

**University of Waterloo**  
**PSCI 657 / GG 650**  
**International Organizations**  
**Winter 2012**  
**1:30-4:20 Monday, BSIA 1-31**

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Office: HH 312

Office Hours: Wednesday, 1pm-4pm, HH312 and Monday, 4:30-5:30, BSIA 302.

**Contact Policy:** The best way to contact me is by email or to come to office hours.

**Pre-Requisites:** Admitted as a graduate student. A strong background in International Relations is recommended.

**Course Description:** This course is the core course in the field of Multilateral Institutions and Diplomacy in the Global Governance program. It is designed as part of the preparation for writing the comprehensive exam in that field, and will also appeal to students seeking a strong background in the IR subfield of International Organization (IO). This course focuses principally on formal, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). In the first part of the course, we examine theoretical issues related to the formation and effectiveness of International Organizations. In the second part of the course, we apply this knowledge to several highly institutionalized issue areas.

**Course Objectives:**

By the end of the course, students should be able to:

- Explain, critique, compare and synthesize, orally and in writing, the major theories and works in the field of international organization
- Fashion original arguments addressing the major questions in the field of international organization
- Write short- and medium-length critical and analytical essays at the graduate level
- Develop analytical questions for discussion and act as a discussion leader
- Begin study for the comprehensive exam in Multilateral Institutions and Diplomacy

**The Fine Print**

By registering in this course you agree to be familiar with and to abide by the University's policies on academic offences and plagiarism, as well as the expectations set out on the course website, on this syllabus, on individual assignments, and as outlined below:

**Academic Integrity:** In order to maintain a culture of academic integrity, members of the University of Waterloo are expected to promote honesty, trust, fairness, respect and responsibility.

**Discipline:** A student is expected to know what constitutes academic integrity, to avoid committing academic offences, and to take responsibility for his/her actions. A student who is unsure whether an

action constitutes an offence, or who needs help in learning how to avoid offences (e.g., plagiarism, cheating) or about “rules” for group work/collaboration should seek guidance from the course professor, academic advisor, or the Undergraduate Associate Dean. When misconduct has been found to have occurred, disciplinary penalties will be imposed under Policy 71 – Student Discipline. For information on categories of offenses and types of penalties, students should refer to Policy 71 - Student Discipline, <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy71.htm>

**Grievance:** A student who believes that a decision affecting some aspect of his/her university life has been unfair or unreasonable may have grounds for initiating a grievance. Read Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances, Section 4, <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy70.htm>

**Appeals:** A student may appeal the finding and/or penalty in a decision made under Policy 70 - Student Petitions and Grievances (other than regarding a petition) or Policy 71 - Student Discipline if a ground for an appeal can be established. Read Policy 72 - Student Appeals, <http://www.adm.uwaterloo.ca/infosec/Policies/policy72.htm>

**Academic Integrity website (Arts):** [http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/arts/ugrad/academic\\_responsibility.html](http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/arts/ugrad/academic_responsibility.html)

**Academic Integrity Office (UW):** <http://uwaterloo.ca/academicintegrity/>

**Note for students with disabilities:** The Office for Persons with Disabilities (OPD), located in Needles Hall, Room 1132, collaborates with all academic departments to arrange appropriate accommodations for students with disabilities without compromising the academic integrity of the curriculum. If you require academic accommodations to lessen the impact of your disability, please register with the OPD at the beginning of each academic term.

## **Evaluation**

### *Critical Review and Discussion Leader*

Students will prepare 2 x 1500-1800 word critical reviews of the literature for one class in Part I of the course, and for one class in Part II of the course. The critical review should outline the major themes, strengths and weaknesses of the literature at hand. Students are encouraged to look beyond the course readings for critiques and book reviews which may assist them in writing the paper. Critical Reviews should be distributed via UW-ACE to the class by 2pm the day before we meet. The goal of the Critical Reviews is to provide practice at critical analysis, but also to provide each student with a set of notes and critiques which will help them to study for the comprehensive exam, should they be taking it.

For the same class, students should prepare several discussion questions based on the readings and their critical review and be prepared to kick off the discussion and generally act as discussion leader. Dr. Coleman’s syllabus for Global Health Policy this year (available on the political science website) has some really excellent advice for how to act as discussion leader.

**Value: 2x15%=30%**

**Due dates will be assigned the first day of class.** Late papers will not be accepted. If you are struck ill or otherwise cannot complete your assignment on your designated day, you may petition the instructor—*beforehand* except in the most unusual circumstances—to choose another date. This will be allowed at the instructor’s discretion.

### *Literature Review*

Students will write a literature review of 3500-5000 words on one of the following topics:

- a) A theoretical question, topic or debate in the field of International Organization
- b) The existing literature on a particular international organization

A literature review makes an original, persuasive argument about a body of literature, rather than an empirical question. Students should refer to the handout on writing literature reviews for guidance, and look to journals such as *World Politics* and *International Studies Review* for examples.

