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The Shift Towards Global (Dis)Integration

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Letter from the Editor

It is with great honour that I present the ninth volume of *Inquiry & Insight*. This journal coincided with the University of Waterloo Annual Graduate Student Conference in Political Science in which all the authors presented their work. Their topics generated interesting debate and constructive criticism from guests and panel moderators alike.

I would like to thank Shelby Davies, Marina Ivanova, Dr. Anna Drake and Dr. Aaron Ettinger for their assistance and guidance with both the Graduate Conference and this journal. I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Cooper for his help with finding our excellent keynote speaker, Dr. Pierre Lizée. Lastly, thanks should be given to the graduate student committee who successfully organized and ran the event to much success. We all should be proud of our accomplishment.

This year the conference, and this journal, cover a look at issues of global integration and disintegration. With the rise of leaders such as Donald Trump, and the successful referendum on Brexit in the United Kingdom, we should ask ourselves if we are in a time of coming together or drifting apart. Each of the authors in this journal delves into a facet of this topic investigating their deeper meanings.

I hope you enjoy these articles, and thank you again to all those to participated and helped make this all happen.

Sincerely,

Philip Charbonneau
Lead Editor

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Table of Contents

The EU's Path From Euro Crisis:

The Institutional Design of Economic and Monetary Union and Implications of Continuity

John Querengesser4

The Political Death of the TPP

The Causes of Growing Protectionist Attitudes in North American Politics and their Culmination in the 2016 Election and its Bipartisan Disdain for the Pacific Trade Agreement

Micah Sienna28

Financial Caution and Limited War Through the Neoliberal Era

The Political Economic Era as it Defines U.S. Military Interventionism

Mark Robbins..... 44

Populism, globalization, and conspiracy theories

An Exploration

Jinelle Piereder..... 66

Immigration Policy in France

The Case of the Roma as an Ethnic Minority

Laura Montserrat Sanchez Martinez 92

The EU's Path From Euro Crisis:

The Institutional Design of Economic and Monetary Union and Implications of Continuity

John Querengesser

Abstract

This paper explains how economic and monetary institutions of the EU have had path dependent feedback effects, and how these institutions shape the still tenuous condition of the Eurozone. First elaborated is how conditions entrenched via the Single Market and common currency fed back into trade and financial behaviour in the Eurozone up to 2008, facilitating the remarkable vulnerability of the euro area to an external shock. Second, the 'mechanisms of reproduction' allowing EMU to endure crisis with only marginal adjustment are detailed. Negative incentives make EU actors somewhat 'stuck' on the previously chosen path, and positive incentives favouring influential 'core' countries, especially Germany, work as barriers to altering that path going forward. However, prior applications of historical institutionalism appear to overlook if mechanisms of reproduction, though durable so far, are in fact resting on undisturbed pillars of support going forward. Despite path dependent actions of mainstream politicians and market actors, EU-wide backlash/populism following the crisis indicates the politics around EMU are not as stable as elite behaviour alone would suggest. Rather, there is real potential for past and present events to reverberate in ways that undermine the path the Eurozone has taken thus far.

Keywords: crisis, euro, European Union, institutions, path dependence, political economy

Introduction

The mood of the Eurozone has changed sharply from the enthusiasm colouring its first decade. People waited in lines for the newly issued currency in 2002 (Kulish, 2011). Ten years later, euro-related issues have become rather more serious. Since the euro crisis started it has been followed by national instances of severe unemployment, pension and service cuts, political extremism, and no definitive answer as to when such conditions can be expected to end (Jabko, 2015). The mess in the euro area, however, is not primarily a “sovereign debt” crisis, nor is it the sole fault of banks and firms EU member states bailed out (see e.g., Blyth 2013). Ultimately, public authority and private interest in the Eurozone is not accurately understood without accounting for the institutional¹ context that defines interaction between them.

This paper builds upon past research on the euro crisis connecting the institutional roots of the European Union to the number of critical issues plaguing it (see e.g., Matthijs & Blyth, 2015; Offe, 2015). The focus in this paper is on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which is defined here to refer to the European Single Market in addition to the common currency and central bank.² The research question underlying this analysis concerns the effect of EMU on the political economy of the Eurozone, and the implications that may flow from it.

My central argument is that the original institutional design of EU Economic and Monetary Union has had important path dependent feedback effects, which have critically shaped the still tenuous condition of the Eurozone. The realization that EMU has been important over time is not in itself unique (see e.g., Gocaj & Meunier, 2013; Verdun, 2015). However, placing this realization in more critical perspective to analyze implications for the future of the Eurozone is a theme that does not substantively appear in prior path dependent assessments of the euro crisis. My aim is to remedy this weakness by incorporating insights of critical political economy scholars, which enables a more complete understanding of the design and consequences of EMU.

¹ This paper works from North's (1990, p. 3) conceptual definition: “*Institutions* are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.

² This is broader than common definitions of “Economic and Monetary Union”, which may refer only to the monetary aspect. Though ramifications of integrating labour, capital, and other markets, as well as single monetary policy institutions can be separately appraised academically, in reality they exist in the same world. This paper is concerned with the impact of overall economic integration, monetary or otherwise. Hence this broader conceptual definition of EMU is useful here.

This paper proceeds first by elaborating the method of analysis employed and situating this assessment relative to other literature on the euro crisis. The second section lays out the influence of EMU in shaping the path toward the current crisis. The third section examines ‘mechanisms of reproduction’ that can explain the continuity of EMU institutions amid the pressures of the crisis. This is found in negative incentives from exit costs, implying EU actors may be ‘stuck’ on their previously chosen path, and in a sufficient mixture of positive incentives and power asymmetries that have effectively become barriers to altering that path going forward. The final section discusses additional factors underlying the path dependent patterns observed, namely how the continued stability of EMU depends on the acquiescence of citizens (in addition to elites) whose consent is under more strain since the crisis. It is here the second component of my argument, that the Eurozone remains in a tenuous situation, is substantiated.

In each aspect examples and evidence are examined of how this institutional design has/does influence the interests and action of the Eurozone’s ‘*core*’ (generally referring to Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Finland) and ‘*periphery*’ countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). For reasons of space and analytical importance, this dichotomy is useful in generally describing the intergovernmental fault lines between EU member states, and allows the analysis to selectively zoom in and add detail where it is key to understand specifically how that dynamic functions empirically. This provides an insightful macroscopic, but substantiated, assessment revealing the intimate connection of EMU’s institutional influence to the euro crisis, as well as the unsettled political-economic conditions of the Eurozone.

Theoretical Aspect and Literature Survey

In taking a ‘path dependent look’ at the economic and monetary institutions of the EU, this paper utilizes a historical institutionalist perspective in assessing the effect of Economic and Monetary Union. Gocaj & Meunier (2013) summarize the ability of this framework to capture “the sequencing of events- an initial shock followed by feedback loops, path dependence, and unintended consequences- to explain institutional choice and preference formation” (p. 240). These theoretical tools, drawn from Paul Pierson’s (2004) *Politics In Time*, are employed here

for the purpose of describing how paths have emerged and self-reinforced over time in the case of EMU.

A number of authors have applied this method of analysis to the euro crisis. However, previous historical institutionalist research has failed to substantively address how path dependent dynamics may contribute to uncertainty and tension in the Eurozone and its institutions going forward.^{3*} In her widely cited article, Kathleen Thelen (1999) highlighted the potential for path dependent analysis to tend toward over emphasizing stability. She argued such assessments must be careful to find and explain what specific mechanisms enable and/or reinforce institutions, and hence would be points of potential *instability* if disturbed (p. 397, 400). A common issue among prior historical institutional accounts of EMU during the crisis is a nuanced variation of this. Past work identifies path dependent changes to the infrastructure of EMU, but has not critically assessed the form of changes in the EU's evolving political context. The relevance of this oversight lies in the fact that despite evidence of overall continuity secured by political and economic elites, the continuing acceptance by mass publics of EMU is less obvious.

Webber's (2014) survey of seven theoretical approaches, analyzing what each suggests for Eurozone disintegration, is the only work found linking historical institutionalism's neutralized inquiry to a potential for ignoring certain post-crisis sources of instability. Though including meaningful discussion of how discontent following the crisis may feedback into EU politics in a destabilizing way, he offers only a superficial sketch of historical institutionalism's applicability to the euro crisis.⁴ The prospect of overcoming this deficiency within a historical institutional analysis is not addressed, nor is the persistent failure of other such research on the euro crisis to do so.

For example, Verdun (2015) describes how the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), Fiscal Pact, and other new capacities related to EMU align with prior institutional trajectories and fit within theories of institutional change. Gocaj & Meunier (2013) likewise take a descriptive/retrospective approach to assessing how current decisions and preferences are

^{3*} Given the author's limiting experience and circumstances, this claim must be tentative. It is, however, based on a deliberate and concerted search of the existing literature. For discussion of how institutional approaches have been applied to the euro crisis see Schmidt, 2016, pp. 1034-37.

⁴ Only Pierson's now dated 1996 assessment is drawn on directly.

outcomes reflecting past events. Schimmelflennig (2015) and Aslett & Caporaso (2016) both highlight path dependent factors that would be expected to incentivize rational actors to sustain the Eurozone and, hence, the institutions it is built on. What these and other path dependent commentaries on EMU alteration miss though, is assessing implications of the adaptations being dominantly ‘change for the purpose of continuity.’

It is helpful here to think of Hall’s (1993) concept of ‘policy paradigms’ and ask: do the institutional changes to EMU imply any fundamental repurposing? And if not, is there evidence such an outcome could be problematic? Among historical institutional assessments, two contributions are partial exceptions. Salines, Glöcker, & Truchlewski (2012) point out the underlying *modus operandi* of EMU has not shifted, but do not identify any potential issues of integration continuing on the trajectory established by the Single Market and ECB monetarism. While Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier (2016) actually problematize the freer-markets-and-incomplete-authority path of EMU, they neglect to link this comment to evident trends that could substantiate it.

In sum, despite Webber (2014) identifying an issue with the framework and a key aspect missed when utilized uncritically, a gap remains between a powerful approach to framing the effects of EMU institutions, and assessing implications of these effects *within* that frame. Notable critical political economists have not overlooked the potential issues of EMU continuing in a laissez faire direction. Lapavistas et al. (2010), Offe (2015), and Streeck (2014) for instance, take a much less benign view of further entrenching the orthodoxy and pressures of unregulated capital in the politically and socioeconomically diverse Eurozone. While such assessments offer much, and the potential status quo bias of historical institutionalism has been pointed out, a meaningful attempt to integrate critical political economy and historical institutionalism to analyze where the path from euro crisis is leading appears to be missing in the literature. This paper attempts to step into that role and provide a more critical historical institutional analysis of the political economy of Economic and Monetary Union. This approach enables a more complete assessment of these institutions past impact, present persistence, and possible future.

Role of EMU Shaping the Path Toward Crisis

The first task in this path dependent analysis is identifying events in the temporal sequence turning out to be crucial as time progresses (Pierson, 2004). That is to say, what early events (whether big shocks or day-to-day decisions) advanced certain patterns until resulting in a large cumulative effect (pp. 18-9). The rest of this section explains how exactly select “critical junctures translated into lasting legacies over time” (Thelen, 1999, p. 390).

The path toward the euro crisis can be usefully traced back to two interrelated events in the 1990s: implementation of the European Single Market, and of Monetary Union under the new European Central Bank (ECB), which represented deeper and more liberal-market-oriented integration (Matthijs & Blyth, 2015). While the interconnection of European economies extends farther back in history⁵, comprehensive institutionalizing of lesser regulated market forces and monetarist central bank policies are useful junctures to trace back to (Schimmelflennig, 2015; Verdun, 2015). A pivotal aspect of the institutional design of EMU to note is its form of *common rules*, rather than discretionary government. This is crucial to understanding how EMU created feedback effects, as the impact of uniform rules on diverse national political economies proved to be quite varied (Mansbach & Pirro, 2016).

Hall (2014) explains while the Eurozone could share common monetary policy and economic regulation, the deep historical differences in national varieties of capitalism and political development did not fade away. The ‘core’ Eurozone countries possessed highly developed institutional capacities for skills training, networking of innovative firms, and industrial relations (p. 1226). On the other hand the ‘periphery’ Eurozone countries lack(ed) the institutional sophistication to coordinate/harmonize various actors and forces in the ways ‘core’ countries could to benefit national economic performance (Schimmelflennig, 2015). With very different levels of export competitiveness, general labour productivity, and overall dynamism and development, a dualist political economy between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ characterized the Eurozone since before EMU and continues to the present (Magone, Laffan, & Schweiger, 2016).

⁵ See e.g., Goodman and Pauly (1993) for an account of key events facilitating continental Europe’s path from capital controls to essentially unregulated mobility in the 1970s and 1980s.

Further integration of markets for capital, goods, services, and labour⁶ set in motion a new depth and breadth of continuous adjustments to new economic rules/realities across the Eurozone. Yet, it failed to produce the kind of convergence between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ that could facilitate macroeconomic balance over the long term (Offe, 2015).

Nonetheless, the liberalization Economic and Monetary Union enshrined, via the Single Market and surrender of monetary authority to the ECB, eliminated measures ‘periphery’ countries had previously used as buffers to maintain domestic demand and employment, and prevent a deteriorating balance of payments on trade; inflationary policies, national currency devaluation, and trade policies had each been used to varying extent (Streeck, 2014). Not only did this take away key policy levers the ‘periphery’ had leaned on, it also allowed ‘core’ countries to increase export competitiveness with ‘periphery’ Eurozone neighbours, whose terms of trade could no longer be artificially adjusted. This likely would have been more problematic, but much of the EMU-enabled export earnings of firms from the ‘core’ were reinvested by banks, especially those in Paris and Frankfurt, as consumption-sustaining credit inflows back into the ‘periphery’ (McNamara, 2015). This was doubly enabled by EMU serving to increase the borrowing capacity of public and private actors in the ‘periphery’. With the advent of a single currency, financial markets ceased distinguishing between government debt issued by ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries. This effectively treated non-German government bonds as though they were as safe as loans to Germany itself (Offe, 2015). The ‘periphery’ had one form of demand stimulus taken away, but ended up with another to in form of exceedingly cheap credit from private actors in the ‘core’ (Streeck, 2014).

