggest increase coming after 1990 (OECD, 2005, p. 36). Now such laws are spreading widely in developing countries too. Accountability and transparency are related, and both are increasingly seen as central to 21st century governance. The downside of increased attention to accountability is that it has become a magic concept (Pollitt & Hupe, 2011), one whose mere invocation is sufficient to signify its obvious importance since everyone obviously knows what it means. But not everybody does know what it means, which is why this literature review by Anna Drake is so valuable.

REFERENCES


On a national level, accountability is well understood and institutionalized; those in power make decisions that affect the lives of voters, who respond by re-electing them or not. Not all issues, however, are ones that fit neatly within domestic borders. Of the many summer smog warnings in southern Ontario, not all are caused solely by emissions from Canadian power plants. Although responsibility for a significant amount of this pollution may lie across the border, Canadians cannot draw upon their power as voters to stop the blanket of ozone drifting in from the United States. Environmental issues, which often defy national borders, are one example of how accountability becomes a difficult concept when extended beyond the borders of a country. Canada’s international commitments also challenge conceptions of accountability. Take, for example, improvements to maternal health, a high profile commitment from the 2010 G8 summit in Canada. Should Canada’s Prime Minister be accountable to domestic constituents in terms of whether or not their taxes should be spent on abortion, or is Canada as a whole accountable to the women that international programs are meant to help? What does accountability mean in a situation where there is such deep disagreement? And what recourse, if any, do the people directly affected by international commitments have if they think that the commitments are insufficient or ill-considered?

Trying to figure out answers to these questions is difficult. And, even after establishing a familiar definition of accountability at home, the definitions we encounter abroad often challenge these conceptions. Without a common understanding of what accountability means and entails, we risk undetected retreat from obligations. This problem arises in all situations of coordinated rather than collaborative action, and it is acute in situations where meeting an international obligation requires states to take domestic actions that are not easy for partners to observe. A fundamental lesson is that mutual accountability is essential if new obligations are to be accepted, and transparency is the foundation for this relationship. This emphasis on transparency, although necessary, cannot by itself resolve these accountability questions. Making the most of mutual accountability and transparency requires first understanding how accountability functions, and where, and why, conflicting demands arise.

Different conceptions of accountability pervade the accountability literature, affect policy prescriptions, and make it difficult to develop accountability mechanisms to use in global governance. International Organizations (IOs) are subject to conflicting demands to be accountable. The number of groups involved in any global project means multiple and often overlapping claims, and, when this is the case, lines of accountability are not always clear. As a result, accountability mechanisms are difficult to apply. Exacerbating the multiple accountabilities problem is the fact that not all demands are identified as accountability claims. Indeed, some are actually claims about legitimacy, affectedness, or justice (to name just a few). The literature on accountability contains a wide variety of perspectives, definitions, and views on the appropriate scope of accountability. Moreover, there is little acknowledgment that the various contributors to the field are in fact approaching accountability from such diverse—and often contradictory—perspectives. As a result, significant parts of the literature talk past each other, thereby frustrating a better understanding of accountability’s role in global governance. This annotated bibliography is an attempt to step back from the assumption that everyone knows—generally speaking—that accountability means and draws attention to the different ways that accountability is actually used and interpreted. This report serves as a guide to the annotated bibliography, as well as an orientation to the accountability literature. In drawing attention to some of the main problems in the literature, challenging accepted (but problematic) understandings of what accountability is and how it works, as well as highlighting the articles and books in which particular debates and perspectives occur, it is the hope that those interested in pursuing accountability questions will be able to ask more pointed questions and engage in a more productive dialogue.

This report maps out the accountability literature and challenges the standard way of analyzing accountability. The first main section of the paper outlines and analyzes concepts of accountability. Formal conceptions of accountability (juridical, sanctions, etc.) and legitimacy-based arguments (perceptions of accountability) are prevalent in the literature, yet these tend to detract from what goes on in accountability relationships. In order to focus on the functional explanations of accountability (developed in the second main section of the paper) it is important to distinguish accountability from the other values that are often confused for accountability—and which make it difficult to analyze the work that accountability itself does.
This section clarifies the relationship between accountability and other values, such as legitimacy, transparency, answerability, responsibility, decision-making, inclusion, and democracy.

The second main section examines the way accountability actually functions. It draws attention to the accountability gaps that exist in power-based conceptions of accountability analyses; departing from the standard approach to accountability, it asks whether states and IOs keep the promises they make. It also examines the complexities that arise when there are multiple and overlapping accountability concerns—as is often the case in a global context. This investigation takes accountability to mandate as the first and foremost concern of IO accountability relations. The substance of the mandate is, in essence, what anchors the accountability investigation. Of course, the way that an IO meets is mandate is also of central importance, and these procedural issues—and the transparency necessary to observe and evaluate them—inform the rest of the accountability analysis.

Noting the central contributions of promise-keeping (accountability to mandate) in a substantive analysis of accountability, and the significant role of mutual accountability in accountability relationships (Borowiak, 2011, p. 69) that are important in terms of measuring the procedural element of accountability, this paper looks at how horizontal accountability can be made to work in global governance, and pays particular attention to what we can do to push transparency in IO accountability relations.

1. THE STANDARD APPROACH TO ACCOUNTABILITY

Traditionally, accountability mechanisms prevent the arbitrary exercise of power by leaders (Posner, 2002, p. 524), and they do so by relying upon "a combination of visibility and punishment" (Borowiak, 2011, p. 7). Accountability is a way to make responsible the exercise of power (Privy Council Office, 1993, Section VII), and typically links two components—"the ability to know what an actor is doing and the ability to make that actor do something else" (Andreas Schedler, in Hale, 2008, p. 74; Keohane, 2006, p. 77). Consequently, "effective accountability requires mechanisms for steady and reliable information and communication between decision-makers and stakeholders as well as mechanisms for imposing penalties (including removal from office)" (Held & Köenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 126).

Domestic political accountability entails a relationship in which power-holders are accountable to broad publics by some means, including elections. Of course, this is different in the global context, where the lack of popular elections and a global electorate does not allow for a shared sense of destiny (Keohane, 2006, p. 7). Consequently, on the global scale we need new, non-electoral ways to hold abusers of power to account.

Ruth Grant and Robert O. Keohane's "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics" (2005) exemplifies the standard way of thinking about accountability in the global governance literature. The central focus of their analysis is on those who wield power and the constraints on their accountability. The point of this analysis is to develop accountability mechanisms that limit abuses of power, but to do so without relying upon a comprehensive accountability system or a centralized government. Grant and Keohane's starting point is the accountability structures built into domestic systems of representative democracy; those who govern are held accountable by citizens, who can use elections to reward or sanction people for keeping their promises—or failing to do so. Accountability is necessary to secure a legitimate and responsible government, and the processes by which people can hold their representatives to account is, while imperfect, relatively straightforward (see also Bexell, Tallberg, & Uhlin, 2010; Bovens, 2007, 2010; Oduhemi & Lee, 2011; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999; Väyrynen, 2003).

As Grant and Keohane examine why accountability is especially problematic at the global level, they focus upon two models of accountability: those of delegation and participation. Both models run along vertical power lines, as accountability processes track the power relationship from one actor to another, using a set of standards to determine whether or not the power-wielder's responsibilities have been met (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 29). The distinction between delegation and participation models rests on different conceptions of the legitimacy of political authority. The former sees those who entrust people with power examine the performance of power-wielders, while the latter sees those who are affected by the exercise of power undertake this evaluation. Vertical lines of accountability can run up (from those affected by power) and down (from those who have delegated power).

Grant and Keohane use their vertical conceptualization of power to categorize a variety of accountability mechanisms. They identify seven mechanisms "on the basis of which improved practices of accountability could be built." Of these seven accountability mechanisms, which rely upon formal and informal norms, four fall under the delegation category and three under participation (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 35). The classification of accountability mechanisms is coupled with a discussion of power-wielders (multilateral organizations, NGOs, transgovernmental networks, firms, and states). Bringing their discussion of power-wielders and the two models of accountability together, Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 40) find that democratic states and multilateral organizations "are the only types of organization in world politics consistently subjected to delegated as well as participatory accountability." Moreover, they conclude that, as a result, these power-wielders "are in general more accountable" than the others and argue that accommodating the different accountability claims from delegation and participation models "can open new prospects for improving accountability to constrain abuses of power" (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 41), and that "an effective accountability system should combine elements from both" (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 42).

Accountability mechanisms, understood largely in terms of obligations and sanctions, underscore the need to curtail "the unauthorized or illegitimate exercise of power and decisions that are judged by accountability holders to be or unjust" (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 30). On this view, accountability mechanisms "always operate after the fact," although Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 30) do acknowledge the ex ante effects that follow from the anticipation of sanctions. The sanction-based approach to power connects the two models of accountability, which Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 31) argue "differ fundamentally in their answer to the question: 'who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable?'" Because one of the central components of accountability is accountability to mandate, focusing on accountability actors—
whether from a delegation or participation perspective—detracts attention from what it is that actors ought to be accountable for. Treating sanctions as the core of accountability mechanisms is insufficient for the complex, and overlapping, accountability relationships that govern relationships of mutual accountability. This is true even if sanctions are designed to have both ex ante and ex post effects.

**Challenging the Standard Approach**

One problematic fact is that “accountability has frequently been used interchangeably with the concept of punishability” (Borowiak, 2011, p. 7). A focus on preventing the abuse of power fails to examine the considerable non-punitive element of accountability that is of central importance to understanding how accountability works. More and more, global governance is moving away from sanctions toward a conception of mutual accountability—as with, for example, the “Millennium Summit Declaration, followed by the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg, Rome and Paris Declarations,” which established mutual accountability as a pillar of development, stemming from a common objective or shared understanding between all involved actors (OECD, 2005, p. 1), and from the recognition that the policies and actions of both developed and developing countries have an impact on the effectiveness of aid and on the outcomes of development efforts (Makonnen, 2003). Mutual accountability occurs along horizontal lines where conceptions of power are quite different from the sanction-heavy account found in Grant and Keohane (and others), in which accountability obligations take a hierarchical or vertical form and compliance with accountability expectations is typically enforced by the threat of punishment. When lines of power run horizontally, as they are increasingly likely to do, the motivation for keeping accountability obligations is that of mutual respect and dependence for keeping accountability commitments. The mechanisms designed to reinforce accountability inevitably take different forms when accountability relationships are horizontal. A sense of obligation is paramount, and is reinforced by concerns over maintaining important working relationships and the reputation of the organization. The vertical lines of accountability that dominate Grant and Keohane’s conceptualization, and the literature’s tendency to refer to principals and agents—which Borowiak (2011) notes is an inherently hierarchical and therefore vertical relationship—fail to capture the complex accountability relationships that occur on this horizontal level.

Nevertheless, “the potential for sanctions” is a central tenet of the standard approach to accountability (Chesterman, 2008, p. 43). The intent of sanctions—which can be legal, fiscal, or political, and can include withdrawal of participation or compliance, as well as using reputations, protests and violence (Steets, 2004, p. 17–18; Steffek & Ferretti, 2009, p. 41)—is to change behaviour both ex ante and ex post, given that the anticipation of sanctions has an effect (Steets, 2004, p. 15). The problem with sanctions is that they do not tell the whole story. This focus on promises arises in response to the tendency to focus on punishment to the exclusion of a more preventative approach. Typically, sanctions are leveled against an organization when it fails to meet its obligations. Mark Bovens (2007) takes a different approach to the use of sanctions, arguing that particular actors ought to be the ones facing consequences. Focusing on “concrete practices of account giving,” Bovens (2007, p. 450) argues that “the obligation to explain and justify conduct” is one that “implies a relationship between an actor, the accountor, and a forum, the accountholder or accountee.” Importantly, Bovens (2007, p. 450) specifies that “the actor can be either an individual, in our case an official or civil servant, or an organization, such as a public institution or an agency. The significant other, the accountability forum, can be a specific person, such as a superior, a minister or a journalist, or it can be an agency, such as parliament, a court or the audit office.” Central to this actor-focused conception of sanctions (or facing consequences, in Bovens’s preferred terminology) is that “actors are to explain and justify their conduct to forums” (Bovens, 2007, p. 454).

**More Than Sanctions: The changing culture of accountability**

Accountability structures are further complicated by the multiple ways that individuals and organizations can exercise power, ranging from sanctions to persuasion to a general sense of moral obligation (Alkoby, 2008; Bovens, 2007). When viewed in conjunction with this range of accountability mechanisms, the punitive element of accountability assumes a smaller role. Separating formal sanctions from moral, reputational, and mutual accountability allows us to examine a wide variety of ways that accountability regimes can be crafted and evaluated, particularly those that underscore a more positive emphasis on accountability for commitment.

Promises are central to a rich understanding of accountability. Anchored in mandate, as well as the substantive and procedural structures that enable IOs to meet these specific accountability relations, an organization’s promises offer a starting point from which to measure accountability. An analysis of promise keeping works for both horizontal and vertical accountability relationships, and thus can accommodate mutual accountability in addition to the more “control-heavy” breach and remedy sanctions approach to accountability. Since global governance is moving away from command-and-control ways of regulation to situations where actors are accountable to each other, a move to expand accountability mechanisms from punishment to prevention is particularly important.

As Turk and Eyster (2010, p. 161) note, “a purely punitive, ‘command and control’ application of accountability ultimately weakens an organization’s culture of accountability.” One concern with taking a punishment approach to accountability is that people view the use of accountability mechanisms as a sign of failure, and “accountability as something that belittles them or happens when performance wanes, problems develop or results fail to materialize” (Turk & Eyster, 2010, p. 161). In this view “if you are using accountability in response to a mistake or problem, it is too late” (Turk & Eyster, 2010, p. 161). The concern that Turk and Eyster note raises the question of ex post and ex ante accountability mechanisms. Responding to accountability problems with sanctions is, of course, important in terms of making sure that organizations do not repeat the same mistakes in the future (thereby serving an important preventative function). The problem with relying on a punitive approach is not that it fails to prevent future problems, but rather that its scope is limited. A preventative approach can incorporate punishment, but—unlike sanctions—can also address the growing sphere of mutual accountability. Prevention is not merely an ex ante accountability mechanism; while the ex ante aspect is particularly important in terms of accommodating mutual accountability (given that formal sanctions are not typically available along...
horizontal lines of accountability), consideration *ex post* can be designed to rectify accountability breaches and to prevent a recurrence. The preventative approach is more flexible than a punitive, neoliberal institutionalist approach in which the assumption is that those involved are in a “prisoner’s dilemma” game and therefore unlikely to cooperate even if it is in their best interests to do so. Flexibility and cooperation are particularly important given the growing role of reputational accountability, and a successful approach to the design and implementation of accountability mechanisms ought to reflect this fact. In a world of increasing interdependency, the fact is that organizations will likely work with each other multiple times; this “shadow of the future” effect highlights the benefits of preferring a preventative approach to a punitive one.

**ACCOUNTABILITY AND OTHER VALUES: DEFINING WHAT IS AT STAKE**

There is a lack of analytical clarity not only over the scope of accountability (that largely centres on democratic and delegation/participation concerns discussed later on) but also over what accountability itself means and how it ought to apply to global governance issues. A great deal of categorical confusion arises because what are often understood as accountability concerns can mask (unintentionally or otherwise) a variety of different issues and values. The term accountability is used in the global governance literature in broad and inconsistent ways. When it comes to trying to understand what is at issue in accountability claims, ill-defined objectives are common (Scott, 2000). Indeed, one of the more formidable problems in understanding accountability is the lack of specificity in terms of what, exactly, accountability ought to achieve in a particular setting. This lack of specificity is often due to the conflation of accountability with a number of other distinct and often conflicting values. Accountability is distinct from legitimacy, transparency, answerability, responsibility, decision making, inclusion, and democracy. Some of these are used as synonyms, while others contribute to each other. Accountability requires transparency, and is valued for its contribution to an organization’s legitimacy. Other concepts may play an important role in particular contexts, yet their addition to understandings of IO and Member accountability often occurs to serve a political purpose and detracts from an analysis of accountability to mandate and questions of promise keeping.

**The Value of Accountability: Why do we need it and how should we use it?**

Broadly speaking, accountability has two main values: an instrumental or purposive value insofar as accountability mechanisms can ensure that an organization is faithful to its mandate, and a normative value insofar as a particular process (that of being held to account for particular actions) is intrinsically valuable. The purpose of accountability is to make sure that people keep their promises. In the global context—where there are no elections to fall back on as a general (if imperfect) safeguard against abuses of accountability—accountability mechanisms are meant to secure cooperation in situations where people may not necessarily trust each other enough to enter into agreements. This extra security in a global context, one that lacks the same institutional safeguards as the domestic level, supports the existence and effective functioning of international organizations.

Ensuring a safeguard against violations of trust makes accountability mechanisms a practical solution to the obstacle of mutual mistrust; at the same time, accountability mechanisms work to secure a normative function and speak to larger questions of legitimacy insofar as processes that evaluate people’s actions have value. We see this with attempts to remedy the widespread noncompliance with MEAs and in the WTO with the preferred approach of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which is that members discuss the matter and try to find a solution without having to resort to formal litigation. The aim is to build on the idea central to representative government: that if citizens have power to hold elected representatives and institutions to account, those representatives will be more likely to carry out their mandate and to respond to citizens’ concerns. Of course, practical problems intervene when we try to develop accountability mechanisms at the global level. As Grant and Keohane (2005, p. 29) rightly note, domestic mechanisms cannot be replicated on the larger, global scale. The practical limitations (no global citizenship, institutions, and the limited scope, membership, and purpose of IOs, amongst others) lead democratic theorists—even most cosmopolitans—to recommend minimal practical responses to problems of global distributive injustice (Miller, 2008; Nagel, 2005; Pogge, 1994; Rawls, 1993). Similarly, because no global *demos* exists to demand accountability—and to receive the democratic benefits from the legitimacy and responsibility that the institutionalization of accountability provides at the domestic level—responses to accountability critiques at the global level end up taking a purposive or instrumental view of accountability, making sure that IOs and states deliver what they promise.

On the global level, accountability performs a variety of important functions. In addition to the general purposes discussed above (keeping the promises outlined in an organization’s mandate and agreements, allowing IOs and states to perform their global governance roles, and developing reputations of legitimacy), holding organizations accountable for their promises allows us to measure an organization’s success in meeting its objectives. Najam and Halle (2010, p. 6) underscore the importance of accountability mechanisms for the routine operations of organizations as they critique the way in which “each subsequent COP [Conference of the Parties] seems to create a new global fund or instrument of some sort with great fanfare, only to be followed by other COPs that fail to hold countries accountable on whether they fulfilled those earlier pledges.” The point here is that, without stopping to evaluate an organization’s strategies and results, the temptation is to get caught up in making promise after promise—and in so doing fail to tackle the problems at hand. The rhetoric of accountability is dangerous when it is used without sufficient thought to the mechanisms that are necessary to evaluate the actions for which groups are supposed to be responsible.

Some argue that more accountability is the answer to the problems currently facing IOs (Weaver, 2010, February, p. 1). It is not clear, however, that this is the answer. Indeed, accountability itself is not always valuable; as Keohane (2008, p. 362) notes “almost all institutions are accountable to someone—if only to the criminal gang or the ‘Godfather’ behind the scenes.” Assuming that an organization has a legitimate purpose and goals, maximizing accountability can still be a poor strategy since “more accountability to one set of interests—one set of ‘accountability holders’”—means less...
accountability to interests that are in opposition to these interests”; when this is the case, “being too responsive to one set of demands will engender opposing demands” (Keohane, 2008, p. 362). Rather than asking whether or not more accountability is the answer, a more helpful approach is to ask about the particular kind or quality of accountability relevant to particular circumstances. Instead of increasing accountability, the stronger response might lie with better designed accountability systems (Grant & Keohane, 2005, p. 41). After all, one of the main problems with accountability is not an accountability deficit, but rather that organizations are accountable in the wrong way, whether this is to the wrong constituencies (Krisch, 2006, p. 250) or due to poor internal structures of accountability. If organizations do not pursue the right kind of accountability or fail to balance it with other responsibilities they may have, then setting out to pursue more (general, unspecified) accountability may do more harm than good (Koppell, 2005, p. 95).

**Accountability in Relation to Other Values**

When problems can be more appropriately characterized as ones of inclusion/exclusion, justice, legitimacy, etc. then they should be identified as such. The accountability literature fails to sufficiently acknowledge the different claims that are made under the guise of accountability. Table 1 details the ways accountability is related to and conflated with other values.

**Accountability and Legitimacy**

The success of global governance depends on people accepting the legitimacy of its various organizations and networks. From a normative perspective, an organization is legitimate if it can offer an accepted justification for its exercise of power. People do not have to like—or even agree with—what an organization does, but they do have to accept the organization and its actions (Rawls, 1993). This acceptance is also necessary from a practical standpoint: for an organization to successfully exercise power, people must accept that it can—legally, historically, and through its leadership—exercise power (Weber, 1948).

General consensus in the accountability literature finds that accountability is a necessary component of legitimacy (see Bäckstrand, 2008; Borowiak, 2007; Curtin & Senden, 2011; Kaufmann & Weber, 2010). The legitimacy of IOs is traditionally defined by their capacity to solve the problems that led to their creation (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 125). Accountability relationships emphasize the normative and formal obligation for those who make promises. Organizations are established to achieve a particular set of tasks, enshrined in their mandate. Since these goals are the premise for an organization’s existence, a failure to uphold—or to act in ways that, in good faith, aim to uphold—these promises would be a violation of the organization’s foundation and therefore illegitimate. As a result, organizations are monitored and held to account for the promises they make.

Substantial disagreement exists on the way legitimacy is deployed in the accountability literature; this dispute takes place between those involved directly in an organization and those who are more broadly affected, and concerns the way we ought to define a “legitimate claim” on an organization. For those who highlight formal accountability, accountability to mandate and accountability relationships between those directly involved in carrying out an organization’s goals determine what makes an organization’s actions legitimate. For those who pursue justice- and democracy-based claims, the ultimate effects on the broader demos are what determine

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**TABLE 1: ACCOUNTABILITY AND OTHER VALUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Relation to Accountability</th>
<th>Relation to Other Values</th>
<th>Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Foundational: Necessary but not sufficient</td>
<td>Enhances most other values</td>
<td>Internal and External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answerability</td>
<td>Important for securing information necessary</td>
<td>Plays an important role when standard lines of</td>
<td>Duty to disclose information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to hold people to account</td>
<td>transparency are problematic</td>
<td>(to whom and how)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Draws attention to the roles of accountability</td>
<td>IOs may be responsible for things</td>
<td>Fixed and Soft law/obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breaches and prevention (developing a “culture</td>
<td>that go beyond particular accountability relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of accountability”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Highlights the role of mandate and</td>
<td>An IO may have limited control over external</td>
<td>Processes and Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>implementation outside Organizations</td>
<td>implementation and be judged despite this</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Depends on the particular accountability</td>
<td>A different kind of obligation/reason for</td>
<td>Those affected; Those</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relationship that exists; Some calls for</td>
<td>inclusion may exist outside of the accountability</td>
<td>directly involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inclusion are outside the mandate of IOs</td>
<td>relation in question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Not all accountability is democratic;</td>
<td>Must not confuse accountability with</td>
<td>Process and Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important that the system being held to</td>
<td>democratic accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>account is normatively desirable; process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>matters in accountability relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the legitimacy of an organization. Evaluating the legitimacy of the World Bank, then, follows a different set of criteria depending on whether the focus is on the way that World Bank mechanisms function as they are designed to, or whether the focus is upon poor countries that struggle to make payments to the IO, and the impact this has upon their citizens. In this case, legitimacy either rests upon the operation of an organization or on questions of distributive injustice.

The connection between accountability and legitimacy becomes problematic when people lose sight of the appropriate role of accountability (i.e., what an organization ought to be held accountable for). Conceptual slippage occurs in IOs when the focus moves away from mandate as the appropriate locus of accountability and instead becomes about the legitimacy of the IO itself. When critiques take this route they “drop” accountability from the picture; legitimacy is no longer the result of whether or not an IO is accountable to its mandate—and therefore meeting its purpose and reinforcing the legitimacy of its existence in this sense—but rather an independent judgment of the organization itself. When this occurs, evaluations of IO accountability ignore who it is the IO is designed to be accountable to and instead focus upon, for example, issues such as the lack of public participation in the IO (see Bonzon, 2008).

Accountability and Transparency

For an organization to be transparent, people must be able to observe its processes and actions. There are two main types of transparency: internal and external. Internal transparency is concerned with the participation of all people in the organization, particularly as it relates to decision-making processes. In order to meet the internal criteria of transparency, members of an organization should be able to observe what is happening, why, and who has (more or less) influence in the organization. External transparency deals with the extent to which people outside of the organization are aware of what happens in an organization and how the organization itself impacts the outside world (Bonzon, 2008, 759).

Often, organizations are critiqued for their lack of external transparency. Transparency of an organization’s decision-making processes (Bonzon, 2008), as well as the information an organization used to make these decisions, is necessary for people outside the group to evaluate an organization’s accountability. One of the biggest external sources of demands for greater transparency are NGOs and INGOs, who have routinely criticized IOs; in response, IOs have undertaken significant steps to make their members and their findings accessible, such as establishing extensive websites, releasing documents and other relevant information, and developing public forums. As a result of enhanced transparency, criticism is “much more muted than 10 years ago” (Hoekman, 2011, p. 11). The WTO, for example, now “provides largely equal and open access for civil society” (Piewitt, 2010, p. 469).

Without the ability to observe what goes on in an organization, holding agents to account would be difficult because accountability depends upon having reliable information about an organization’s (or individual’s) conduct (Steets, 2005, p. 12). Pursuing the implications of transparency as a precondition for accountability—whether for shifting the balance of power or for pursuing greater accountability—leads to the realization that resisting greater transparency can be “the first line of defense” (Burall & Neligan, 2005, p. 15) against other reforms and as such can serve as a warning for organizations that may neglect their accountability.

