Veronica M. Kitchen
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Office: HH 312
Office Hours: Wednesday, 10-12 or by appointment

Contact Policy: The best way to contact me is by email or to come to office hours.

Pre-Requisites: Admitted as a graduate student. A strong background in International Relations is recommended.

Course Description: This course is the core course in the field of Multilateral Institutions and Diplomacy in the Global Governance program. It is designed as part of the preparation for writing the comprehensive exam in that field, and will also appeal to students seeking a strong background in the IR subfield of International Organization (IO). This course focuses principally on formal, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). In the first part of the course, we examine theoretical issues related to the formation and effectiveness of International Organizations. In the second part of the course, we apply this knowledge to several highly institutionalized issue areas.

Course Objectives:

By the end of the course, students should be able to:

- Explain, critique, compare and synthesize, orally and in writing, the major theories and works in the field of international organization
- Fashion original arguments addressing the major questions in the field of international organization
- Write short- and medium-length critical and analytical essays at the graduate level
- Develop analytical questions for discussion and act as a discussion leader
- Begin study for the comprehensive exam in Multilateral Institutions and Diplomacy

The Fine Print

By registering in this course you agree to be familiar with and to abide by the University's policies on academic offences and plagiarism, as well as the expectations set out on the course website, on this syllabus, on individual assignments, and as outlined below:

Academic Integrity: In order to maintain a culture of academic integrity, members of the University of Waterloo are expected to promote honesty, trust, fairness, respect and responsibility.

Discipline: A student is expected to know what constitutes academic integrity, to avoid committing academic offences, and to take responsibility for his/her actions. A student who is unsure whether an action constitutes an offence, or who needs help in learning how to avoid offences (e.g., plagiarism, cheating) or about "rules" for group work/collaboration should seek guidance from the course professor, academic advisor, or the Undergraduate Associate Dean. When misconduct has been found to have occurred, disciplinary penalties will be imposed under Policy 71 – Student Discipline. For information on categories of offenses and types of penalties, students should refer to Policy 71 - Student Discipline, http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy71.htm
Grievance: A student who believes that a decision affecting some aspect of his/her university life has been unfair or unreasonable may have grounds for initiating a grievance. Read Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances, Section 4, http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy70.htm
Appeals: A student may appeal the finding and/or penalty in a decision made under Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances (other than regarding a petition) or Policy 71 - Student Discipline if a ground for an appeal can be established. Read Policy 72 - Student Appeals, http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy72.htm
Academic Integrity website (Arts): http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/arts/ugrad/academic_responsibility.html
Academic Integrity Office (UW): http://uwaterloo.ca/academicintegrity/

Note for students with disabilities: The Office for Persons with Disabilities (OPD), located in Needles Hall, Room 1132, collaborates with all academic departments to arrange appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities without compromising the academic integrity of the curriculum. If you require academic accommodations to lessen the impact of your disability, please register with the OPD at the beginning of each academic term.

Evaluation

Critical Review and Discussion Leader

Students will prepare 2 x 1500-1800 word critical reviews of the literature for one class in Part I of the course, and for one class in Part II of the course. The critical review should outline the major themes, strengths and weaknesses of the literature at hand. Students are encouraged to look beyond the course readings for critiques and book reviews which may assist them in writing the paper. Critical Reviews should be distributed via UW-ACE to the class by 2pm the day before we meet. The goal of the Critical Reviews is to provide practice at critical analysis, but also to provide each student with a set of notes and critiques which will help them to study for the comprehensive exam, should they be taking it.

For the same class, students should prepare several discussion questions based on the readings and their critical review and be prepared to kick off the discussion and generally act as discussion leader. Dr. Coleman's syllabus for Global Health Policy this year (available on the political science website) has some really excellent advice for how to act as discussion leader.

Value: 2x15%=30%
Due dates will be assigned the first day of class. Late papers will not be accepted. If you are struck ill or otherwise cannot complete your assignment on your designated day, you may petition the instructor—*beforehand* except in the most unusual circumstances—to choose another date. This will be allowed at the instructor's discretion.