This helped pump up real estate bubbles in Spain and Ireland where house prices surged over the 2000s (Scharpf, 2013). Firms, households, and governments in Greece and Portugal borrowed virtually without restriction over the same period (Streeck, 2014). During this time the balance sheets of large banks in ‘core’ countries swelled with liabilities from these loans (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier, 2016). Also, EMU institutions not only aided asset bubbles and credit-dependent spending commitments over the course of the 2000s, but the uniform monetary policy set by the ECB for the entire euro area precluded ‘periphery’ countries from using interest rate

⁶To the extent labour market integration has occurred, it has been at the firm demand level. Industrial relations, skills training, and active labour market policy remain a national jurisdiction.

adjustments to cool overheating domestic markets (Offe, 2015). Concurrently, regulatory arbitrage among national financial sectors and growing dependence on credit inflows greatly increased the issues a ‘periphery’ government faced in unilaterally increasing capital requirements of domestic banks (Streeck, 2014; Scharpf, 2013).

By 2008 public and private actors in the ‘periphery’ (and others in the Eurozone generally) had become heavily exposed to the interest rates influencing their debt burden (Jabko, 2015). The lower growth, cost of bailouts, and tight lending environment after the initial 2008 turmoil blatantly exposed these vulnerabilities. As credit became scarcer and more expensive, financial markets began to clue in to the precarious fiscal positions of ‘periphery’ countries.⁷ Furthermore, due to EMU speculators realized there was no national central bank to provide emergency liquidity, a no-bailout clause binding the only monetary authority that remained, and no traditional shock-absorbers like currency devaluation, inflation, or import restrictions (Offe, 2015). This unsurprisingly led to a series of panicked sell-offs from 2010 that only abated when the ECB under Mario Draghi announced they would do “whatever it takes” to prevent a meltdown of the Eurozone (Aslett & Caporaso, 2016).

In retrospect, the institutional design of Economic and Monetary Union was critical to the euro crisis given its far-reaching feedback effects into trade, investment, and lending patterns in the euro area up to, and since, the initial crisis. This shaping of the path that left the Eurozone utterly exposed to the post-2008 financial turbulence is an important determinant of the euro crisis. Yet, as discussed below, this is not the only way EMU is relevant to the issues currently plaguing the Eurozone.

Mechanisms of EMU ‘Reproduction’

Having established the link between Economic and Monetary Union and temporal feedback shaping the path of the Eurozone, the next concern is how ‘locked in’ this situation is. This section addresses the present persistence of the Eurozone, which is evidenced to result from

⁷ While specific combinations of factors facilitating domestic financial crises varied across ‘periphery’ countries, the influence of EMU stands out as a significant and common independent effect (Scharpf, 2013).

continuing feedback into negative and positive incentives that increase the durability of EMU as an institutional arrangement.

‘Stuck’ on Previously Chosen Path

The negative incentives present suggest there may be no going back to “square one” for the euro area (Offe, 2015, p. 48). A key aspect of path dependence, noted by Pierson (2004), is “how costs of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time” (p. 19). This is another dynamic evident in the path of the euro area, which now decisively impacts the cost-benefit analysis facing any Eurozone actor at this point in time.

Appreciating costs associated with disintegration of the euro area means pointing out European and global financial markets are characterized by generally unregulated capital mobility. With no restrictions on short-term financial flows, uncertainty is liable to become a destabilizing sell-off of an asset under scrutiny. This itself can spiral into a less-than-rational panic permitting a ‘financial stampede’, where the contagion of crisis spreads, potentially too rapidly to control, through the interconnected transnational financial system, then the broader economy. Under such conditions, short-term turmoil and long-term disruptions are threatened not only in the source country, but its economic partners as well (Kirshner, 1999; Helleiner, 1994).

This is the general hazard facing EMU member governments dealing with the prospect of national defaults in the Eurozone. If the financial markets devour a Eurozone country, negative effects will transmit across national borders, threatening Eurozone neighbours above all (Offe, 2015). This scenario threatened to materialize from 2010 as credit rating firms and investors became concerned about debt burdens in ‘periphery’ Eurozone countries (Scharpf, 2013) leading to intermittent panics that “threatened to bring down the euro in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain” (Mansbach & Pirro, 2016, p. 108). The particular design EMU has taken is central to these issues given market liberalizing integration removed instruments national governments had

previously used to dampen problems at the root of financial concerns engulfing the ‘periphery’ (Hall, 2014).⁸

Just how severe would full/partial Eurozone disintegration be? Much would depend on the way it occurred, particularly timeframe and coordination. Assessments in the literature are diverse, but opinions generally range from ‘problematic, but conceivable’ at best, to ‘possible socioeconomic catastrophe’ at worst. Presumably referring to a more orderly and partial event, Aslett & Caporaso (2016) argue leaving the euro would “require coordinated action with the members as a whole” (p. 9), especially the ‘core’ to avoid capital flight and financial collapses in the exiting state, and wider recession in the Eurozone. Other views give little weight to the idea it is realistic to abandon the euro currency. Hall (2014) assesses exiting the Eurozone is likely to expose the ‘periphery’ to even more severe recession and financial turmoil.⁹ Offe (2015) goes so far to argue that “the Euro currency is, for all practical purposes, an irreversible arrangement” (p. 48) citing many issues discussed above, all offering potential for even carefully crafted breakup plans to go awry. He further points out the extent of micro-level adaptations and learning in response to EMU over two decades (replacing prior norms/patterns) add up to reversal costs in the present day of an unpredictable magnitude (pp. 48-52).

Likewise, the ‘core’ is unlikely to see benefit in facilitating abandonment of EMU institutions comparable with the prospective damage. For example, Streeck (2014), receptive to the idea given the structural problems attributable to EMU, sees the deep exposure of systemically important German and French banks to the value of Greek debt securities as a severe obstacle. Schimmelflennig (2015) also points out even if a national default and exit of Greece could “probably” (p. 181)¹⁰ be handled in isolation, the penultimate fear of German and likeminded leaders is in precipitating a collapse in confidence in larger struggling Eurozone countries, which would be exponentially harder to counteract. While ‘core’ countries have demonstrated a basic preference for no-bailout rules (Scharpf, 2013) the severity of interdependence has decisively shaped the cost-benefit analysis they face (Blyth, 2013; Hall,

⁸ Mentioned previously: exchange rate devaluation, lowering national interest rates, trade policies, etc.

⁹ The depreciation of renationalized currencies would be a severe concern to result in spiking import prices, inflation, and debt burdens that are denominated in euros.

¹⁰ In light of experiences since 2008, to find out the response of financial markets to such ambiguity in the heat of crisis seems a gamble in the extreme.

2014). The institutional design of the currency union and Single Market have facilitated a degree of 'exist cost' on a different scale than was previously the case (Offe, 2015).

In 1996, Pierson commented "though member states remain [technically] free to walk away, the constantly increasing cost of exit in a densely integrated polity have rendered this option virtually unthinkable for EC member states" (p. 146). If such a statement had any merit then, this mechanism of reproduction has only deepened over the time EMU has been active, increasing the risk associated with euro disintegration, and constituting a severe negative incentive against reversing the previously chosen path.

Barriers to Altering Path Going Forward

With an understanding of how Economic and Monetary Union facilitated the road to crisis, and conditions making it ever more difficult to reverse, the focus of this section is on the prospect of qualitatively altering that road going forward. In this regard it is important to assess where institutional arrangements allocate political power and authority (Pierson, 2004). What motivates influential actors in positions of strength can suggest how institutions are likely to be used and adapted going forward. Examining the interests and action of the 'core' countries and their role in post-crisis changes to EMU provides evidence deep reformatations may not likely be forthcoming.

Schimmelflennig (2015) explains the Eurozone context of flawed institutions and severe negative interdependence has produced a situation where both the EU 'core' and 'periphery' leaders have an overriding preference to sustain EMU, and secondary conflict over allocating the burdensome adjustments necessary to prevent disintegration. Whatever the rhetoric, little hard evidence suggests EMU is primarily made possible by altruistic motivations; crisis has revealed a Eurozone premised on the expectation of some degree of national gain, and certainly not transnational redistribution (Hall, 2014; Schmidt, 2013).

This was evident during the crisis as leaders from the 'core' found themselves in a position to dictate the base terms of bailouts, given the financial resources required to resolve the situation were too large to be drawn from the relatively small budgets of the EU or IMF

(Matthijs & Blyth, 2015). This allowed national leaders in Germany, France, and others in comparatively better fiscal circumstances to guide the European Council and shape responses to various emergencies. This served to amplify the influence of the German government and Chancellor Angela Merkel, representing the largest Eurozone economy whose participation was requisite for a credible bailout plan (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013). The significance of this relates to the fact that the existing design of EMU broadly reflects institutional preferences of the ‘core’. Particularly with Germany, Fioretos (2001) explains the current institutional design of EMU, from the monetarist orientation of the ECB to broader rules-based governance, is not a coincidence, but in fact were/are supported for their perceived complementarity with domestic arrangements. Furthermore Reisenbichler & Morgan (2012, 2013¹¹) point out the favourable economic conditions prevailing in Germany during the main crisis episodes gave its leaders little incentive to rethink their approach. From this perspective it is hardly surprising that ‘core’ countries, and especially Germany, insisted on layering new, but similar, institutional forms (such as the EFSF, ESM, Fiscal Pact) during the crisis, which did not alter EMU in fundamental ways (Scharpf, 2013)

‘Periphery’ governments, for their part, were not helpless. Streeck (2014) contends the election of a left-wing government in Greece during austerity negotiations was enough to “raise the price” the ‘core’ was willing to pay to prevent it collapsing out of the Eurozone. However, the ability of ‘periphery’ governments to leverage the ‘game of chicken’ defining the bailout negotiations was persistently limited by a sense of domestic crisis and perceived role of being in trouble and needing assistance from others (Schimmelflennig, 2015). This assessment indicates a clear power imbalance has been important in enabling the institutions of EMU to persist with only minor alterations despite facing significant challenges.

In addition to the hierarchy of political authority between governments, the durability of these arrangements may further be aided by continuing support of the (transnational) business community (Streeck, 2006). Lapavitsas et al. (2010) argues this setup undercuts the position of organized labour and national authorities relative to mobile firms, increasingly bound only by their interests, whereas states are territorially fixed and in competition to attract their operations. Furthermore, the less developed and now distressed ‘periphery’ countries put downward pressure

¹¹ “How Germany won the euro crisis”.

on the value of the euro in foreign exchange markets, which is highly advantageous to the export-oriented firms of the ‘core’ (Hall, 2014). For example German machine tool, auto, and chemical product firms’ output is made more competitive in global markets where demand is more buoyant (Möller, 2015). The prospect of weaker countries leaving the Eurozone would be almost certain to cause the euro to appreciate and lead to a recessionary export slump in the ‘core’. Given the benefits that accrue to prominent market actors under the current system (Streeck, 2006), they can be expected to continue advocating its maintenance and further entrenchment.

In sum, the power asymmetry between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ was pivotal in sustaining the path of the Eurozone during the crisis (Magone, Laffan, & Schweiger, 2016), and the interests and relative influence of key actors have not undergone substantial change since. This general hierarchy of national and private economic interests has meant ‘core’ governments have broadly controlled the evolution of EMU institutions (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013), with an absence of any fundamental revisions the result. This discussion suggests where negative incentives explain why actors are keen to avoid a meltdown of the Eurozone, positive incentives evidence why institutional change since the crisis has been a series of ad hoc attempts to sustain the current path (Scharpf, 2014). That the upheaval has not overcome the status quo is evidence of resilient mechanisms of reproduction. However, while the crisis has not undermined essential institutional continuities, EMU’s capacity to reproduce itself may be pushed further in the future.

Implications Of EMU Continuity

The deeper insight such analysis can provide concerns the possible future of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, visible when the reflection of critical political economy is unified with the framework of historical institutionalism. Previous research on the euro crisis utilizing this approach has identified feedback effects of past policies, but has seemingly failed to critically assess if mechanisms of reproduction, though proving durable so far, should be expected to have the same resilience in the future. Drawing on Thelen’s (1999) critique, a thorough analysis is compelled to consider if it is in fact clear that EMU institutions are resting

on the same/undisturbed pillars of support. The simple observation that despite recent political, economic, and social stress the Eurozone has avoided disintegration, and managed to marginally adapt, does not equate to certainty another crisis in the future would be similarly undisruptive.

The relevance of this issue lies in the significant possibility EMU will face critical challenges again due to still present structural flaws and systemic risks (Hopkin, 2015). This especially refers to underlying differences in the political economy of the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ that produced key macroeconomic imbalances which remain unresolved (Hall, 2014). Also, individual member nations of EMU generally remain defenseless against international developments and market pressures. Further, collective action capacities at the EU level remain relatively weak (Offe, 2015). Such factors indicate why McNamara (2015) concludes tendencies toward economic instability remain, with the institutional architecture of EMU still very incomplete for what has been necessary historically for a fully functional and resilient political economy with diverse interdependent sub-units.

Under such conditions, discussion of how EMU mechanisms of reproduction might fare if tested again is an important consideration. Analyzing “power distributional features of institutions” offers insight in this regard (Thelen, 2009, p. 490). Borrowing from Streeck (2014), the Eurozone at present can be understood by the dynamic between (national) citizen actors and (international) market actors. Under arrangements like EMU, mainstream politicians must respond to exogenously determined pressures of market actors, who are decreasingly subject to national authority (Lapavistas et al., 2010). The euro crisis has largely been characterized by mainstream politicians feeling compelled to socialize losses of market actors in order to prevent negative material consequences for all societal groups in the event status quo institutions disintegrate (Offe, 2015). EMU closely fits the general trend in the global economy advantaging international business (especially finance), and which resulted in market actors being largely absolved of their responsibility for the current crisis (Schrapf, 2014; Streeck, 2014). While mainstream politicians continuing to perceive their interests as overlapping with those of market actors has defined the recent changes to EMU institutions, the continuing stability of this dynamic tacitly rests on the acquiescence of (national) citizen actors. A key implication of continuity deserving attention is thus that although path dependent realities suggest fundamental

change is unlikely to come from the top-down, this alone may not be enough to guarantee continuity.