Conceptual slippage is common between accountability and transparency. While transparency is a necessary component of accountability, accountability problems cannot be solved merely through increased transparency measures (Väyrynen, 2003, p. 185). An additional requirement of access and engagement must exist in order for an organization to be held accountable—rather than just transparent; what people do, and what they can do, once activities and information become transparent is key to accountability (Halle, Wolfe, & Beaton, 2011, p. 4). Information must be manageable and relevant; many warn against the problem of information “dumping”—something that, while it technically complies with transparency requirements (favouring a presumption on disclosure), serves to hide relevant information among a large amount of essentially useless information (Burall & Neligan, 2005, p. 14; see also Grant & Keohane, 2005, pp. 39–40; Curtin & Senden, 2011, p. 185; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 314).

Accountability and Answerability

The duty to disclose information—to be answerable for decisions and actions—can play an important role in the pursuit of accountability. An important part of accountability is that agents are able to answer for their actions or the lack thereof, and are made to do so when necessary (Newell, 2008, p. 124). Answerability is not, however, the same as accountability. As Philippe Lagassé (2010) notes in his analysis of accountability for national defence, the typical understanding of transparency (as a necessary component of accountability) is sometimes problematic; disclosure in matters of national defence could compromise national security and undermine the effective exercise of accountability. In such a circumstance, however, accountability still needs to be pursued. The proposals Lagassé offers to account for this problem build upon the distinction/relationship between accountability and answerability; instead of requiring the military and the department of national defence (DND) be directly accountable, Lagassé (2010, p. 5) looks to principles and practices in the larger institutional setting that allow Canadians to hold the government to account, and government leaders keeping the military and DND accountable.

In complex organizations, and particularly when dealing with complex or sensitive issues, “a system of divided powers makes it virtually impossible to hold individuals personally accountable, except in the narrow sense of prosecuting personal misconduct” (Privy Council Office, 1993, Chap. VII, cited in Lagassé, 2010, p. 9). Moving beyond a narrow conception of accountability involves paying attention to the institutional background against which the accountability relationship occurs. The particular problem that exists between accountability, effectiveness, and security is one that is ultimately addressed through the principle of responsible government (Lagassé, 2010, p. 5) and should serve as a reminder that accountability, properly understood, should always be exercised in order to meet a larger goal (mandate, legitimacy). When circumstances make holding people directly accountable problematic, requiring answerability—and situating accountability in a particular institutional framework—may be the most effective solution and one that best realizes the overall accountability of the larger
institution; in this case, the Canadian government is responsible for national security and it is ministers who are accountable. The chief of defence staff is answerable to Parliament. In this way, “being answerable” means that Parliament is informed of the way in which the power of the state is being used; being accountable ensures that those on whom Parliament confers the powers of the state account for their actions” (Nicholas d’Ombrain, 2008, p. 199, cited in Lagassé, 2010, p. 45).

**Accountability and Responsibility**

Accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that Members keep their promises to one another, and that organizations keep their promises to those outside the group. Obligations differ in degree; people within an organization may have fixed, legally enforceable contractual obligations to fellow members and to certain groups/actors outside the organization. Other responsibilities may be of a “softer” nature, and the only real recourse, if people or organizations fail to meet their responsibilities, may be an attempt to employ reputational responsibility, in the hopes that pressuring or shaming may ensure compliance (Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004; Grant & Keohane, 2005; Gillies, 2010; Naiki, 2009). The lack of legal enforcement for responsibilities, however, does not automatically mean that a state or organization does not have a strong incentive to keep promises; as Paloma Raggo (2011) notes, reputational mechanisms are one of the main constraining mechanisms on transnational NGOs and do a great deal of work to ensure an organization’s accountability.

However, accountability and responsibility are not synonymous. Traditional models of accountability view the action of holding people to account as a retroactive step—that is, to sanction after an accountability breach (Burall & Neligan, 2005, p. 7). This model is coming under increasing criticism because it does not do enough to establish a culture of accountability that will guard against transgressions. The distinction between accountability and responsibility alerts us to the importance of understanding accountability’s role in not only trying to ensure that breaches are not repeated, but also in preventing them from occurring in the first place. It also highlights the importance of acknowledging agents’ informal responsibilities to those who cannot directly call them to account but who are nonetheless affected by an organization’s actions. While the distinction between direct accountability relationships and a more general responsibility (in terms of limiting harm to people and the environment, ethical responsibilities, etc.) is important, it is important to keep in mind that organizations’ obligations do not stop at keeping promises to people in their accountability network. These obligations, however, are not ones of functional accountability. Where the problems are ones of distributive injustice and environmental degradation, they should be identified as such; confusing these responsibilities with an IO’s accountability to mandate makes it harder to address problems in either domain.

**Accountability and Decision Making**

Agents under accountability obligations will often need to make decisions, and decision-making processes are a key component in the pursuit of accountability insofar as they allow people to identify and evaluate substantive and procedural elements of accountability relationships (Hoekman, 2011; Kaufmann & Weber, 2010; Mitchell & Sheargold, 2009). If organizations are to stay within the confines of their mandate then they are limited in the kinds of decisions they can make (Fisher, 2010). Accountability may extend beyond the actions of the organization. When general policies are put into practice outside the organization—in environments that may contain a host of unanticipated factors—implementation may require more specific decisions. Notably these may be ones that an organization did not predict (or desire). The relationship between decision making and implementation is not always predictable and it affects our ability to hold agents to account for general policies. Members of an organization may make decisions that meet all of that organization’s accountability requirements, and which take their external accountability obligations seriously. Despite these good faith efforts, accountability problems may occur if these decisions leave a significant amount of room for further decision making by third parties at the level of implementation. Perhaps the biggest implementation failure in this respect is the problems experienced with aid funding delivery; with multiple accountability relationships (implementing agencies to end users; implementing agencies to governments; governments to end users; governments to donors; and donors to governments and end users) IO accountability is difficult to track (Winters, 2010). International institutions are facing a double challenge of effectiveness and legitimacy that arises from increasing responsibilities and inadequate respect, support, and compliance from member states (Woods, 2007).

Decision making outside an organization may jeopardize its substantive and procedural goals. As Heyvaert (2009) notes in her analysis of the costs of safeguarding biodiversity, meeting the substantive standards of the Stockholm Convention has different costs; in some cases it requires minor changes to an existing framework (as in the EU), but in developing countries it “requires major legislative, regulatory, and administrative change and has a profound impact on local agriculture, industry, and economy” (Heyvaert, 2009, p. 652). Accountability mechanisms in global regulatory structures differ from those in domestic settings. The differences between international and state infrastructure underscore the need to ask the “accountability to whom” question and suggest the benefits of involving all constituencies in decision-making processes by establishing multiple accountability mechanisms rather than depending upon one procedure (Krisch, 2006).

Agents cannot be held accountable for any problems in implementation over which they lack control and cannot reasonably foresee (see Najam & Halle, 2010, p. 4). It is important to remember this when trying to balance an organization’s accountability to mandate with larger, networked accountability relations that involve states, corporations, and NGOs. While one organization may not be able to effectively demand accountability for micro-level implementation, the larger system of global governance may be able to push for greater accountability. As Lund-Thomsen (2005) argues in his study of the role of community organizing in environmental governance in Durban, South Africa, corporate social responsibility initiatives can improve the practice of companies and alter the way that corporate activities affect local workers and communities. Partnerships between community organizations and NGOs can mitigate some of the negative effects of transnational corporations (TNCs) and states that fail to extend sufficient protections to citizens and workers. NGO and civil society organization (CSO) involvement in decision-making processes is one promising area of accountability.
analysis, and one that, importantly, highlights the importance of analyzing a larger accountability system (Bernstein, 2010; Chesterman, 2008; Gillies, 2010; Pallas & Urpelainen, 2012).

Accountability and Inclusion
One of the dominant criticisms in the accountability literature is that because IOs are not broadly inclusive of those whom their policy decisions affect they are not accountable. These critiques are made by citizens and—more vocally—by NGOs and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that champion the claims of those affected. To give just a few examples, the World Bank and IMF are criticized for failing to adequately take the interests of citizens in developing countries into account; the WTO is criticized for the power imbalance between developed and developing country Member states; and the GATT was criticized for the negative environmental effects of trade decisions as it attempted to eliminate trade advantages between member states, notably with the Tuna-Dolphin case.

While there are important connections between inclusion and accountability, the issues identified in criticisms of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and GATT (among other IOs) are not ones that are properly characterized as accountability critiques. Criticisms against these organizations do not automatically indicate that blame for exclusion ought to lie with the IO. There may be good reasons why an accountability relationship ought to exist, but the important (and often overlooked) question is who ought to be accountable for the exclusion of affected citizens? Governments may be a better target for the critiques levelled by NGOs and INGOs [although, in response to the limited jurisdiction of states vis-à-vis environmental effects of trade decisions as it attempted to eliminate trade advantages between member states, notably with the Tuna-Dolphin case.]

Questions of inclusion, state accountability, and global justice ought to be identified as such and not conflated with an analysis of an IO’s ability to remain accountable for its mandate. It is important to distinguish an analysis of an organization’s current accountability (whether it is accountable to its mandate and whether the processes it employs to achieve these substantive goals are ones that are done well) from the kind of accountability we might think is desirable in these IOs. Accountability relationships between states and citizens may be warranted on other (justice or humanitarian) grounds; these may indeed be compatible with revised IO and global governance relationships, and improved accountability relationships (within the IO, via an amended mandate or new agreements) may be desirable. The mistake rests in evaluating an existing organization’s accountability structures according to these standards.

Accountability and Democracy
Democratic theory and practice is centrally concerned with ways that power can be held accountable. Voting, transparency, the availability of information, and the equal ability of people to exercise democratic power are all fundamental to our understanding of what accountability requires and why accountability is important. Because the connection between accountability and democracy is such an important one, it tends to encroach on the analysis of accountability in global governance. However, accountability occurs in the absence of democracy. Crime syndicates, for example, function with a clear chain of accountability; in terms of pure proceduralism, this may be an ideal setting to see accountability at work—and work well. The trade-off for this kind of accountability, however, is not one that people are usually willing to make.

The normative value placed upon accountability has its roots in the process and substance of an organization. Process matters. When people evaluate the accountability of an organization, it is important that people act in the way they promised; without establishing trust, an organization may not be able to perform the activities it is tasked to do. Moreover, if an organization’s processes are criticized, the organization may see a withdrawal of support necessary to sustain its operations (membership, funding, etc.). The substantive goals of an organization also play an important role in the normative value of accountability. It is important that the system held to account is normatively desirable. This value need not be—and often is not—democratic. Major IOs are not democratic, but they have value insofar as they aim to advance a larger goal (be it poverty reduction, trade regulation, etc.).

In the global accountability literature, accountability and democracy are frequently conflated, with a significant number of people assuming that accountability means (or ought to mean) democratic accountability. The tendency in the literature is to identify accountability as a democratic value (Bexell, Tallberg, & Uhlman, 2010, p. 84; Keohane, Macedo, & Moravcsik, 2009, p. 26; Steffek, 2010, p. 54); as a motivator or prerequisite for accountability (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 102, p. 105; Ranganathan, 2006, p. 11); and as a measure of accountability (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010, p. 308). Others go even further. Goodin (2010) argues that accountability leads to the worldwide growth of democracy. While there are people who make a distinction between accountability and democratic accountability (Ranganathan, 2006, p. 3; Steffek, 2010, p. 46), this is not the norm in the literature. Accountability can serve all of the above functions in particular contexts, but failing to distinguish between accountability and democratic accountability is detrimental to the analysis of accountability. There are too few efforts to talk about accountability to mandate, to analyze it on its own terms, and to situate numerous other aspects of accountability in relation to democratic accountability, which may not always be appropriate.

Much of the accountability literature questions the democratic accountability of IOs in terms of how well—or indeed if at all—IOs can address the concerns of all those affected by their policies. While these questions have value, they are distinct from questions of IO accountability; the tendency of contributors to the accountability literature to shift unproblematically from an analysis of mandate to one of democratic accountability without acknowledging the motivation and political implications of this approach is troubling.

The assumption that “accountability” means “democratic accountability” is one of the more prominent problems in the accountability literature. It is another instance in which people wrongly use the language of accountability when, in fact, the particular claims fit into other categories (social justice, etc.) or are, as noted above, more appropriately discussed in terms of such things as transparency, responsibility. The conflation of accountability with democratic accountability is at the root of numerous demands for IOs to remedy an alleged democratic deficit; these accountability claims are frequently accompanied by the insistence of a growing demand for democratic legitimacy (Piewitt, 2010) and suggestions for remedies to this “deficit” accompany these critiques (Nanz &
Steffek, 2004, p. 328). The crucial fact remains that democratic accountability is seldom part of IO mandates, which tend to focus on specific, predetermined goals and rely on experts to perform these tasks. Moreover, it is not clear how it could be otherwise; if all IO mandates fail to meet a test, then perhaps the test is (in this context at least) inappropriate. Democratic accountability, in the context of IOs, primarily comes into play at the domestic level, where citizens can (at least in principle) hold their governments to account for their membership in, and agreements with, IOs; citizens may have a difficult time doing this, but, despite the valid critiques concerning the minimal efficacy voters have in successfully exercising this accountability, these problems are ultimately ones of democratic accountability at the state level—that is, as long as IOs facilitate this domestic accountability through their own transparency. When IOs themselves engage in democratic accountability, the demos is very specific (agencies, boards, etc.) and typically removed from those outside the organization. This is where democracy meets administrative law and global administrative law, and, as such, traditional democratic analyses are problematic. Of course, many multilateral organizations are non-electoral, and are dominated by experts and diplomats (Steffek & Ferretti, 2009, p. 37), who have very tenuous links to voters, making it difficult to apply the concept of political accountability at all. Accountability critiques should not skip the important stage of traditional democratic analysis, but “accountability” should not be used as code for “undemocratic” or “illegitimate”; where the problems are ones of democracy, legitimacy, and inclusion, they ought to be labelled as such and analyzed on their own terms.

CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIONS IN THE ACCOUNTABILITY LITERATURE

There is a great deal of conceptual confusion between participation, legitimacy, and accountability. Sometimes, the discrepancies in these interpretations are clear, as is the case when people confuse delegation and participation approaches to accountability. Many critiques focus on a broad, participatory conception of accountability that are usually advanced in NGO and CSO analyses of state and IO accountability obligations. These participatory accounts not only call for more accountability, but a different kind of accountability—toward people affected by decisions—than IOs and states intend when constructing their mandates (Park, 2010, p. 7). Koenig-Archibugi (2004, p. 236) argues that “the fact that a person or community is substantially affected by the actions of an individual or organization may, under certain circumstances, justify the establishment of a relationship of accountability between them.” Scholte (2010, p. 3) analyzes accountability as the processes whereby one actor (for example, a global governance institution) answers to other actors (circles affected by that regulatory body) for its impacts on them. The participatory model’s call for expanding the scope of accountability largely takes the form of calls for democratic accountability; specifically the arguments that decisions made by IOs, insofar as IOs require the participation of governments (or at minimum rely on IO-friendly policies), have significant effects on citizens, and ought not to prevent citizens in democratic societies from holding someone accountable for these decisions. It is difficult, however, to determine just how IOs affect citizens and whether or not this kind of effect warrants the demand for far-reaching accountability mechanisms.

The question of holding people responsible for decisions with far-reaching effects (ones that go beyond the people directly responsible for making the decisions) is one taken up in the democratic theory literature on the “all-affected principle” (Abizadeh, 2008; Arrhenius, 2005; Goodin, 2007; Heyward, 2008; Karlsson, 2006, 2009; Näström, 2010). The legitimacy of political decision making in democratic societies is premised on the idea that all people who are affected by decisions ought to play a role in the decision-making process. The opportunity for people to influence the circumstances that affect their lives is part of what it means to respect people’s autonomy, and is of central importance to democracies—which is why all-of-age citizens have the right to vote. This role, however, is unclear when boundaries are themselves in question, as is especially the case in the global context. The environmental impact of factories, for example, does not respect state borders, yet the impact outside the state may be significant (Näström, 2010, p. 8). These far-reaching effects give rise to a set of problems with the scope of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2: PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability to Whom?</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those implicated in accountability processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Questions of institutional accountability, accountability to mandate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Those affected by accountability processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Questions of distributive inequality, democratic accountability; social justice)</td>
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</table>
the all-affected principle. When the people affected by decisions do not have any say in what those decisions ought to be, they lack the ability to control the conditions that affect their lives. The problem for conceptions of accountability in the global governance literature arises because such a far-reaching conception of accountability is at odds with the focus on accountability to mandate; instead of a participatory approach, accountability is delegated to specific organizations and limited to those directly involved in decision making, and accountability relations are much more narrowly defined. In this latter approach, formal sanctions—rather than public opinion—are the main constraints and motivations for keeping obligations. As a result, the standard sanction-based approach may not be able to address the concerns of those affected (Burgis & Zadek, 2006, p. 6, p. 54).

Analytical clarity is further obstructed by the overlap of accountability models and remedies. Although delegation and participation models of accountability may pull in different directions, it is not always the case of choosing one or the other. CSOs, typically associated with the participation model, are adopting aspects of delegation, developing their relationships with IOs and nuancing their opposition to IO power, choosing to work with organizations as it benefits them, and analyzing power relations within the NGO infrastructure itself—especially when it comes to relations between North and South. IOs and states are increasingly aware of the need to consider participatory claims, and to this end have reached out to NGOs and CSOs, inviting their input and extending their infrastructure to accommodate this involvement (Dombrowski, 2010; Newell, 2008; Piewitt, 2010; Scholte, 2011; Steffek, 2010; Tallberg & Uhlin, 2011). Participation can be rooted in democratic principles, but giving effect to the all-affected principle is not feasible in global governance. What IOs can (and do) draw from the democratic ideals underlying the all-affected principle is the instrumental value of including a diverse set of voices, drawing from this to extend working relationships with those affected and enabling the production of better policy. Indeed, some NGOs with demonstrable expertise are valued partners of MEAs and help to keep the process accountable (Wolfe & Baddeley, 2012). Participation can also be rooted in the delegation model; all who are affected cannot participate, but their delegates can, and through their observations they can help to increase transparency and thus accountability.

Underlying the variety of claims that take place within and between the participatory and delegation models is a foundational distinction over the perceived function of accountability relationships. This distinction is key, yet the accountability literature is full of instances in which people fail to clearly identify the particular approach they take. The broad, participatory accountability that NGOs and CSOs usually call for is very different from an approach that focuses on formal accountability. When the focus is on the obligations that are clearly set out in foundational documents, and the subsequent agreements people reach based on these documents, the success or failure of accountability relationships is evaluated in terms of people’s ability to meet what is outlined in these documents/agreements—not in terms of how far-reaching participation is. There are, of course, disagreements about how to interpret/apply foundational documents, but when disagreements take this form, having the same starting point goes a long way to cut down on people talking at cross-purposes.

Not only do people have different conceptions of delegation and participation with respect to IOs, they also have different normative evaluations of accountability relations. One common approach in the literature is to take a legitimacy-based understanding of accountability: to focus on what is the “right” thing to do rather than on whether an organization does the thing it said it would do. When this is the lens people use to approach accountability, the core of the dispute rests on the purpose of the organization. If the aims or methods of an organization are under dispute (or rejected outright), then any subsequent accountability analysis is likely to be coloured by this, and the organization will be perceived unaccountable to the people outside the organization (and whom it affects). In this view, legitimacy is not just a question of how well an organization works; it is a question of what it works to do. This particular question of legitimacy (the “rightness” of mandate) should not be (although often is) confused with other legitimacy concerns. Whether an IO is legitimate is a normative question, while whether it does what it was created to do is an instrumental question. It is important to keep in mind the substantive and procedural aspects of accountability (Table 3) when assessing an organization’s successes and failures. Perceptions of accountability can vary significantly, whether as a result of genuine misunderstandings over an organization’s role and mission or due to overly political reasons for recasting what an organization “should” do. These perceptions carry a great deal of influence. They have the

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE 3: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ACCOUNTABILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Question</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>How close does the IO come to meeting its objectives?</td>
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<tr>
<td>An organization’s mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization do what it says it will do?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on</td>
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<tr>
<td>What criteria are best for meeting objectives?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goals and promise-keeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the benchmarks toward meeting goals?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What steps does the organization take to check progress?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the appropriate course of action if the organization does not meet its goals?</td>
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</table>
potential to shape the actual role an organization will play, and they affect the accountability mechanisms and relationships that academics and policy-makers think are possible and desirable. Different perceptions affect the accountability literature and are responsible for a central shortcoming—the extent to which people evaluating accountability talk at cross-purposes. As a result, the concept of accountability “has become less useful for analytical purposes, and today resembles a dustbin filled with good intentions, loosely defined concepts and vague images of good governance” (Bovens, 2007, p. 449).

How then do people evaluate accountability given the different scope of accountability claims? Formal accountability depends upon the codification in an organization’s founding documents. While documents may be adapted and revised in meetings and through subsequent declarations, it is the understanding of these obligations to mandate and agreement, specified in relation to the people who are directly involved, that determines how people should evaluate accountability. This is true even though the mandate may face challenges—and even be rejected outright—from those outside the organization who dispute the organization’s legitimacy.

When an organization is evaluated according to its ability to carry out its mandate and obligations, part of the accountability analysis is dedicated to making sure that the organization’s processes function in a legitimate way (often highlighting the central role of transparency). In this latter case, legitimacy is part of what makes accountability work (regardless of what the mandate is); in the former, legitimacy is a normative question of the organization’s global governance role.

When the kind of accountability that is challenged is a rejection of the accountability of an organization because of its mandate (and not accountability to its mandate) then the conflict ought to be presented as a dispute over the legitimacy of the organization and not as a problem of accountability. An organization may do everything “by the book” when it comes to meeting formal accountability obligations and still come under harsh criticism from people outside the organization. When disagreements unfold this way it is important to keep in mind that accountability (and the evaluation of accountability) always occurs in a larger system.

Even the most carefully crafted accountability mechanisms may not be successful if there are conflicting understandings about what kind of accountability ought to be pursued. It is important to be clear on whether the accountability critique made against an organization is whether it ought to be doing something else, or if it is not accountable for what it sets out to do (Mashaw, 2006, p. 15). Both formal accountability and accountability as legitimacy perspectives evaluate substance and process in accountability relationships, but they derive their answers from different sources. Some critiques have little to do with accountability, but more appropriately concern another interest or value.

Accountability always serves a particular purpose. Newell (2008, 129) notes that “accountability is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to an end and requires, therefore, that the end be specified” (cf. Kingsbury and Stewart (2009, p. 10). Keeping in mind the ends of accountability and the accountability strategies that help organizations to achieve these ends is important when it comes to understanding the ways that accountability strategies can be constructed to serve particular interests—some of which may stray from an original mandate and promises made between Members and by IOs. Such a “politicized understanding of accountability,” that requires paying attention to “which accountability strategy will serve whom and when” allows us to interpret changes in policy approaches and to evaluate their success (Newell, 2008, p. 129). As people try to make an organization’s accountability about what they want, instead of its professed aims, accountability becomes a political project (see Wolfe, 2011). In this way, accountability regimes can help to generate legitimacy, or they can “provide normative cover for abuses of power,” misusing the language of accountability and responsibility in an attempt to justify relationships that actually undermine the original terms of a mandate or reinterpret promises in a way that violates their original intent (Borowiak, 2007, p. 1013).

Accountability to mandate is itself complicated (and fundamentally implicated in discussions of power relations) because different stakeholders have different views of what the mandate is (is it based on historical relations? Are there a treaty? The last ministerial meeting?). These disagreements occur at a different level than the dialogue that drives perceptions of accountability as legitimacy. Because mandate is the prime responsibility of an organization, any discussions of the people who are implicated in accountability obligations must begin with an understanding of what exactly the primary goal of the organization is. If this goal is contentious—if disagreement exists about whether or not the latest meeting produced an agreement that “trumps” the terms of the original treaty—then an organization must address this before they expect to deal with the way in which their accountability obligations are affected by their interactions with other organizations. An organization’s mandate sets out what the organization is meant to accomplish; given that the mandate is the reason for the organization’s existence it is of central importance that questions of an organization’s accountability deal first and foremost with whether or not the organization accomplishes what it was created to do. Answering this question requires paying careful attention to the organization’s substantive goals and to procedural questions: do the accountability mechanisms facilitate the pursuit of these substantive goals?

Assessing an organization’s accountability depends on its level of autonomy and relations vis-à-vis other groups. When organizations have less autonomy, relatively few resources, and when their actions are limited to governments (as is the case with the WTO, for example), the more accountability rests on Members’ ability to keep their promises to each other. When organizations have greater autonomy, more resources, and the capacity to affect people directly (as with the IMF), accountability rests on the ability of the organization itself to keep its promises. The ability of an organization to keep its promises (whether to its members or as an IO), and to communicate its ability to fulfil these obligations, is central to understanding accountability.

A GENERAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING ACCOUNTABILITY?
The accountability literature includes both doctrinal and socio-legal approaches in law (with an emphasis on texts and empirical observation respectively), and to rationalist/realist (as opposed to constructivist) approaches in political science and international relations. The various approaches generate a variety of answers to questions of accountability that, for lack of a common starting point and analytical lens, fail to illuminate the topic.
In an attempt to address this problem, Jerry Mashaw (2005, p. 17) argues that all accountability relationships offer answers to six important and connected questions. “Who is liable or accountable to whom; what they are liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding that those standards have been breached.” These questions are “the price of admission to participate in a meaningful discussion”; put bluntly, “unless we know the answers to these questions we do not know much about what accountability means in any particular domain or instance” (Mashaw, 2005, pp. 16–17).