Literature Review

Students will write a literature review of 3500-5000 words on one of the following topics:

    a) A theoretical question, topic or debate in the field of International Organization
    b) The existing literature on a particular international organization

A literature review makes an original, persuasive argument about a body of literature, rather than an empirical question. Students should refer to the handout on writing literature reviews for guidance, and look to journals such as *World Politics* and *International Studies Review* for examples.

Value: 30%
Due: in class on March 31st.

Mock Comprehensive Exam

Students will write a take-home exam modelled on the comprehensive exams. Students will be expected to craft persuasive and original answers to 2 questions based on their knowledge of the literature on international organizations. No additional reading outside of the coursework is required or expected. Exams will not exceed 5000 words (excluding bibliography and references).

Value: 20%
Due: the exam will be written during the final exam period, over a 24 hour period to be determined by the instructor and students in consultation early in the semester.

Class Participation

Class participation is imperative to a successful graduate level classroom experience. Students are expected to critically read all of the required readings, and to come prepared with questions and critiques. You may wish to refer to the document "How Do I Know If I'm Participating?" for a rubric.

Value: 20%. Note that it is not possible to pass this portion of your mark by attendance alone.

 Laptops and Class Participation: The success of this seminar course relies on excellent discussions and intensive class participation. In order to facilitate the flow of discussion, I request that students not use their laptops to take notes (or do anything else) in seminar. If you have a valid reason for why you must use your laptop during class, please speak to me.

Late Policy

Extensions are granted at the discretion of the instructor and usually only with appropriate documentation from the OPD or Counselling Services, or with the Verification of Illness Form, although there is more room for manoeuvre with graduate students than undergraduates.

Late assignments are penalized at the rate of 1% of the *weighted final grade* per day (per hour for the Mock Comp), including weekends (astute students will notice that this is equivalent to 1% of your final mark in the course). For example: If a student receives 40/50 on an assignment worth 20%, the weighted final grade is 16/20, and if the student hands in the assignment 1 day late, she would receive a mark of 15/20.

Unless otherwise indicated, late assignments must be submitted to my drop box in the political science department. An assignment submitted after 4pm will be dated the following morning.

If an assignment is due in class, it is considered 1 day late if you submit it after class is over.

If you submit an assignment on a weekend, email me a copy of the assignment and at the same time, put a copy in my drop box. *If and only if* I find a copy in my box Monday morning, *and* it corresponds exactly to the emailed copy, I will mark the assignment as submitted at the time and day I receive the email.

For assignments submitted by email or on UW-ACE, you are responsible for ensuring that files are uncorrupted and in a format that I can read (.pdf, .doc, .docx, or .rtf)

Texts

We will read portions of the following books. With the exception of Barnett & Finnemore, they have *not* been ordered at the bookstore:

Robert Keohane (1984) *After Hegemony*
Arthur Stein (1990) *Why Nations Co-operate*
Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore (2004) *Rules for the World*
Stephen Walt (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*

Everything will be available online or on reserve at the Porter Library [R].

Schedule of Classes

Part I: Thinking About International Organizations

January 6: Introduction and Logistics

Beth Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (2002) "International Organizations and Institutions" in Carlnaes, Risse, & Simmons eds, *Handbook of International Relations*, 192-211. [R]

OR

Beth Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (1998) "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions" *International Organization* (52)4 729-757.

**The concept of "regimes" serves as essential background to much of what we will do. If you haven't recently read Stephen Krasner on regimes, please review it:

Stephen Krasner (1982) "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables" *International Organization* 36(2). OR in the edited collection titled *International Regimes* (1983) Cornell University Press.

Supplementary:

Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie (1986) "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State" *International Organization* 40(4), p. 753-775.