**Value: 30%**

**Due: in class on March 30<sup>th</sup>.**

### *Mock Comprehensive Exam*

Students will write a take-home exam modelled on the comprehensive exams. Students will be expected to craft persuasive and original answers to 2 questions based on their knowledge of the literature on international organizations. No additional reading outside of the coursework is required or expected. Exams will not exceed 5000 words (excluding bibliography and references).

**Value: 20%**

**Due: the exam will be written during the final exam period, over a 24 hour period to be determined by the instructor and students in consultation early in the semester.**

### *Class Participation*

Class participation is imperative to a successful graduate level classroom experience. Students are expected to critically read all of the required readings, and to come prepared with questions and critiques. You may wish to refer to the document “How Do I Know If I’m Participating?” for a rubric.

**Value: 20%. Note that it is not possible to pass this portion of your mark by attendance alone.**

**Laptops and Class Participation:** The success of this seminar course relies on excellent discussions and intensive class participation. In order to facilitate the flow of discussion, I request that students not use their laptops to take notes (or do anything else) in seminar. If you have a valid reason for why you must use your laptop during class, please speak to me.

### **Late Policy**

Extensions are granted at the discretion of the instructor and usually only with appropriate documentation from the OPD or Counselling Services, or with the Verification of Illness Form, although there is more room for manoeuvre with graduate students than undergraduates.

Late assignments are penalized at the rate of 1% of the *weighted final grade* per day (per hour for the Mock Comp), including weekends (astute students will notice that this is equivalent to 1% of your final mark in the course). For example: If a student receives 40/50 on an assignment worth 20%, the weighted final grade is 16/20, and if the student hands in the assignment 1 day late, she would receive a mark of 15/20.

Unless otherwise indicated, late assignments must be submitted to my drop box in the political science department. An assignment submitted after 4pm will be dated the following morning.

If an assignment is due in class, it is considered 1 day late if you submit it after class is over.

If you submit an assignment on a weekend, email me a copy of the assignment and at the same time, put a copy in my drop box. *If and only if* I find a copy in my box Monday morning, *and* it corresponds exactly to the emailed copy, I will mark the assignment as submitted at the time and day I receive the email.

For assignments submitted by email or on UW-ACE, you are responsible for ensuring that files are uncorrupted and in a format that I can read (.pdf, .doc, .docx, or .rtf)

### **Texts**

We will read portions of the following books. They have *not* been ordered in the bookstore – you should be able to get them used online, or borrow them from another student.

Robert Keohane (1984) *After Hegemony*

Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore (2004) *Rules for the World*

Everything will be available online or on reserve at the Porter Library [R].

### **Schedule of Classes**

Part I: Thinking About International Organizations

*January 9: Introduction and Logistics*

Beth Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (2002) “International Organizations and Institutions” in Carlnaes, Risse, & Simmons eds, *Handbook of International Relations*, 192-211. [R]

OR

Beth Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (1998) “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions” *International Organization* (52)4 729-757.

Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (Yale University Press, 1974), Chapter 1 (p. 1-36).

*\*\*The concept of “regimes” serves as essential background to much of what we will do. If you haven’t recently read Stephen Krasner on regimes, please review it:*

Stephen Krasner (1982) “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables” *International Organization* 36(2). OR in the edited collection titled *International Regimes* (1983) Cornell University Press.

Supplementary:

Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (Yale University Press, 1974), Chapter 11.

*January 16: Why Do States Form (and Stay in) International Organizations?(I)*

John Mearsheimer (1994/1995) "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* (19)3, 5-49. [realist]

Skim the replies to Mearsheimer (above) from Ruggie, Kupchan & Kupchan, Keohane & Martin, Wendt, and Mearsheimer again, in (1995) *International Organization* 20(1)

Robert Keohane (1984) *After Hegemony* Chapters 4-7, p. 49-110 [neo-liberal] [R]

Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 03 (1987): 335-370.

*January 23: Why Do States Form (and Stay in) International Organizations? (II)*

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998) "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1), p. 3-32. [rational institutionalist]

Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney (eds.) (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch. 1, p. 3-33 [principal-agent theory] Available as an online book via Primo.

Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2000) "Hard Law and Soft Law in International Governance" *International Organization* 54(3) p. 421-456. [legalism]

Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001) "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4), p. 487-515. [constructivist]

Michael Tierney and Catherine Weaver (n.d.) "Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations" Draft chapter. Available online at <http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/recent%20papers/principals%20and%20principals.pdf> or from Dr. Kitchen

*January 30: Institutional Design*

J.G. Ruggie (1992) "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" *International Organization* 46(2)

J.G. Ruggie (1982) "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order" *International Organization* 36(2)

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001) "The Rational Design of International Institutions" *International Organization* 55(4), p. 761-799

John S. Duffield (2003) "The Limits of 'Rational Design'" *International Organization* 57(2), 411-430.

one of the substantive articles in the special issue of *International Organization* (2001) 55(4)

Supplementary:

J.G. Ruggie (1991) "Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and Progress in International Economic Relations", in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 202-234.