Identifying the available “tool kit” of techniques through which people can hold others accountable makes it “much easier to argue meaningfully about what sort of accountability is wanted and why” (Mashaw, 2005, p. 15). The larger conceptual questions about what kind of accountability is desirable depend in large part on what is possible and what is required to achieve it. Focused categories help to facilitate a more rigorous analysis. Investigating accountability as it functions at particular points in an accountability regime requires paying more attention to available data—and indeed whether or not data is available. The empirical work this requires helps to ground examinations of accountability that might otherwise be in danger of succumbing to the kind of conceptual bleeding noted earlier. Breaking accountability regimes down into components also facilitates the development of a more nuanced view of each component and the way they fit together. This level of specificity is necessary because, as Mashaw (2005, p. 19) notes, the answers to the different questions will vary depending on which accountability regime the questions are posed to.

Mashaw’s “six questions” approach to clarifying accountability is important in terms of the specificity of the analysis it facilitates (importantly, these are aspects of an accountability regime that can be tracked). It is also important for the way that these questions lend themselves to an analysis of accountability as a political project. The following is a brief overview of the way Mashaw’s six questions are approached in the literature.

### TABLE 4: MOTIVATING AND MEASURING ACCOUNTABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Accountability</th>
<th>Accountability Mechanisms</th>
<th>Key Determination</th>
<th>Requires</th>
<th>Driving Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Measures</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Does the organization offer a clear account of its goals and performance?</td>
<td>Usable information available to accountability-holders, who can then apply the standards to the performance of those who are held to account</td>
<td>• Promise-keeping as standard of evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Who has input? Is this input equal and effective?</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>• Does the organization make good faith attempts to meet its goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Liability</td>
<td>Did the organization face consequences for its performance?</td>
<td>• Transparency</td>
<td>• Is the procedure transparent? Fair?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Controllability</td>
<td>Did the organization do what the principal (e.g., Congress, president) desired?</td>
<td>• Either the possibility of sanctions or mutual accountability</td>
<td>• Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Did the organization follow the rules?</td>
<td>• Transparency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>Did the organization fulfill the substantive expectation (demand/need)?</td>
<td>• Either the possibility of sanctions or mutual accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recourse</td>
<td>Constructive problem-solving</td>
<td>Can affected parties reach a resolution on their own?</td>
<td>• Cooperation</td>
<td>• Success of infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complaint and response</td>
<td>Can people address problems with the process?</td>
<td>• Engagement with complainants</td>
<td>• Sense of obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Imposed by accountability-holders in order to attach costs to the failure to meet the standards</td>
<td>• Ability to enforce punishment if necessary</td>
<td>• Maintaining power relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who?
The question of who is accountable (often paired with a discussion of “to whom”) is, not surprisingly, commonly asked in the literature. Typically, responses will focus on public officials and members of IOs and their obligation to inform, explain, and give an account of why a particular decision was made (Schedler, 1999). Although some focus on the accountability of individuals (to themselves and to others) (Bovens, 2007; Grant & Keohane, 2005; Macdonald, 2004; Steets, 2004), much of the literature asks whether or not a particular institutional body is legitimate. Both the larger organizational and individual accountability are, of course, important, and even when the focus is on an organization, how this work might (who inside the organization must be accountable, and to whom) is still a key concern. This line of investigation is problematicized by what Steets (2004, p. 7) terms “the problem of many hands,” in which it is unclear where to assign blame for the wrongdoing of an IO. Tracing these lines of accountability needs further theoretical and empirical attention.

To Whom?
As Borowiak (2011, p. 6) notes, accountability is a relational concept that is “organized around the relationship between an accountability holder and an accountability holder.” This relationship means that accountability to whom is asked as frequently as “who is accountable,” and the two are often considered simultaneously (Posner, 2002, p. 524). IOs must be accountable to their shareholders and stakeholders (Scott, 2000; Steets, 2004; Weaver, 2010); the WTO is accountable to its Members; the state is accountable to its citizens, etc. While these discussions receive a lot of attention (along with the “who” question), this doesn’t mean that everyone is talking about the same thing in the same way. While the questions “who is accountable?” and “accountable to whom?” dominate the literature, this does not prevent people from talking at cross-purposes. As noted earlier, the extent to which people confuse accountability with democratic accountability (should accountability be to citizens, to those affected, or to stakeholders/members?), and accountability to mandate with questions of legitimacy (what an organization “ought” to be accountable for) mean that the way these two questions are framed (and answered) varies considerably. Further complicating this is the debate over how wide States and IOs should cast their net when considering who ought to participate in (or be represented in) discussions: just those directly involved or all those who are affected? The literature needs to be clear which values are at stake, and how these values affect who people look to for answers.

About What?
There are a great number of things an organization can be accountable for. Bovens (2007, p. 461), for example, develops an accountability typology, based on: (1) the nature of the forum; (2) the nature of the actor; (3) the nature of the conduct; and (4) the nature of the obligation. These categories contain a number of different types of accountability: (1) political; legal; administrative; professional; social (2) corporate; hierarchical; collective; individual (3) financial; procedural; product (4) vertical; diagonal; horizontal. Those who focus on institutional accountability ask whether the organization is being managed well, and place emphasis on processes and performance rather than outcomes (Najam & Halle, 2010; Weaver, 2010). This question is important because IOs have significant autonomy to establish their own standards, procedures and policies (Park, 2010, p. 18). Other values still affect the “about what?” question, and connect accountability to human rights and democratic concerns (Scholte, 2004, 2010, 2011; Sperling, 2009, p. 12). As Scott (2000, pp. 40–42) notes, it is not only social and procedural values that draw people’s analytical attention; there are also those who focus on accountability as it corresponds with economic values and continuity/security values. The “about what” question is subject to a great deal of analytical distortion and talking at cross-purposes, although the consensus in the literature is that this is an important question and it does draw a lot of attention.

The pursuit of these answers is difficult because IOs vary in terms of their goals, structures, and their political salience (Hurd, 2011, p. 15). IOs have three general, and sometimes overlapping, roles and functions. They can operate as actors “independent entities, separate from the states that make them up as their founders and their members”; as fora, with assemblies that work to legitimate the organization and its decisions; and as resources that states can use to pursue their own goals (Hurd, 2011, pp. 17–20). None of these functions alone can explain the contribution of IOs, but, when taken together, they offer a better picture of what it is that IOs do (Hurd, 2011, p. 22).

The organization of IOs has a significant bearing not only on what IOs are accountable for, but what options are available—and likely to be exercised—in order to ensure they are actually held to account. As Hurd (2011, p. 1) notes, the ability to ensure that states keep their commitments to IOs depends on the particular relationship between the obligations states make to IOs, decisions to comply (or not) with IO decisions, and the power of enforcement the IO has. Each IO has a different relationship with regard to these three aspects of accountability.

Through What Processes?
The literature approaches the “through what processes?” question in two main ways: first by examining specific accountability initiatives and mechanisms (and their success/failures), and second by breaking down accountability into various principles and processes (such as the ones discussed earlier in the report) and examining the ways these are used to pursue accountability as an overarching value. When analyses of accountability are situated in a global context, global administrative law (GAL)—“the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies” (Kingsbury, Krish, & Stewart, 2005, p. 17)—can be an important tool to help institutions determine if their processes make them accountable (Kingsbury & Casini, 2009). It performs this function by drawing attention to procedural requirements (Lang & Scott, 2009, p. 607). A significant part of the procedural accountability analysis focuses on sanctions, noting that accountability rests on the ability to impose sanctions for ill-behaviour, with the expectation that it will result in a change in behaviour (Burgis & Zadek, 2006, p. 6; Lloyd, 2008, p. 274; Schedler, 1999, p. 14; Steets, 2004).

When attention turns to IOs, recommendations get more specific, and there are a number of strategies proposed for improving and securing accountability. “Positive” (carrot) strategies include
LO DATING ACCOUNTABILITY: CONCEPTUAL AND CATEGORICAL CHALLENGES IN THE LITERATURE

prospective (“harnessing the means of accountability to facilitate good regulatory decision-making, and to avoid the pitfalls of regulation”) and retrospective (learning/confidence-building). “Negative” (stick) strategies can also be prospective (threat of exposure) and retrospective (attributing blame with penalty/redress) (House of Lords, 2004; see also Collins-Williams & Wolfe, 2010; Grant & Keohane, 2005; Raggo 2011; Scholte, 2004; Steffek, 2010).

Some authors argue that IOs must be located in a context where independent monitoring agents can interrogate their behaviour (Keohane, 2006, 86; Zürn, 2004, p. 273), or perform an effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make (Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, 2005, p. 40; Lang & Scott, 2009, p. 607). Part of the motivation for this is that political pressures from mobilized groups in well-functioning democracies can correct any shortcomings (Keohane et al., 2009, p. 13). Responding with monitoring infrastructure enhances the future efficiency and external credibility and legitimacy, of the IO (Weaver, 2010, p. 2). In response to calls for increased accountability—largely from CSOs—many IOs have responded by creating evaluation mechanisms (the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group and Department of Institutional Integrity, etc.) (Park, 2010, pp. 16–18). The results from evaluation mechanisms are widely distributed by IO critics (Weaver, 2010, p. 3), and accompanied by a significant amount of monitoring (that largely focuses on compliance) (OECD, 2005). The internal regulations, laws, and processes of IOs may be the most important components of IO accountability; as Macdonald (2004, p. 8) notes, “what one is able to accomplish substantively is typically constrained by the processes one has adopted for achieving one’s goals—conversely, the goals one seeks to achieve often limit the range of processes available for their accomplishment.” When designing these processes it is also important to keep in mind who should participate; the procedures in question would look very different if they were extended to all those affected by policies versus the current scope, where participation is typically limited to those directly involved in and responsible for a particular issue.

Many academics and organizations have proposed ways of conceptualizing accountability that highlight component values and processes. Scholte (2010) proposes analyzing transparency; consultation of affected parties; monitoring and evaluation; and correction and redress. Similarly, the One World Trust (OWT), an independent think tank tasked with improving the accountability of global institutions, argues that multiple (and often competing) accountability relationships, all of which may require different interpretations and applications of these broad principles, makes it even harder to respond in any specific way to this question. The answers are likely to change from accountability relationship to accountability relationship, and, along with the changing context, the standards themselves are likely to shift. Context is particularly important when it comes to selecting which processes to use. The tables that Mashaw (2005, p. 27) and Wolfe (2011, p. 12) create highlight the ways that approaches differ with the variation in the subject and object of accountability relations. The accountability processes that work between elected officials and citizens are not the mechanisms that work in social networks between members and each other (Mashaw, 2005, p. 27).

The problems encountered in standard setting are twofold. First, in light of the problems inherent in producing a set of standards by which to measure accountability, people such as Borowiak (2011, p. 8) “adopt a more relaxed view of accountability standards.” Instead of attempting to find “a consensual determination of accountability standards ex ante,” Borowiak (2011, p. 8) looks at standards “as themselves sites of contestation.” Looking at specific accountability relationships can indeed be a very useful approach to understanding not only what standards are used, but why and to what effects. The prevalence of talking at cross-purposes in the literature illustrates a clear need for more empirical, methodical studies of the specific standards and mechanisms that organizations use to try to secure accountability. Such a study ought to pay particular attention to the way that accountability networks and partnerships affect specific accountability relations, and why this is the case. Second, and relatedly, given that the accountability mechanisms that work in some accountability relationships may not work in others, it is important to engage in a thorough analysis of the way that accountability mechanisms are used and if—and under what circumstances—they enable organizations to meet their goals. The tables that Mashaw and Wolfe develop are particularly useful in this respect.

By What Standards?
The literature is less clear on the specific standards that ought to be applied to the putatively accountable behaviour. The various ways of conceptualizing accountability (noted above) come closest to providing an answer to this question, but, given that the concepts are broad, it is difficult to get a clear sense of the standards that are actually applied (how should transparency work? When should we use particular strategies/processes? How can we measure success? What kind of participation ought to occur?). The fact that there are multiple (and often competing) accountability relationships, all of which may require different interpretations and applications of these broad principles, makes it even harder to respond in any specific way to this question. The answers are likely to change from accountability relationship to accountability relationship, and, along with the changing context, the standards themselves are likely to shift. Context is particularly important when it comes to selecting which processes to use. The tables that Mashaw (2005, p. 27) and Wolfe (2011, p. 12) create highlight the ways that approaches differ with the variation in the subject and object of accountability relations. The accountability processes that work between elected officials and citizens are not the mechanisms that work in social networks between members and each other (Mashaw, 2005, p. 27).

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With What Effects?
Different accountability regimes elicit different behaviours in IOs, who respond in a variety of ways to accountability obligations. In some instances, formal sanctions are required to ensure compliance. Others keep their promises because of informal measures and mutual accountability obligations. Within these two broad categories are a number of specific actions that IOs can take and even more effects that can follow from the processes that IOs choose to utilize. When it comes to an action such as monitoring, for example,
there are a variety of potential effects. An IO can lend its approval, make substitutions, or take other action (Mashaw, 2005, p. 27). These “other actions” could include sanctions or informal pressure—and indeed the decision to report (or not) can influence the larger effects of an organization’s monitoring. When it comes to external monitoring, such as that undertaken by NGOs and CSOs, the findings (and publication) can result in praise or blame (Wolfe, 2011, p. 12), and IOs can choose to listen or ignore external criticism, itself with a range of effects (from the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle to the more recent increasing CSO and NGO engagement with IOs and an increasing willingness on the part of IOs to meet with these groups) (Dombrowski, 2010; Hoekman, 2011; Newell, 2008; Scholte, 2011; Steffek, 2010). The key question to ask is whether or not an IO’s behaviour changes as a result of the process’s organizations adopt in an attempt to pursue accountability. If they do not change—or they change in a way that does not advance accountability—then we ought to study the institutional design and rethink the use of particular incentives and sanctions as organizations try to meet their goals. It is important to keep in mind, however, that, while measuring outcome-based success is one way to track accountability, an organization’s failure to achieve its outcomes does not necessarily mean a failure of accountability. What matters are good faith efforts to meet an outcome, and the existence of procedures and mechanisms that aim to assist the organization to evaluate their efforts—and, of course, a careful evaluation of their effects.

ADVANCING ACCOUNTABILITY REGIMES: A SEVENTH QUESTION
Answers to the six questions posed by Mashaw will define what he calls an accountability regime. Such regimes are an analytic device used to describe how accountability works, or ought to work, in a given context. And in each context, as he shows, we can observe multiple accountability regimes, each one of which is based on an implicit answer to a seventh question: “why?” This missing question, explored by Wolfe in a table that shows the effect of different answers (2011, p. 12) deals with the accountability motivators that lead people and organizations to opt for a particular approach to (or interpretation of) accountability. When we ask “why” a particular motivation for or interpretation of accountability we are asking a foundational question, the answer to which can colour the answers to Mashaw’s questions. The question “why” isn’t typically asked outright, but the responses academics offer to the larger issue of strengthening accountability are ones that do not fit neatly into Mashaw’s categories; this is not to say that Mashaw’s questions are not useful (they are), or that a great deal of what academics do offer finds its way into these six categories (it does); rather, it acknowledges that the continual efforts to design accountability models, categories, and mechanisms are guided by a larger desire to understand how the different pieces fit together and what motivates people and organizations to approach accountability relationships in particular ways.

To illustrate, there are a number of different types of accountability specifically referred to in the literature. In a sample of the literature (Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004; Bovens, 2007; Grant & Keohane, 2005; Keohane, 2008; Kingsbury & Stewart, 2009; Mashaw, 2005; Steffek, 2010a) the following types of accountability are acknowledged: hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, professional/peer, public reputational, electoral, administrative, labour, social network, team, procedural, and product. These different types of accountability work to varying degrees of success; context is significant, as is interaction between different entries. The different types of accountability are differently weighted in different contexts. Similarly, others propose a number of different approaches to accountability (internal, external, delegation, participation, direct democracy, populist) (Elsig, 2007; Grant & Keohane, 2005).

Each IO’s response to the “accountable for what?” question will vary significantly. Sometimes asking the “accountability for what?” question will require an analysis of the internal operations of an IO, or the relationship between an IO and states. In other instances, the more appropriate “accountability for what?” question may concern a broader topic that includes—but is not limited to—a collection of IOs. When we ask about accountability and sustainable development, for example, it is not only the relationships between people and organizations in the here and now that are relevant, but also whether or not we ought to be held accountable by other living things (Deere-Birkbeck & Monagle, 2009; Fisher, 2010; Scholte, 2011; Wolfe, 2011) and future generations (Alkoby, 2008; Barrett & Toman, 2010; Halle & Wolfe, 2007; Heyward, 2008; Mitchell, 2011; Newell, 2008; Willems & Van Dooren, 2011; Zia & Koliba, 2011). The same principle holds for other issues, such as accountability for loans (and an analysis of the role of the World Bank and IMF), Montreal Protocol monitoring of CFCs, and the role of the UN.

ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS IN CONFLICT
Many different claims are made under the guise of accountability, and it is conflicting expectations that gives rise to what Koppell (2005) calls “multiple accountabilities disorder” (MAD). As Koppell (2005, pp. 94–95) notes, when people have “disparate conceptual understandings” of accountability, and when an organization tries to meet these conflicting expectations, it inevitably suffers. An organization with MAD will vacillate between actions that try to meet different accountability expectations, changing course whenever one fails to work and continually having to change course because of the conflicting expectations. The problem with this approach, as illustrated in the case of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is that organizations end up “pleasing no one while trying to please everyone” (Koppell, 2005, p. 95).

MAD underscores that accountability mechanisms are best understood when we look at particular relationships of accountability, or accountability regimes, and when we do so systematically. Taking a systematic approach is a good way to move beyond the limits of the typical approach to accountability, which is to divide lines of accountability into horizontal and vertical power relationships. While a lot of important analytical work makes good use of these two accountability structures, horizontal and vertical lines are not independent of each other. Accountability relationships are more complex, and often take the form of networks that span several vertical and horizontal lines, and, in so doing, affecting the nature of the accountability relations within any one “line.” It is also important to avoid assumptions about the specific roles and importance of different accountability structures. As Germain (2007) notes, favouring vertical over horizontal accountability can weaken accountability. When horizontal and vertical accountability are
analyzed independently of one another, unintentionally “assigning” vertical and horizontal accountability systems, the overall analysis is limited. Drawing from a series of case studies, Goetz and Jenkins (2007) challenge the vertical/horizontal accountability dichotomy and argue that hybrid forms of accountability can bridge the vertical/horizontal divide, although this is hindered when states offer civic groups opportunities for ex ante consultation as a substitute for the ability to engage in ex post accountability. Similarly, Bovens (2007) notes that there are organizations that do not quite fit into either a vertical or horizontal classification; when accountability relations are indirectly connected to a vertical or horizontal understanding, this relationship is better understood as a “diagonal” relationship—one where accountability functions “in the shadow of hierarchy” and where people exercise informal power (Bovens, 2007, p. 460). There is a lot at stake when it comes to challenging the standard approach to accountability and accepting the importance of horizontal accountability relations. Multiple accountabilities are not a disorder but rather are an inevitable part of accountability relations in a global world. Vertical and horizontal accountability lines are both important and they overlap in confusing ways; when we pay little attention to why they overlap, or undervalue the role of horizontal accountability, then this can be a disorder. When we shift our perception of the relationship between horizontal and vertical lines of accountability we are in a better position to understand these complex accountability networks, as well as to enhance our understanding of the ways that vertical and horizontal accountability relations can complement each other (Halle & Wolfe, 2011).

Another important aspect of accountability—one that is often obscured in the literature—is that of scope. The main issue is introduced by democratic conceptions of accountability, such as that exemplified by Scholte (2011) who discusses the impact of IO activities on those who are affected by their actions—a considerably wide-reaching audience. In light of this critique (and those like it, of which there are many), it is perhaps helpful to consider dimensions of accountability in terms of two main strands: those directly implicated (at different levels) and those who are broadly affected, but removed from the process (Table 2). Identifying these two dimensions of accountability allows us to avoid the problem of conflating questions of distributive inequality and social justice with questions of institutional accountability/accountability to mandate. Disagreement in terms of degrees of affectedness (both for those implicated in and indirectly affected by actions) is inevitable, but trying to deal with the issues on the appropriate terms—instead of conflating them—is a good place to start a discourse about specific accountability obligations and mechanisms.

**POLYCENTRISM AND THE “ACCOUNTABILITY TRILEMMA”**

Some analysts escape the horizontal/vertical distinction by conceiving accountability relations as polycentric. They distinguish between a state-centric lens (in which states draw on the concept of responsible government to track and evaluate the accountability relations they enter into) and a polycentric lens (in which transnational actors and coalitions, and networks of public officials all claim their own sphere of authority over a particular thing) (Koenig-Archipugi, 2010). Polycentric systems differ from monocentric systems (Alligica & Tarko, 2011; Ostrom, 2010), but just because we choose to adopt either a polycentric or monocentric lens does not remove the overlap and conflicts in accountability relationships in a global context. Slaughter (2004, p. 171) deals with the role of national officials by proposing dual functions, arguing that, when applicable, it should be made clear when “responsibilities will include both a national and a transgovernmental component.” Slaughter (2004, p. 172) notes that “officials may have two faces, internal and external, but they still have only one audience.” Attempting to balance obligations, when it comes to multiple accountability relationships, however, is a problem that can be especially acute at global level. More research is needed into what standards of legitimacy and accountability we can apply when accountability regimes overlap and create multiple centres at which accountability converges (Bäckstrand, 2008). When numerous agencies could be called to account, it may be difficult to zero in on specific parties and hold them to account, as Scholte (2011, p. 4) illustrates with the example of regulatory failure in the recent economic crisis.

Accountability suffers conceptual and practical confusion when interests pull in a variety of directions. The problem of polycentrism (having many “centres” of accountability that have conflicting demands) poses a challenge due to failures to identify a standard metric of value to measure progress or to focus disagreement. The number of organizations (accountability networks, collaborations between IOs and CSOs/NGOs or local governments) involved in agreements increases the likelihood that different accountability regimes will “follow different ‘schools of thought’ and traditions concerning the meaning and mechanisms of accountability” (Steets, 2005, p. 19) and will ultimately understand accountability in different ways, making this type of problematic agreement more likely. As Fisher (2010, p. 74) notes, “it is also the case that different accountability mechanisms can impose different standards of good decision making.” As an example, Fisher notes “the US Clean Air Act does not allow the US EPA to take costs into account in setting ambient air quality standards the OMB regulatory impact assessment process does require them to (Elliott et al., 2001).” With interests pulling in a variety of directions, and multiple conceptions of where accountability lies, accountability no longer has one centre. It is possible to reach agreement under these circumstances, but whether or not this happens is another question. Indeed, many people are skeptical in this respect. Koppell (2008, p. 201) notes the “complete lack of consensus regarding the basis of legitimacy for GGOs [global governance organizations]. Achieving a widespread perception of legitimacy seems almost impossible . . . because all these different constituencies maintain (but do not necessarily articulate) different standards.”

Enforcement and implementation challenges further complicate the polycentric problem. As it is, it is difficult to hold an organization to account for the ways in which rules are enforced by people who implement IO policies if the rules in question do not violate—even if they do not quite meet the “spirit” of—IO agreements (see Black, 2008, p. 143). Holding organizations and states accountable for their promises—measuring whether they did what they said they would do—is a much more difficult task if what, exactly, it is they said they would do is subject to the interpretive shifts that mark polycentrism. Wolfe and Baddeley (2012, p. 4) note, as they focus on MEA transparency and not whether an MEA achieves its intended objectives, determining whether an organization has solved
a problem is not easy; other benchmarks may be necessary. They argue that “MEAs set standards; if those standards are respected, if the required procedures are followed and laws changed, or policies implemented, then the MEA can be said to be effective regardless of the environmental consequences or even real changes in behaviour by individuals.” While this is a helpful way to approach IO evaluations, particularly given the inevitable roadblocks that IOs encounter, it does underscore an additional layer of difficulty that arises when we ask who is accountable.

The problem of multiple interpretations is exacerbated at the global level, where participants come from a wide range of cultural, political, and economic backgrounds. As Alkoby (2008, p. 13) reminds us “norms receive a different meaning in differing cultural contexts even after the relevant political actors are persuaded to comply with them.” Cultural values shape the way people see things; they affect regulatory responses and the construction of rules (Smith, 2008). For example, disagreements between the WTO negotiators on the Doha Round, Smith (2008, pp. 52–53) argues “are inevitable because people perceive the subject, rules, and amendments differently.” Biukovic’s (2008, p. 825) study of China and Japan attributes noncompliance and the “selective adaptation” of WTO norms to cultural difference. This is further exacerbated by the fact that IOs “as well as operating in numerous national and local cultural situations, have their own very specific organizational cultures” (Burall & Neligan, 2005, p. 7) and makes the task of understanding accountability complex and ambiguous (Weisband & Ebrahim, 2007, p. 11). It can also function to the detriment of Third World countries, whose interests and cultural traditions may not fare well in the face of the transnational structure of power (Harlow, 2006, p. 189).

Polycentrism cannot be resolved by increasing accountability. More accountability in one direction can mean less in another. As Mashaw (2005, p. 30) notes, “most actors operate within overlapping regimes” and these regimes “sometimes reinforce and sometimes are in tension with each other.” Asking for more accountability from one actor may mean that another actor is less accountable (Krisch, 2006, p. 251), and is not always the best thing to do. When larger accountability networks contain a number of accountability relationships, each with their own requirements, the different relationships may come into conflict; when this is the case, weakening the accountability constraints of one regime may be a better decision than strengthening accountability (Mashaw, 2005, p. 30). Merely increasing accountability without a careful analysis of the larger context can create a new set of problems. In the case where one organization is accountable to multiple organizations, the dual (or more) nature of the commitment may have the result of making the organization not really accountable to either (Mashaw, 2005, p. 4). Put simply, “requirements for one accountability process may run counter to the requirements for another” (Burall & Neligan, 2005, p. 7). Some accountability relationships preclude forming others, while some accountability regimes overshadow or even reject others as a result of a perceived “out” it can provide to organizations that find it in their best interests to respond to meet some claims over others (Black, 2008, pp. 153–157). Conflicting demands also mean that it might be particularly difficult for some organizations to ever be thought of as truly accountable (Koppell, 2008, p. 201).