In light of events since 2010 the continued acceptance by mass publics of EMU institutions should perhaps not be taken for granted. In both the Eurozone's 'core' and 'periphery' polities a marked trend of Eurosceptic and anti-establishment populism has followed in wake of the crisis. This may increase the complication of maintaining EMU, let alone further developing it (Kreisi & Pappas, 2015; Offe, 2015). Prior historical institutionalist accounts of the euro crisis largely take the neo-functionalist logic that path dependency and spillover effects have-driven/will-drive integration as crisis situations create the incentive for "more Europe" (e.g. Niemann & Ioannou, 2015; Salines, Glöcker, & Truchlewski, 2012).

However, the dominance of national self-interest during the recent crisis justifies considering whether the political viability of solving systemic EMU problems by transferring evermore sovereignty to the EU-level might fast be approaching critical limits (Schmidt, 2013; Scharpf, 2014). Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier (2016) briefly express skepticism about this pattern of EMU advancement, whereby incomplete institutions contribute to and/or muddle through crisis, which is conveyed to the public as the impetus for further integration to remedy apparent flaws. Reflecting on this traditional path of 'crisis leading to deeper integration', Offe (2015) argues the context of economic uncertainty and political discontent following the recent turmoil may be the "first instance in the history of the EU where this logic no longer applies" (p. 57). And if market actors and mainstream politicians that support integration are unable to secure public acceptance as they have in the past, any resolution of future crises will be bound by the limiting preexisting framework.

If the option of more coherent and/or egalitarian EMU institutions at the supranational level is not available, the possibility EU actors will default back to the precedent of bailouts and austerity cannot be ignored as a threat to future stability. Matthijs & Blyth (2015, p. 266) warn unless the options for remedying crisis become more palatable than grudging bailouts in exchange for social deprivation "sheer political sustainability" becomes the critical concern. Leaders of 'core' countries showed great consternation over having to provide bailouts while complaining about the perceived moral hazard they represent (Offe, 2015). Even more troubling is uncritically expecting 'periphery' countries to continue in the role of 'permanent losers' under

EMU without asking how many times mainstream politicians will/can ask their citizens to vote to sacrifice their own felt needs for the purpose of preserving EMU (Hopkin, 2015; Matthijs & Blyth, 2015).

Beyond this unsolved ‘core’ vs. ‘periphery’ cleavage, general satisfaction in domestic context is unlikely to help. Indeed, the distance between winners and losers of liberalization and EMU is increasing within, as well as across, most EMU member states (Magone, Laffan, & Schweiger, 2016). Whatever its benefit, given the relative burden of increasingly market-oriented EMU institutions has been on working and middle classes since even before the crisis (Lapavistas et al. 2010) there is solid reason to account for contentment with the status quo, to say the least, not being on an upward trend (Streeck, 2014). EMU entered the recent crisis largely viewed as constructive and modernizing by the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ respectively, and not an object of meaningful public hostility (Hall, 2014; Magone, Laffan, & Schweiger, 2016). Whatever affection EU citizens had for EMU prior to 2008, it is reasonable to conclude any future challenges will encounter a less patient public.

Conversely, recent events indicate another external or internal shock might not be required to put the future of EMU in question. The current crisis has not been without backlash, and these substantive populist trends warrant considering another threat to EMU continuity: that path dependent influences, based on at least somewhat rational-materialist calculations, are likely more applicable to actors of the political mainstream than actors of the political fringe emerging in the wake of the crisis. Webber’s (2014) insights on aspects of EU political economy become especially relevant here. He notes the tide of rather nationalist populism following the crisis has reached a point where mainstream politicians across the EU are concluding it is electorally infeasible to ignore this sentiment. Such concerns are the result of developments like the unexpected success of Germany’s right-wing AfD party in subnational elections in 2016, the continuing degree of support in France for the Front Nationale, and the discontent manifesting in failure for Italian PM Monti’s constitutional referendum. (Kreisi & Pappas, 2015; Reuters, 2016b; Spiegel Online, 2016).

Perhaps the most vivid illustration to date is the successful referendum vote for Britain to leave the European Union. While the business community and mainstream political leaders campaigned to remain, dissenting and fringe politicians, like Nigel Farage of the far-right UKIP,

are thought to have successfully appealed to growing socioeconomic antipathy in the electorate (Scheuermann, 2016). While not justifying dramatic speculation, it is worth pointing out this juncture of discontent overcoming status quo bias of mainstream politicians and market actors occurred in a referendum called by Britain's mainstream right Conservative Party to address growing populist tension in their voter base, and market actors seem to have failed to anticipate the viability of their non-preferred outcome (Reuters, 2016a)¹². While noting the UK is (or was) to some degree a less conventional EU member, and a comparable rupture has not occurred within the currency union, the discontent found in 'Brexit' is not especially unique (Kreisi & Pappas, 2015). Overall, despite continuity being an accurate description of EMU's post-crisis evolutions, the persistence of such path dependent patterns certainly seems more tenuous than prior historical institutional analyses suggest.

The neutral language of historical institutionalism's theoretical tools does not naturally emphasize the hierarchical power relations defining which societal groups favour the current institutional design of EMU. Thelen (1999) cautioned such language can "obscure the fact that... stability, far from being automatic, may have to be sustained politically" (p. 396). Building on Webber's (2014) insight and incorporating more critical assessments of political economy scholars facilitates a historical institutional analysis evidencing that despite path dependent actions of mainstream politicians, the political environment around EMU may not be as stable as elite behaviour alone would suggest. Again, it is worth stating that the evidence available are not grounds for predicting imminent disaster, but it is important to consider that past and recent events may reverberate in ways that undermine the political support EMU rested on going into the recent crisis. The pattern of further-crisis-enabling-further-integration should not be understood as an EMU trajectory without meaningful risks.

¹² Two early 2016 surveys of employees in Britain's financial sector predicted 'Bremain', one unanimously and one at 80 percent.

Conclusion

Events since the euro crisis began indicate the institutions of Economic and Monetary Union are, in critical ways, dependent on a previously chosen path. The cumulative feedback effects after adopting EMU enabled the vulnerability of the euro area to an exogenous shock in 2008. A combination of economic and financial interdependencies, and general preference for EMU status quo among dominant EU actors, provides both negative and positive incentives that have proven capable of reproducing EMU through the crisis. However, more attention should be given to the ‘political coalitional support’ (Thelen, 2009) required for those mechanisms of reproduction to continue having a stabilizing effect. EU and EMU integration has always reflected the limits of national political sensitivities, which made comparatively subtle technocratic supranational rules a practical path when the issue had only moderate electoral salience. Never since EMU has been in effect though, have pro-Single Market and currency union advocates had to deal with such meaningful countervailing forces (Webber, 2014). Aftershocks of electoral backlash, social discontent, and continuing economic imbalances offer real potential to undermine the continuity of the path the Eurozone has taken thus far.

This paper provides a cursory glance at some of the numerous and complex reasons EMU institutions have exhibited path dependent dynamics. There is much more that can be said about why timing/sequence matter in this case. Because detailed assessments of particular aspects are available elsewhere (e.g., Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier [2016] on financial governance) a somewhat streamlined inquiry has merit here. This analysis builds on previous applications of historical institutionalism to the euro crisis, but emphasizes less stabilizing implications that can be explained, yet have been less discussed, within this framework; finding not only which path dependent factors reinforce EMU, but also those threatening to undermine it. By fusing the insights of critical political economy with this approach the implications of mutually present continuity and potential instability are more adequately addressed.

To start, attention is drawn to issues of suboptimal patterns becoming entrenched in the political economy of the EU, which seems devoid of the conditions Jacobs (2011) suggests can enable farsighted reform; i.e. consensus about the benefit to be gained, concentration of relevant authorities/capacities, and acceptable electoral risks. This may be problematic as the path to and

from the euro crisis evidences neither calm nor panicked circumstances have been sufficient to change or suspend these realities to enable constructive reformations. To state this conclusion generally, EMU has been significant in integrating Europe as an economy to an extent Europe as a polity seems unready, and perhaps unable, to mirror. Yet built up path dependencies, especially since EMU and amidst economic globalization, complicate the option of bringing Eurozone markets and monetary policy back down to a politically coherent level. Hence at present the Eurozone appears destined to go forward with neither the political unity nor the institutional design needed to remedy systemic issues in either direction.

The perspective of this analysis links such findings to the potential this impasse may not be enough to ensure EMU will endure given the discontent this status quo has proven capable of facilitating. In the aftermath of the imbalances and crisis, it has been particularly ominous to observe how the EU/EMU has increasingly become part of radical and effective populist appeals regardless of the Left/Right leanings of fringe political actors (Kreisi & Pappas, 2015). With this in mind EMU's largely unchanged path from the euro crisis may rightfully be seen as concerning. The unchanged dynamic between market economy and representative government in the EU, the euro crisis, and the global turmoil they were part of, evidence the productive coexistence of democracy and capitalism is not a natural law, but more a politically contested balance. That it appears to be a hazy equilibrium, which does not automatically self-correct if disturbed, echoes Keynes' warnings about the hazards of basing social life around neoclassical economic assumptions (Kirshner, 1999), such as those characterizing EMU (Streeck, 2006).

To the extent lack of aforementioned balance and ensuing pressures of unregulated capitalism have circumscribed a more responsive democracy in this case, this analysis should raise questions about the political viability of the trajectory institutionalized by EMU; particularly if it leads to systemic confrontation between the logic of national voter's frustrations and the logic of international market actor's interests. The bounded rationality of mainstream politicians and market actors supporting EMU may be a decreasingly benign fault if it continues to prove capable of constructing and maintaining institutional arrangements disconnected from the mood of EU citizens, even if their consent proves somewhat malleable over (probably not unlimited) periods of time. The design of EMU, events of the euro crisis, and subsequent

populist frustration among publics in the European Union may indeed be evidence of growing headwinds in response to the previously charted course.

If path dependencies make EMU arrangements impractical to reverse/alter, but built-in flaws make them decreasingly practical to sustain, the ramifications for the European project could be quite large. In light of past events and the context of an unknown future, such disconnects appear to represent a perpetual and/or heightened risk of instability, as both the practicality of pacifying significant backlash indefinitely, and assessing the point at which capacities to govern are critically eroded, defy precise measurement. The vigilance required to appreciate such implications is put well by Streeck (2014, p. 163) that “professionalized” political and economic study tends “to underestimate the impact of moral outrage”. Uncritically ignoring normative aspects of mass public experience make EMU seem almost certain to reproduce itself over time. While path dependent dynamics may increase the likelihood EMU will persist, vulnerabilities are evident enough this outcome should not be taken for granted.

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The Political Death of the TPP

The Causes of Growing Protectionist Attitudes in North American Politics and their Culmination in the 2016 Election and its Bipartisan Disdain for the Pacific Trade Agreement

Micah Sienna

Abstract:

This paper considers what conditions led to US policy shifting (by nature of changing the two major party platforms and the rhetoric of the two candidates) against the TPP, and on a more broad note: what conditions within a country will lead to bipartisan or multilateral agreement in favour of trade protectionism. This paper argues that the TPP lost support in the United States because of growing resentment and anxiety around income inequality and the fear of future unemployment, coupled with a high degree of partisanship and nationalism yet a large distrust in the government.

First this paper judges whether the failure of the TPP to be politically tenable in the United States was a flaw in the particular agreement. Then this paper reviews the literature relating to the causes of protectionism, and relates them to literature discussing the TPP. Finally this paper aggregates data on the comments and rhetoric of candidates as well as news coverage in the 2016 US national election and the 2015 Canadian national election and compares the data to see which factors are stressed, and which contradict the literature. Canada and the United States are similar countries in some respects and very different in others meaning it provides an interesting comparison for a case study in that it is easy to control for or isolate certain variables.

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In the 2016 USA election both the major party candidates opposed the free trade agreement: the Trans Pacific Partnership (hillaryclinton.com & donaldjtrump.com). Both candidates' oppositions to the TPP are not individual; they both amended their party's platforms to oppose the TPP, making the official policy of both major American parties to be against the Pacific trade deal. In 2016 American politics is at its most polarized in decades, potentially over a century (Pew Research, 2014), and the two political parties are seemingly more and more stratified in their policy objectives. These two facts seem to be at odds with each other, the parties and the voters disagree more and more, yet on this incredibly important and controversial topic, the two candidates seem to be in agreement. Additionally confusing is the fact that the TPP is an easily defensible policy that will benefit Americans; the benefits could be articulated easily to either party's bases and their concerns. The Republican party could boast to its base that the TPP will increase American GDP through more exports, boost employment in high tech and other capital intensive goods, and will reduce China's economic influence in the region. While the Democratic Party has traditionally been more protectionist, the TPP was heavily designed by President Obama, and there are areas of the TPP that could be used to appeal to progressive voters such as: how the TPP will improve labour standards, environmental protection, human rights, and reduce corruption while spurring innovation. Additionally, the benefits of increased exports, and cheaper imports are neither inherently conservative nor liberal, and it would have been entirely reasonable within the policy structure of either party to include support for the TPP as a part of their platform.

This paper considers what conditions led to US policy shifting (by nature of changing the two major party platforms and the rhetoric of the two candidates) against the TPP, and on a more broad note: what conditions within a country will lead to bipartisan or multilateral agreement in favour of trade protectionism? Interest groups traditionally attempt to take advantage of economic downturns, and this is a common explanation in the literature as to how protectionist policies arise. However, this paper argues that the TPP lost support in the United States because of growing resentment and anxiety around income inequality and the fear of future unemployment, coupled with a high degree of partisanship and nationalism yet a large distrust in the government.