*February 6: IOs as Bureaucracies*

Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore (2004) *Rules for the World* (Ithaca: Cornell UP) Ch. 2 and one of Ch. 3, 4, or 5. [R]

Martin Koch, "Autonomization of IGOs," *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (2009): 431-448.

And at least one of the following:

Roland Paris (2003) "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture" *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(3), p. 441-473

Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman (2005) "Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations" *International Studies Quarterly* 49, p. 593-619.

Catherine Weaver and Ralf Leuteritz (2005) "'Our Poverty is a World Full of Dreams': Reforming the World Bank" *Global Governance* 11, p. 369-388.

*February 13: Compliance and Enforcement*

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. (1993) "On Compliance." *International Organization*. 47(2), p. 175-205.

George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1996) "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization*. 50 (3), p. 379-406.

Jeffrey Checkel (2001) Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization* 55: 553-588

Oona Hathaway (2002) "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111, 1935-2041.

George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones (2002) "Reputation, Compliance, and International Law" *Journal of Legal Studies* 31. Available online at:  
<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/downs/reputation.pdf>

*February 20-24 – Reading Week*

February 27: How do IOs Matter

Oneal, Berbaum and Bruce Russett (2003) "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992" *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3), p. 371-393. [liberal]

Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" *International Organization* 55(1) p. 47-80.  
[rational/constructivist/sociological synthesis]

Martha Finnemore (1993) "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy" *International Organization* 47(4) p. 565-597.

Grigorescu, Alexandru (2003) "International Organizations and Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms." *International Studies Quarterly* 47: 643-667.

March 5: Institutional Density

Vinod K. Aggarwal, *Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting*, illustrated edition. (Cornell University Press, 1998), Chapter 1.

Oran R. Young, *Governance in world affairs* (Cornell University Press, 1999), Chapter 7.

Daniel Drezner, (2007) "Institutional Proliferation and World Order: Is There Viscosity in Global Governance?" Available online at: <http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/viscosity.pdf>

And two of:

Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources," *International Organization* 58, no. 02 (2004): 277-309.

Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, "Nested and overlapping regimes in the transatlantic banana trade dispute," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 3 (2006): 362.

Christina L. Davis, "Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2009): 25-31.

Judith Kelley, "The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2009): 59-64.

Laurence R. Helfer, "Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2009): 39-44.

Alexander Betts, "Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2, 2009): 53-58.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2, 2009): 33.

Supplementary:

International Law Commission, "Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law" (2006) Available online at:  
[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1\\_9\\_2006.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf)

Part II: International Organizations in the Wild

*March 12: The United Nations System*

Bruce Cronin, "Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism" *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 53.

Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 35.

Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization* 51, no. 04 (1997): 555-589.

Charlotte Ku and Paul Diehl (2006) "Filling In the Gaps: Extrasystemic Mechanisms for Addressing Imbalances Between the International Legal Operating System and the Normative System" *Global Governance* 12(2), p. 161

And one of:

Alexander Thompson (2006) "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission" *International Organization* 60, p. 1-34.

Peter Romaniuk, "Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Since 9/11," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 03 (2010): 591-613.

*Review notes from earlier discussions where articles discussed UN System*

*March 19: Security Institutions*

Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and The New Europe," *International Organization* 59, no. 04 (2005): 973-1012.

Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 03 (1996): 445-475.

Møller, Bjørn (2009) *The African Union as a security actor: African solutions to African problems?* Crisis States Research Centre working papers series 2, 57. Crisis States Research Centre, London School



of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. Available online at:  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28485/>

Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 01 (2009): 45-52.

*March 26: Trade and Financial Institutions*

Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney (2003) "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform" *International Organization* 57(2), p. 241-276 [principal-agent theory]

Beth A. Simmons, "The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation," *International Organization* 55, no. 03 (2001): 589-620.

Goldstein, Rivers & Tomz (2007) "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade" *International Organization* 61(1) 37-67.

Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt (2008) "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime" *International Organization* 62, p. 477-505.

Tony Porter, "Why International Institutions Matter in the Global Credit Crisis," *Global Governance* 15 (2009): 3.

*April 2: Environmental Institutions* [This class will be rescheduled due to the ISA Conference]

Biermann, Frank, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli. (2009). "The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis." *Global Environmental Politics* 9(4): 14-40.

Alexander Thompson, "Rational design in motion: Uncertainty and flexibility in the global climate regime," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 269 -296.

Peter M. Haas (1989). "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organization* 43(3) p. 377-403.

Najam, Adil (2003) "The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization," *Global Governance*, 9, p. 367-384.