How can we deal with polycentrism? The pursuit of accountability may require multi-dimensional, plural approaches with multiple alternative mechanisms (Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004, p. 198; Burall & Neligan, 2005; Harlow, 2006; Krisch, 2006; Mashaw, 2005). Newall (2008) argues that thinking about inter-regime relations in terms of competing accountabilities can itself help us to gain traction. Benner, Reinicke and Witte (2004, p. 199) argue that individual accountability needs to be complemented by mechanisms of collective accountability. Many suggestions for reform also propose new ways of dealing with jurisdiction. There are proposals for a regulatory regime that acknowledges that “boundaries are marked by the issues or problems which they are concerned with, rather than necessarily by a common solution” (Black 2008, p. 137). Skelcher (2005, p. 91) argues for “jurisdictional integrity” as “a reformulation and contextualization of the classic idea of ‘sovereignty’” capable of addressing relations between different jurisdictions in a non-hierarchical way. In a similar vein, “polycentric regulation,” as proposed by Black (2008, p. 140) notes the importance of maintaining a significant role for the state, but argues that this new form of regulation must also draw attention to the multiple (sub-national, national, and transnational) sites where regulation occurs. Importantly, as Black (2008, p. 157) argues, we can examine questions of accountability regarding the constituent elements of an accountability regime, but this “awareness of how those elements may respond to legitimacy and accountability claims needs to be an integral part of any attempts to advance those claims” and as a result “is consonant with the decentering analysis, not contrary to it.”

The accountability trilemma poses an additional challenge. A tension exists in the accountability literature between the values that contribute to richer accountability and the limitations encountered when trying to realize these values simultaneously. Competing conceptions of accountability are perhaps inevitable. Conflicts exist between wide inclusiveness and clear chains of representation and accountability, or of participation and internal accountability (Bexell, Tällberg, & Ulhøi, 2010, pp. 90, 95–96). Policy-makers will always encounter dilemmas and will have to make decisions that involve some kind of trade-off, and that affect the type of accountability an organization can pursue. Maximizing participation in an organization of any significant size is incompatible with maximizing efficiency, for example. More complex than this is the “regulatory trilemma,” which arises when institutions attempt to balance a series of conflicting values. Mashaw (2006, p. 154) notes that efficacy, responsiveness, and coherency are all necessary components of regulatory institutions (all of which are desirable), but the problem is that virtually any attempt to reinforce one of these demands works to limit the capacity of the regulatory institution to satisfy another (Teubner, 1987; also see Mashaw, 2005, p. 13; Black, 2008; Keohane, 2008).

The existence of a trilemma inevitably leads to people making hard choices, and choosing to pursue one (or two) of the values at the expense of a third. The question of balance then becomes less about actual balance and more about trade-offs. The problem, of course, is that not everyone agrees on which values are more important, and so the trilemma further contributes to the problem of MAD.

Efforts to combat the problems raised by the trilemma largely consist of arguments as to why a particular value ought to take
preference. Bonzon (2008, p. 754) does this as he disaggregates participation and outlines its four parameters (goal; object; decisions at stake; and actors involved). Although Bonzon’s focus is on democratic legitimacy, he argues that we need to set out why it is we want to pursue a particular value, and what, specifically, that value entails. This process is particularly relevant for IOs, where, returning to the WTO example, “there is a risk of conflating accountability for doing the right thing (e.g. open inclusive negotiations) with achieving the right thing (e.g. a trading system that would support sustainable development)” (Halle, Wolfe, & Beaton, 2011, p. 6).

CONCLUSION

In order to really understand accountability we need to move beyond the standard sanctions-based approach that dominates much of the literature. The standard approach is unable to account for the increasingly complex and informal way that accountability relations actually work. Vertical accountability relations still play an important role in global governance, but the increase of horizontal accountability relations and polycentric accountability networks means that formal, sanctions-based approaches fail to capture the whole story.

One of the most striking things about the accountability literature is the significant discrepancy in what people mean when they talk about accountability. Misunderstandings and talking at cross-purposes continue because people assume that accountability automatically means democratic accountability when, in many cases, democratic processes have very little to do with accountability relations. For most IOs, the focus is on accountability to mandate, and not accountability to a broader appeal for social or economic justice. If our aim is to understand accountability relations in global governance, then it is crucial that we do not confine the two approaches. The pertinent area of analysis for those concerned with IO accountability is whether an organization actually does what it says it will do, and whether it uses the mechanisms available to it in an appropriate way. Answering these questions requires breaking down accountability into an analysis of both substantive and procedural accountability, as well as an awareness that what accountability means is subject to multiple interpretations (and misinterpretations). The variety of perspectives should caution anyone against trying to find a unity in the literature insofar as what accountability “means.” A range of diverse (and often conflicting) viewpoints exist both within those directly involved in the accountability processes and within those interested in and affected by the processes but who happen to be outside the organization (namely CSOs and NGOs), as well as within the academics who analyze these areas. In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of a very porous definition of accountability it is beneficial to situate accountability in relation to a series of other values that are sometimes (wrongly) used interchangeably with accountability. This definitional work is an important analytical task, and one that is necessary to keep accountability analysis sharp.

Much of the work that is required to understand accountability in global governance depends upon what we can do to push transparency in IO accountability relations. Transparency is important not only as a necessary foundation for accountability (after all, without knowledge of what organizations have promised and how they are attempting to keep these promises there is insufficient information to hold organizations accountable), but a clearer sense of IOs’ goals and processes would go a long way to remedying the conceptual confusion that results in so many people talking about accountability when they really mean something else. Pursuing transparency as a foundation for strengthening accountability relations requires knowledge of the mechanisms that are available to IOs and how well they function. With this foundation we can begin to determine what new mechanisms might be required.

Although critiques made by NGOs and CSOs have been instrumental in pressuring IOs to increase transparency and accountability, the central role of accountability to mandate (as opposed to external calls for democratic accountability) reminds us that the distinction between those directly involved in organizations and those affected by (but located outside) the organizations is a crucial one for accountability analyses. Many people play an important part in calls for increased accountability, but it would be a mistake to confuse the varying levels of the role and influence held by members, stakeholders, and third parties.

Identifying an understanding of accountability in the literature is difficult for a variety of reasons. In addition to the problems noted above, even those who acknowledge the need to move beyond a standard approach to accountability cite a number of significant obstacles. If accountability has multiple centres (if it is polycentric), then it is considerably more difficult to map accountability relations and obligations, let alone find ways to ensure that organizations keep their promises. The difficulty of accountability in such a complex setting is exacerbated by accountability trilemmas, where the pursuit of one or more elements of accountability makes it difficult to simultaneously pursue others. When accountability trilemmas occur, trade-offs have to be made. In order to make such decisions wisely, it is crucial to have sufficient information (transparency) about the mandate, processes, and achievements of organizations. It is also crucial to know exactly what is at stake, who is involved, and how others are affected by an IO’s decisions. Without such information, people will continue to talk past one another and accountability will remain elusive.

1 The author is grateful for the research assistance of Phillipe Mineau.


3 See especially One World Trust; Keohane (2008); Grant and Keohane (2005); Koppell (2005).

4 http://www.gpii.net/approach/research/exploring_and_analyzing_accountability_in_global_governance/


Abbott draws from available WTO secretariat data to examine the participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement process. He focuses on both who was involved and who instigated cases, as well as on the value judgments related to the facts in order to get a better picture of participation in disputes. The author analyzes what is meant by participation and examines the definition and classification of developing countries. And argues that participation needs to be measures at both the initial consultation stage and at the panel/appeal stage, and that disputes initiated by developing members are a more relevant measure of the ability for effective participation.


Alkoby examines state compliance with international law as it impacts the design of international commitments and the effectiveness of international institutions. He critiques the narrow definition of compliance that such studies usually take and compares legal obligations with a broad process of lawmaking, situating this in a broader social context in order to evaluate the extent to which existing studies of state compliance consider the impact of cultural diversity on state compliance with international law. Alkoby focuses on the causal elements of compliance and finds that public support is not enough for governments—they need active participation in order to successfully implement international commitments. He also argues that we need to “develop a contextualized understanding of compliance” and that understanding why nations comply with international norms requires a deeper investigation of the interaction of intra-state components. As well, he looks at the role of persuasion in both horizontal and vertical legitimacy and asks a series of questions about coercion and vertical legitimacy. Alkoby finds that norms receive different meanings in differing cultural contexts even after political actors have been persuaded to comply with them and concludes that we need to be aware of the normative implications of relying on coercion as a method of inducing “conformity” with norms.


The authors note the initial assumption that developing countries would be able to use the WTO dispute settlement system despite their (lack of) size and power and examine this in light of the difficulties developing countries face in this respect. They focus on a particular area of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) in which developing countries have been able to participate as third parties, while looking at the impact of extending third party rights on main parties, how third party rights might be improved in a way that benefits developing members, and at the evolution of third party rights in the international arena. In addition, they argue that developing countries’ participation as third parties is important and ought to occur on a regular basis. Also, they examine third party rights at the panel/appeal stage and note that they are unclear and need strengthening; they offer proposals for reforming WTO understanding of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).


The authors look at the initial developments of polycentrism and examine them to clarify and elaborate the concept and its operationalization, using Ostrom’s work as a starting point for further developments. They identify three basic features of polycentricity: 1) multiple decision centres; 2) an overarching system of rules that is the result of a particular institutional and cultural framework; and 3) an overarching order that emerges from “evolutionary competition between the different decision centers’ ideas, methods, and ways of doing things.” They discuss polycentrism in different areas (the market; judiciary; politics; constitutions) and note the connections between them, finding that one type of polycentrism entails another. In addition, they map out “the logical structure of polycentricity” and find that within their parameters there are 28 different possible types of polycentric systems. According to the authors, polycentricity is also useful for making analogies between different complex systems.


The authors look at Canada’s departure from federal/provincial territorial accountability mechanisms and assesses the effectiveness of public reporting as an accountability measure. They examine the suggestion that public reporting can, on its own, provide sufficient accountability: they do this by measuring reporting against the government’s own standards, using the Public Sector Accounting Board’s guidelines, and asking: 1) if progress can be clearly tracked through public reporting; and 2) if there have been improvements in early childhood development. The authors structure their analysis upon ease of access, as well as clarity, comparability, and comprehensiveness of reporting. They analyze both process and substance and highlight problems with both in terms of public reporting, including a lack of reporting between governments and an over-reliance on public reporting when the public does not have the necessary time and resources to support this. They conclude that public reporting has not lived up to its promise of accountability to citizens. According to the authors, given the important role of public reporting in the accountability process, we need to pursue more effective public reporting and we need general agreement for recommendations on this. They caution, however, that such improvements “can only be one piece of the accountability puzzle.”

Bäckstrand looks at ways that global governance, multilateral institutions and intergovernmental negotiations can be designed to improve representation, accountability, and effectiveness. She advances a model of “stakeholder democracy,” assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and offers a framework for evaluating the democratic legitimacy of the model. The article sets out four key aspects of the model: (1) the concept of democracy that underpins it; (2) the status and understanding of a “model”; (3) how it might complement existing institutions in international politics; and (4) the role of deliberation in stakeholder democracy. She conceptualizes partnerships as networks and looks at three types: public–private (hybrid); governmental; and private-to-private. Bäckstrand argues that accountability is a central component of transnational legitimacy, and that we need plural forms of accountability to evaluate networked climate governance. Additionally, we need to look beyond principal-agent notions of accountability and examine the way that accountability functions in networks. The essay looks at three different models of multilateralism (multi-stakeholder multilateralism; market multilateralism; and elite multilateralism) and notes that each is associated with a certain type of partnership and has its own accountability challenges. A key question that arises from this is what standards of legitimacy and accountability to apply to the accountability of multiple sites of networked climate governance. It also highlights some of the shortcomings of a focus on democratic legitimacy in a global PPP context.


Here, Bäckstrand looks at public–private partnerships as a new tool of global governance and their ability to be effective and legitimate. Bäckstrand’s aim are as follows: 1) to categorize the different partnerships and evaluate their legitimacy; and 2) to evaluate the accountability record in climate partnerships in terms of transparency, monitoring mechanisms, and stakeholder representation. She conceptualizes partnerships as networks and looks at three types: public–private (hybrid); governmental; and private-to-private. Bäckstrand argues that accountability is a central component of transnational legitimacy, and that we need plural forms of accountability to evaluate networked climate governance. Additionally, we need to look beyond principal-agent notions of accountability and examine the way that accountability functions in networks. The essay looks at three different models of multilateralism (multi-stakeholder multilateralism; market multilateralism; and elite multilateralism) and notes that each is associated with a certain type of partnership and has its own accountability challenges. A key question that arises from this is what standards of legitimacy and accountability to apply to the accountability of multiple sites of networked climate governance. It also highlights some of the shortcomings of a focus on democratic legitimacy in a global PPP context.


The authors analyze ongoing efforts to finance mitigation and adaptation in developing countries and examine how governments can design a mechanism that is widely perceived to be legitimate. They review the governance structures, operational procedures, and records of 10 national and international financial institutions, and do so along the lines of the three dimensions of institutional legitimacy that they identify (1) power; (2) responsibility; and (3) accountability. They then deploy this analysis to offer lessons for future institutional arrangements, arguing that redistributing power, responsibility, and accountability is long overdue and necessary if we are to establish a successful global partnership on climate finance.


Barrett and Toman compare two approaches to strengthening incentives for cooperation (establishing targets and timetables, and loosely-coordinated smaller-scale agreements). They observe that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but argue that the latter, while not being fully cost-effective, is more likely to succeed. They measure effectiveness by the ability to achieve 1) a high level of participation; 2) a high level of compliance; and 3) a substantial reduction of emissions. Barrett and Toman note a trilemma and argue that while it is relatively easy to meet one or two of these requirements, accomplishing all three is more difficult. They thus emphasize the need for credible enforcement mechanisms and note preconditions that must exist in order to have these.


The authors examine the accountability of global public policy-making with the goal of making realistic recommendations that are useful for the daily practice of global governance. They discuss the operational and participatory challenges that arise because of gaps created by governance asymmetry, observing that electoral and hierarchical mechanisms of accountability are not applicable in networks and arguing that we need to rely on alternative mechanisms of accountability. They also examine accountability mechanisms that address actors, process, and outcomes and outline key principles and mechanisms of accountability in multisectoral networks with an aim to reforming them. They state that a pluralistic system of accountability is the best way to promote accountability in these networks; there can be no single mechanisms of accountability—instead, we need to create a multi-dimensional system with multiple alternative accountability mechanisms (professional/peer accountability; public reputational accountability; market accountability; fiscal/financial accountability; legal accountability). The authors conclude by identifying key challenges to a changing agenda and suggest that networked governance is best understood as a “learning model” of accountability.


Noting the benefits of civil society involvement in International Organizations, Bernstein looks at the ways that civil society organizations (defined broadly to include any non-state actor, including the private sector) participate in international institutions. Bernstein looks at 14 IOs and their relationships with CSOs, and observes the diversity of views within CSOs to argue that we need to create a political space that 1) allows CSOs to inform decision-making processes; and 2) takes into account both the form and function of
CSO-IO relationships. The ability to do this bears on the effectiveness, legitimacy, credibility, and relevance of IO outcomes. Bernstein sets out a spectrum of multistakeholder engagement that details four models of CSO involvement (ranging from minimalist to universal suffrage). She examines these four models, details mechanisms for civil society involvement, and analyzes the quality of the outcomes of the particular IO/CSO relationships. Her assessment criteria are overall credibility, saliency, transparency, and legitimacy, and are applied to outputs, the bodies, degree of ownership, and policy impact. For each model, Bernstein assesses the lessons for the IPBES. She finds that civil society participation in governing bodies is more important than voting rights and attributes this to the IO requirement of consensus.


The authors look at the source of legitimacy for global governance arrangements, arguing that global governance may be democratized by expanding participation and strengthening accountability. They note that global governance arrangements suffer from democratic deficits and examine the role of transnational actors as they may be able to make global governance more democratic. They then analyze three components of global governance: 1) the design of international institutions; 2) public-private partnerships; and 3) transnational actors, with a particular emphasis on the participation of global civil society actors. They examine the extent to which transnational actors live up to standards of inclusive participation and clear mechanisms of accountability, noting pitfalls in this respect but also highlighting promising aspects of transnational civil society accountability, including accountability measures taken by some NGOs. Finally, they conclude that we need comparative empirical assessments of transnational actors and that the task of democratizing global governance through transnational actors is made difficult due to trade-offs between different democratic values.


Biermann and Gupta set out the aim of the Earth System Governance Project and detail the contributions of the special section, which focuses on the impact of new trends of governance on securing accountability, legitimacy, and democratic goals. It also examines the impact of accountable and legitimate governance on effectiveness. They then look at the role that non-state actors play in developing global norms and standards and note the challenge this poses to securing accountability and legitimacy in global rule-making. In addition, they highlight the importance of identifying sources and mechanisms that can contribute to the enhanced accountability and legitimacy of governance arrangements. They also look at the ways that accountability and legitimacy can be conceptualized in earth system governance and examine these questions in the context of earth system transformation. Biermann and Gupta scrutinize different sources and mechanisms of accountability and legitimacy within different governance arrangements and propose reform options to correct deficits in the accountability, legitimacy, and the democratic potential of earth system governance.


Biukovic looks at local cultural norms in China and Japan as they impact legitimacy and the “selective adaptation of WTO norms,” arguing that international law can acquire a variety of local meanings and, as such, it is important to understand local history and culture in addition to the domestic economy and laws. Biukovic also notes that the historical and cultural traditions of some countries may clash with WTO transparency norms, but, using the case of Japan, he argues that this is slowly changing as a result of WTO dispute settlement mechanisms that have affected political and legal reform in the country. Biukovic concludes that we could remedy the noncompliance that arises as a result of cultural differences either by allowing for more flexible compliance, or building normative consensus through broad political, administrative, and cultural reforms.


Black draws attention to often overlooked questions of the nature and understanding of regulation, the role of the state, and understanding of law. She examines the role of a regulatory society in which regulation is not tied (only) to the state and is decentred and diffused throughout society. She then sets out descriptive and prescriptive aspects of a decentred approach, and explores what kind of regulation a decentred analysis requires, and examines the impact this has for the understanding of the relationship between law and regulation. Black then develops a decentred definition of regulation and identifies five central elements of it: 1) complexity; 2) fragmentation; 3) interdependencies; 4) ungovernability; and 5) the rejection of a clear distinction between public and private. She also discusses a set of prescriptions regarding the types of regulatory structures that ought to be adopted and identifies three hallmarks of these, noting that decentred strategies should be: 1) hybrid; 2) multi-faceted; and 3) indirect. Finally, she identifies five sets of meanings/applications of regulation: 1) who or what regulates; 2) the institutional/organizational form regulation takes; 3) what actors or areas of social life it affects; 4) how regulation is conducted; and 5) the mechanisms, instruments, and techniques that are used.


Here, Black builds on prior work and takes two previously-raised questions as her starting point. She looks at 1) how, when, and where we can inject deliberation or participation into the regulatory system; and 2) the extent to which procedural regulation is compatible with thick proceduralization. Black examines these questions in the context of decentred understandings of regulation and focuses on enforcement techniques. She explains what a decentred approach is and discusses five central aspects: 1) complexity; 2) fragmentation; 3) interdependencies; 4) ungovernability; and 5) the rejection of a clear distinction between public and private. She then details four main implications of this approach on the development of regulatory systems, which identify: 1) a diagnosis of regulatory failure; 2)
the polycentric nature of regulation; 3) prescriptions for regulatory strategies; and 4) lack of consensus on the normative goals strategies should pursue. Black argues that adopting a decentralised approach allows us to identify and make use of entry points into the process in order to pursue greater participation or, ideally, democratization. She draws from examples of enforcement process to demonstrate how we might achieve this, highlighting five preconditions for success. She also looks at ways this might be used to further develop and constitutionalise polycentric regulation.


Here, Black asks what it means for regulators to be legitimate and accountable. She examines demands that regulators should change in order to meet the legitimacy and accountability claims and looks at the roles that objects of accountability and legitimacy demands play in shaping them. She then looks at these questions in transnational polycentric regimes, examining three key elements of legitimacy and accountability relationships (the institutional environment of legitimacy constructions; the dialectical nature of accountability relationships; and the communicative structures that encompass the two). Black notes four challenges posed by decentralised and polycentric regimes (functional; systemic; democratic; and normative) and looks at the responses of regulatory regimes to multiple and conflicting legitimacy and accountability claims and examines the broader institutional and conceptual context. She then proposes an institutional, relational, and discursive conception of legitimacy and accountability. In addition, Black examines four types of legitimacy claims made upon regulators (constitutional; justice; functional or performance; and democratic) and notes the contestation between and within groups. She also looks at dilemmas and trilemmas that arise with legitimacy and accountability relationships and at responses to these, arguing that all regulatory regimes are polycentric to varying degrees and that understanding the dynamics of legitimacy and accountability relationships is a necessary prerequisite for making recommendations.


Bonzon examines mechanisms that aim to structure and enhance the relationship between the WTO and civil society. He looks at two interrelated dimensions of public participation: the transparency of an institution’s decision-making process and the engagement of non-state actors in decision-making processes. He goes on to develop a conceptual framework with four (interrelated) implementation parameters of public participation: the goal, the object, the mechanisms, and the actors. Bonzon finds the decisions that would require public participation (if the concern is with democratic legitimacy) are ones that are almost exclusively reached by dispute settlement bodies, and argues that any steps taken toward institutionalizing greater public participation in the WTO should only happen after comprehensive reforms of the overall institutional structure of the WTO.


Borowiak looks at accountability as it relates to democracy and global governance. He looks at two competing conceptions of democratic accountability (federalist and anti-federalist) in order to examine the under-theorized connection between accountability and democratic legitimacy. He then uses this debate to argue that there are no simple oppositions between government accountability and government efficacy. Borowiak identifies important gaps that separate those who make governmental decisions from those who are affected by them (spatial, scalar, temporal, epistemological, competence, and identity). He argues that we can learn from the ratification debates that there is no simple opposition between efficacy and accountability and that it is important to interrogate background assumptions. Borowiak draws lessons for global governance from these debates in terms of the prospects of expanding the sphere of governance beyond traditional boundaries. He notes that accountability offers a mediating role between republican/democratic principles of legitimacy and the apparent need for authoritative governance structures. Borowiak concludes that it is important to develop political cultures that enable those who are excluded to demand accountability from those with power, though he notes the significance of this challenge.


Here, Borowiak observes that there are many variations of accountability and that the ambiguity among the variations presents a problem for those primarily concerned with accountability as a resource for democracy. He critiques the way accountability is used as a stand-in for democracy and to displace democratic norms and develops a defence of democratic accountability. He also examines the meaning of democratic accountability means and looks at its applications across democratic traditions and in levels of analysis. Borowiak looks at ways that institutions can be configured to enhance democratic control and argues for a break with the norm of sovereignty on the grounds that it is fundamentally incompatible with the democratic ideals of accountable governance.


Bovens offers a “mapping exercise” to develop an analytical framework that helps to establish whether organizations or individuals are subject to accountability and what types of accountability are involved here. He also develops an evaluative framework to assess accountability more systematically. Bovens offers a conceptual discussion of accountability and adopts a narrow understanding of the concept. He sets out seven criteria that help us to determine when a relationship is one that involves accountability, while also setting out four important questions that we need to ask (to whom is account to be rendered?; who should render account?; about what is account to be rendered?; and why the actor feels compelled to render account?) and details three elements of account giving (informing
a forum about conduct; providing to forum with an opportunity to question the actor; and the forum passing judgment on the actor). Bovens identifies five different forums and five corresponding kinds of accountability (political; legal; administrative; professional; and social) and notes that there are different reasons why accountability is important and that each reason offers a different perspective and theoretical justification; moreover, this makes evaluating accountability arrangements particularly difficult.


Brown looks at multiparty social action initiatives that seek solutions for complex, uncertain, and changing social problems. He argues that the most common conceptual models for understanding and ensuring accountability are not very helpful in organizing and governing such initiatives. Brown looks at two existing models—agency theory and representative theory—and details their drawbacks, which include the fact that they are focused on two party relationships (where representatives are accountable to constituents and agents are responsible to principals) that entail a negotiation of accountability. He then offers a third and more fruitful alternative: a model of mutual accountability that involves “many parties in poorly defined relationships” that tends to create multiple accountabilities. He discusses the advantages of multiparty initiatives and what is required to create accountability systems across diverse parties, arguing that the differences in the three accountability models suggest that they may be appropriate in different situations and that the appropriateness of accountability models may best be determined by situation rather than the origins of the parties.


Bryant looks at the ways that NGOs use evaluation systems and examines how they can enable and constrain accountability. She observes that, in the context of NGOs, evaluative practices are often poorly understood and underutilized. Drawing from interviews with NGOs, Bryant finds that there are significant variations in accountability systems. She argues that a contingent model of accountability is better able to respond to the range of NGO constituencies. She also finds that NGOs that are the least dependent on donor funding also find that NGOs that are the least dependent on donor funding are the NGO doing the most about evaluation.


Buchanan and Keohane examine the normative aspect of legitimacy discussions and develop a global public standard for the normative legitimacy of global governance institutions that they hope can form a basis for principled criticism of global governance institutions and help guide global governance institutions in reform efforts aimed at addressing global justice questions. They move away from conceptions of legitimacy that conflate state consent and legitimacy and reject the view that global governance institutions require the same democratic standards as states. Buchanan and Keohane also caution against conflating legitimacy with justice, staking out a principled, middle ground conception of legitimacy that uses epistemic virtues (set out in the “complex standard of legitimacy” they develop) and requires institutions to engage in ongoing critical revision of their goals.


Burall and Neligan start to develop a “pluralistic system of accountability” that offers a better conceptual account of accountability and also has operational effects. They examine the meaning, role, and significance of accountability in global governance, as well as the ways that accountability is put into practice. They use the One World Trust’s accountability framework to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of current accountability mechanisms. Burall and Neligan highlight gaps within each of these four dimensions, and argue that accountability leads to greater organizational efficiency and note the importance of context for understanding to whom IGOs should be accountable, and for the design and application of accountability mechanisms. They draw examples from organizations including the ILO, UNAIDS, and the OECD. Finally, Burall and Neligan highlight key reforms that, they argue, would promote greater accountability.