This paper will begin by judging whether the failure of the TPP to be politically tenable in the United States was a flaw in the particular agreement. Then this paper reviews the literature

relating to the causes of protectionism, and relates them to literature discussing the TPP. Finally this paper aggregates data on the comments and rhetoric of candidates as well as news coverage in the 2016 US national election and the 2015 Canadian national election and compares the data to see which factors are stressed, and which contradict the literature. Canada and the United States are similar countries in some respects and very different in others meaning it provides an interesting comparison for a case study in that it is easy to control for or isolate certain variables. Canada and the US are both capital abundant high-income countries with plenty of natural resources. They both also had national elections recently, during the time that the TPP was an issue being debated in the public sphere.

The first question to consider is whether there was something inherent in the TPP that made both parties reject it that is exclusive to the TPP. In other words, is the rejection of the TPP an outlier – a flaw in the specific agreement – or representative of a trend? While there are plenty of critiques one can level at the TPP, the rhetoric of Trump, specifically that the TPP would benefit Mexico or Asian countries more than America is strange, given that most research indicates that the TPP was largely shaped by American interests. Allee and Lugg performed a set of textual analyses comparing the text of the TPP to the 74 other free trade agreements that any of the TPP signatories have entered into to find textual similarities. They found that the United States had an overwhelmingly disproportionate hand in the writing of the TPP text; the ten most textually similar free trade agreements to the TPP were all American FTAs (Allee and Lugg, 4). Certain free trade agreements such as the US and South Korea or the US and Bahrain had as much as 50% of the text verbatim included in the TPP (4). Applying this data to an institutional hegemony lens, they conclude that since the US works with international institutions to protect and streamline their hegemony, that the overwhelming presence of American influence in the TPP text reveals that America had the strongest hand in negotiations. It is strange to conceive that the US would use their negotiating strength to write a free trade agreement that disproportionately benefited other countries. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that political criticism of the TPP was a justified reaction to a suboptimal trade agreement. Additionally, given the harsh words both candidates have had for trade deals such as NAFTA, and other free trade agreements, there is evidence to suggest that the opposition is not directly specific to the TPP, but rather that opposition to the TPP is a manifestation of a growing call for protectionism within the United States.

Opposition to free trade and globalization in the United States is not a recent advent in American politics; Ross Perot ran an extremely successful third party run at the Presidency in 1992 almost exclusively campaigning for protectionist trade policy (Bernstein, online). However, given the election of Donald Trump as President-Elect, a man who was able to win the Republican primary and then the presidency against high odds partly due to his anti-globalization rhetoric, protectionist attitudes in the United States have widened since the era of NAFTA and Perot. Additionally, given the failure of the recent CETA negotiation, the heavy anti-globalism rhetoric in the Brexit referendum and the failure of the Doha negotiations for the WTO, the increase of protectionist rhetoric and policy is not isolated in the United States. While the same factors of resentment towards inequality, increased partisanship, growing nationalism and distrust in government very likely had causal impacts on the success of Brexit and other protectionist policies recently implemented, that is beyond the scope of this research paper.

If the likely withdrawal of the US, and the subsequent failure of the TPP to accede is not a result of a particular flaw in the treaty but rather a symptom of a change in national attitudes and priorities, then it is necessary to consider what factors have led to this systemic change. Also, it is important to decide on what methodologies or frameworks can be used to categorize and judge the importance of the different factors. Using a political economic lens, there is plenty of literature studying the causes of protectionism both in terms of personal opinions and in terms of national policy. These factors are broadly divided into economic, political, and cultural factors. These factors will be analysed through an institutionalist (and institutionalist hegemony) framework.

Busch and Mansfield in their article “The Political Economy of Trade Policy” provide a helpful literature review that explores the different causal factors that lead a country to pursue protectionist policies using an institutionalist approach. The analysis was on national governments, and how they interact with domestic institutions that are responding to domestic economic, political, and social conditions within a country. Busch and Mansfield conclude certain economic factors have stronger empirical evidence that correlates to higher levels of protectionist trade policy. Those conditions are: geographic concentration of industries and sectors, unemployment, and the exchange rate (Busch and Mansfield, 7-8). Additionally, they pointed to several political factors that had strong correlative effects such as: ethnic stratification, the strength and access of interest groups, partisanship, number of veto points in the legislative

process, system of government, and the size of the relevant districts (13-16). In terms of cultural factors, Busch and Mansfield find that protectionist attitudes are much higher in, “those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praiseworthy than their own racial or ethnic group... this study finds that they are far more predictive of trade preferences than indicators of economic self-interest” (Busch and Mansfield 5-6). Geographic concentration of industries and sectors was an important factor in how Donald Trump was able to win the Electoral College without the popular vote, by appealing to a few geographically concentrated industries in swing states, such as Ohio where he campaigned extremely frequently. Unemployment or the fear of unemployment is an important factor that appears in much of the oppositional rhetoric towards the TPP. Partisanship is an important variable as it is steadily increasing in the United States at a faster rate than in Canada.

Another interesting review on causes of protectionism is in Mayda and Rodrik’s “Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?” Using data from the International Social Survey Programme as well as the World Values Survey, they tracked what factors in the surveys were correlated to individual preferences regarding trade policy. They analyzed the median feelings of trade in citizens of a given country and also looked to see if that result had a high or low degree of variance to the other citizens in the country. The economic factors that the article analyzed specifically were factor endowments (i.e. whether a country has an advantage in capital, labour or land/resources) versus the specific factors model (i.e. whether a country has a more vocal import or export competing sector). Within a factor endowment model, they found that education and capital rich countries on a whole favour free trade, while labour intensive countries do not. Additionally within a specific factors model: those in export competing sectors favoured free trade policy, while those in import competing sectors were against free trade. However, they found a much more statistically significant correlation through the factor endowments model than through the specific factors model. Additionally they found those with higher incomes and social statuses tend to favour free trade. This comes into contrast with the failure of the United States to ratify the TPP. As a capital endowed, higher wealth country, most models would expect the United States to ratify, and yet politically, the American voters chose to renounce it. Non-economic variables in the article seemed to explain the recent election outcome better. The article found that those who have a high attachment to their community combined with nationalism and a distrust of the functionality of the current

government will be strongly protectionist. To clarify the differences between patriotism and trust in the government, Mayda and Rodrik state, “communitarian-patriotic values tend to foster protectionist attitudes, but this tendency is moderated when the broader institutions of society are perceived to be working well.” (Mayda and Rodrik, page number). In America, people are intensely patriotic and nationalistic but they also have a deep distrust in the functioning of their government. This could also explain why the TPP had bipartisan opposition in the United States as opposed to in Canada. In the United States, trust in government is at an all time low.

According to the Pew Research Centre, while the majority of Americans say they are still patriotic and love their country, only 19% of Americans trust the government to do what is right, and the period from 2007 to today has been the longest period of aggregate low trust in government in over 50 years (Pew Research, 2015, online). In stark contrast to this, EKOS Research has determined that Canadian’s trust in the government is at its highest in the last 20 years, with 44% of Canadians saying they trust the government to always or most of the time do what is right (Connolly, 2016, online). Trust in government is a recurring theme in the political rhetoric of the US election and represents a large divergence between the American and Canadian political spectrum.

Articles that delve more deeply into measurable economic variables and their affects on national trade policy and protectionist attitudes of a country’s citizen’s include Martijn (1989), Bradford (1991) and Busch and Reinhardt (1999). These articles, while older are some of the foundational theories examining economic factors within a country that can lead to protectionism. In the article, “Real Exchange Rate Changes as a Cause of Protectionism” Martijn shows that “a prolonged real appreciation will lead to a higher level of protection in the country concerned” (Martijn, 328). Additionally, Martijn argues that even if the exchange rate completely reverts to the original value, the effects are sticky and will likely remain, meaning over time there is a build-up of protectionism in the long term. Martijn explains that in a perfectly competitive political market, protectionist trade policies will never be used to correct market failures because there are more sensitive instruments that could better solve the problems caused by exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore the presence of protectionist trade policies in response to a lower exchange rate additionally reflects some imperfection in the political market. These notably include issues regarding access to accurate and clear information to the cost of participating in the political process. These imperfections create free rider problems where small

interest groups can outweigh the small but negative effects spread out among the voter base. Martijn shows that the presence of an appreciated currency can lead to the implementation of protectionist trade policies, but only if the country has certain flaws in the political structure that allow interest groups to mobilize and substantially affect policy in a self-interested manner. Concerns around America's strong dollar and other countries' ability to manipulate their currency to take advantage of that, are a concern for trade policy, and Martijn as well as Busch and Mansfield discuss the ways in which anxieties around exchange rates can cause an increase in protectionist policies. On the surface the data is a good example of the distinctions between America and Canada given Canada's weak dollar compared to the strength of the American dollar. However, the strength of interest groups, which is fundamental to Martijn's model as well as a strong factor in Bradford's and Busch and Mansfield's, is not relevant to this analysis. This is because Donald Trump's opposition to the TPP was counter to the traditional interest groups that support the Republican Party. While it is arguable that Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders opposed the TPP because of the influence of labour unions, Donald Trump had no such incentive. Additionally, Martijn's argument seems surprising given the data around American's educations and what concerns them in an election that the exchange rate would be a policy the average voter was fluent in and concerned about. This is an area that invites more research: how much does the American voter understand regarding currency distortions, how much does it concern them, and whether that had a substantive impact on the 2016 election. For now, this paper simply puts forth that anxieties around the dollar likely had a contributing impact in the uptick in protectionist rhetoric in the 2016 election.

Scott Bradford in "Protection and jobs: explaining the structure of trade barriers across industries" argues that as unemployment rises and GNP decreases, a country will pursue more protectionist policies, as it has less political capital to fight against interest groups. Bradford notes that the amounts to which firms lobby for free trade and consequently how much they will receive will depend on: the labour pool in that sector, the elasticities of labour demand and import demand, and the price of lobbying. Considering that the unemployment rate in Canada is higher than in the United States, and that lobbying is considerably more deregulated in the US compared to Canada, this also seems to be an untenable explanation into the protectionist attitudes of the 2016 election.

Busch and Reinhardt in “Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Non-tariff Barriers” show that geographically concentrated industries are more likely to receive import protection if they are politically dispersed across many different districts. In addition, politically concentrated industries in one or two districts will only be successful in pursuing protectionism if they are a small number of very large firms that have the capital to spend on costly lobbying. The geography of protectionism is an important consideration when analysing the 2016 election, and the way trade rhetoric was applied to voters in Ohio and other labour abundant swing states is evident when analysing the rhetoric of the election.

Many of the articles (Busch and Mansfield, Martijn, Bradford) have suggested that protectionism is only successful through the hard work of special interest groups that lobby on its behalf. However, this is in stark contrast to the populist mentalities of many of the protectionist movements, from Bernie, to Trump, to Brexit. In fact, the predominant rhetorical angle – especially from Trump – was that special interest groups were overwhelmingly in favour of the TPP and that was why it was being put forth against the interests of the American people. Therefore, interest group analysis seems fruitless to explain the growing protectionist policies in the United States and around the world, and rather this paper views growing protectionist political rhetoric as an extension of protectionist attitudes among its citizens.


This is in line with Susan Strange who in her article, “Protectionism and World Politics” argues that increasing protectionism is actually a product of increased democratization in a country. She argues that to preserve national order, sometimes “it may be necessary to assert independence over efficiency” (238). Comparing current American policy to the protection of peasant farmers from imported grain in 1880s France she describes protectionism as “a set of stages in the widening participation of different groups in that body politic. The transition from mid-nineteenth century liberalization of trade to late nineteenth century protectionism was not a regressive atavistic response by conservative agrarian pressure but a progression in political participation” (238). She claims that the conflict between calls for protectionism by citizens and the free trade policies touted by most governments is due to the fact that governmental policy isn’t as responsive to economic shifts as individual preferences are. She states, “well into the 1940s and 1950s, British government officials continued to believe and advocate the ideology of free trade even though by that time only a few in British industry were still able to win in open

competition with Americans, Germans, or Japanese. I suspect the same thing is now true of the United States, where the rhetoric of free, non-discriminatory trade still strongly persists in Washington long after the reality of U.S. policy in some sectors is pointed in quite an opposite direction” (243). While there are plenty of aspects of Strange’s argument that are open for criticism regarding her personal opinions on protectionism and free trade, that last point may be another clue as to what happened in the 2016 American election. While the Republican party has been staunchly in favour of free trade for decades, Donald Trump was able to win the primary and then the presidency appealing to import competing labourers in swing states such as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. The dissonance between Donald Trump’s opinions on trade, and the strength of interest groups in favour of the TPP influencing the opinions of the majority of Congress may be evidence of Strange’s assertion, that there is a lag between national preferences and governmental policy.


While the above articles talk about the causes of protectionist policies or attitudes more broadly, many of the themes can be related to articles that directly address the TPP. For example: unemployment and income which are considered import causal factors by Bradford, Mayda and Rodrik, and Busch and Mansfield is brought up as a major point of contention in Takeuchi’s “The Political Economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications beyond Economics”. Takeuchi argues that much of the opposition to the TPP in North American countries is a product of growing resentment around increasing economic inequality. This is an important consideration when comparing the United States and Canada, since while there is income inequality in both countries, the United States has a significantly higher rate of income inequality, making it another difference between the US and Canada (Conference Board of Canada, online). This can explain why the rhetoric of Trump and his claims of massive outsourcing because of the TPP gained a more receptive audience than those who claimed the same in Canada.