January 13: Why Do States Form (and Stay in) International Organizations?(I)

John Mearsheimer (1994/1995) "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* (19)3, 5-49. [realist]

Robert Keohane (1984) *After Hegemony* Chapters 4-7, p. 49-110 [neo-liberal] [R]

Arthur Stein (1990) *Why Nations Co-operate* Ch. 1-3, p. 3-86. [game theory] [R]

Supplementary:

Replies to Mearsheimer (above) from Ruggie, Kupchan & Kupchan, Keohane & Martin, Wendt, and Mearsheimer again, in (1995) *International Organization* 20(1)

John G. Ikenberry (2001) *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) ch. 1-3.

Kenneth Oye, ed. (1986) *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

January 20: Why Do States Form (and Stay in) International Organizations? (II)

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998) "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1), p. 3-32. [rational institutionalist]

Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney (eds.) (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch. 1, p. 3-33 [principal-agent theory] Available as an online book via Primo.

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2000) "Hard Law and Soft Law in International Governance" *International Organization* 54(3) p. 421-456. [legalism]

Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001) "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4), p. 487-515. [constructivist]

Michael Tierney and Catherine Weaver (n.d.) "Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations" Draft chapter. Available online at:
http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/papers/principals%20and%20principals.pdf [rational-constructivist synthesis]

Supplementary:

Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse (2008) "Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2) 269-294

Wendt, Alexander (1987). "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, 41, p. 335-370.

James March & Johan Olsen (1998) "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders" *International Organization* 52(4) 943-969

January 27: Institutional Design

J.G. Ruggie (1992) "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" *International Organization* 46(2)

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001) "The Rational Design of International Institutions" *International Organization* 55(4), p. 761-799

John S. Duffield (2003) "The Limits of 'Rational Design'" *International Organization* 57(2), 411-430.

at least one of the substantive articles in the special issue of *International Organization* (2001) 55(4)

Supplementary:

J.G. Ruggie (1982) "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order" *International Organization* 36(2)

J.G. Ruggie (1991) "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and Progress in International Economic Relations", in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 202-234.

February 3: IOs as Bureaucracies

Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore (2004) *Rules for the World* (Ithaca: Cornell UP) Ch. 2 and one of Ch. 3, 4, or 5. [R]

And two of the following:

Roland Paris (1993) "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture" *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(3), p. 441-473

Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman (2005) "Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations" *International Studies Quarterly* 49, p. 593-619.

Catherine Weaver and Ralf Leiteritz (2005) "'Our Poverty is a World Full of Dreams': Reforming the World Bank" *Global Governance* 11, p. 369-388.

Supplementary:

Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999) "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations", *International Organization,* 53(4), p. 699-732. [constructivist]

Leslie Johns (2007) "A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats" *International Organization* 61, p. 247-275. [formal theory / communications]

February 10: Compliance and Enforcement

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1993) "On Compliance." *International Organization.* 47(2), p. 175-205.

George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1996) "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization.* 50 (3), p. 379-406.

Daniel Drezner (2000) "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54(1), p. 73-102.

Oona Hathaway (2002) "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111, 1935-2041.

George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones (2002) "Reputation, Compliance, and International Law" *Journal of Legal Studies* 31. Available online at:
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/downs/reputation.pdf

Supplementary:

James D. Fearon (1998) "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization.* 52 (2): 269-305.

Beth Simmons (1998) "Compliance with International Agreements" *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, p. 75-93.

Jana Von Stein (2005) "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review.* 99 (4), p. 611-622.

Lloyd Gruber (2000) "Winners and Losers: The Case for Theoretical Reorientation," in *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 33-57.

Jeffrey Checkel (2001) Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization* 55: 553-588

February 17: No Class – Reading Week

February 24: How do IOs Matter

Oneal, Berbaum and Bruce Russett (2003) "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992" *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3), p. 371-393. [liberal]

Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" *International Organization* 55(1) p. 47-80. [rational/constructivist/sociological synthesis]

Martha Finnemore (1993) "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy" *International Organization* 47(4) p. 565-597.

Grigorescu, Alexandru (2003) "International Organizations and Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms." *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 643-667.

Supplementary:

Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward (2008) "Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2), p. 189-212.

Oneal & Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992" *World Politics* 52(1), p. 1-37.