Busch and Reinhardt discuss the conventional wisdom of third-party behaviour and examine the role and contributions of third parties in WTO dispute settlement. They examine the hypothesis that third parties lower the prospects for early settlement, as well as that third-party influence is conditional on the fact that their participation increases the likelihood that a dispute will end in a ruling. Busch and Reinhardt test their hypotheses through an analysis of WTO disputes until 2002. They conduct a large-N case-level analysis of the impact of political pressure on the international court and discuss the implications of the WTO findings for international relations.


The authors look at accountability within non-profit organizations, focusing on the accountability of executive directors and boards and their obligation and accountability to stakeholders. They review the role of government as an external stakeholder of non-profit organizations and look at the multiple accountabilities of voluntary organizations, noting the fundamental distinctions that exist between different stakeholders. Candler and Dumont then develop a non-profit accountability matrix that evaluates the accountability of various stakeholders, measuring consequential inputs and outputs, as well as procedural accountability. The framework has 90 different components; 10 different resources; and 9 different types of stakeholders. They found that it is easy to identify the stakeholders that organiza-
tions felt the strongest accountability obligation, as well as the resources organizations most felt the need to account for. Also, they find surprisingly low scores on the perceived unimportance of constituents and on the media.


Carmody argues, contra Joost Pauwelyn, that we should not classify WTO obligations as bilateral. He notes that the classification we choose is key and argues that we should classify WTO obligations as collective. He also argues that thinking of obligations as collective, in terms of the expectations re: trade-related behaviour of governments, results in looking at obligations as unquantifiable and invisible (and therefore not something that we can divide in order to fit the bilateral classifications) and “fundamentally unitary.” Carmody then discusses the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation of GATT Article I and argues that, on this classification, we should think of a WTO obligation as something that is undertaken by one WTO country toward all other WTO countries. Finally, he observes that on this reading the aim of dispute settlement is to re-establish the distribution of expectations.


The authors look at the accountability of international organizations and examine governance and accountability in Regional Development Banks (RDB). They focus upon internal accountability and oversight, independent review mechanisms, and the role of civil society. They also examine disclosure and civil society critiques, noting that the RDB’s information disclosure policies have been criticized by civil society organizations on the grounds that they do not share enough information. Finally, the authors argue that there ought to be an appeal mechanism at all RDBs that would allow civil society to challenge a bank’s decision to withhold information.


Chesterman responds to calls for accountability in global administrative law and aims to make GAL more reasoned, rather than more democratic. The article has a particular focus on the UN and the UN Security Council. Chesterman examines developing forms and structures of accountability and looks for ways to improve the quality of decision-making and to protect legitimate rights and interests for those who are affected. He also looks at the ways that power disparities affect the creation and implementation of accountability mechanisms. He argues that the emerging practices may end up making more than the sum of their parts, though he observes that legal forms of accountability can never be sufficient to bridge the democratic deficit and argues that we need to ensure that the standards themselves are legitimate.


Chimni details the many ways that a network of international institutions—what he calls the “nascent global state”—serves the interests of powerful states and transnational capital to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples. He discusses eight features of international intergovernmental organizations and argues that they limit the possibility of global redistributive justice and genuine democratization; powerful states, however, are able to create a contrary impression. Chimni details the implications of the nascent global state for peoples and states in the Third World, noting the WTO’s role in the erosion of state sovereignty and highlighting the absence of transparency, participation, and accountability of international institutions. Finally, he finds that there is a need to consider transnational models in addition to statist reforms.


The authors investigate how the WTO uses transparency as a trade policy tool and whether it is effective. They offer a typology of transparency and divide the WTO’s transparency obligations into three groups of transparency practices (right-to-know; monitoring and surveillance/targeted transparency; and collaborative transparency). They also examine the circumstances where transparency requirements work in the WTO, and find that transparency varies considerably, ranging from disappointing to excellent. They offer a case study of the use of notifications and, because of the poor results here, identify why comparisons are difficult. They find that transparency as a trade policy tool does not work as well as it might and identify particular obstacles to transparency and offer suggestions for reform.


Cooley and Ron analyze problems within the transnational sector in order to assess their impact on an emerging civil society. Using a political economy approach to examine contemporary transnational networks, they argue that a materialist analysis, notably transnational incentives and constraints, can explain many aspects of IO and INGO behaviour. They make two main arguments: first, the growing number of IOs and INGOs increases problems for all organizations in a transnational sector, and, second, that contrary to the assumption that market-based institutions increase efficiency and effectiveness, the marketization of IO and INGO activities leads to dysfunctional outcomes. They draw from the New Economics of Organization theory and apply its concepts to the environment in which transnational actors operate in order to explain patterns of behaviour that liberal theories of transnationalism do not address. They then discuss the “multiple-principals problem” in the competition for projects and note that nonprofit INGOs respond in much the same way as firms do in markets. They also draw on interviews to examine three cases of transnational assistance in order to test their model (for-profit corporations operating in Kyrgyzstan; inter-INGO competition in Goma; and inter-IO and INGO competition in Bosnia). They then critique the process, use of renewable contracts, and multiple contractors and illustrate that the incentives
these create are antithetical to liberal expectations and “organizations may find financial considerations more pressing than liberal norms.” Finally, Cooley and Ron suggest that donors should consider giving INGOs nonrevocable contracts as a way to counter aid abuse and political interference.

Cottier, T. (2009, March). A two-tier approach to WTO decision making. NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 2009/06. Cottier examines the roles of procedure and substantive goals and the mutually-dependent relationship between the two. He explores these questions with regards to the obligations of Members in the WTO. He also examines the role and function of the Secretariat and stakeholders. He looks at both horizontal and vertical structures and finds that underlying institutional issues are not being addressed by Members. Finally, Cottier argues for a two-tier approach to decision making built upon framework agreements and implementing rule-making.

Curtin, D., & Senden, L. (2011). Public accountability of transnational private regulation: Chimera or reality? Journal of Law and Society, 38(1), 163–188. Curtin and Senden look at the private role in regulation and ask whether the private sphere has a different relationship between legitimacy and accountability. They set out a conceptual foundation for the dual role of accountability, and examine 1) accountability as a normative concept that can be used to evaluate the behaviour of public actors; and 2) the institutional aspects of accountability, focusing on accountability as a “social mechanism.” They note that this second role of accountability does not depend on the existence of a principal/agent relationship. The authors hope that this foundation will help advance more detailed empirical research in a range of policy areas. They use a three-stage approach that 1) looks at the nature of private governance; 2) examines the lack of a strict distinction between the public and private; and asks if accountability is considered to be an issue in transnational private regulation (TPR) regimes. Curtin and Senden identify three stages in account-giving [1) informing a forum of conduct; 2) debate; and 3) passing judgment]. They analyze and define public accountability, look at accountability as a virtue, and apply an understanding of accountability as a mechanism to TPR in order to determine how it is distinctive from transnational public regulation. They then argue that there is no fixed level of accountability for TPR regimes to comply with, rather that accountability is on a sliding scale. They find that TPRs are devolving public authority and power to private actors, who can operate outside traditional public accountability mechanisms.


The authors note the critiques levelled against the WTO and argue that it needs to increase its credibility, accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and relevance. They detail the problems in these areas and offer suggestions for improving the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism. They also argue that we should open up the TPRM to civil society and that national governments should be encouraged to organize consultations on national trade policy with relevant stakeholders.

Davis, C., & Shirato, Y. (2007). Firms, governments, and WTO adjudication: Japan’s selection of WTO disputes. World Politics, 59(2), 274–313. Davis and Shirato analyze the selection of WTO disputes, and why certain institutions are used to deal with certain issues, and the connection to variation in industry demand. They also note the influence of policy priorities and diplomatic concerns, arguing that we should not just focus on disputes that are raised or treaties that are concluded, but should broaden our analysis to the selection of these issues. They offer a theory of selection for WTO disputes and, through an in-depth analysis of Japan’s selection process, analyze the impact of selection bias in WTO disputes. They also identify potential dispute cases and categorize them according to: 1) not negotiation; 2) negotiation; and 2) WTO adjudication. They then compare issues selected for WTO adjudication with this broader sample of likely cases and examine market-opening strategies relevant to foreign trade barriers. Davis and Shirato develop a model for industry demand and government supply of WTO complaints and discuss the ways that a business environment shapes the pattern of WTO adjudication. They find that standard political economy variables strongly predict the selection of WTO disputes, and highlight the significance of the velocity of the business environment as another variable.

De Wilde, J. (2011). The mirage of global democracy. European Review, 19(1), 5–18. De Wilde examines two different types of democratization in global democracy: Type 1 democracy (distributional democracy), and Type 2 democracy (democratizing world politics). He argues that this distinction is “crucial but seldom acknowledged” and discusses the problems that each type encounters, noting that Type 2’s problems are fundamental ones. De Wilde draws a series of conclusions for both types of democracy and, ultimately, finds that both types of democracy are better served by fact-checking and by enhancing transparency, accountability, and human rights protection.


The authors conduct a “mapping study” of WTO reform proposals and statements since 1995. They draw from materials created by Member states, the Secretariat, and heads of IOs, as well as reform proposals offered by academics and stakeholders. The study focuses on the WTO Management & Internal Administration, as well as eight functional aspects of WTO activity (strategic direction, policy deliberation and problem-solving; negotiation; monitoring, assessment and evaluation; dispute settlement; international cooperation and coordination; outreach and external transparency; capacity building and aid for trade, and; research).

Dellas addresses accountability and legitimacy questions surrounding public–private partnerships through an analysis of the drinking water partnerships initiated after the World Summit on Sustainable Development. She examines the implications of private sector participation in the Commission on Sustainable Development partnerships, focusing on questions of legitimacy. She also looks at stakeholder participation. Finally, she examines input and output legitimacy and identifies tensions and trade-offs between the two.


Dicerni looks at the underpinnings of governmental accountability, the ways that standards of accountability are changing, and the relationship that Deputy Ministers (DMs) have to accountability. He also looks at factors that contribute to accountability deficits. He focuses on the accountability of the Deputy Minister, who the DM is accountable to, what the DM is accountable for, and the factors that make the scope of accountability unclear.


Dombrowski ties together some of the questions that arise from debate on the legitimacy of IOs and private actors in the area of global climate governance. She links a discussion of NGO demands for representation and participation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to an analysis of representation and participation within the NGO community. She also details NGO responses to perceived representation and participation deficits in the climate convention and examines participation and representation within NGOs. Dombrowski analyzes NGO submission documents from 2007–2009. She notes that NGOs have a potentially valuable role to play in strengthening the participation and representation of affected communities in international organizations and examines potential mechanisms that NGOs might use to do so. She also observes that NGOs’ procedural demands for equity tend to go hand in hand with their substantive demands (she focuses on the former here). Dombrowski finds that NGOs engaging with international organizations are contributing to their democratization as well as increasing IO accountability to the communities affected by their decisions. NGOs, however, still have a limited impact on concrete policy outcomes.


The authors draw from recent work on the idea of a deliberative system in order to think through questions of global democracy for earth system governance. They identify key elements and characteristics of a deliberative system and evaluate the environmental performance of states in order to determine who performs best and why and to identify remaining shortcomings. They also look at transmission and accountability, and argue that consensual democracies have a better environmental performance than adversarial democracies and that in a global deliberative system we need to look for critical distance between empowered and public space. Finally, they look for ways to overcome the shortcomings of rudimentary global deliberative systems.


The authors engage in an empirical analysis in order to examine the impact of NGOs on trade policy processes and outcomes in the EU. They detail the discrepancy between inclusion in processes and little influence on policy outcomes. They also develop a theoretical framework that sets out group influence in trade policy. They examine issues of access and mobilization and diffuse versus concentrated interests. Drawing from a survey of actors in EU trade policy lobbying and an Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) case study, they detail the ways that NGOs’ lobbying activities are inhibited and look at the way that groups assess their own influence. They find that NGO impact on trade policy outcomes has been limited; NGOs are effective at putting issues on the agenda, whereas business associations are active during policy formation and implementation.


Ebrahim looks at the challenges that NGOs face when they try to enhance organizational learning while maintaining accountability to donors. He finds that the ways accountability is problematized affect the kinds of solutions that then emerge. His focus is on two main problematics: 1) myopias of accountability characterized by attention to short-term performance measurement rather than long-term social change and a focus on accountability to funders at the expense of accountabilities to clients and mission; and 2) logics of participation that tend to be compliance-driven and ritualistic rather than about increasing public accountability. Ebrahim offers a practical review of how accountability systems might be constructed in broader systematic terms that promote critical reflection and learning within NGOs. He argues that we should place organizational learning—and evaluation in particular—at the core of a more reflective approach to accountability and that we need to conceptualize accountability as a system of relations that recognizes actors’ differential power and structural limitations on participatory voice. He also argues that accountability, like power, is a relational concept and the effects of its mechanisms can thus only be understood when we place them in context and that reframing accountability as a system of relations requires looking at participatory mechanisms that are empowering rather than ritualistic and symbolic. Ebrahim then identifies seven factors that require future investigation: prioritization of accountabilities; perceptions about learning; perceptions about failure; organizational visions of the future; reporting and communication structures; job roles and incentives; and information systems. He then offers propositions for all of these and notes that internal change in NGOs is a vehicle toward altering their interactions with external stakeholders.

Elsig looks at new powerful actors and shifting regulatory issues as the “twin challenge” for global regulatory politics. He looks at the impact of changing authorities on the accountability discourse and, in order to better understand how new powerful voices are accommodated, calls for a systematic analysis in addressing IGOs. He focuses on the WTO as he does this. Elsig also looks at the impact of changing authorities on emerging discourses of accountability.


Filho notes the central role of a legal framework and legal reasoning in terms of a free, just, and efficient market. He argues that this is still the case with a decline in traditional national powers. He then discusses the dense network of regulatory rules and identifies ontological differences between global market governance and global administrative law, and details these concepts as two distinct ways to regulate the market. Noting the shifts in power, he argues that we need to find new accountability mechanisms, as well as for the important role of multilevel constitutionalism as a response to the need for multilayered governance.


Fisher examines the role that risk regulatory concepts play in administrative government and looks at their implications for law. She argues that we need to pay particular attention to context if we wish to understand how risk regulatory concepts operate and are interpreted. She also notes that risk regulatory concepts can promote accountability, but that accountability mechanisms may be destabilizing. Fisher observes that the disagreement between those who argue that risk regulatory concepts will lead to more accountable and transparent decisions and those who argue they do the opposite. She develops a framework for the use of risk regulatory concepts.


Germain details three things that weaken accountability: 1) favouring vertical over horizontal accountability; 2) having responsible agencies independent from central governments; and 3) requiring a high degree of specialist knowledge from those who participate. He examines what we can do to address these barriers and improve accountability. He pursues two strategies for strengthening accountability: 1) clearly internalizing accountability within governing institutions—what he calls “a logic of participation rather than a logic of compliance”; and 2) consolidating the emerging global financial public sphere. Here he argues that thinking about accountability in terms of participation and reciprocity requires a deeper foundation for participation.


Gillies studies the ways that reputational agendas can drive norm emergence, and details the spread of transparency in developing countries and focuses on the ways that reputational agendas affect high-profile actors. She also examines the connections between interest-driven and norm-driven decision making.


Goetz and Jenkins note low levels of public confidence in horizontal forms of accountability found in most developing countries, as well as dissatisfaction with the limitations on the effectiveness of vertical forms of accountability. They criticize the division of labour typically found in accountability analyses; instead of trying to remedy problems of horizontal and vertical accountability separately, they challenge the vertical-horizontal dichotomy. They draw from two case studies of civil society activism in India and focus on a hybrid form of accountability, “diagonal accountability,” that bridges the vertical-horizontal divide. They then identify five key institutional characteristics that could strengthen the institutional form of hybrid accountability and examine obstacles to diagonal accountability.


Here, Goetz and Jenkins address the challenge of operationalizing accountability in order to achieve “genuine” accountability through an analysis of two cases of citizen activism in India. Taking a different approach to remedying problems of horizontal and vertical accountability, they observe that analysis of these occur independently of one another and argue that this approach has, unintentionally, “assigned” vertical and horizontal accountability systems and that this separate approach has its limitations. The case studies challenge the vertical-horizontal accountability dichotomy. They argue that these civic groups use a hybrid form of accountability that bridges the vertical-horizontal divide. They note one obstacle to this new hybrid form of accountability is the state’s tendency to offer civic groups opportunities for ex ante consultation as a substitute for the ability to engage in ex post accountability.


Goodin looks at the Reform-Act model of democracy in a global context and notes that it is “the thumbnail version of democracy that is most readily available both for popular consumption and for...
political implementation." He draws a parallel between the democratization of states and global democratization and argues that global democracy is in the “first steps” of democratization. Goodin also argues that his model is a “slippery slope in one direction” and that the two features of this process (1) that emergent crises expand the range of people to whom power-holders are accountable; and 2) that accountability “mostly only expands” and “almost never contracts”) guarantee an eventual worldwide predominance of domestic and international democracy. Finally, he argues that the first step to global democracy is to get an accountability regime in place, and the next ones are to strengthen and to democratize it.


Grant and Keohane look at “the twin issues of accountability and democracy” and examine why accountability is problematic at the global level. They analyze both democratic and non-democratic accountability mechanisms and investigate the analogy between domestic and global power structures. They then discuss two models of accountability: 1) the delegation model; and 2) the participation model, and look at the accountability mechanisms that each would require. They note that the distinction between these models rests on different conceptions of the legitimacy of political authority; the former looks at those who trust people with power, while the later looks at those who are affected by the exercise of power. They also look at power wielders and constraints and discuss these with respect to accountability mechanisms. The aim is to limit abuses of power without relying upon a comprehensive accountability system or a centralized government. Grant and Keohane argue that multilateral organizations are accountable, and in some ways more so than states, but note that they are accountable in ways that some people might not expect. They examine different perceptions of accountability (that of NGOs and the World Bank). They also identify seven accountability mechanisms that operate in world politics (1) hierarchical; 2) supervisory; 3) fiscal; 4) legal; 5) market; 6) peer; and 7) public reputational. Finally, they identify three standards that are necessary for accountability [1] standards of behaviour; 2) availability of sanctions; and 3) information].


Grigorescu examines the accountability of international organizations and asks which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms and when and are they more likely to adopt them. He argues that the answer to this is 1) those IGOs with large budgets, and 2) where decisions are based on weighted voting. Grigorescu looks at the connection between democracy and the adoption of norms and mechanisms; he argues that interactions among IGOs will, over time, spread these mechanisms through a process of “horizontal diffusion” and will do so with less regard to budgets and voting systems.


The authors observe that decreasing levels of legitimacy are a problem for both the effectiveness of IOs and in terms of justice and fairness. They analyze IOs’ strategies to enhance legitimacy and search for patterns and the implications for the process of IO democratization. They begin with a literature review of legitimacy-building and then compare the EU and the IMF in terms of their legitimacy-building approaches. They argue the legitimacy-building process has failed because participation and transparency were used as supplementary strategies. Noting the recent turn to principles of democratic representation in these institutions, they argue that participation, representation, and accountability should be “complementary and mutually supporting rather than antithetical,” and that participation and delegation mechanisms must ensure that they are representative if they wish to enhance legitimacy.


Gupta argues that transparency is an overused but underanalyzed concept. We need to investigate calls for greater transparency in the context of global environmental governance and to analyze the assumed link between transparency and legitimate and democratic governance. As she does so, she focuses on information disclosure, a “third wave” in environmental governance termed “regulation by revelation.” She also notes that transparency has multiple normative justifications and that as a result its implications for accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness will differ depending on the situation. Gupta argues that this is a good reason not to take the use of transparency for granted. She then discusses two core assumptions (dealing with the procedural nature of governance-by-disclosure initiatives and the central role of information) that are common to these and that link governance-by-disclosure initiatives.


Hachez and Wouters note the lack of effective public international regulation for foodstuffs; they focus on the role of private food safety standards and examine the impact these standards have on producers and suppliers, with a special emphasis on developing countries. They also examine the relationship between these private governing entities and the communities they affect, focusing on the ways legitimacy is implicated in this relationship. They use a two-part approach to their analysis: first, they explore the normative importance of legitimacy and develop a model of legitimacy (based on democratic accountability) for private actors; second, they engage in a case study and apply this model to G.A.P and GLOBAL G.A.P., focusing on stakeholder participation opportunities and accountability mechanisms. Hachez and Wouters also examine two dimensions of the legitimacy of a norm: normative and empirical/descriptive; note that while both aspects should co-exist, this is not always the case. They analyze “output legitimacy,” which
highlights the problem-solving potential of governing entities, and note that norms may gain legitimacy at the expense of democratic forms; they also argue that democratic deficits cannot be overcome by a high degree of output legitimacy—legitimacy requires a strong democratic project, which they present in terms of public accountability. In addition, they discuss input and output legitimacy as an ideal continuum and argue for a strong but flexible link between regulation and public deliberations. Hachez and Wouters then examine the public and its role in this context, as well as what accountability means here. They discuss prospective and retrospective dimensions of accountability and discuss responsiveness and control “as two sides of the same accountability coin,” as well as the supporting meta-principles that enable accountability to function effectively, with a particular focus on transparency.


Hajnal focuses upon civil society’s impact on G8 accountability and finds that, for the most part, interaction between the two has been positive and substantial. He looks at different ways that civil society can push for G8 accountability as well as at different ways to evaluate G8 performance, and also examines the accountability of civil society, observing that civil society’s ability to hold the G8 to account is greater when it, too, demonstrates accountability.


Hale examines whether and how transparency can change global actors’ behaviour. To do so, he builds on Schedler’s work to analyze the way that transparency fits into his two components of accountability (the ability to know what an actor is doing and the ability to make that actor do something else). Hale argues that transparency can affect both components; he examines market power, external discourse, and internal norms in order to illustrate transparency’s contribution to enforcement. He focuses on two cases studies: the World Bank Inspection Panel and the Commission on Environmental Cooperation Citizen Submission Process. He then examines the implications of these findings for larger questions of global governance, specifically the way that transparency creates problem-based decision-making communities.


Hale and Wolfe explore the relationship between accountability and transparency at the WTO through an examination of transparency procedures at the WTO and the transparency norms that do not address the accountability or transparency of the WTO itself. They note the way that WTO transparency mechanisms influence the trading system and examine the use of these transparency mechanisms in the collective response to the 2008 global financial crisis. They then examine the ways G20 members resisted protectionism during this time. They observe that the concepts of transparency and accountability are difficult to untangle and underscore the need for further work on why accountability mechanisms function well in some aspects of WTO work but not in others.


The authors detail the aspects of the WTO that have been strengthened by civil society contributions. They draw from discussions with people from CSOs and NGOs at a 2011 workshop on civil society contributions to WTO accountability in order to identify ways to further strengthen these contributions. They then detail the evolution of rules and practices in the WTO and note several key developments here (WTO Secretariat engagement with NGOs; the development of the WTO website; and The WTO Public Forum in Geneva). They also observe changes in the developing relationship between the WTO and civil society and identify two key functions of civil society in promoting WTO accountability (improving transparency, and conducting monitoring and evaluation of WTO Members). The authors also note that participants cited transparency, monitoring and evaluation, and consultation as three key areas that require further strengthening. They then examine these three issues and highlight areas for future study and action, noting a series of series of unresolved questions for each one. They find that an increased role for monitoring and evaluation has the most potential for constructive contributions to WTO accountability, and conclude with some policy implications and recommendations.


Hammer looks at the effectiveness and sustainability of globally operating organizations (corporate; state and international; NGOs) and examines accountability in the relationship between organizations and those affected by their operations. The One World Trust’s Global Accountability Framework conceptualizes accountability as a function of four key dimensions: transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint and response. Hammer finds that, while intergovernmental organizations do well overall in terms of policy and systems for evaluating their work, their transparency and response to stakeholder complaints is much weaker.


The authors detail key issues in the One World Trust study on accountability challenges in global climate governance. They argue that citizen calls for leadership on climate change issues are difficult due to poor communication, that there is a discrepancy between available evidence and agreements people will reach, and that it is difficult for citizens to identify a locus of accountability.


Hammer and Whitty develop an accountability framework for policy-oriented research organizations with an aim to examining the implications for the development of not-for-profit policy oriented research institutions. They provide an overview of a refined account-
ability framework and database structure and note that accountability is not about meeting a fixed set of rules, but is a process that depends on context. They identify five work processes in which accountability can be applied (ongoing governance; strategy formation; project identification and design; conduct of research; and closing projects). They also compare the accountability framework’s structure to “an onion with multiple layers,” and note its three interconnected rings of 1) four core principles of accountability (transparency, evaluation, participation, and complaints and response); 2) institutional processes (including strategy-setting, identifying projects, and conducting and concluding research); and 3) accountability to stakeholders (including policy-makers, media, the research community, and partners). They then look at first, second, and third party accountability mechanisms and identify accountability tools in different phases of accountability processes. Hammer and Whitty also look at the connection between accountability and positioning and contrast this with strategy-based approaches to accountability, examining two case studies in order to show organizations’ response to changing circumstances, shifts in positioning, and the way this affects their internal structures. They draw from the Accountability Tools for Policy Research database and discuss the ways that tools apply: 1) to all research organizations; and 2) only to particular kinds of organizations.

Hanegraaff, M., Beyers, J., & Braun, C. (2011). Open the door to more of the same? The development of interest group representation at the WTO. World Trade Review, 10(4), 447–472. The authors look at the effects of more openness towards NGOs in the WTO, both in terms of the effects of the WTO’s interests and on the democratic accountability and transparency of the organization. In order to do this, they examine the evolution of the interest system of the WTO over two decades. Looking at the history of the relationship between the WTO and trade interest groups, they analyze the development of the WTO interest group population (drawing from attendance Ministerial Conferences). They then examine the density of the WTO interest group system and the diversity of the WTO population, and find that only a small number of organizations are capable of lobbying in the long run. They conclude by discussing the implications of opening up the WTO system to the input of non-state actors.