Using the American Presidency Project (which transcribes and archives all presidential and presidential election documents), I was able to locate approximately 50 times where the TPP was brought up by name (either as TPP or as Trans Pacific Partnership) in the 2016 election. I organized them by positive, negative, or neutral, by who said it, and if it was more than a cursory mention, what they thought of the TPP. While 50 does not sound like a lot at first glance (given the election cycle was nearly two years long) it’s important to remember that very little substantive policy was discussed during the election. The Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics

and Public Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government released three reports during the election on media coverage of the election. The overarching theme was that issues rarely were discussed with coverage of Clinton being about her policies at 28% and for Trump only at 12% (Patterson, 16). While there were a plethora of statements regarding a candidate's support for free trade while also saying that the current free trade deals were not benefitting Americans sufficiently, finding moments when candidate's spoke about the benefits or costs of a specific policy was rare. All in all, I discovered that as an issue of policy, the TPP was given a lot of weight in the election, especially through the larger presidential campaign moments. The TPP was discussed in two out of three of the presidential debates, was brought up in four republican primary debates and two democratic primary debates. It was additionally mentioned in Donald Trump's acceptance speech during the primaries. Of all the times it was discussed, it had a negative presentation in 93%, a positive in 4% and neutral in 2%. This is obviously distorted by the fact that politics engages in black and white rhetoric ignoring nuance, that those who brought it up usually did so in an effort to disparage it, and that Donald Trump received more attention and air time to present his opinions on the TPP than other candidates.



Of those who brought up the TPP, 40% of its mentions came from Donald Trump, 30% from Bernie Sanders, 19% from Hillary Clinton, and the rest from various other candidates. However, Hillary Clinton's mentions of the TPP were almost always cursory, and rarely provided an explanation of her opposition.



The most common critiques of the TPP were (and many of these crossed party lines): It will outsource American jobs overseas (often times specifically in reference to workers in Ohio), it was only written to benefit billionaires and multinational corporations, that politicians weren't aware of what they were signing, that it will long term benefit China more than America, that it does not address currency manipulation, that it will continue to increase American trade deficits, and that it will erode American sovereignty. Many of these talking points echo many of the economic and political anxieties necessary for politicians to push for protectionism discussed in the literature. The talking points around outsourcing were the most common in events in swing states that had strong import competing sectors such as Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and North Carolina. The geographic concentration of these import competing sectors within important political districts echoes Busch and Reinhardt's article around the geographic concentration of import competing districts and the specific factors model. Talking points around the TPP only benefiting the upper class are a response to resentment around income inequality discussed by Takeuchi, and the criticism around politician's ignorance is reminiscent of Mayda and Rodrik's points around trust in government.

Of all of the criticism's currency manipulation was a surprisingly frequent talking point. Within all of the negative, non-cursory mentions of the TPP, currency manipulation was brought up as a point of criticism 16% of the time. The criticisms were mostly around the fact that currency manipulation was not addressed in the TPP and was excluded so that China would still be able to join at a later date and reap more rewards because of it than America could. This was a criticism brought up both by Clinton and Trump but much more frequently by Trump. This

seems to confirm Martijn's and Busch and Mansfield's data surrounding exchange rates and protectionism but as mentioned earlier, it seems unlikely that Trump was authentically reaching out to voters concerned about currency manipulation, but rather used it as a talking point to confirm a broader narrative that America was losing hegemonic ground to China.

While there is no database of all Canadian election documents, I was able to comb through the transcripts of the five leaders debates during the 2015 election. The Trans Pacific Partnership was mentioned in four out of the five debates, as part of larger discussions on trade and the economy (that were present in all the debates). In these debates, the three leaders touched upon their opinions on either the strength or weakness of the Pacific Trade agreement. Certain observations that I believe to be intriguing, is while Mulcair, and Elizabeth May were both vocally critical of aspects of the TPP, at no point, did any candidate vocally say they were either in favour or opposed the TPP. They simply debated the policy merits and potential costs. Some of the most common positive effects of the TPP that were mentioned were: its ability to boost the rate of growth for Canadian exports, to diversify our trading partners with the fastest growing markets, and to provide the Canadian agricultural sector with more buyers. Some of the most common negative effects of the TPP that were mentioned were: eroding Canadian sovereignty, selling the rights to our natural resources, potential environmental concerns, the potential end of supply management, and the potential to be priced out of the auto market.

Additionally to analyzing the debate transcripts, Schram et al analyzes the coverage of the TPP within major Canadian newspapers using the Political Economic framework of neoliberal hegemony. Schram discovers that while the TPP did not receive a lot of coverage, within the coverage it received, 43% of the articles were strongly in favour of joining the TPP, 49% were neutral, and only 8% were openly against Canada joining the TPP (164-165). Schram attributes this distortion to the concentration of media ownership; there is an increasing trend of monopolization in Canadian media (and this phenomenon is similarly exhibited in the US). Three companies in Canada control 90% of the Canadian newspaper market, and all companies owned by these conglomerates had consistently low frequencies of TPP criticism, ranging from 14% of relevant articles to no negative articles at all (165). She is critical of the assumptions that Canadian supply management is harmful to the economy, as well as the notion that engaging in more free trade will benefit the Canadian economy and she laments that the majority of the articles surrounding the TPP took these facts to be a given. However, one area of policy, that did

raise substantive criticism in the articles surveyed were the chapters regarding intellectual property rights. The criticism in the media regarding this area of the treaty may lend insight into why the TPP has faced so much opposition in the recent months. Schram hypothesizes that the intellectual property provisions as they relate to curtailing internet freedom, and their potential impacts on drug prices represents an easily demonstrable example of how the TPP was shaped to benefit corporate interests, even at the cost of ordinary citizens/consumers (169). She notes that the criticisms of these provisions in the articles was almost always coupled with criticism regarding the secretive nature of the negotiations, signalling that the opposition towards the TPP (expressed through the criticism of the above mentioned elements) is caused by a growing distrust of the government and its ability to act in the people's interests.

By comparing political discourse around the TPP in the Canadian and American elections, we see some ways in which Trump, and the surrounding political rhetoric in the American election differed from that in Canada. Firstly, we look at appeals to income inequality and fears of unemployment. In the Canadian election, when incomes were discussed in relation to trade they were spoken about positively, noting that increasing exports increased Canadian incomes across the board. Then Minister Trudeau said in one of the debates, "We also understand that trade and creating good jobs is at the heart of what every Canadian prime minister needs to do. We are too big a country with too few people to be able to do it all on our own" (Macleans, September 28, 2015. Online). In contrast, in the context of incomes and trade, a typical Trump press release would contain language such as, "Clinton has consistently advocated for global trade deals that have cost America millions of jobs that have been shipped to cheap labor havens abroad. Clinton has shown herself to be a solid advocate of multinational interests and their pursuit of profits at the expense of American jobs." In quotes like this Trump is using both the anxiety of future unemployment and the resentment around growing inequality to push the narrative that trade will cost American's their jobs. Partisanship is also an important differential factor. In Canada where we have 3 major parties and a total of 5 within Parliament, parties are allowed to take more nuanced positions on policy, since a platform is not simply the opposite of your opponent but rather a consistent and nuanced document based on a specific political ideology. Additionally the level of civility and intelligent debate in Canadian politics allowed for substantive policy discussions around the TPP rather than using a piece of policy as a tool to personally attack an opponent (as was seen in the above Trump quote). In America, with

two parties with very little civility, the policy discussions were forced to become black and white, us versus them, and with the other contributing factors, both parties had to be unequivocally opposed to the TPP. Finally, the combined increase in nationalism and decrease in trust in government, not only led to the rise in protectionist attitudes but very likely led to the election of Donald Trump. This is how Donald Trump discussed the TPP in one of the primary debates:

“The TPP is horrible deal. It is a deal that is going to lead to nothing but trouble. It's a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone. It's 5,600 pages long. So complex that nobodies read it. It's like Obamacare; nobody ever read it. They passed it; nobody read it.”

Here Donald Trump is playing on nationalistic feelings of patriotism in America, and how easily that is threatened by hegemonic competition (in this case China). Simultaneously, he blames this loss of hegemonic power on American politician's incompetence. Here Trump brilliant bridges nationalism with distrust in government, by claiming that America could be regain hegemonic control if it weren't for bureaucratic incompetence. Canada's lack of hegemony means that there is less concern for growing Chinese hegemonic control. While China's growing influence is a concern for Canada, and was brought up during the debates in reference to the TPP, it is a policy concern not an emotional concern. Trump, by classifying China's growing hegemonic influence as a personal failure on the part of politicians, is able to stoke nationalism and distrust in government at the same time, using protectionism as a policy translation of those emotions, and then presenting himself as the only logical alternative.

In conclusion, trust in government to work for citizens rather than special interests is a recurring theme in the TPP political narrative. It is used as a campaign tactic both in the American and Canadian election debates and was prominently hinted at in news coverage. However, the broader trust in government that Canadians have mean that the TPP is not as easily used as a scare tactic. Canadians trusted that whether the TPP had more positives than negatives or vice versa, that the policy was being discussed on its merits to Canadian citizens. On the other hand, trust in American government – and in governments around the world such as in Britain –has been so eroded that the TPP was represented as epitomizing American politician's deference to special interests over its citizens. This coupled with increasing partisanship and resentment towards growing income inequality was sufficient to completely shift American political discourse against the TPP.

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Financial Caution and Limited War Through the Neoliberal Era

The Political Economic Era as it Defines U.S. Military Interventionism

Mark Robbins

Abstract

Questions about the relationship between finance and war have occupied political-economy since the early origins of the discipline. With the 2016 election of Donald Trump, the populist whiplash of the Brexit vote and the resurgence of nationalism in the Western world more generally, it becomes necessary to probe this relationship in a renewed light. Many have presumed a cooperative relationship between capitalism and imperialism, and thus between finance and war, but the neoliberal era has not confirmed this tendency. Kirshner for one argues the opposite point- his Financial Caution thesis stating that financial interests tend to be cautious about war, if not being actively opposed to war altogether. Indeed, a close relationship between financial interests and state power during the neoliberal era may have tended to act as a safeguard against military adventurism.

There are nevertheless conditions under which financial interests will support militarization and the application of military force, namely when wars are strictly limited in scope and commitment. This tendency to support militarization, and not war, has been kept in check during the neoliberal era but may well be pushed beyond safe limits as underlying trends for state aggression are exacerbated by populism and nationalism. Both of these forces seek a reinvigorated role for the military and present the opportunity for minor conflicts to escalate beyond what financial decision-makers would voluntarily tolerate. In this sense, the populist rise against financial interests and collapse of neoliberalism more generally is a troubling development for global peace and stability. This work finds that a dangerous combination of factors could bypass the Financial Caution thesis and that recent conditions could undermine the otherwise pacific preferences of financial interests.

Keywords: Finance, military, war, neoliberalism, political economy

Early political economists were well aware that that war and economic growth had contradictory impulses. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1776) classified labour according to its economic productivity and referred to the soldier unreservedly as “an unproductive worker” (p. 423). The inability of the military to contribute to economic prosperity in any direct way was clearly understood by early thinkers and, at least until the mid-20th century, this fact was seldom contested. With the emergence of capitalism, it became increasingly possible to imagine circumstances where war would be used in support of financial interests in an indirect way. Marx (1848) for one saw the state as being little more than window-dressing for the interests of capital, accusing the state of being, ‘a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie’. Although war and military spending have the tendency to destroy or inhibit wealth, rather than to create it, state power could be employed for the enrichment of the few at the expense of the many. Thus the bourgeoisie could find war to be in its interests, even while being against the general interest. This theme was picked up by Lenin, who applied Marxist theory to global affairs. Lenin (1917) argued that imperialism is an inevitable outgrowth of capitalism and that geopolitical bullying and aggression stem in large part from impulses inherent to the close relationship between the state and capital. Lenin posited that it is in the interests of developing countries to close themselves to globalization and capitalism, but since it is in the interests of global capitalism have open markets, financial interests will seek to cajole the state into war and the application of military force nonetheless.

Kirshner (2007) reopens this discussion in the contemporary period, arguing that financial interests are, in contrast to what has perhaps become popular opinion, in fact generally reluctant to support war. This is not to suggest that financial interests have never supported wars, nor is it to suggest that the financial community’s reluctance to war is due to any sort of benevolence or moral righteousness which leads to a pursuit of peace. Rather Kirshner suggests that the macroeconomic conditions which accompany war are anathema to those sought out by finance, leading finance to a generalizable pre-disposition against war. Kirshner states, ‘...the financial community’s aversion to armed conflict is a residual of its basic disposition in favour of macroeconomic stability...(and) as a general rule, finance will be among the most cautious and reluctant to risk and initiate war (p. 9).’ The financial community is predisposed towards what Kirshner terms ‘Financial Caution’ and out of its own self-interest, finance will seek to steer the ship of the state away from conflict whenever possible. Kirshner makes a compelling case for

Financial Caution, noting through a variety of cases how financial interests are usually one of the most resistant constituencies when it comes to adopting policies that might lead to war. The ideal habitat for finance is one in which there are assurances of low inflation, monetary and fiscal discipline, steady interest rates, fixed currency exchange values, and consistent international capital flows. All of these conditions are put at risk by war (Kirshner, 2007).

It is these macroeconomic conditions which will permit the financial community to flourish, and therefore finance seeks to either locate in states where these conditions are present or to maintain and instigate these conditions in its existing environment. Indeed, financiers throughout history have been notoriously reluctant to support war, to the point of being regularly accused of disloyalty to the *polis*. While Lenin directly referenced the Spanish-American War as a clear and archetypical example of imperialism and capitalist aggression at work, in examining the same conflict, Kirshner notes that financial interests within the U.S. were in fact vocally opposed to any military escapades with Spain, to the point of standing in direct opposition to the state apparatus and the generally pro-war attitudes of the American public. Journals and periodicals aligned with financial interests, such as *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Banker* and the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* all took editorial positions firmly against the war, in spite of its popularity among the public at large (Kirshner, 2007). This occurred even while many of those same outlets advocated the opening of the Cuban market. While there may be an impulse towards opening new markets as noted by Lenin, it seems this is in fact seldom judged to be worth the risk of war. While larger markets are certainly appealing to the impulses of finances, the fact that each of the ideal economic conditions of finance is thrown into disarray during war gives finance has a vested interest in preventing war in its home country or, at least, in fleeing from areas where the economic conditions of war are present.