Journal of Conflict Resolution (2008) special issue on IOs & large sample empirical testing (52)2

Part II: International Organizations in the Wild

March 3: The United Nations System

Thomas G. Weiss (2008) *What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It* (Cambrige: Polity) Ch. 1 [R]

Charlotte Ku and Paul Diehl (2006) "Filling In the Gaps: Extrasystemic Mechanisms for Addressing Imbalances Between the International Legal Operating System and the Normative System" *Global Governance* 12(2), p. 161

Alexander Thompson (2006) "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission" *International Organization* 60, p. 1-34.

Inis Claude (1966) Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. *International Organization* 20 (3): 367-79.

Review notes from earlier discussions where articles discussed UN System

Supplementary:

Inis Claude (1964) *Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House)

Courtney B. Smith (2006) *Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global Dance* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers)

Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds. (2007) *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press)

Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns (2006) *The United Nations in the Twenty-first Century,* 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview)

March 10: The European Union

George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett (2001) "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union." *International Organization* 55(2), p. 357-390.

Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter] and Walter Mattli (1993) "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration" *International Organization* 47(1) p. 41-76.

Craig Parsons (2002). "Showing Ideas as Causes: Origins of the European Union." *International Organization* 56, 1: 47-84.

Andrew Moravscik (1993) "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4), p. 473-524.

Antoine Vauchez (2008) "The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda)" *International Political Sociology* 2(2) 128-144.

Review: Schimmelfennig from Feb. 24.

March 17: Alliances and Security Institutions

Stephen Walt (1987) *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell UP), Ch. 1 & 2. [R]

Glenn Snyder (1984) "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics" *World Politics* 36(4), p. 461-495.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) *Security Communities* Ch. 1 & 2, p. 1-39. [R]

Celeste Wallender and Robert Keohane (1999) "Risk, Threat and Security Institutions" in Wallender, Keohane, & Haftendorn, eds. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space* (Oxford University Press). Available online via Primo.

Supplementary:

Glenn Snyder (1997) *Alliance Politics*

Karl Deutsch (1957) *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* [the inspiration for Adler & Barnett above]

Lawrence S. Kaplan (1999) *The Long Entanglement* (and virtually anything else by Kaplan)

Ron Asmus (2002) *Opening NATO's Door*

P.T. Jackson (2006) *Civilizing the Enemy* [poststructuralist]

Thomas Risse (1996) "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO" in P.J. Katzenstein, ed, *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia UP).

March 24: Trade and Financial Institutions

Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (2003) "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform" *International Organization* 57(2), p. 241-276 [principal-agent theory]

Xun Cao (2010) "Networks of Intergovernmental Organizations and Convergence in Domestic Economic Policies" *International Studies Quarterly* 53(4), p. 1095-1130.

Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz (2007) "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade" *International Organization* 61(1) 37-67.

Nitsan Chorev and Sarah Babb (2009) "The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO" *Theory and Society* 38(5), p. 459-484.

Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt (2008) "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime" *International Organization* 62, p. 477-505.

Supplementary

Paul Ingram, Jeffrey Robinson, and Marc L. Busch (2005) "The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness" *American Journal of Sociology* 111(3), p. 824-858.

March 31: Environmental Institutions

Andrew Thompson (forthcoming) "Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime" *European Journal of International Relations* Available online: http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/rapidpdf/1354066109342918v1.pdf.

Peter M. Haas (1989). "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organization* 43(3) p. 377-403.

Ronald B. Mitchell (1994) "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance" *International Organization* 48(3), p. 425-458.

Steffen Bauer (2006) "Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats in Global Environmental Politics" *Global Environmental Politics* 6(1), p. 23-49.

Steinar Andreson and Kristin Rosendal (2009) "Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in the Coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements" in Biermann, Siebenhüner, and Schreyögg, eds, *International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance* (New York: Routledge), p. 133-150.

Supplementary:

Several articles in *Global Environmental Politics* (2009) 9(4) on the climate change regime.

Najam, Adil (2003) "The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization," *Global Governance,* 9, p. 367-384.