Harlow, C. (2006). Global administrative law: The quest for principles and values. The European Journal of International Law, 17(1), 187–214. Harlow identifies principles that might serve as the basis for a global administrative law. She argues that a universal set of administrative law principles is neither welcome nor desirable, but that we ought to aim for a system of diversity and pluralism. She also suggests that a global network of legal rules and practices may erode the interests and traditions of Third World countries.

Harlow, C., & Rawlings, R. (2007). Promoting accountability in multilevel governance: A network approach. European Law Journal, 13(4), 542–562. The authors challenge the assumption that supervisory powers in EU institutions can address accountability gaps, noting that there is a risk that mutual interest will undermine the accountability function of mutual accountability networks. They highlight problems of transparency here and question whether the accountability processes can offer the necessary legitimacy. They also argue for a different accountability strategy: an “accountability network” that may prove to be better equipped to bridge accountability gaps. They note that a primary function of accountability networks is that of institutional cohesion and that they also provide important educational functions. They observe several characteristics that accountability mechanisms require: 1) a network of agencies that specialize in a specific method of accountability; 2) the coalescence of these in a relationship of mutual support; and 3) shared professional expertise and ethos. A main contribution of this article is the 4th requirement: a sense of a common purpose. They posit this after an analysis of the judicial system and the ombudsman network, which coalesce into an accountability network. They highlight two particular contributions of the network: 1) the standard-setting function that builds up accountability machinery, and 2) the EO’s user-friendly website with its shared point of access.

He, B., & Murphy, H. (2007). Global social justice at the WTO? The role of NGOs in constructing global social contracts. International Affairs, 83(4), 707–727. The authors aim to provide an empirical foundation for a cosmopolitan or transnational democratic ethos and to develop a conceptual framework for a global social contract and examine its prospects for real-world application. They examine the roles of NGOs in the construction of global social contracts, arguing that NGOs play important roles in enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of international institutions. They structure the paper around two case studies: 1) the WTO labour standards clause; and 2) the campaign to clarify the use of the safeguard measures in the WTO’s Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). They review different conceptualizations of the global social contract idea and then turn to the case studies. They formulate six testable empirical questions and evaluate both case studies in light of these questions. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of the findings. They find that there are three key stages in the development of global social contracts: 1) the initial construction of economic contracts by nations, with input from business actors; 2) NGO campaigns that try to modify the contract to take account of social justice; and 3) the dialogue between them on adapting the original contract re: social justice. The authors highlight three core elements of a global social contract: one that 1) is global (recognizes all nations); 2) embodies social justice (social protection; principle of equality); and 3) uses the democratic process to construct the agreement. Finally, they conclude that NGOs have the capacity to undertake significant agenda-setting roles at the WTO, but their success overseeing contract revisions depends upon a number of factors.

Heyvaert examines the relationship between Treaty member states and non-state actors involved in the implementation of international agreements. She argues that increased reliance on non-state actors fosters the development of hybrid networks and diffuses accountability and that the involvement of transnational organizations affects the nature and quality of state accountability for CBDR. She looks at hybridization within the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention or POPs Convention). She then identifies three responses to the tensions that exist between state and non-state actors in the hybrid CBDRs and that diffuse accountability (levelling down; levelling up; and governing across). Heyvaert notes that all three responses are present (“in embryonic form”) in the Stockholm Convention and discusses each approach, indicating what they would look like if they were to develop.


The authors identify two ideal types of global governance: Global Governance Type 1 (an economic theory) and Global Governance Type 2 (a political theory). They argue that, without enhancing normative (and mostly cosmopolitan) theory, global governance driven by economic theory will become normatively indefensible and unsustainable. They develop a two-track view of transnational legitimacy (formal deliberative decision making and informal processes of opinion- and will-formation) in order to inform and guide the constitutional framework of an extended deliberative global governance system. They pursue two questions: 1) what global governance is, conceptually-speaking, in an era of contested globalization, and 2) what role international organizations might play in the democratic legitimacy of international economic organizations.


Hoekman examines proposals for WTO institutional reform along three dimensions (rulemaking and decision-making processes; management of day-to-day activities; and the enforcement of negotiated commitments and rules of the game). He notes that most recent proposals focus on rulemaking and decision-making processes. He then examines arguments and proposals to reform the WTO and looks at five of its major functions, providing an overview of many of the aspects of the WTO and summarizing proposals for reform. Hoekman focuses upon dispute settlements and transparency and finds it unlikely that suggestions to move away from established WTO norms would be effective.


The authors note the United Nations’ failure to offer adequate responses to accountability questions and examine the potential contribution of a UN system-wide ombudsperson re: improving the UN’s human rights record. They examine the UN’s record on accountability issues, as well as the effects of the organization as it shifts from a predominantly intergovernmental organization into a global governance institution. They also look at the connection between accountability and responsibility and argue that the UN’s accountability is “somewhere between political responsiveness and legal responsibility.” They then set out criteria that a UN ombudsperson should aim to meet.


The authors note the basis problem for defining the role of MEAs in the WTO, as well as the uncertain legal role of MEAs in this context. They identify two broad reasons why adjudicating bodies of the
WTO should be cautious when drawing on MEAs; they discuss the strategic benefits of separate negotiations and agreements and demonstrate the ways that separating trade and environmental agreements may reduce contracting costs. Horn and Mavroidis then examine the implications for the role of MEAs in WTO disputes, focusing on the reasons for gaps in separate agreements and the relationship between obligations in two sets of agreements. They note that WTO judges should exercise caution and argue that the relationship between MEAs and the WTO should be addressed “in light of reason(s) why the parties have chosen to form separate agreements on trade and on the environment.”


This piece looks at the relationship between accountability and regulation. It examines the accountability of government-appointed regulators, adopting a wide view of accountability. It looks at what and to whom regulators are accountable and examines accountability processes. It also identifies three key elements of accountability (the duty to explain; exposure to scrutiny; and the possibility of independent review); argues that all three have to be effective and that these are key to a macro design of the larger regulatory system. It then finds that there are significant concerns in all three elements of accountability and notes that many of these concerns have common causes. It also observes that the government’s approach is departmentalized and insufficiently co-ordinated. Offers 15 recommendations in response. Finally, it notes that there are multiple accountabilities in practice and recommends collective board structures.


Howse responds to critiques of the WTO’s lack of democratic legitimacy and compares this with the democratic deficit in the domestic context. He argues that, given general disillusionment with domestic democratic institutions, it is not sufficient to address the democratic deficit by (only) comparing the outcomes of the WTO to those of domestic polities. He also looks at NGO involvement as monitors in WTO negotiations insofar as it improves classic representative democracy. Howse notes that networks can be held accountable through normal representative processes, but these accountability mechanisms still require conduct within networks to reflect democratic values and attitudes. He then argues that we need to pay more attention to democratic values and ethics in existing institutions of global economic governance rather than continuing to pursue mechanisms and institutions that might democratize the WTO.


This piece examines the measures necessary to ensure accountability from IOs to their members and third parties. It notes three levels of IO accountability: 1) internal and external scrutiny and monitoring; 2) tortious liability; and 3) responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach of a rule of law. All three levels are interrelated and mutually supportive. The piece then looks at three required rules and practices (RRPs) between IOs and NGOs: Recommended Rules and Practices on the Relationship between NGOs and IOs: 1) establishing appropriate relationships; 2) establishing an NGO liaison service to facilitate NGO involvement; and 3) conduct briefings that allow NGO representatives to present their views. It discusses primary and secondary RRPs as they correspond with three levels of accountability and discusses remedies against IOs where they focus on the implementation of the accountability regime and appropriate remedies for different levels of accountability. It also details six general features of remedies against IOs. Finally, it finds that there is no necessary incompatibility between the autonomy necessary for IOs require and the requirements of an accountability regime.


Jones notes that, although most of the criticism was directed at the G20 meetings, the real divide was within the G8, arguing that this is a “silver lining” because it was not a deep rupture between the West and the rising powers. He also argues that the U.S./Europe clash in the G8 is the real reason for the continued existence of the G8 and notes the important contribution of the Muskoka Accountability Report.


Jordon notes that accountability mechanisms typically applied to NGOs do not reflect the value-base of NGO activities, are perceived to be divorced from the mission of the organization, unable to capture their responsibility to a variety of stakeholders, and are unable to reflect the “complex web of relationships” NGOs are in. She asks how NGOs can reconcile their missions, values, and context with the top-down operational demands of accountability. To do so, she draws from an informal study of 12 NGOs, provides an overview of NGO accountability, and examines the purposes this accountability serves. She then introduces a rights framework to NGO activities and examines the political context of defining NGO responsibilities. Jordan argues that accountability can help to solidify rights. She then reviews accountability mechanisms that take into account NGOs’ complex realities, observing that solid NGO accountability mechanisms need to take rights and context into account and that developing a rights framework is important in terms of defining several aspects of accountability and developing better accountability mechanisms.


Kahler examines democratic accountability and the ways it is evaluated. He analyzes two measures of accountability that have been applied to global institutions—those who argue for a democratic global polity and those (like Kahler) who argue for the delegation of authority from national governments to institutional agents. He looks at the criteria that accountability is weighed against and cautions against those who use “rigorous standards of democratic
accountability” as a benchmark for evaluating international institutions, arguing that this might not be the best measure. He suggests that the accountability of global economic multilaterals (GEMs) can be enhanced by pursuing transparency, competition, and changes in rules of representation. He argues that accountability might be undermined in the interest of pursuing a particular definition of democracy and that we need to pay more attention to the domestic bases of support for GEMs. He also looks at the IMF and the WTO and at the WTO’s engagement with NGOs. He argues that the extent to which GEMs display accountability deficits they are likely to be due to decisions made by influential national governments and not because of dysfunctional international bureaucracies. Finally, he notes the central role that governments play as gatekeepers.


Here, Kahler, draws from corporate governance insights to evaluate IMF governance using the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy. He observes the tensions between these criteria and that the trade-off between legitimacy and effectiveness needs particularly careful examination in terms of transparency and relations with stakeholders. He analyzes the power of dominant shareholders as a barrier to effectiveness and legitimacy, evaluates the composition and capabilities of staff and management, and sets out possible conflicts between enhanced legitimacy and increased effectiveness.


Kaufmann and Weber take the transparency principles developed in constitutional law and argue that we can apply them to financial regulation. They argue for a rule-based rather than a solely process-oriented approach. After discussing transparency as a concept, they develop a three-dimensional concept of transparency in financial regulation. They then develop these three dimensions of transparency, which are: 1) Institutional aspects, i.e.: procedures and decision-making; 2) Substantive aspects, i.e.: values and goals; and 3) the accountability of actors. They also discuss accountability as part of the concept of transparency and note three challenges in holding actors in the financial sector accountable: 1) institutional; 2) contractual; and 3) due to the international context. They find that it is necessary to provide transparency on both judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms. They also suggest that pursuing the GATS principles for defining a set of applicable international may be fruitful.


Kelly asks whether NGOs impact IGOs. He builds on Scholte’s work and generates indicators of NGOs’ impact on IGOs. He then offers four hypotheses to explain this impact: 1) great power dominance; 2) organizational defense; 3) mission performance; and 4) identity/ideological and six empirical indicators to demonstrate this. He applies this to two cases: the IMF and the World Bank. Drawing from a content analysis of the IMF and WB; a questionnaire distributed to NGO, IMF, and WB informants; and participant observation, Kelly finds strong conclusions from an analysis of the WB, but mixed ones from the IMF.


Keohane examines different understandings of accountability and how, and why, it works. There are three elements that he argues are necessary in order for accountability to be effective (standards; availability of information; and the ability to impose sanctions). He focuses here on the demands placed on multinational businesses to be accountable to society. He discusses “multiple accountability” in global governance and looks at its implications. Keohane notes the complexity and multidimensionality of this form of accountability and observes that chains of accountability and multiple, overlapping accountability relationships both exist. He then identifies seven channels of accountability (hierarchical; supervisory; fiscal; legal; market; peer; and public reputational). Finally, he examines different institutional responses to accountability challenges.


Keohane here aims to redefine the study of world politics by broadening its scope. To do so, he uses a rational-choice approach to analyze transnational relations and interdependence as well as the conditions that facilitate institutionalized or legalized cooperation between states. He then examines the implications of inter-state cooperation for desired outcomes. He also argues that international regimes reduce the cost on states re: making and enforcing agreements and also enhance the credibility of states’ commitments. Keohane then suggests that issues of accountability can only be properly understood by taking into account both strategic interactions in accountability relations and the norms that outline appropriate behaviour for rule making. In addition, he examines the extent to which democratic principles of accountability can be applied to world politics. He argues that we cannot make an analogy with domestic politics, but that this finding does not mean that we should abandon the idea of accountability at a global level. Instead, we need to find ways to protect ourselves from the abuse of global governance. To this end, he argues we need to pursue innovative ways to hold potential abusers of power to account. He discusses what constitutes an abuse of power and who is entitled to hold power-wielders to account and why. He looks at external and internal accountability, compares accountability with other ways to limit abuses of power, and outlines a “pluralistic accountability system.”


The authors challenge the framing of multilateralism and reject the debate between global governance as elitist, with international...
organizations undermining democracy, versus defenders who stress pragmatic benefits. Instead, they look at participation within multilateral institutions as it can enhance the quality of domestic democracy. They aim to set out critical democratic standards to evaluate and guide the reform of international institutions, arguing that multilateral institutions may, and do, enhance domestic democracy in established democracies. They discuss accountability as it affects power, democracy, and participation and identify three failings (1) that unfettered legal sovereignty is a necessary prerequisite of democracy; (2) that existing domestic institutions always adhere to high democratic standards; and (3) that constitutional democracy maximizes direct popular participation). They then outline a working conception of constitutional democracy and highlight three democracy-enhancing constitutional functions (1) off-setting factions; 2) protecting minority rights; and 3) enhancing the quality of democratic deliberation). They argue that fulfilling these constitutional functions can come at the cost of participation.


Here, Koenig-Archibugi examines the interaction between global and local factors in the production of policies and policy outcomes, arguing that disagreement about the nature of this interaction is the result of people choosing either a state-centric or a polycentric analytic approach. He examines the assumptions underlying both approaches and argues that a more productive way forward is to treat these two approaches as complementary.


Koppell notes the problems of clarity and performance that exist due to different conceptual understandings of accountability. He identifies particular ways that organizations demonstrate accountability problems (accountable in the wrong sense; accountable in every sense) and labels this “multiple accountabilities disorder” (MAD). He then illustrates “the MAD phenomenon” through an analysis of ICANN. The piece aims to address some of these problems by establishing a typology of dimensions of accountability (transparency; liability; controllability; responsibility; and responsiveness). Koppell observes that these categories that not mutually exclusive, although he notes that they are rarely differentiated. He also discusses three substantive notions of accountability (controlability; responsibility; and responsibility). Argues that MAD is not inevitable.


Here Koppell examines the relationship between legitimacy and authority, noting situations where legitimacy supports authority but also ones in which the two create irreconcilable demands. He focuses on this relationship in the context of global governance organizations and examines the structure, rulemaking processes, and enforcement regimes of a number of these organizations. He then discusses legitimacy and authority as distinct concepts and argues that GGOs are interested in the two concepts independently and notes that, at times, GGOs can only secure authority by violating requirements of normative legitimacy. Koppell examines the sources of both concepts, as well as the demands and expectations that follow from them. He discusses the way that the GGO challenge is particularly
distinctive, and argues that we ought to view failures of GGO accountability as the “near-inevitable consequence” of inherently incompatible expectations.


Koppell examines the structure of global rulemaking bodies and asks why organizations operate in ways that generate criticism for accountability shortcomings. He argues that accountability is elusive as a result of the forces that shape Global Governance Organizations (GGOs) and that the architecture of global governance is a response to and cause of the accountability challenge. He analyzes the organizational design and administrations of GGOs, focusing on variation in GGO approaches to structure, rulemaking, adherence, and interest group participation with the aim of detecting patterns that may offer an explanation for the accountability challenge. He goes on to identify general GGO types and three models of global governance (classical; cartel; and symbiotic) that represent a different solution to the problem. Then, he identifies five different conceptions of accountability (transparency; liability; controllability; responsibility; and responsiveness); Koppell notes that these need to be disentangled, but that they are broad and not mutually exclusive. Finally, he argues that failures of accountability are the direct result of the inherent conflicts among the demands of global governance.


Krisch looks at Global Administrative Law questions from an accountability perspective in order to see if domestic administrative law ideas can help address accountability problems in global governance. He examines the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in order to illustrate the way that accountability mechanisms in global regulatory structures differ from those in domestic settings. His focus is on the global constituents of accountability—the “accountability to whom” question—and he argues for a pluralist global administrative law. He observes that it is preferable to have all constituencies involved in decision-making processes through multiple accountability mechanisms rather than through one procedure.


The authors lay out the assumptions that underlie global administrative law (GAL) and detail the normative issues that arise when people discuss the potential and problems of GAL. They then discuss the challenges that a global administrative space and the regulatory governance of global markets may pose to inter-state, consent-based models of international law.


Kuo argues that Kingsbury’s conception of international law does not resolve the challenges facing global administrative law. Kuo contests Kingsbury’s use of publicness and argues that his proposal, instead of corresponding to inter-public law, is a privatized, post-public conception of legitimacy and as such faces “a fundamental legitimacy crisis.”


Laan looks at current sources of data on fossil fuel subsidies that are available from IOs and NGOs at both the regional and national levels. She identifies a lack of available information and outlines reasons for this. She notes the importance of transparency in reform processes and suggests mechanisms that could better facilitate transparency and argues for a two-track approach to improve transparency: 1) better reporting within countries; and 2) a new international regime.


Lagassé examines accountability in a domestic context and at the ways this is complicated by issues of effectiveness and security. He details accountability relationships in a context where transparency, typically understood, is problematic. He thus aims to assess the state of accountability for national defence and to evaluate reform proposals for the ways the government ought to be held to account for military and defence matters. He notes the important difference between answerability and accountability and argues that efforts to improve defence accountability should try to strengthen the existing principles and practices that allow Canadians to hold the government to account. He also examines the relationship between accountability and responsibility, as well as the ways that contestation affects accountability—and the decisions likely to be made—in the context of democratic governance. He finds reforms to increase Parliament’s role in Canada’s defence affairs appealing, but are likely to undermine defence accountability, arguing that for the sake of effective defence accountability we ought to reject them and ensure that any reforms respect the principle of responsible government.


The authors offer descriptive case studies of two parts of the WTO’s committee system in the hopes that the day-to-day interactions and “apparently mundane activity” will help to improve “understanding of what global governance is and ought to be” and in order to better understand illuminate the evolution of global economic governance structures. They find that even when WTO committees are not producing new texts and formal rules they can still become part of broader networks that are creating soft international standards and norms. They observe that if WTO committee activity resembles transgovernmental network activity then this poses specific legitimacy questions and should push us to examine related accounta-
bility mechanisms. They argue that WTO committees may partially address legitimacy concerns; they focus on the SPS Committee in order to examine this, particularly in terms of emerging norms and procedures that aim to promote accountability in global governance.


The authors look at new forms of governance and ask if this transition is also occurring in the WTO. They reject Steinberg’s critique of them on the grounds that the analytical paradigm he uses is no longer properly applicable.


Lederer investigates the likelihood of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) establishing an effective and legitimate instrument of carbon governance that can guarantee accountability. He approaches this question by comparing REDD+ with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and finds that the CDM provides valuable lessons for REDD+.


Lewis analyzes the results of a study of a large Bangladeshi NGO. He discusses the complex accountability problems the NGO faces and uses this case study to examine the cultural embeddedness of accountability systems. Lewis argues that there is a need to link local and global agendas and constituencies within development work and notes that this increases the complexity of accountability pressures. He finds that NGO accountability can be only partly understood through analyzing the formal bureaucratic operation of organizational relationships and internal systems; accountability problems are not simply managerial or technical ones, but those that require analysis within a broader contextual framework. Finally, Lewis argues that this accountability framework needs to take into account organizations’ positions within wider fields of power and social networks.


Lim looks at why sovereign states comply with the rules of international law and examines compliance issues that arise under the TRIPS Agreement. He takes an interdisciplinary approach and aims to draw connections between compliance theory and intellectual property law in order to better understand TRIPS regime management. He argues that the horizontal focus of the TRIPS debate neglects important dimensions of compliance and that we ought to pay more attention to the “vertical transmission belt” that brings international norms to the domestic sphere. Lim then analyzes the norm-based and sociopolitical barriers to norm transmission and finds that the key challenge to the TRIPs community is bringing intellectual property norms home. In this respect he argues that the transnational legal process can serve as an important bridge between norm articulation at the international level and the reception of these norms domestically.


Lindenthal examines the redesign of IEO accountability systems and notes that accountability systems are an important mechanism for structuring interaction with actors in the organizational environment. She argues that the success of climate mainstreaming, as well as the legitimacy of IEOs, depends on the effectiveness of particular accountability systems. She also discusses the accountability and legitimacy of IEOs from a theoretical perspective and then examines the design of IEO accountability systems with a focus on external accountability. Lindenthal develops two strategies of “self-legitimizing” and looks at the way that different IEOs (European Bank; IMF; OECD; World Bank; and the WTO) integrate environmental and climate protection concerns into their activities. She ends with a discussion of the legitimacy strategies that IEOs use and notes that we need further qualitative research in order to determine whether the existing IEO accountability systems meet normative requirements, if we can successfully apply their mechanisms, and the extent to which they influence climate mainstreaming.


The authors note the misleading conclusions that arise out of previous research that combines transparency, publicity, and accountability. The main contribution of this article is to explain why the link between transparency and corruption is more complicated than people assume. The authors argue that this link is subject to two important and overlooked conditions: 1) the publicity condition; and 2) the accountability condition, which the authors examine in detail. Additionally, they distinguish between two types of transparency: 1) that controlled by the agent itself; and 2) transparency that is not under the agent’s immediate control. They argue that these two types of transparency affect corruption for different reasons and to different degrees. As a result, they contend that transparency on its own will do little to prevent corruption; it is dependent upon and needs to be accompanied by institutional mechanisms and other circumstances that promote publicity and accountability. This discussion of different types of transparency is followed by an analysis of previous empirical research. Lindstedt and Naurin find that there is an important distinction between agent-controlled and non-agent-controlled transparency and note that reforms that target the principal and mediators between the agent and principle may be just as important as those targeted toward the agent. Also, they caution that improving transparency, because it is dependent upon other factors, may take a long time.

Livermore notes challenges to the legitimacy and efficacy of the Codex that are the result of increased authority that undermines deliberative processes. He calls for a process-based judicial review, undertaken by the WTO appellate body, as a partial solution, arguing that this will provide an important check on the Codex and help to facilitate equal participation in Codex deliberations as well as to ensure that Codex standards are broadly accepted before they are adopted. He also looks at the impact of the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Technical Barriers to Trade agreements on the legitimacy of the Codex and analyzes deliberations in the Codex. Finally, he discusses ways that the experience of the Codex might inform international organizations and regimes.


Discusses the shift of power to whistleblowers, leaking organizations, and the news media with the advent of WikiLeaks, as well as the damage these leaks pose to peace efforts, security measures, and future negotiations. Cautions against the ability of social media to stimulate a liberation movement where one would otherwise not take root, but also argues that this should not prevent the push for new media in authoritarian states.


Lloyd discusses the work of the One World Trust (OWT) and other groups as they promote accountability at the global level in order to offer a snapshot of the current status of accountability debates and practices. He identifies areas where progress has been made and identifies the biggest remaining challenges. He then discusses OWT’s multistakeholder dialogue that led to 1) the Global Accountability Project’s Framework and Guidelines, which identifies four key dimensions of accountability (transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint/response) and identifies the ways that organizations can embed these matters into policies, procedures, and practices, and 2) the Global Accountability Index, that draws from these four dimensions of accountability in order to measure the existence and quality of accountability policies and management systems at the headquarters of global organizations. Lloyd notes four important advances in global accountability [1] promoting organizational change; [2] constructing a common framework for global actors; [3] pushing accountability up the global agenda; and [4] challenging common perceptions of global accountability.


Lund-Thomsen examines South African natural resource extraction industries and argues for a multilevel approach to evaluate the impact of the corporate responsibility approaches that international corporations and civil society groups advocate. He looks at the way that corporate social responsibility projects can affect microlevel change through an examination of a voluntary initiative in Durban, South Africa. He also examines the ways that initiatives are constrained at the domestic level and identifies three contextual factors that limit the potential of CSR initiatives to improve the corporate responsibility practice of companies in South Africa [1] the historical legacy of environmental injustice and spatial segregation that followed from apartheid; [2] the fragmented nature of the environmental governance structure; and [3] the ANC’s economic policy]. Lund-Thomsen argues that civil society can use corporate accountability strategies to alter the way that corporate activities can ultimately affect local workers and communities, but finds that both CSR and corporate accountability approaches are limited because they do not significantly alter or challenge the global-level, structural causes of conflicts between companies and stakeholders.


In response to sceptics, the authors argue in support of prospects for establishing global democratic accountability. They note the significant obstacles to electoral forms of democratic accountability on the global scale and so, instead, they make the case for non-electoral democratic accountability through more workable institutional mechanisms. This latter form of accountability can, they argue, perform equivalent democratic functions. They develop their argument via a case study of the global institutions that determine labour standards in the global garment industry. They contend that the key democratic function of electoral accountability is to ensure a reasonable degree of public control over public decision-making—something that non-electoral democratic accountability mechanisms can facilitate. They then discuss the key institutional features of this form of accountability: public transparency and public disempowerment. They also set out ways to achieve these in practice while noting conceptual and institutional challenges to doing so. Finally, they observe that the challenges should not lead us to abandon the project of global democracy and argue that developing a new framework of non-electoral accountability is institutionally feasible.