Yet how can this tendency toward Financial Caution be reconciled with the obvious interest of finance in opening markets, securing assets and imperialism observed by Marx and Lenin? It is indelicate and problematic to claim that these great minds of political economy were flatly mistaken. For this reason, Financial Caution, or this aversion of financial interests to the conditions of war, requires the important caveat that financial interests are not inherently opposed to bellicosity so much as its economic side effects. Financial interests can both tacitly and actively support military conflict and militarization, so long as the bellicosity is subordinate

to financial considerations. In this light, the Financial Caution thesis does not offer a confirmation that financial interests are opposed to war against the wisdom of prior scholarship, as much as it confirms that financial interests have their own goals, objectives and perimeters when it comes to the ideal application of military force. In the neoliberal era, as the interests of the state and capital were overtly brought into closer harmony, those ideal conditions for the application of force seem to have been found and gradually fine-tuned over time.

For Marxist thinkers, it would stand to reason that the neoliberal political economic era would entail greater military interventionism as the state becomes more accommodating to the interests of capital and the opening of markets. And yet, this does not seem to have occurred, or at least not as predicted. The lack of major U.S. wars in the neoliberal era would seem to indicate that finance was able to enact its preferences for Financial Caution. While this addresses the core question of whether the state is more or less bellicose when financial interests are at the helm, this theorization is not completely satisfying. It is possible to imagine that financial interests do in fact support certain outcomes of war, while abhorring the conditions of war which usually prove necessary to their realization. Indeed, Financial Caution is the product of self-interest, not charity. Since it is the macroeconomic conditions on the road to war and not war itself that are problematic for finance, presumably a political economic era marked by greater harmony of interests between the state and capital could produce a solution to this dilemma. If there were a type of war which can minimize these financially unsavoury economic conditions, then financial interests should be relatively supportive, or at least permissive, of war's occurrence. The inevitable result is a form of state bellicosity which accommodates the military policy preferences of finance, which I term "Limited War".

Limited War in the Age of Neoliberalism

In contrast to long-term protracted wars, Limited War presents less risk of birthing the troubling economic policies and financial conditions that are anathema to financial interests, such as high government spending, indebtedness and inflation. Given that many of the elements of warfare that financial markets find so disagreeable are related to the disruption of commerce which emerges during protracted conflicts, wars that are more limited in scope may not provoke the ire of the financial community. While large and indeterminate conflicts arouse Financial Caution, Limited Wars are strong candidates for financial acquiescence, or perhaps even active

support from the financial community in some circumstances. In contrast to the examples selected by Kirshner, Limited Wars tend to take place between asymmetrically powerful combatants and do not entail the near total dedication of the state's energies to military victory. Limited Wars are typically short in duration and only marginally disruptive to the international political and economic order, since among other things, these wars tend to occur at the periphery. Perhaps most importantly, the state's commitment to limitations on war conduct must be deemed credible by market observers. Indeed, Mosley (2005) observes that as a result of the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, 'governments must sell their policies not only to domestic voters, but also to international investors' (p. 357). A preference for Limited War has understandably been aided by the decline of the Bretton Woods System and the rise of globalized capital flows which have made states increasingly sensitive to the preferences of financial capital markets (Germain, 2010). There has been a clear preference of policy-makers for Limited War since the end of the U.S.-Vietnam War, and while much of this has to do with the poor outcomes of that particular conflict, it would be a mistake not to notice the clear overlap of Limited War with neoliberalism.

The U.S.-Vietnam war was the last U.S. war before the Neoliberal era and is an archetypical example of the type of conflict that financial interests seek to avoid. With no clear limitations on the scope of commitment or duration of the conflict, the financial and human costs of the war continuously escalated until the war's drawdown and ultimate conclusion in 1975. The amount of state spending for the conflict continued to rise beyond initial expectations; there was a serious bout of inflation, conscription interfered with labour market efficiency, and there was political unrest domestically. Expectedly, there was also Financial Caution. In one particular instance, Wall street bankers literally walked out of their offices joined the anti-war protesters in the streets (Preston, 1969). Stock market growth remained low throughout the duration of the conflict, jumping occasionally when a ceasefire had been announced, a clear "vote" for peace by financial interests (Stock Market Soars with Rumours of a Bombing Halt in Vietnam, 1969). The end of the conflict was bookended with instability in the Middle East and global economic malaise, but by the time these conditions had settled in the early 1980s, and with the U.S. drawn out of major wars, U.S. stock markets began their first steady climb since the Vietnam war began in early 1960s. From the rise of the neoliberal order in the early 1980s and until the early 2000s, stock market prices steadily rose while all U.S. military engagements adhered the principle of Limited War (Hirsch, 2014). Both military and civilian government activities were since marked

by an increasing adherence to finance's economic policy preferences. The model of Limited War is in part a product of these and seems to strike an effective balance between the financial interest in economic stability and the political necessity for the strategic application of force.

Financial acquiescence in Limited War holds true in a variety of conflicts in which the U.S. was a participant since the emergence of the neoliberal era. The first U.S. war following the end of the U.S.-Vietnam war was the 'American invasion of Grenada in 1983...(which) ended quickly and had little market impact' (Norris, 1991). The invasion employed a small force of 7,300 soldiers and the war was resolved in the remarkably short order of 52 days. The financial community's reaction to this conflict was one of relative disinterest and the disturbance was barely reflected in financial markets or in the public discourse of financiers. Indeed, there was little reason to suspect that this conflict would last very long, nor could escalate into a larger conflagration. Overall, it lacked the potential to disturb the global economy and as such, it did not incite Financial Caution. From this conflict emerged the Weinberger Doctrine in 1984, which set high standards for future U.S. military interventions and severely limiting their scope of activity (Dubois, 1991). Later renamed the "Powell Doctrine", this code of conduct for U.S. military interventions demanded an adherence to principles that ultimately amounted to Limited War and military conduct that would avoid instigating Financial Caution. Soon after in 1986, the U.S. engaged in another Limited War with similar financial ambivalence in the bombing campaign of Libya. Although there were some initial dips in stock values as a reaction, just 125 days after the resolution of hostilities, U.S. stock markets were trading an average 6.0% higher than they were before the conflict (What War Means for Your Wealth, 2003). Although it's difficult to predict with certainty whether a conflict will be limited in scope from the outset, the early examples of Grenada and Libya demonstrated a formula for conducting war that would not invoke Financial Caution. While wars in Grenada and Libya demonstrated the principles of Limited War in action, the 1989, the U.S. invasion of Panama exemplified the neoliberal formula for Limited War.

Limited War in Panama began with an extremely light footprint, with around only 26,000 U.S. soldiers deployed and where 'compared to previous armed conflicts, total casualties were (also) extraordinarily light' (Brown, 2006) The humble beginnings of this conflict appear to have been interpreted by financial interests as foreshadowing a short war. There was an exceptionally short lead-up to war, with announcement of official hostilities and invasion (Operation Just

Cause) separated by only 2 days (Operation Just Cause, 2014) with the conflict itself being of abnormally short duration. 'Operation Just Cause (was) one of the shortest armed conflicts in American military history...within seventy-two hours of the outbreak of hostilities; all major combat operations (had) ended' (Brown, 2006). President Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces 14 days after initial hostilities and active U.S. combat operations had completely ended 30 days later, bringing the conflict to a conclusive close in just 54 days (Gilboa, 1995). Judging the reaction of the financial community, again by way of American stock market values, there were initial movements which seemed to indicate the presence of Financial Caution, with American stocks dipping -2.2% during the invasion and remaining -4.8% below their pre-invasion levels at 25 days after the cessation of hostilities (What War Means for Your Wealth, 2003). However, 6 months after the war's conclusion, American stock markets were trading at 8.0% *above* pre-conflict levels (Classic Concept, 2012). In fact, financial analysts doubted that the post-invasion dip in the U.S. stock markets was even related to the invasion, one claiming, 'the initial reaction (to the invasion) is one of a non-event' (Marino, 1989). The Associated Press reported that on the whole, 'most experts did not view the Panamanian situation as a reason for making big changes in investment strategies' (Marino, 1989). Some financial analysts even viewed the war favourably, '...looking upon the assault as generally positive because it showed that the Bush administration meant business' (Marino, 1989).

The invasion of Panama was the last Limited War occurring during the Cold War era, and the subsequent U.S.-centric global order emboldened the occurrence of Limited Wars and finance's obvious preference for the Limited War compromise even under a shifting geopolitical landscape. In the post-Cold War era, American military interventionism increasingly acquiesced to the expectations of finance increasing, by consequence, the degree to which these wars have been underpinned by financial confidence. In other words, once the recipe for Limited War had been perfected, wars would increasingly be conducted according to financial rules of engagement and to avoid the penalties associated with Financial Caution. The response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provides one strong example of how Limited War could be used to support financial objectives, not just to avoid Financial Caution. Widely condemned by the international community, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was swiftly followed by a -12.6% dip in U.S. stock market prices, a dip comparable to a small financial crisis (What War Means for Your Wealth, 2003). Occurring during the twilight of the Cold-War era, the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait cast doubts on the stability of the emergent international order, both politically and economically, as Kuwait was an important exporter of energy resources important to the global economy. Yet, it is crucial to note that this strong market reaction to war occurred prior to any U.S. involvement, which would seem to indicate the importance of this war's effect on the global status quo more than the presence of Financial Caution.

When the U.S. did decide to enter into war with Iraq over 4 months later in 1990, the markets reacted favourably by immediately jumping 3.7% after the declaration of hostilities (What War Means for Your Wealth, 2003). Being conducted according to the principle of Limited War, an American ceasefire was declared 44 days after the campaign had begun; a timeline fairly comparable to those of the earlier limited wars. Moving on to 125 days after the official American disengagement in hostilities, U.S. stocks were trading an average of 16.2% higher than they were before the war (What War Means for Your Wealth, 2003). Although financial markets react negatively to the leadup of war as the Financial Caution thesis would predict, the market reaction to the Iraq war would seem to indicate that there are also in fact conditions where financial interests could be actively supportive of war. Similar observations can be made about the NATO interventions in the former Yugoslavia in 1999. Strictly limited in scope, seldom referred to as "war" and overwhelming composed of airstrikes with no ground presence, financial interests reacted favourably to the start of the military campaign with the stock markets of all 19 NATO members rising in direct response to opening hostilities (Peach, 1999). We can suspect that a confirmation through action of the limited nature of the military intervention is a large part of the reason why. Another important reason of course would be that the beginning of NATO hostilities also signified a commitment to regional stability and the upholding of conditions conducive to financial interests. Indeed, in countries immediately bordering the conflict area there was an especially strong market rebound following NATO involvement (Emerging Markets Bounce Back After NATO's First Bomb Attack, 1999).

In this sense it is clear that it is not so much that financial interests are inherently averse to war, as Kirshner has suggested, but that in order to earn the support of the financial community wars must adhere to certain rules of conduct. War is a deeply uncertain subject and many wars that began with the understanding that they will be both short and limited, end up entailing a large commitment over the longer term. It should be clear that no war's duration or outcome can be determined in advance with certainty, yet wars which begin with limited aims

and scope are less likely to arouse fears that a war will continue over the long term and give rise to the economic conditions which Kirshner describes as the root of Financial Caution. Indeed, when there are indications that a war may end quickly, or that the worst of the conflict is over, financial markets will often quickly rebound to pre-war levels or even higher (Schneider and Troeger, 2006). With the early examples of Grenada and Libya providing a proof of concept, the U.S. became less hesitant about Limited Wars and financial interests appeared to be increasingly comfortable with U.S. military interventions as well. This seems to indicate that when a war is perceived by the financial community to truly be of a limited nature, financial interests can be little obstacle for a hawkish military policy. From the war in Grenada onward, U.S. military interventions followed the Weinberger Doctrine which called for U.S. wars to occur only after all non-military options had been exhausted and under the principle that the U.S. will only go to war when the conflict is likely to be short, decisive and popular (LaFeber, 2009). In this sense, the Weinberger (Powell) Doctrine is a playbook for avoiding the wrath of Financial Caution, codifying the principles of Limited War that had struck an effective balance with financial interests in the Neoliberal era.

Cracks in the Foundation

At first, the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did not appear to anything other than a Limited War of the kind which had characterized the first 20 years of neoliberalism. The invasion was billed as a retaliation for the terrorist attacks of September 11th and had the objective of capturing those responsible. Although stock market prices declined following the September 11th attacks, they experienced a slight rebound out the outset of the invasion of Afghanistan (Simeunovic, 2016). U.S. military spokespeople announced that the Taliban movement had collapsed 64 days after the beginning of hostilities, a timeline common with other Limited Wars. Major public relations efforts were made to eliminate the perception that war could continue. Continuing U.S. operations were portrayed more as a sort of 'large manhunt' rather than as a long-term conflict. Early military proposals following the fall of the Taliban government confirmed a lack of commitment to a long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was not until late 2002 that any plans were developed for a reconstruction mission (Operation Anaconda), which would be a tacit admission of a continuing military commitment (Sherlick, Bruno, 2017). After their release, reconstruction plans were repeatedly characterized

as having light footprint and entailing a short-term military presence, set to occur in parallel with U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. This pattern reflects a continuation of the trend of Limited War, or at least providing a semblance that the Afghanistan war would be conducted within the perimeters of what was considered by the financial community to be acceptable bellicosity. Although the tenuous compromise between financial interests and military interventionism seemed to be stable at the outset of the Afghanistan conflict, it soon became clear that serious cracks were emerging in the consensus about Limited War.