The authors look at the ways that institutional mechanisms work—or fail to work—to hold various stakeholders accountable. They reject the focus on preconditions for global democratization and instead examine ways to establish representative (global) democratic institutions within the present structure. However, they argue that because of the lack of sovereign structures we cannot just replicate familiar representative democratic institutions and that there must be institutional stability, transparency of political roles, and institutional mechanisms that expose the exercise of public power to political critiques.

Maguire notes the benefits of making available more open data, specifically in terms of extending trust if information is provided voluntarily. He discusses the potential impact of open data within government and proposes a digital redesign of public services delivery. He also cautions about the cost of this process as well as the self-interested motivations that underlie spending revelations, and notes that while open data is a prerequisite for transparency it is not sufficient by itself.


The authors examine the WTO’s Aid For Trade (AFT) initiative as a response to accountability and legitimacy challenges at the global level. They assess the AFT initiative against global administrative law principles, focusing on those of transparency, accountability, review, and monitoring. They also find that the AFT has momentum and stakeholder support and that the WTO facilitates the accountability reporting of AFT actors. They make note of the remaining challenges.


Margetts looks at the effect the Internet has on transparency. In particular, she looks at the impact of blogging sites and examines how this “democratization” of media changes the relationship between citizen-government relationships. She argues that one key negative effect of increased online transparency is the reduction in trust of governmental institutions—which may lead to uncertain and unpredictable governance—and the (problematic) way that people then have to trust others.


Markell looks at the new North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) citizen submissions process. He argues that it operates as a “soft law” instrument that expands opportunities for public involvement in governance and is “a form of enhanced ‘reasoned transparency’.” Offers an overview of the CEC and an empirical evaluation of the CEC’s track record to date. Notes the successes that are the result of the CEC process but, from his standpoint as the first director for the submissions process, also notes problems with the process itself and its future prospects. Proposes both short-term fixes to the process and a conceptual framework for a long-term solution.


Marsh looks at the availability of information on sites such as Wikileaks and discusses the limitations of transparency. While arguing that transparency is a necessary condition for public discourse and scrutiny, he notes that it is not sufficient. He cautions that the availability of information is not—and should not be viewed as—an end in itself. Marsh also looks at the important role of investigative journalists and argues that if transparency is to have real meaning it must be accompanied by assessment and given salience.


Marshaw responds to Richard Stewart’s article “The Reformation of American Administrative Law” and asks if the “dense complexity” and unease regarding legitimacy he wrote of still persists. He finds that little has improved and new problems have emerged. He notes that criticisms of the “generic accountability devices” that map onto traditional state processes, as well as the argument that they do more than put “loose boundary conditions around the exercise of official discretion.” Marshaw also examines the critiques and demands made by advocates of soft law and discusses them in relation to demands for “hard law” accountability, which he notes are difficult to suppress. He argues that abandoning hard law in favour of soft law leads to the problem of fragmented authority that Stewart identified. Aims to clarify the accountability project. He then broadens the discussion of institutional design and hopes to achieve progress by: 1) providing a new perspective on concerns about “unaccountable bureaucrats”; and 2) examining accountability techniques in order to provide a “tool kit” for institutional design. Marsh contends that unpacking accountability and focusing on the ways we can operationalize accountability allows us to better understand the task of administrative law. He highlights a “hidden unity” within accountability discourse, noting that all accountability regimes offer answers to six important and connected questions (Who is liable or accountable to whom; what they are liable for; through what processes; by what standards; behaviour is to be judged; and the potential effects of finding a breach of standards). These features describe an “accountability regime,” and Marshaw argues that we need a more nuanced view of these six questions. He contends that we need a way to group accountability regimes to better see their similarities, differences, and interconnections. Finally, he observes that accountability regimes are roughly of three types (public governance; the marketplace; non-governmental, non-market, social realm).


Mason argues that we need to do more to question the normative representation of transparency as governance-by-disclosure. In this respect he argues that Gupta’s work does not go far enough. Mason contends that we need to examine the political economy of competing governance norms if we are to understand mechanisms for disclosing environmental information. He looks at the space for civil society actors in information disclosure governance and at the ways they campaign for transparency in global environmental governance. Marsh also examines transparency and accountability standards and
argues that we need to pay more attention to the broader political and economic context of transparency practices and norms.


This collection details the motivation for creating the multi-stakeholder coalition Open Government Partnership (OGP) and examines guiding principles and emerging best practices for funding and delivering aid. It also sets out aid transparency principles and discuss the development of a common standard.


Miller asks if international institutions can use processes of reasoning and deliberation to establish limits on the global exercise of power. He focuses on knowledge-making and decision-making processes in international governance [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)] with an eye to democratic legitimacy. He then examines three mechanisms that international institutions contribute [1) setting international knowledge standards; 2) “making global kinds”; and 3) constructing new deliberative spaces]. Miller argues that if international institutions develop and enhance open systems of knowledge production, they might strengthen limits on other actors’ legitimate exercise of power and reduce their own reliance on forms of illegitimate, compulsory power.


Mitchell examines the roles of accountability, legitimacy, and transparency in the improvement of global environmental governance. He evaluates the success of policies that rely on transparency and information in generating more environmentally-beneficial behaviour, and investigates how legitimacy and accountability contribute to this effectiveness. He focuses on transparency for governance rather transparency of governance, looking at particular processes and mechanisms in an attempt to discover the conditions most likely to promote environmentally-desirable behaviour. He then develops a typology of transparency policies that sets out the conditions under which different types of transparency are likely to be effective and discusses the implications for research and policy.


The authors examine the WTO’s contribution to democracy at the global level through an analysis of decision making in the WTO. They focus on dispute settlement decisions and Agreements on Members. They look at decision making in the WTO in light of democratic theory and at compliance with dispute settlement tribunals.


Mittelman examines restratification through an analysis of the interactions between the IMF and global forums. He looks at this though an historical analysis, institutions and practices that occur along horizontal dimensions of global governance, and hierarchies of social forces on the vertical dimension. He argues that all three turn on material power relations and that we ought to understand this process in terms of: 1) evolving and devolving structures of globalization; 2) vesting authority; and 3) reliance on informal networks. He examines the way these open transnational space with democratic potential. Mittelman draws on interview work and from personal engagement with UN agencies. He details five characteristics of restratification (fluidity; new groupings; new alliances; hybridity; and multidirectionality) and looks at the impact this may have on accountability frameworks.


Moore introduces the journal’s special issue on transparency by noting the democratic benefits of greater transparency, but underscores that these benefits require context. The purpose of the special issue is to question an often-unthinking consensus on transparency and to remind people that transparency cannot, in and of itself, function as an all-powerful political tonic. It includes articles that question transparency from a variety of perspectives: legal; journalistic; governance; technological; practical; and civic.


Beginning from the premise that a useful assessment of the democratic legitimacy of international institutions requires asking whether they approximate the real-world democracy achieved by states, Moravcsik argues for a comparative empirical analysis of modern advanced industrial democracies and international institutions. He argues that if we apply these normative and empirical criteria to international institutions we find they do not lack democratic legitimacy, as is typically assumed. While some international institutions suffer from a democratic deficit, he finds “it is by no means obvious that many do.” He contends that demonstrating a deficit requires more, and different, empirical analysis. Moravcsik illustrates his argument through an analysis of the EU, which he examines in light of four conceptions of democracy. He finds that the democratic credentials of the EU fall within the norm for advanced industrial democracies; this renders criticisms of the EU as democratically illegitimate unwarranted.


Mulgan notes the way that accountability has been extended beyond
the traditional scope of being required to give an account of actions to an authority; instead, it now encompasses: 1) professional and personal responsibility; 2) control without interaction or exchange; 3) responsiveness to citizens without inducements; and 4) accountability as dialogue. Mulgan structures his article around these four extended conceptions of accountability, analyzing the implications of these and linking each to the original, core meaning of the concept. He notes the tendency to equate accountability with actions that are ultimately not the same, but argues that this identification is not inevitable. He suggests that no single type of institutional structure is capable of ensuring effective accountability for all types of public activity and notes that we need to tailor institutional design. He also argues that we can best understand accountability in these contexts by utilizing a more restrictive understanding of accountability.


Murphy argues that NGOs make an important contribution to international trade politics. She focuses on non-profit advocacy groups that attempt to reform the WTO and looks at two NGO campaigns that have attempted to limit the authority of the WTO in relation to developing states. She contends that these cases (access to medicine and investment negotiations) highlight lessons for NGO involvement with the WTO; NGOs are able to exert agenda-setting influence at the WTO, and, in some cases, affect the outcomes of negotiations, but to do so they need to utilize political opportunities, mobilize normative consensus, and take state interests into account.


Murray examines the desirability of transparency. To do so, he looks at the relationship between transparency and privacy through an analysis of WikiLeaks, and focuses on the legal questions surrounding the site. In particular, he critiques the secrecy that WikiLeaks pursues for itself while pursuing transparency for others. He asks whether, and under what circumstances, transparency is desirable, and notes the increased role of “spin” when information is made public, and argues that this does not improve transparency. He contends that greater transparency is not necessarily in the interest of society and that, for transparency to serve this purpose, we need to comply with legal and normative principles.


Naiki looks at the role and function of the SPS Committee and analyzes state interactions within the SPS Committee as they occur independent of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. She seeks to contribute to our understanding of the WTO in terms of Member States’ activities, the participation of developing countries, and the functions of the SPS Committee and the Technical Barriers to Trade Committee. Naiki also looks at the role of the SPS Committee in the context of WTO accountability, finding that the Committee has reinforced accountability among member states, and argues that the Committee system can be another accountability mechanism. She examines accountability’s connection with participation and transparency in the SPS Committee and examines the legitimacy of the Committee. The article also looks at the functions of the SPS Committee and argues that it can improve the accountability of Member States. It discusses this with respect to different categories of accountability (legal, peer, and reputational): it finds that the WTO dispute settlement system extends a significant role to private firms, goes beyond a state-to-state relationship, and only contributes to the WTO’s external accountability in a very limited way.


Najam and Halle discuss global environmental governance’s general culture of accountability. They identify three levels of accountability in international organizations [1] accountability to mandate; [2] institutional accountability; and [3] accountability to constituency]. They then highlight areas with a more evolved culture of international accountability and offer five reasons that explain why the culture of unaccountability is so pervasive [the GEG’s tendency to: 1) be declaratory rather than regulatory; 2) function as a negotiation system rather than an implementation system; 3) fail to represent those who shape environmental governance in decision-making; 4) fail to match the scale of ambition to the scale of the problems and institutional capabilities; and 5) lack real disincentives for failure to implement]. They propose seven ideas for GEG reform [1) national reporting requirements and mechanisms for secretariats to collect, collate and report on performance indicators; 2) complete the compilation of a register of global goals and obligations; 3) create a compendium of best practices in compliance and enforcement; 4) Require independent third-party reviews and monitoring of performance; 5) Establish a system of incentives for better performance and reward good behaviour and early action; 6) make accountability a key function of the GMEF; and 7) construct something resembling a global version of the Aarhus Convention].


Nanz and Steffek look at global decision making from a deliberative democracy perspective. They argue that democratic legitimacy in global governance depends upon an institutionalized public sphere that exists beyond national boundaries. They also contend that civil society plays an important role in creating this public sphere and that civil society actors can be a “discursive interface” between international organizations and a global citizenry and that organized civil society can act as a “transmission belt” between IO deliberative processes and emerging transnational public spheres. They then examine the connection between decision-making processes, citizen participation, and public deliberation. Nanz and Steffek support
their claims with examples from the WTO. They also discuss necessary preconditions that must be met before civil society organizations can become legitimate participants in global politics, as well as elements that they argue will promote public deliberation about the WTO.


Newell looks at the relationship between companies and local communities in order to better understand the developmental implications of the CSR agenda. He examines the extent to which poorer groups are protected by mechanisms designed to improve the social and environmental conduct of firms, and asks who benefits from corporate social responsibility and under what conditions. Newell argues that existing CSR approaches have significant limitations, namely a lack of sufficient checks and balances for irresponsible businesses. He draws from an analysis of case studies on large firms in India that work with poor communities. Finally, he examines community-based accountability strategies and looks at ways to strengthen multi-stakeholder accountability.


Here, Newell examines the politics of accountability through an analysis of climate change, arguing that accountability is central to the study of global environmental politics because it: 1) helps us to understand power and the division of rights and responsibilities; 2) gives us a vocabulary for thinking about liability and redress; and 3) highlights procedural democratic deficits as it highlights questions of representation and participation. Newell uses the lens of accountability to look at civil society group engagement with global actors and to examine the ways their strategies shift (and why). Identifies two main approaches groups have to accountability: 1) groups that aim to increase answerability for actions, and 2) groups that pursue enforceability when there is a failure to deliver on obligations. He contends that these approaches highlight competing understandings and practices of accountability. He analyzes both traditional methods aimed to increase public accountability and the more recent role of corporate accountability aimed at promoting “civil regulation”—civil society based regulation of the private sector. His discussion of civil regulation addresses shareholder activism, corporate accountability movements, and civil society accountability. Newell suggests that we can gain traction by thinking about inter-regime relations in terms of competing accountabilities. He ends with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of civil society actors as they take on these accountability roles and notes that civil society groups have been successful in increasing democratic accountability.


This text discusses three elements necessary for mutual accountability: 1) a shared agenda; 2) monitoring and evaluating commitments and actions; and 3) dialogue and review. It notes the problems measuring performance and examines the constraints that arise from incomplete reporting, observing systematic problems at the program design and implementation stage, as well as in terms of the ability to examine the outcome and impacts of projects. It also looks at six categories of the aid-for-trade agenda in order to examine it, and does so with a particular emphasis on the OECD and the WTO. It argues for: 1) a focus on results throughout an aid project’s cycle; 2) the use of systematic learning; and 3) independent joint evaluations. It also suggests tools that might provide a global perspective in order to facilitate drawing broader lessons and impacts from these programs. It notes the impact of a country’s broader context and propose questions that will improve analysis in this context. It also notes the need to focus evaluations on the impact of programs/projects upon trade. It focuses on the ability to increase transparency and compare results in order to make aid-for-trade more effective. In particular, it looks at managing for development results (MfDR); it details five principles and five core elements of MfDR and highlight the benefits of harmonizing different results measurement systems.


O’Toole argues for the benefits that come from extending public administration research to the issues in political science (and vice versa). In particular, he contends that public administration needs to pay systemic attention to the implications of networked action; networks that implicate key issues in political science research. He details core issues in the networked character of public administrative action that researchers need to take into account. He also asks questions about accountability in a multi-government, multi-level system and notes that we need to develop a vocabulary and mode of analysis if we are to identify the full range of issues that are at stake.


The authors offer a strategic analysis of why states allow NGOs to monitor policy implementation in international cooperation. They argue that states get two payoffs for cooperation: 1) material payoffs that depend on their success or failure, and 2) legitimacy payoffs that depend on domestic perceptions. They note that NGO monitoring may influence both types of payoffs and examine the conditions under which states will allow their policy implementation to be monitored. Pallas and Urpelainen find two benefits of NGO monitoring: 1) mitigating free-rider incentives, and 2) a “stamp of approval” for state cooperation. They note, however, that states risk adverse reputational effects if cooperative policy implementation fails. They discuss the conditions under which states are likely to allow NGO participation and offer a hypothesis to help understand when the benefits of NGO monitoring might exceed the costs, as well as how NGO participation influences state behaviour. They then look at three case studies: 1) the Kyoto Protocol; 2) the World Bank; and 3) the Global Environment Facility. Finally, they discuss the broader implications of their findings for research on NGO participation in international politics.

Palombella discusses the rule of law as it implies an institutional scheme bearing the duality of law: he examines this in the global arena. He analyzes frames of law as they intersect in the global environment, arguing that it is important to deal with law as a system, and considers the impact of constructing global administrative law as a law for the globe. Finally, he examines the relationship between responsibility and accountability.


Parks scrutinises the creation of the first external accountability mechanisms for an IEO. She examines the role of civil society and member State demands for accountability, as well as the origins of accountability claims in the development of this mechanism at the World Bank. She notes that the issue was originally internal to the World Bank—in the form of an Inspection Panel—but ended up as an external accountability mechanism. She also examines the rise of external IEO accountability and looks at the ways that civil society organizations have tried to make the WTO more accountable through, among other things, calls for greater transparency.


Paterson examines reforms to enhance public transparency and participation at the WTO. He counters arguments advanced by social constructivists and liberal pluralists and argues that current reforms use the language of transparency and participation to try to enhance the WTO’s legitimacy, but that these reforms are unable to facilitate significant policy change. He identifies three forms of democratic deficits in the WTO, looks at the role of NGOs in terms of addressing these democratic deficits, and evaluates transparency and participation reforms at the WTO from the perspective of NGOs. Paterson draws from his research asking members of the NGOs whether these reforms enhance public transparency and participation at the WTO: he finds that NGOs are frustrated and critical of participation and transparency in the Dispute Settlement Body.


Pauwelyn and Berman examine the WTO’s response to the 2008–2009 financial crisis in light of the concepts and principles of the Global Administrative Law project. They detail the emergence of informal administrative actions that go beyond the traditional member-dominated approach at the WTO. Focusing on the WTO’s initial reaction to the financial crisis, they find that the Director General and Secretariat dominated the initial reaction and did so without an explicit mandate or approval. They argue that this response illustrates the emergence of informal administrative actions that go beyond the traditional member-dominated WTO.


In light of the increasing demand for democratic legitimacy, Piewitt examines civil society inclusion as a way to enhance the transparency and accountability of the international trade regime. She identifies two obstacles to the inclusiveness of global civil society in international organizations and examines the extent to which these obstacles are present within the WTO. To do this, she analyzes the sectoral and regional distribution of CSOs that have participated in WTO public outreach programs in a 10-year timespan, applying a typology of CSOs. She then examines the institutional and legal framework of civil society participation in the WTO. Looking at participation at Ministerial conferences in terms of the north-south divide, Piewitt finds that it can be mitigated but not eliminated by global venue rotation: she concludes that the individual exchange of information is important for NGOs.


Raggo notes that transnational non-governmental organizations contain important analytical challenges for our understanding of accountability. She asks how transnational NGOs hold others and themselves accountable as well as whom they hold accountable, drawing from Grant and Keohane’s (2005) seven accountability mechanisms to do so, and noting several important limitations. She also offers an empirical analysis based on data drawn from 152 in-depth interviews with leaders of transnational NGOs. Her analysis assesses how transnational NGO leaders perceive accountability and finds that they develop views as accountability subjects and accountability holders—an important analytical distinction. She finds that some mechanisms are increasingly constraining as organizations are stronger while some constraints have a weak influence upon already weak organizations, and argues that the reputational mechanism is one of the main constraining mechanisms on transnational NGOs and that the peer mechanism appears to be a weak constraint on them.


Raggo and Schmitz examine the varying institutional structures and accountability mechanisms of transnational NGOs; noting how the different perceptions affect behaviour and incentives, they examine the ways that leaders of TNGOs discuss core challenges of governance and accountability. The authors approach decision-making processes and organizational constraints from an analysis of 152 semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions, as well as financial and organizational data. They use this data to identify the main themes relating to governance, as highlighted by the respon-
dents, and to detail how organizational structure and change intersect with accountability. They argue that the study of transnational NGO leaders’ views about governance and accountability provides new insights into ongoing debates about global governance, and find that accountability is central to structuring decisions about governance.

Ramsay, I. (2006). Consumer law, regulatory capitalism and the “new learning” in regulation. Sydney Law Review, 28(1), 9–35. Ramsay looks at regulatory trilemma critiques and innovation in regulatory fields. He examines the implications of new learning on regulation for consumer law and policy through an analysis of consumer regulatory developments. With a focus on the consumer as a regulatory subject and the influence of different levels (regional, national, international) of consumer law and policy, Ramsay examines five areas of consumer regulation (self-regulation changes; the role of the Office of Fair Trading; market gatekeepers; financial services Ombudsmen; and the Community Reinvestment Act). He discusses the influence of both decentralization and transnational and international norms and institutions, arguing that we need further empirical evaluation of the effects of regulatory regimes. Finally, he notes a movement toward greater formality, accountability, and transparency, as well as the increasing role of third parties.

Ranganathan, S. (2006, November). Accountability in global governance. Report. A Global Administrative Law Project Workshop: Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law. The workshop focuses on different conceptions of accountability with an aim to achieving a common understanding of its elements and mechanisms. The primary questions the participants seek to answer are how to identify: 1) the elements of accountability and ways to make power holders accountable; 2) who can invoke accountability mechanisms and to what ends; and 3) how to operationalize accountability mechanisms in decision making. The report notes disagreement among participants as to whether accountability ought to be interpreted broadly or narrowly (with a majority preferring a broad interpretation). There was also disagreement as to the appropriate relationship between democracy and accountability, with many participants arguing that democracy is the basis for claims for accountability; the general agreement was that democracy provides a rational explanation as to why people care about accountability.

Reinisch, A. (2001). Securing the accountability of international organizations. Global Governance, 7(2), 131–149. Reinisch looks at fundamental rights violations by international organizations and asks what we can and should do in order to protect against these violations. He finds that international law and international forums do not always provide adequate protection and argues that, because of this, we need to develop ways to ensure that IOs respect fundamental rights, as well as forums that could ensure this obligation is met. He looks at fundamental rights as part of general unwritten international law and at whether or not this law is binding on IOs. Reinisch argues that when states transfer tasks to non-state actors effective accountability mechanisms are necessary; they are responsible for ensuring that jurisdictional gaps do not arise, and human rights bodies should hold states accountable if they do not prevent the human rights infringements of IOs.

Risse, T. (2004). Global governance and communicative action. Government and Opposition, 39(2), 288–313. Risse examines the potential contributions of arguing and communicative action as non-hierarchical steering modes in global governance. He looks at two forms of non-hierarchical steering (positive incentives and negative sanctions, and the moral legitimacy of rules and norms) and suggests that arguing and communicative action might improve the legitimacy of global governance by providing stakeholders with increased voice and, though deliberative processes, facilitating greater problem-solving abilities of government institutions. He also examines the ways that deliberative processes impact rule-setting and implementation argues that, in order to benefit from this, there must be a communicative feedback loop in order to hold agents accountable. Without this, he argues, there is a danger of sacrificing accountability and legitimacy for efficiency.

Roberts, A. (2004). A partial revolution: The diplomatic ethos and transparency in intergovernmental organizations. Public Administration Review, 64(4), 410–424. Roberts looks at the limitations of promoting transparency within organizations and argues that “a true revolution in transparency” requires a more substantial right to information of IO activities. He examines this through an analysis of the WTO and the IMF and contends that increasing transparency in this way may be justified by the protection of basic human rights. He also looks at access to information within IOs and examines transparency in the WTO’s dispute settlement process, noting advances in IOs but arguing that diplomatic confidentiality remains a significant barrier to improved transparency. He suggests that questions of greater transparency cannot be left entirely to national governments and notes that the WTO and IMF are capable of more demanding disclosure regimes.

Rosen-Zvi, I. (2011). Climate change governance: Mapping the terrain. Carbon & Climate Law Review, 5(2), 234–243. Rosen-Zvi looks at the failures of international climate change negotiations and examine new governance or soft law approaches; discuss the effects of this on the ways that norms are produced and the dissatisfaction with conventional models of regulation. He examines the theoretical underpinnings of the regulatory tools of new governance and their implications on climate change regulation. He notes that state and local governments are filling a void left by poorly international efforts to address climate change; argues that while these actions are not sufficient to address the problem they are still significant. Rosen-Zvi also looks at different facets of regulation and examine the benefits of hybrid regulatory norms, in particular the public-private initiative the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF). He examines the specifics of climate change that make regulation difficult and explores the benefits of creative forms of soft regulation uses by environmental groups, NGOs, and INGOs. He then discusses three major transformations associated with new governance: 1) state to non-state; 2) public to private; and 3) mandatory to vol-
untary. Finally, he argues that the distinctions between public/private and mandatory/voluntary are best understood as existing on a continuum, that the distinctions are fluid and dynamic, and that traditional regulation should be complemented with new governance mechanisms.


The authors discuss the extent to which we can draw lessons from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to use in the design of the UN-REDD program. They draw from document and literature analysis and interviews with key actors in order to discuss the concepts of legitimacy, effectiveness and performance and how they relate to the design and functioning of GEF and UN-REDD. They find that with respect to global design the UN-REDD initiative poses major challenges for effectiveness and legitimacy, is at least politically feasible.


Saurugger analyzes the emergence of the participatory turn at the EU level and looks at the role of civil society in decision-making procedures. She examines the role of participatory democracy in light of: 1) its relationship with representative democracy; and 2) multiple and contradictory interpretations. She argues that there is a hegemonic discourse of participatory democracy, but that the participatory norm has not been homogenously implemented and is subject to differential interpretations. Saurugger also discusses competing conceptions of democracy in the EU and analyzes debates surrounding the emergence of a participatory norm at the European level. She analyzes the instruments that implemented the norm and looks at the way the norm has developed: she finds that civil society participation led to the development of the participatory turn in EU democracy, but that it did so slowly and not in a linear way. Finally, Saurugger notes that both strategy, routinization, and normative framing played an important role in its acceptance.


Savage and Weale look at two-level games from a normative perspective and ask what taking this approach might mean for the responsibilities that political representatives have: 1) to their international partners; and 2) to their domestic constituents. They examine the implications of this approach to two-level games for democratic accountability at the domestic level and in terms of the obligations to international negotiating partners. To do so, they utilize two concepts: representation and accountability. They argue that political representation must combine authorization and accountability, and that accountability must be reasoned and entail a commitment to fair co-operation and “a willingness to accept the burdens of judgement.” They also contend that the interlocking norms of fairness and accountability restrict the arguments that can be legitimately advanced in two-level games. According to Savage and Weale, strategic thinking takes both levels into account and that normative requirements of reasonableness operate with equal force at both levels. They suggest that their argument has implications for democratic theory and practice.