In late 2002, the U.S. Congress authorized the funds for what would be the Iraq war and around the same time, the trading values in U.S. stock markets began to sink, reaching a floor in March of 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration continued to characterize both conflicts as being limited, low-stakes, and of short duration. U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were regularly said to be reaching their conclusion, even as belligerency in the southern provinces increased. The U.S. narrative in 2003 was one of soldiers being redeployed from the concluded Afghanistan war directly to the Iraq conflict, which was expected to end in a similarly short-order. To much fanfare, George Bush implausibly announced in May 2003 that it was “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq, just 43 days after the opening of hostilities (Cline, 2013). On the same day in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld announced to a group of reporters that “major combat” had ended in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were far from over in 2003 and at the time of writing in 2017, the U.S. continues to maintain a significant military footprint in both countries, a decade and a half later. There is little indication that either of these wars will end soon, with some suggestions that the U.S. military could ultimately establish a permanent military presence in Afghanistan (Mulrine, 2016). In spite of early signaling that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would be conducted according to the bargain struck in the neoliberal era, these wars were far from the Limited Wars which had placated Financial Caution in the 1980s and 1990s.

There continues to be a great deal of discussion about the degree to which the Bush administration was aware of the depth of commitment these conflicts would entail or whether stakeholders were intentionally misled to believe these wars would be Limited Wars. In spite of advice from military advisors, the U.S. administrations made every effort to minimize the duration and level of military commitment that would be required to conclude the wars. The unwillingness of the Bush administration to acknowledge estimates of troop obligations provided

by the U.S. military before the invasion of Iraq later came into the public light, making it clear that any consensus that Afghanistan and Iraq would be Limited Wars had been superficial at best (Schmitt, 2003). Military advisors who appraised the conflicts as requiring a significant dedication of time and resources were publicly overruled by the civilian administration, that was committed to a strategy based on limited engagement. This ultimately led to the resignation of Secretary of Defence Colin Powell in 2004, who had come to exemplify the principle of Limited War and whose resignation signaled the end of the Weinberger (Powell) Doctrine. In a major public relations crisis, one general admitted shortly after retirement that the official war plans were “catastrophically flawed (and) unrealistically optimistic” (Cloud, 2007). The degree to which the misappraisal of the wars’ requirements was intentional or accidental may never be known, but as it became strategically clear that these were not Limited Wars, the state invested heavily in the counter-narrative that these conflicts were in fact “limited”. Among other policy measures, this has included an unprecedented rise in unofficial military presence through private military contractors, which systematically underrepresents the actual degree of military involvement (Ettinger, 2011). In terms of public relations, American officials vigorously sought to undermine all comparisons between these wars and the U.S.-Vietnam war, the last war conducted outside of the Limited War compromise.

In spite of the energetic effort to paint the post-9/11 U.S. military interventionism with the same brush as its dedication to Limited War in the 1980s and 1990s, there is little indication that this branding and line of argument made any significant inroads among decision-makers in the financial community. Indeed, the decline of the Limited War consensus throughout the early 2000s is marked by a clear reemergence of Financial Caution. Stock performance during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars has been consistently low and market performance has drawn comparisons with that of the U.S.-Vietnam War era (Hirsch, 2014). Rather than upholding and supporting the global economy, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have perturbed it. These wars have been closely associated with increasing global trade in heroin trade, a rise in transnational organized crime, terrorism and unfavourable economic outcomes including price fluctuations in global resources markets, trade in arms and serious regional instability. Both conflicts have also overlapped with increasing macroeconomic instability in the U.S., particularly in terms of fiscal policy and a shocking accumulation of government debt. With the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Neoliberal order itself also began a steady collapse and the final nails were put in the

coffin of the U.S. consensus around Limited War. Some went as far as to argue that the deep macroeconomic disturbances from Afghanistan and Iraq wars, in fact caused Global Financial Crisis, at least in part (Oatley, 2013). Certainly much of this macroeconomic instability of this era is closely related to both the 2008 crisis and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and a close comparison with the Vietnam era does yield some interesting observations. Although the argument that these wars caused the 2008 Financial Crisis has likely missed its mark in proving causation, there is little room to dispute the close association between the bypassing of the rules of Limited War and general financial disarray. More generally, there has been a clear overlap between collapse of the Limited War consensus and that of the Neoliberal order more generally.

There are many different ways to interpret this pattern of events, and certainly, the attitudes and reactions of finance would only be one of them. Yet there has been distinctly strong public dedication to the idea that these conflicts represented the same type of Limited War as the prior conflicts of the Neoliberal era. In hindsight, these claims may seem laughable as both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have lasted longer than the Second World War, something which military advisors made clear from the outset was a realistic possibility. This discrepancy between reality and rhetoric may be best explained by an effort to placate the tendency of Financial Caution. Indeed, the rhetoric surrounding of these conflicts had been nearly identical to that used during the truly Limited Wars of the 1980s and 1990s. This includes the familiar timing of each war having been declared complete within 100 days of opening hostilities, a clear part of the Limited War formula. The 2000s and 2010s were also accompanied by the invention of new euphemisms to insinuate that a war was Limited, such as “shock and awe”, “surgical strike” and even avoiding the use of the word war itself; the conflicts were renamed “overseas contingency operations” (Astore, 2016). These wars were also marked by a regular adherence to the illusion that the conflicts had “ended”, or become severely limited in scope, far in advance of when that could meaningfully be said to be the case. This notably includes the announcement of the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq in August of 2010 while there were still 52,000 U.S. soldiers in theatre (Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn Fast Facts, 2016). Just over a year later, at the conclusion of operation New Dawn in December of 2011, which was again also said to definitively end the U.S. military presence in Iraq, the U.S. continued to have 17,000 personnel operating in the country (Denselow, 2011). As the Neoliberal era comes to a more conclusive close in 2017, the United States is involved in multi-year military campaigns in at least 7

different countries (Zenko, Wilson, 2017) that are not marked by any overtly declared limitations. In several cases, the United States has steadily dropped more ordnance each year in theatre since the war itself was declared to have ended (Zenko, 2016). This leaves little doubt that Limited War has receded far into the background of U.S. military doctrine and the rulebook of political economic conduct.

War and Finance in the Illiberal Era

Many hailed the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as marking the end of Neoliberalism and happily announced the beginning of a new “post-Neoliberal era” of political economy. Although perhaps premature, there is little doubt that the 2008 financial crisis did mark the beginning of the end of the Neoliberal era and one which overlapped with the end of the prior consensus between finance and war about Limited War. Certainly, the global financial crisis undermined fundamental principles of the Neoliberal era, perhaps especially so in terms of commitments to eliminating capital controls and restraining fiscal policy. In response to the economic crisis, the U.S. launched a historic program of stimulus spending, in direct contradiction with Neoliberal orthodoxy on fiscal policy. This more free-handed fiscal policy was closely associated with the 2007 troop ‘surge’ in Iraq, and the 2009 troop ‘surge’ in Afghanistan, raising questions about a possible revival of military keynesianism. Indeed, U.S. military spending in 2008 was roughly double of 2001 expenditures (in constant dollars), with significant increases in spending on both overseas operations and baseline budgetary allotments (Shah, 2013). In the wake of 2008, the U.S. has also gradually backed away from a previously resolute commitment to the unbridled free flow of capital, which was perceived as contributing to the financial crisis in the first place and producing its global contagion effect. These developments, assuming a continuation of this policy trajectory, will have significant effects on the nature of war and the persistence of Financial Caution. Indeed, the liberalization of global capital flows at the end of the Bretton Woods System in the 1970s is a large part of what had given finance such significant power to demand the state’s adherence the principle of Limited War in the 1980s and 1990s. Recalling Financial Caution, these kinds of unrestrained fiscal policies, in support of military objectives or otherwise, are a major contributor to finance’s distaste for war. If the fiscal policies in response to the 2008 financial crisis is are indication of the new political economic order to come, policies

involving major spending or a significant military commitment start to again become conceivable.

There is a steady progression from one era of political economy to the next, with contradictions and policy failures building up before culminating in a paradigmatic shift. The paradigmatic shift away from Neoliberalism certainly began in 2008, but there a new order has yet to be fully established and its character far from being completely understood. The kinds of developments which have occurred since the beginning of slow collapse of Neoliberalism and in the interregnum help inform the direction of paradigm shift, one which can give some important insights into the newly emergent political economic era. Political economic orders are themselves punctuated by formalized policy innovation processes that ultimately see to the wider adoption and diffusion of ideas. All countries go through this process somewhat differently but in the United States, this punctuation is typically been initiated by the presidency (Bradford, 1998). With the election of radical outsider candidate Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in late 2016, it seems that a reimagining of the political economy is underway. Indeed, Trump has campaigned against free trade, Wall Street financiers, and weak-wristed military interventionism, all of which represent a clear turn away from the fundamental principles of Neoliberalism. None of these developments point to the type of military restraint that characterized Limited War in the Neoliberal era. From this perspective it is possible to imagine the blunt application of U.S. military force as increasingly characterizing Illiberal times. The downstream effects of this are likely to circulate much more globally as the Trump Administration fundamentally shifts the U.S.'s relationship with its friends, foes, finance and war.

It is difficult to say with any certainty what will emerge from the reimagining of the political economic order that is currently underway, although it is possible to suggest a few hypotheses on the basis of which ideological ingredients are being thrown into the policy mix. While Trump has on occasion advocated economic growth, development and 'big business capitalism', these clash with other stated policy goals and seem to be cosmetic and rhetorical in comparison. The market fundamentalism that characterized the Neoliberal era will be hollowed out in favour of a caricature of Neoliberalism which masks a more traditional kleptocratic, rent-seeking, merger of business and political interests. The Trump administration has been noteworthy for the incredible net wealth of its cabinet, the unapologetic use of political authority for private accumulation and a willingness to brandish power for seemingly arbitrary ends in a

way that circumvents regular decision-making pathways and authority, as exemplified by the 2017 “Muslim Ban”. Early exercises of political power for the promotion of personal interests and accumulate rents, such as interventions on behalf of the T.V. show *The Apprentice*, the *Ivanka Trump* clothing brand, and Melania Trump’s personal brand valuation, all seem to be a strong indication that political authority will increasingly be used to dominate and subdue the market. This represents an exact reversal of the Neoliberal era where market forces were accused of dominating and limiting political authority. While Neoliberalism was accused of limiting political power and the ability of politicians to freely make decisions on behalf of their constituents, what comes after Neoliberalism is likely to have the opposite problem. Illiberalism will be characterized by a political decision-making process that is less accountable to multi-stage decision-making processes and market forces alike.

The best comparator case at the moment may be Russia, where a merging of wealth with concentrated political power has been in play in a modern kleptocratic form since the early 2000s. Russia scholars noted early on the similarities between the rhetoric, policies and style of populism employed by both Putin and Trump. Russian military spending has been significant since 2000 as Russia implemented a substantial “military industrial complex” of military-led economic growth, production expansion and procurement (Russian Military Budget, 2017). Military spending in Russia has increased nearly 10 times over from Putin’s election in 1999 to 2013, the last year before the collapse of the ruble made meaningful longitudinal comparison difficult (Holodny, 2014). High levels of military spending may be especially welcome in kleptocratic and Illiberal conditions. For one, military spending can be used quickly satisfy populist demands for job creation and nationalist demands for hard political power. For another, the secrecy surrounding military procurement programs and opacity of cost-structures means that military spending can be easily used to siphon away public funds for personal enrichment, to reward supporters and to satiate vested-interests (Robbins, 2015). These vested interests of course includes the military itself, an important constituency in non-democratic societies. Increasing the military budget is especially important in Russia due to the poor civil-military relations environment of the 1990s (Desh, 1999). Although nothing as dramatic has plagued American civil-military relations, they have nonetheless been poor following the end of the Cold War and the related military drawdowns. Given all of these factors and Trump’s stated policy of

increasing military spending, by 9% in 2017 alone, it is likely that the Illiberal era will be characterized by much bigger military budgets.

All of these prospects put finance in the backseat of military policy and decision-making in the emerging Illiberal era. Financial Caution tells us that we can expect financial interests to generally oppose the military policies of the Illiberal era much in the same way that it did prior to Neoliberalism and the compromise on Limited War. Yet with the Neoliberal era by most estimates having ended, or at least gradually coming to a close, financial interests are also losing the leverage they once had to disincentivize war. Economic growth rates, international trade flows and the flow of international capital have been tepid since 2008 and are continuing to slow (International Monetary Fund, 2016). The Brexit vote and rise of other protectionist impulses confirm that an accelerating trend towards inward looking policies and contracting economic interdependence is likely to continue. Although certainly it can be expected that there will be a relocation of some industries and financial communities to jurisdictions that generally continue to adhere to liberal and Neoliberal principles, it's difficult to say with any certainty the degree to which this will occur, if at all. Once relocation or reorganization has already occurred for those with the greatest sensitivity to Illiberal conditions, avoiding Financial Caution will be an ever-smaller consideration for political decision-makers. As the Neoliberal era increased the punitive impact of ignoring the interests of finance, we can similarly expect the decline of Neoliberalism to increase the ease with which military force can be exercised. Similarly, Limited War will play less of a role in geopolitical affairs, permitting military engagements to occur for longer duration and with a larger footprint.

This raises the obvious question of what the military will be used for and how. Such significant increases in military spending are unlikely to result in commensurate improvements in military effectiveness since this may not be the principal goal of this type of spending. There is a long history of engaging the military as an instrument for job creation and skills development; a popular measure but ultimately one that puts the military to use outside of its core competency (Robbins, 2015). The Russian military also used for the ultimately peculiar interventions Crimea and Donbass in 2014, territory whose sovereignty is currently contested by

both Russia and Ukraine. Irredentism in Ukraine¹³ has little strategic or geopolitical value and there are more effective ways to bully neighbours and exert influence than to claim small marginal pieces of their territory. Regardless of the strategic calculus or real-world military effectiveness during these engagements, these military actions have proven immensely popular with Russian nationalists and shore up support for Russia's leadership. Although a cynical use of power, Putin's military interventions in the Ukraine were very popular and increased Putin's popularity rating from roughly 60 per cent to nearly 90 per cent immediately subsequent (Nardelli, Rankin, Arnett, 2015). This provides one model for understanding the use of the military in the Illiberal era; as an economic tool domestically and internationally as a tool for generating political support. It is not outside of the realm of possibility for a Trump presidency to conduct a military intervention to claim a symbolic popular victory and justify high expenditures by annexing an ultimately worthless piece of nearby territory. Perhaps a stretch of Mexican desert to compensate for the government of Mexico's refusal to pay for "The Wall" or a similarly unimportant act of irredentism that has a high symbolic value.