In response to a gap in the literature, Schäfer compares the European Employment Strategy (EES) to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) of the EU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Economic Surveys, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article IV Consultations. He compares the above organizations in order to better understand the OMC and draws from interviews with the organizations’ staff in order to do so. Schäfer identifies six common features of multilateral surveillance from this research, with the aim of constructing a general model of multilateral surveillance which can be subject to further empirical analysis. He finds that multilateral surveillance is primarily chosen for its capacity to facilitate compromise.


Schmateman looks at Ontario’s mandated municipal performance measurement program and evaluates the performance reports and its goals. She finds that despite clear measurements and reporting standards there are significant differences in the overall quality of the municipal reports. Despite the goal of increased accountability, municipalities do not invest the time or resources and produce low-quality reports. Schmateman attributes this to the perception of low demand, finding that citizens are not demanding the reports, and argues that there needs to be more research to determine what is responsible for this low demand. She then sets out criteria for better reporting and notes that the goal of accountability to citizens is not possible under the current system because of a lack of transparency and limited report production.


Scholte looks at the possibility of civil society activity obtaining greater democratic accountability from international organizations. He details the growth of civil society’s engagement with global governance, and discusses four ways that civil society associations have increased accountability here: 1) increasing the public transparency of global governance operations; 2) monitoring and reviewing global policies; 3) seeking redress for mistakes and harms attributable to global regulatory bodies; and 4) advancing the creation of formal accountability mechanisms for global governance], and identifies six general issues that impact the extent of civil society achievement [1) resources; 2) networking; 3) official attitudes; 4) the mass media; 5) political culture; and 6) the democratic accountability of civil society organizations]. Scholte draws heavily on observations of the
IMF and finds that civil society associations play an important role in terms of strengthening democratic accountability in global regulatory arrangements. He concludes by suggesting ways to enhance civil society contributions to global democracy.


Here, Scholte examines civil society’s contributions to increasing accountability. He observes that existing contributions in this respect are disproportionate in terms of constituents in the global north and south, and argues that in order to acquire greater effectiveness and legitimacy, global governance has to become more accountable. He suggests several institutional reforms, including: 1) greater allocation of funds for relations with CSOs; 2) databases of relevant CSOs; 3) improving the staff for CSO liaison; 4) better guidance and training on relations with CSOs; 5) clearer and more substantial incentives to engage with civil society; 6) promoting relations with CSOs; and 7) cultivating positive institutional attitudes towards civil society.


Here, Scholte examines the relationship between civil society and accountability in global governance and sets out a framework of analysis for case studies on a variety of global regulatory institutions. He argues that global governance institutions are accountable to the extent that: 1) it is transparent to those affected; 2) consults those affected; 3) reports to those affected; and 4) provides redress to those who are adversely affected. He notes that all case studies examine the ways and to what extents civil society activities advance these four aspects of accountability. Scholte then discusses global governance as “a complex of rules and regulatory institutions that apply to transnational jurisdictions and constituencies” and sets out six different types of global regulatory bodies: intergovernmental; transgovernmental; interregional; translocal; private; and public-private hybrids. He views accountability as a process, examining the shortcomings of accountability in terms of global governance, and argues that these pose a major challenge to delivering effective and legitimate public policy. He emphasizes democratic accountability. Finally, Scholte sets out contrasting definitions of civil society and asks if civil society activities can increase levels of global governance accountability and facilitate substantial redistributions of global governance accountabilities towards less privileged countries.


The aim of the book is to elaborate a conceptualization of global governance, accountability, and civil society, and to relate this analytical framework to 13 arrangements for transnational regulation. Evidence from the 13 case studies in this book indicates that the general picture on delivering accountability is poor. The text queries the extent to which civil society engagement can answer accountability deficits in contemporary global governance. It notes that due to the release of more documentation and public information operations more people are aware of the nature and significance of global regulatory apparatuses in contemporary society; however, it argues that CSOs have done little to address issues of meaningful transparency. It also contends that civil society matters for democratic accountability in contemporary global governance, but notes that accountability is not an unproblematic good and cautions that the overall extent of civil society influence on democratic accountability in global governance must not be overestimated. It argues that it is always necessary to ask “accountability for whom” and “accountability for what purpose.” The text also looks at the accountability of civil society organizations and finds that the record here is as mixed as the record on accountability in global governance.


Schouten and Glasbergen note the new global governing patterns created by the institutionalization of private governance and observe that this raises legitimacy questions. They argue that these legitimacy challenges are particularly significant for private governance initiatives and examine three reasons why this is the case. Responding to a gap in the literature, they investigate how legitimacy emerges in private governance initiatives though an analysis of the legitimation process of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) as a social practice in which specific action strategies are developed. They employ three perspectives to see how accountability emerges in the RSPO (the legal approach; the political philosophical approach; and the sociological approach) and draw from interviews and an analysis of RSPO and stakeholder documents. Finally, they identify tensions and trade-offs between the three elements of the legitimation process.


Scott examines the relationship between accountability and autonomy. He notes that the central problem of accountability is the result of a substantial delegation of authority and highlights the dilemma between control and granting sufficient autonomy for people to achieve their tasks. He uses a concept of “extended accountability” to argue that the fragmentation of the public sector has increased the transparency of dense accountability networks. In addressing the problem of scope, Scott notes the importance of separating the “accountability to whom?” question from that of “accountability for what?”; he identifies three broad classes within each of these two categories (upwards accountability, horizontal accountability, and downwards accountability; economic values, social and procedural values, and continuity/security values). He then develops possible configurations of these questions and, in so doing, offers nine possible pairs of co-ordinates. Scott observes that objectives behind accountability are ill-defined and examines some of the motives for accountability. He suggests that conflict and tension are inevitable with complex accountability webs and argues that we should not try to iron out conflict, but use this “in order to
hold regimes in appropriate tension.” He finds that there is potential to make networks of accountability more transparent and to harness these networks in order to achieve affective accountability or control.

Scott, S. V. (2008). The problem of unequal treaties in contemporary international law: How the powerful have reneged on the political compacts within which five cornerstone treaties of global governance are situated. *Journal of International Law and International Relations, 4*(2), 101–126.

Scott examines global governance treaties that have been reneged upon in order to better understand regime noncompliance and obstacles to political accommodation. She looks at international law in a global governance context. She also analyzes power relations and imbalances and discusses this with respect to the legitimacy deficit in international law.


Skelcher examines institutional design for polycentric systems of governance. He looks at European Integration theory as a special case of democratic network governance and discusses the problems that arise from both theoretical and technical/practical angles. Skelcher aims to develop a general theory for network governance that will apply at the subnational, national, and supranational levels. He thus specifically discusses the institutional design of consociationalism in order to examine collective democratic decision making under conditions of plural political authority. He contends that institutional design needs to be addressed at both the formal organizational level and in terms of informal norms and behaviours. Skelcher also argues that consociationalism’s effectiveness for polycentric governance depends on the context of this power-sharing; consequently, we need to examine the ways that polycentric governance impacts jurisdictional integrity and have a better understanding of jurisdictional integrity. Finally, he looks at boundary integrity and its vertical and lateral limits.


Slaughter looks to better utilize government networks in order to address problems of global governance. She argues that government networks do a better job than global policy networks in terms of identifying who is exercising power (and on behalf of whom); moreover, government networks can perform many of the functions of a world government. She aims to develop an informal alternative to an actual global constitution and offers a set of principles and norms that can operate informally. Looking at a global governance system of government networks—what Slaughter calls “a networked world order”—she argues for its effectiveness and accountability. She then sets out five ways to increase the accountability of government and offers five norms to apply to members of government networks as they interact with each other. She also examines the concept of “disaggregated sovereignty,” arguing that government officials ought to be able to exercise some sovereignty in the global context and noting that this conception of sovereignty is a positive one, understood as the capacity to enter into international regulatory regimes. She also observes that this type of sovereignty also carries an obligation to adhere to international law.


Smillie examines the central role that NGOs played in the campaign to ban conflict diamonds, arguing that the greatest NGO contribution was their continuing pressure on governments and the industry to act quickly and decisively. He details conflicts between NGOs and other parties as well as how they were resolved. His essay highlights three main accountability issues in the Kimberley Process: 1) the power of mutual accountability arrangements; the role of traditional forms of accountability; and 3) NGO legitimacy and representation regarding their presence in governmental and private sector affairs.


Noting that the problem of cultural diversity is a multilayered, polycentric problem that can (correctly) be described in many ways, Smith focuses on one description: that our cultural values shape how we see any subject and affects regulatory responses and the construction of rules. She argues that disagreements between the WTO negotiators on the Doha Development Round agenda topics are inevitable because people perceive the subject, rules, and amendments differently and that culture is important to all aspects of international trade regulation. She outlines three ways that WTO rules on international agricultural trade are viewed—1) as reductions in trade barriers/fiscal cuts; 2) in terms of special and differential treatment; and 3) in terms of trade/non-trade concerns—and argues that even when these categories and their rankings are accepted, disagreements about the scope of the disagreement are what create difficulties in multilateral agreements. Smith draws from Fuller’s discussion of the polycentric problem as a spiderweb and argues that the paths people choose are not neutral, but influenced by cultural ideas (that change over time); she maps the three interpretations of the agricultural problem onto this and illustrated additional “strands” to underscore the complexity of the polycentric problem and to highlight the problems of placing a regulatory structure on top of a polycentric problem—a static “snapshot” that “becomes part of the problem and not the solution to it.”


Somek argues that when a broad range of phenomena enter the scope of GAL it departs from the analogy that grounded the project. He contends that the paradigm shift decentres the project and we can no longer consider the paradigmatic core of administrative law to be regulation on the basis of delegation; moreover, there is no
other relationship that can claim this role. This situation is, he argues, “rhizomatic” and leaves us without a system or center but with “merely a number of family resemblances among different processes.” He notes that GAL now leaves relationships unclear. If we wish to remedy this then we need legal reform in which GAL can determine legal relationships.


Spagnuolo draws on the earth system governance conceptual framework to investigate how global administrative law can enhance equal participation and democracy beyond the state. She argues that, because administrative law techniques reflect the dominant position of industrialized countries, we need to use a pluralistic approach to GAL. She then examines the relationship between GAL and deliberative democracy, detailing the way that procedural rights and norms are used to allow industrial countries to maintain their dominant positions, and looking at ways that diversity and pluralism might be used to shape GAL. Spagnuolo finds that we need administrative law principles and mechanisms typically at the state level in order to establish a degree of democratic legitimacy in earth system governance, but cautions that they may have adverse effects if they are applied beyond the state.


Steffek argues that the key problem affecting international governance is not a lack of accountability in the managerial sense, but a lack of accountability to the wider public; this problem of public accountability lies at the core of the democratic deficit of international governance. Steffek suggests that understanding “public accountability” as it includes opportunities for citizens to monitor and engage in debate is on the decline, with talk of stakeholders replacing talk of citizens. The article responds to this and makes a strong case for the “public” in public accountability. He also discusses the definitional struggle over the concept and argues that 1) the stakeholder concept; 2) the principal-agent framing; and 3) the view of public accountability as an umbrella concept are undermining the traditional view of public accountability as democratic accountability. Steffek contends that public accountability should always mean direct accountability to citizens; public accountability is a specific type of accountability relationship that functions through critical debate in the public sphere and contributes to the broader task of democratic accountability. The public sphere that is necessary for this requires 1) a functioning media infrastructure, and 2) a transnational civil society. According to Steffek, democratic mechanisms of accountability are electoral, legal, and public (which includes the role of NGOs).


Here, Steffek draws on previous research data in order to examine why participatory arrangements between CSOs and IOs emerged. He concentrates on data that deal with the conditions of access CSOs have to the policy-making process of international organizations. His starting point is the hypothesis that the institutionalization or cooperation between IOs and non-state actors is determined by the benefits that both sides, but in particular IOs, expect. Steffek finds that the more an IO is forced to act in a local context, the more it seeks to influence human behaviour in that context and the more likely it is to interact with organized civil society. He notes that IO–CSO collaboration is essentially about bridging the gap between the global and the local levels. He compares the empirical evidence from four international policy fields with theory-guided expectations and identifies four possible situations where an IO might be particularly interested in cooperating with non-state actors: 1) pinpointing new political issues or technological problems that need to be dealt with; 2) acquiring additional expertise to formulate policies; 3) implementing policies; and 4) evaluating the success of its policies and monitoring member state compliance with its treaties. He concludes that there is a persistent variation of participation across policy fields.


Here Steffek looks at the debate over the legitimacy of international governance, noting that the focus is on the democratic deficit and input legitimacy and arguing that insufficient attention is paid to output legitimation. He contends that when we approach output legitimation as something that rests on tangible benefits that individuals receive from governance, then we miss its normative content.
He draws from Scharpf and focuses on the historical and normative dimensions of output legitimacy. Steffek identifies four central motives of an early legitimating account of IOs (1) to serve the common good; 2) to resolve transnational problems; 3) to secure the quality of governance; and 4) to shield experts and administrators from abuses of power) and argues for the benefits it can offer.


The authors ask whether, how, and under what conditions civil society participation can contribute to the democratic quality of European and global governance. They look at people’s expectations about civil society contributions to democratic governance beyond the state, as well as the conditions that are necessary for civil society to be able to perform these functions. They examine two goals of participatory procedures: public accountability and the quality of decisions and discuss the two claims that flow from this (the accountability claim and the epistemic claim). They look at two case studies: the European Commission and European Food Safety Authority, and the WTO and Codex Alimentarius. They identify the goals of existing participatory procedures and assess the extent to which they are achieved in practice. They conclude that the different roles assigned to civil society organizations can be difficult to reconcile and that CSOs may face a trade-off between working within governance arrangements and contesting them in public.


Steinberg critiques Lang and Scott’s analysis and description, arguing that they fail to take into account the central role of states as principals who direct the activities of committee representatives. He analyzes Lang and Scott’s use of data and analysis and discusses the role of intergovernmental bargaining in WTO committees. Steinberg argues that studying the state is necessary if we wish to understand and assess WTO committees and that interest-based intergovernmental frameworks are better suited to understanding how WTO committees operate.


Tallberg proposes three analytical approaches to transnational access to IOs: 1) rational choice institutionalism, which privileges concerns about functional efficiency; 2) sociological institutionalism, which privileges concerns about democratic legitimacy; and 3) power-oriented institutionalism, which privileges concerns about power implications. Within this, he sets out a series of theories and hypotheses. He argues for engaging in theoretical dialogue and outlines three alternative models for this: 1) competitive testing of hypotheses; 2) additive explanatory power; and 3) complementary domains of application (or the “domain-of-application” approach). Tallberg undertakes this analysis in order to set the ground for systematic research on transnational access and finds that the three approaches have comparative advantages in terms of accounting for variation across different dimensions. He suggests that changing norms of legitimate global governance best explain why international institutions have opened up to civil society actors, and differences in the functional benefits that TNAs offer may account for patterns of variation across international institutions.


The authors assess the empirical viability of the normative vision to democratize existing institutional arrangements through the involvement of civil society actors. Their aim is to advance a new agenda in research on global democracy; in doing so, they look at the empirical preconditions of alternative theoretical models. They focus on existing patterns of participation and accountability and the implications these have for the normative vision of “democratic polycentrism.” They note that existing empirical patterns in global governance are problematic and outline four causes for concern: the question of who gets to participate; where in global governance CSOs get to participate; when CSOs get to participate; and how CSOs get to participate. They also argue that civil society actors are well-positioned to contribute to the development of democratic polycentrism. They draw upon primary empirical observations and secondary sources in order to map patterns of civil society involvement in global governance and look at mechanisms that CSOs can use to hold states and international institutions accountable for their decisions (judicial access; monitoring state commitments; and policy evaluation) and contend that external accountability to civil society actors may constructively supplement chains of internal accountability within international institutions. They also examine whether civil society actors themselves live up to standards of participation and accountability. The authors conclude that existing procedures and practices fail to meet normative criteria of democratic polycentrism; they may, however, be a step in a long-term process of this kind of democratization.


Turk and Eyster examine the UNHCR’s efforts to become more accountable, both internally and externally. They identify three overarching dimensions of accountability in UNHCR (accountability of governments providing humanitarian assistance and international protection; legal accountability regarding government action toward refugees; and accountability to persons of concern and UNHCR’s partners). They argue that the most effective solution to accountability problems is developing a culture of accountability within the organization. One of the best ways to do this is to map authority across the organization. They then discuss the Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF) and the steps the UNHCR has taken to improve accountability.

Vandenbergh examines a new form of governance that achieves public ends through private contracting. He notes that NGOs are using consumer pressure to demand that corporations engage in private regulation and argues that networks of private contracts are an integral part of an emerging global environmental governance regime. He also looks at the extent and influence of the private environmental contracting that emerged in the regulatory gap created by shifts in global trade production. Vandenbergh discusses the role of NGOs as corporations adopt environmental standards and examines the accountability of NGOs. He analyzes the accountability of exporting firms to the customers of the importing firm using three criteria: coercion; transparency; and participation, and examines whether private contracting can satisfy democratic concerns for efficacy and accountability. He outlines the potential problems, some of which are significant, but argues that private environmental contracting “may be the only viable means to fill important gaps in the regulatory regime.”


Van den Bossche examines four main arguments for and against NGO involvement in the WTO. He addresses the grounds for NGO involvement in the WTO and the kinds of involvement the WTO provides for. Van den Bossche also examines four arguments against this involvement. He details the historical and legal history of the relationship between the WTO and NGOs, including in-depth details of policies, documents, and reports, and compares this relationship to the relationship that NGOs have with the UN. He also observes that there is “a significant difference in how the United Nations and the WTO approach engagement with NGOs” and that the UN “has seized the opportunity to provide for forms of significant involvement of NGOs.” He then examines the practice of NGO engagement with NGOs, including well-established practices, and notes the significant difference between formal provisions for involvement and what actually happens. He argues that “largely due to the efforts of the WTO Secretariat, the relations between the WTO and NGOs are currently more meaningful, more constructive, and less antagonistic than ever before” and that “the Sutherland Report shows a regrettable lack of ambition in the area of dialogue with civil society” and thus “the WTO can, and should, engage with NGOs, and allow for NGO involvement, more than it currently does.”


Väyrynen looks at problems of accountability and legitimacy in global governance, arguing that social movements, while they do not solve problems of responsibility and legitimacy, may be necessary to catalyze new action. He finds that accountability problems cannot be resolved by enhancing transparency and mechanical accountability. He also looks at recent calls for a new, complex type of accountability that sees different agents responsible for different principles in a variety of issue areas. Väyrynen contends that while there is no single institutional response to the legitimacy problems of global governance the aim should be first to strengthen domestic democratic institutions, and then to increase the democratic accountability of transnational and cosmopolitan arrangements.


Weaver analyzes the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). She draws from primary interviews to look at the IEO’s motivation, design, and delegation of authority. While acknowledging the impact of external pressures, Weaver argues that the timing and design of the IEO is better explained by the internal IMF debates between the Executive Board, management, and staff. Here she highlights the strategic agency of “norm advocacy.” She discusses four key challenges currently facing the IEO: independence; assessment; candor vs. credibility; and a culture of learning. Weaver concludes that the IEO is a “ruthless truth-teller” but notes that it is harder to determine whether findings are directly affecting policy change or leading to organizational learning, which she observes is the biggest challenge for independent evaluation.


Here Weaver examines the tensions in the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). She identifies the internal and external factors that explain the evaluation authority of the IEO. She draws from primary interviews and archive documents and asks why the IMF pursued independent evaluation when, and as late, as it did. She concludes that external pressures help to explain this, but that a better explanation lies with the internal debates within and between the Fund’s Executive Board, management, and staff. She also discusses performance-related issues currently facing the IEO and notes that the biggest challenge for evaluation is ensuring that lessons and recommendations influence the organization. Weaver outlines tensions in the multiple purposes of the Fund’s independent evaluation and concludes that performance is contingent on numerous internal and external factors.


This book responds to questions of accountability and has two primary objectives: 1) to problematize accountability: “to understand the concept and its applications without taking prototypical normative assumptions for granted”; and 2) “to observe accountability as a form of participatory praxis, and thus to identify its impacts on social relations and configurations of power.” Note that the book does not offer an all-encompassing and rationalist accountability framework. Instead, its contributors find that accountability
is multileveled, pluralistic, and has a contested terrain: the chapters show that accountability defies broad generalizations and universal theorizing. Despite this, the contributors draw cautious conclusions from the different accountability frameworks.


Winters examines the role of accountability in the context of problems with foreign aid funding delivery. He looks at end-user monitoring of foreign aid projects and argues that international donors should be accountable to countries and citizens that receive aid. He also reviews current understandings of accountability relationships in foreign aid and contends that foreign aid accomplishes more where there is more accountability. He discusses participatory and non-participatory mechanisms that might lead to accountability in development projects and argues that accountability is enhanced when more participatory elements are introduced to aid projects. Winters outlines five accountability relationships that may impact the overall success of foreign aid: 1) implementing agencies to end users; 2) implementing agencies to governments; 3) governments to end users; 4) governments to donors; and 5) donors to governments and end users. He concludes by looking at the role that NGOs play in this process and notes that it is difficult to create true donor accountability in the foreign aid process.


Wolfe examines accountability in the WTO—an organization that has numerous “accountability regimes.” He argues that multiple accountabilities create a polycentric problem and suggests that WTO might face an accountability trilemma where efforts to enhance one aspect of accountability might undermine others. He notes that without conceptual clarity we risk conflating accountability for doing the right thing with achieving the right thing. He also observes that accountability might also be harmful if principals make demands of agents that are beyond the scope of the WTO. He applies an analytic framework developed by Jerry Mashaw to examine accountability mechanisms. Wolfe argues that examining who is accountable at WTO depends on knowing why we ask about accountability in the first place. He develops an analytic framework identifying the variety of accountability regimes that function in the WTO.


Here, Wolfe investigates why states did not use protectionist measures in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. He asks whether G20 members met their commitments and whether WTO Member actions were consistent with the objectives of the trading system. He argues that strong institutions and two novel accountability mechanisms—one IO and one civil society—account for the ability to avoid protectionist measures. He draws from Mashaw’s analysis of accountability regimes—examines the WTO answer to his six questions, examines the two novel accountability mechanisms, and offers a detailed comparison of WTO and GTA data. He then outlines the implications for accountability in global governance. In the preface, Halle examines ways to hold WTO members accountable for commitments to sustainable development and investigates the ways that transparency and accountability impact the WTO’s commitment to the preambular goal. He focuses on monitoring and reporting functions of the WTO secretariat and contrasts it with the Global Trade Alert (GTA), an independent monitoring scheme. He then looks at the way the WTO interacts with other policy areas and examines challenges of accountability in a multilateral system.


Woods notes that international institutions are facing a double challenge of effectiveness and legitimacy that arises from increasing responsibilities and inadequate respect, support, and compliance from member states. She examines the principles that underlie current attempts to enhance and strengthen international institutions. She then discusses the growing disaffection with multilateral organizations and explores how the twin challenges of improving effectiveness and legitimacy are affected by independence, participation, enhanced transparency, and enhanced accountability. She outlines the limitations of judicial-style accountability and argues that we need to be careful when discussing NGOs inclusion because there is a risk of this further distorting the under-representation of developing countries. She argues that new forms of accountability could usefully expand the scope for holding decision-makers in global governance collectively to account if they recognize the rights of minority and developing country shareholders.


Young looks at state obligations regarding climate change and notes that many of these do not conflict, but are distinct or overlap; a con-
sequence of this is that the focus in climate change governance should be on the productive interaction between regimes. She offers an overview of international laws as they relate to climate change, noting that there is no single regime that can provide sufficient legal and institutional responses. She looks at several organizations and examines common responses to the challenges of the fragmentation of international law. She identifies key challenges for governance and examines alternative responses. She contends that we should focus on institutional and normative interplay when there is overlap and diversity in climate change governance and that it is better to investigate the biases and preferences of regimes rather than engage in a “vain search for unity.” She then discusses the principles and processes this interplay requires as well as the implications that this kind of polycentric and interconnected approach has for states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state actors.


The authors examine the WTO decision-making process. They identify three parameters of the process (object; organ; and procedural mode). They begin by defining WTO powers and then examine whether and how these three components fulfil WTO legitimacy requirements. They then examine the efficiency of decision making with a focus on the way that reform proposals affect the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency and create a typology of WTO decisions in order to illustrate legitimacy requirements. They note that the type of decision an organization aims to adopt will implicate different legitimacy requirements—something they term a “varying legitimization requirement.” They look at informal practices as they lead to the formal adoption of a decision, and distinguish between adopting a decision and the process of reaching a decision; they term these “non-objection/passive consensus” and “active consensus” respectively.


Zürn looks at the impact that removing decisions from national and democratic responsibility has upon the acceptance of and resistance to global governance. He details the normative problems that arise from this and argues that normative legitimacy deficits stand in the way of societal acceptance. He then undertakes a four-step analysis of Lipset’s hypothesis that empirical belief in the legitimacy of institutions depends on the normative validity of a political order. Zürn notes that multilateralism requires the backing of national and transnational societies and currently appears to be in a legitimacy crisis. He argues that, in order to fulfil legitimacy requirements, we need to reshape multilateralism to meet the challenges of an increasingly denationalized world. After examining the institutional dynamic of the international political order, he examines the quality of international institutions. Zürn contends that executive multilateralism cannot meet legitimacy requirements, arguing that we ought to create institutional mechanisms that enable “the highest degree of democratization under the given conditions” and that international institutions need to contribute to democratization through transnational political communities and transnational communication channels.
The research programme ENTWINED – Environment and Trade in a World of Interdependence – examines the interplay between the global trade regime and environmental policies promulgated by governments and private entities with a particular focus on the treatment of transboundary problems. ENTWINED is actively engaged with policy makers and other stakeholders to the trade and environment debate. The team includes researchers specializing in environmental and natural resource economics, international economics and trade law. The programme has its focus in Sweden, but engages leading experts in other locations, including Geneva, New York, Washington and Montreal. The ENTWINED programme is funded by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research (Mistra), see www.entwined.se.