Few political decision-makers would intentionally seek to find themselves permanently and irrevocably at odds with finance, and indeed the disintegration of Neoliberalism does not mean an end to the power of finance in the affairs of state. If the Russian case provides any insight, it would be that Illiberalism may very well be accompanied by the continuing enrichment of the financially well-to-do, but just not under the radically free market factors that characterized Neoliberalism. It is conceivable that Illiberalism would be characterized by reinvigorated military keynesianism, designed in such a way that enriches financial interests allied with the political leadership of the day and improves the military's stature among civilian supporters, although all at the expense of real military effectiveness. Although this may not represent the exact preferences of finance as they were manifest in the Neoliberal era, harmonization of state and financial interests is possible in another form. This kind of type of corporatism would certainly be more predatory for the average citizen, but it is far from unprecedented. In fact, a long-run historical examination tells us that this political-economic arrangement has existed before, and may in fact be the most common structure of the political economy throughout human history. As the dust of Illiberalism begins to settle, the relationship between finance and

¹³ This is not to understate the value of the Black Sea Fleet's base in Crimea, it is simply to note that the seizure of the entire territory is a change in strategy and one that likely has more to do with domestic Russian politics than the operational value of the base in Sevastopol.

the military will carry important signals for the direction political economy and global affairs in the coming political economic era, even while it may not represent progress.

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Populism, globalization, and conspiracy theories

An Exploration

Jinelle Piereder

Introduction

Over the last decade and more, we have witnessed a number of far-right-wing populist mobilizations across Eastern and Western Europe, and most recently, in the United States. But populism is not a new phenomenon, nor is it exclusively employed by far-right-wing parties, movements, or voters. Populism and its many drivers have been and continue to be extensively studied, and yet much of the popular discourse uses “populism” simply as a way of discounting or dismissing specific political parties or leaders. I suggest that this is a mistake, and risks a certain blind-sidedness, much in the same way that the Democratic Party and voters were “shocked” at the recent US presidential election results. Much of the analysis leading up to and for several months after the election focused on two¹⁴ key factors contributing to the rise of Donald Trump and populist sentiment: economic anxiety and xenophobia. The first is most often attributed to the so-called “losers of globalization,” left behind by offshoring practices and automation in the manufacturing and extraction sectors. The second is linked to already-present

¹⁴ A third cause has also garnered much attention and discussion, particularly due to the kinds of attacks thrown at then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, and the distasteful language often employed by Donald Trump: sexism. One study looked specifically at measures of attitudes on racism and sexism during the latest U.S. presidential campaign and found that these two factors were more important than economic dissatisfaction in explaining the education gap among white voters (see Schaffner, MacWilliams, & Nteta, 2017). However, there is little to no literature connecting sexism to populism (other than the fact that populist mobilizations are most often led by and, historically, filled by men), and so it is not discussed here.

xenophobic or racist tendencies as well as an increase in immigration and cultural diversity. Both explanations have some merit, but are incomplete on their own.

To get a more thorough understanding of this and other populisms, the following questions are important: is the current wave of populism a reaction to or backlash against globalization (as discussed in a later section)? Are populisms during a period of globalization different from those that happened before? If so, what are the unique factors at play now? Finally, what are the additional drivers of populism? In this paper, I will ask whether populism is a distinct “counter-punch” to contemporary forces of economic and cultural globalization, or, more generally, a manifestation of anxieties about change (economic, demographic). Populism may not be inherently dangerous; for instance, it may lead to greater political engagement by citizens. However, many populisms (historical and contemporary) exacerbate racisms and xenophobia, proliferate conspiracist scapegoating, and have the potential to be breeding grounds for authoritarianism. A better understanding of the drivers and conditions of populism, and their interactions, is important for maintaining democratic and egalitarian principles, and for identifying potential “leverage points” of entry for those interested in encouraging a different kind of political dialogue and engagement.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I examine the various theories around populism itself, focusing on three main approaches: populism as an ideology, as a political strategy or form of political mobilization, and as a discourse or discursive frame. Then, I review several historical and contemporary cases of populism that demonstrate aspects of those three approaches. Second, I explore the various consequences of globalization, including economic, social, and individual ones. Third, I highlight a key cognitive mechanism exploited by populist movements, and discuss the unique role of conspiracy theories in populism as an extreme expression of this cognitive mechanism. Fourth, based on the previous sections, I summarize the various supply-side and demand-side factors as well as rhetorical devices of populism. Here, I offer a brief and incomplete causal analysis (drawing on Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009) in an attempt to provide the beginnings of an explanation for the rise of populism, particularly in the context of globalization. I anticipate that the research will show that populism is an “equifinal” outcome (there are many ways to get there), but that the characteristics of globalization are insufficient but necessary parts of a set that is unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) for the rise of populism.

Furthermore, I anticipate that due to forces of globalization, several conditions are in fact heightened or sharpened in modern cases of populism compared with historical ones.

Theories Of and Around Populism

Populism has received substantial attention from social scientists over the last decade. In part, this is because populist politics play what seems to be an increasing (and potentially toxic) role (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 17) in modern democracies. Yet, the concept is both widely used and widely contested (Barr, 2009; Roberts, 2006). Furthermore, it has been analyzed from many theoretical perspectives – including party politics, democratic theory, political economy, political psychology, modernization theory, structuralism, post-structuralism, and social movement theory (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2011; Ionescu & Gelner, 1969; Canovan, 2002; Hawkins, 2009; Goodliffe, 2012; Postel, 2007). On a most basic level, “populism worships the people” (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p.4). And yet, “there is general agreement in the comparative literature that populism is confrontational, chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent” (Arter, 2010, p. 490). Populism cuts across geographical borders and boundaries, historical time-periods, as well as ideological divides. Scholars examine cases from Eastern and Western Europe, Russia, Latin America, North America, and Africa, from the late 19th century to the present (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 3). Gidron and Bonikowski (n.d.) point out that “populist politics are far from a new phenomenon, even in established democracies, which suggests that some of the claims about contemporary populism may be prone to a presentist bias” (p. 25).

There are generally three main conceptual approaches to populism: as an ideology, as a political strategy or form of political mobilization, and as a discourse or discursive frame. One of the most widely recognized approaches to populism comes from Cas Mudde building on the work of Michael Freeden. Mudde (2004) understands populism as a “thin-centred” ideology “that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people.” (p. 543). The core of this version of populism is popular sovereignty, “whereby the virtuous general will is placed in opposition to the moral corruption of elite actors” (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 6).

A thin-centred ideology, following Freeden's definition, is one that does not "provide answers to all the major socio-political questions, and could therefore be compatible with other, more extensively developed political belief systems," (cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 6) like socialism, liberalism, conservatism, or right-wing authoritarianism. To use a computer metaphor, populism is a kind of software application or module that is compatible with, and is installed into pre-existing, more comprehensive ideology operating systems. This means that populist sentiments can have very broad appeal, and explains why we see populist parties and movements on many points of the political spectrum.

However, several authors have argued that treating populism as essentially a small and highly-transferrable bundle of ideas has particular implications for how research is done. Most of the work done in this tradition focuses on party literature, including programmatic statements, public manifestoes, and internal party publications to deduce whether or not the party or political actor under study is populist (Aslanidis, 2016; Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 7). Furthermore, Aslanidis (2016) criticizes the normative connotations of populism, arguing that "[p]ortraying populism as ideology...forces analysts to take sides in favor of or against it...scholars of populism tend to write as if they are loyal opponents or supporters of a political cause, rather than objective observers" (p. 94). Using the recent Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements in the U.S. as an example, Aslanidis (2016) points out that,

Analysts who do not sympathize with populism tend to apply the term to the movement they dislike, and protect their favorite from the ominous association. On the contrary, supporters of populism as a progressive notion happily assign its label to the movement they feel to be endearing and refuse its bestowal on 'reactionary' ones. In both cases, *ad hoc* dimensions are inserted to justify these choices. (p. 94)

In a recent conference presentation, Freeden (2016) actually challenged Mudde's (and others') interpretation of populism as a "thin-centred" ideology, instead suggesting that it is, "at best, a phantom ideology; a spectre that can be draped over pressing and intricate socio-political issues to blur and to conceal" (31:19).

According to Freeden (2016), the three typical attributes of populism(s) are: (1) a “methodological monism – an inclination to conceive of society as a singular unitary body” (9:48); (2) “an appeal to the originality and integrity of a defining founding moment or natality [...] (even if it is not articulated as such)” (10:04) – a temporal sovereignty-esque narrative like ‘we were here first, and so we are the ultimate decision makers,’ leading to exclusivity and ‘purity’ (12:39); and (3) “a visceral fear of imported change in law, in customs, and in people” (10:18) – whether this change or externality is real or imagined. Freeden (2016) argues that while both populism and ideology are “discursive competition[s] over the control of public political language,” (27:57) populism actually falls short of the requirements of even thin-centred ideology, because of its incomprehensiveness, its lack of nuanced specificity about what it (populism) actually offers, its high vulnerability to rapid transit of peripheral events to the core (as compared with more developed ideologies), its thriving on the immediacy of emotion, plus the weight of imagination and fantasy (15:59), and finally, its vagueness and indeterminacy (which happen to be good “vote-catchers”) (31:16). However, he concludes by suggesting that “we may be experiencing a new, unfamiliar genre of ideology: amorphous, sporadic, and truncated” (31:40). One of the key questions, of course, is whether and to what extent populisms are deliberate or unconscious.

The second main approach is of populism as a mode of political strategy, with emphasis on policy choices, political organization, and forms of mobilization. This approach is mostly prevalent among scholars of Latin America (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 10). For example, Weyland (2001) sees populism “as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks to exercise government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (p. 14). The emphasis here is not on content or discourse, but on the relationship between political actors and their constituents. Often then, this approach emphasizes the identity and role of charismatic leaders, who often cast themselves as outsiders. Paul Taggart (2000) argues that because of its “lack of key values,” populism is “particularly liable to the politics of personality” (p. 101). Also pointing to the role of leadership, Pappas (2012) argues that “populism obtains when a certain political entrepreneur is able to polarize politics by creating a cleavage based on the interaction between ‘the people’ versus some establishment, thus forging a mass political movement” (p. 2). However, others point out that there have also been non-charismatic populist leaders, and that personality and leadership

are only sometimes associated with populism rather than constitutive elements of it (Barr, 2009). Furthermore, strategy is inherently in political activity anyway; categorizing populism as simply another strategic tool dilutes the concept, and equates it with demagoguery (Aslanidis, 2016).

Finally, the third approach is populism as a discourse or discursive style. De la Torre (2000) defines populism as a “rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy” (p. 4). Hawkins (2009) conceptualizes it as a “Manichaeian discourse that assigns a binary moral dimension to political conflicts” (cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 8). For others, populism is a selectively and strategically employed mode of political expression (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 9). The emphasis here, then, is not on content or leadership, but the linguistic-grammatical construction of particular dualisms. Drawing on Laclau (2005), the ‘us’ and ‘them’ of populist discourse are “empty signifiers” that take on different content, depending on their social context, and gain and change meaning through antagonistic processes of “identification” or classification. Here, populism “refers to relatively fluid practices of identification, rather than to individuals or parties. It is a form of politics rather than a stable category of political actors” (as cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 9). Several scholars who use the discursive approach to populism also draw on Richard Hofstadter’s *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (1964), which describes a style characterized by suspiciousness, heated exaggeration, and apocalyptic and/or conspiratorial worldviews. I will return to this “paranoid style” and its role in populism in a later discussion.

Drawing on Erving Goffman (1974),¹⁵ Aslanidis (2016) understands populism as a discursive frame. He suggests that,

Populist discourse can [...] be perceived as the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because ‘corrupt elites’ have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the ‘noble People’ and maintain that the solution to the problem resides in the righteous political mobilization of the latter in order to regain power. This, therefore, can be labelled the ‘*populist frame*’ – the ‘subatomic matter’ that constitutes populist discourse. (p. 89)

¹⁵ Goffman defines frames as “schemata of interpretation” that allow their users “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” complex events taking place in daily life (see Goffman, 1974, p. 21).

Aslanidis (2016) views “populist frames” as “formal vessels of meaning” in the Laclauian sense, and the deliberate activity of populist framing as “just another tool of persuasion in the arsenal of political agents” (p. 100). Yet others criticize this approach as being too all-inclusive of any and all dualistic rhetoric, making populism too vague and malleable a concept (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2012, p. 7).

While many theorists are fairly committed to their respective approaches, the three highlighted here are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Filc (2010) suggests that populism as ideology, political strategy, or discourse overlap at points: “If populist politics is about the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ then delineating who belongs to these categories requires a dynamic process of simultaneously excluding and including specific groups within these boundaries,” (cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 16) on material, symbolic and political levels. In this sense—and this is the position taken in this paper—the content, strategic use, and discursive practice of populism(s) intersect often. A later section attempts to better capture this overlap and intersection in a more integrated model of populism.

A Few Historical and Contemporary Populisms

In a recent study, Hans-Georg Betz (2013) looked at two major waves of populist mobilization in nineteenth-century America and compared them to contemporary incidents in Western Europe. The first movement began in 1840 as a response to the “massive influx of immigrants, predominantly from Catholic Ireland” (p. 200). The second, provoked by significant structural changes that affected rural America, happened during the 1880s and 1890s. Both mobilizations happened during times of intense socioeconomic turbulence and significant immigration. According to Betz (2013), “[b]oth movements promoted a far-reaching social and political reform agenda, which they believed would restore the country to its foundational roots: evangelical Protestantism directed primarily against the Catholic ‘invasion’ in the first case, Jeffersonian republicanism directed against the collusion of money and politics in the second” (p. 208). While neither the agrarian, anti-establishment (and anti-Wall Street) movement nor the anti-Catholic nativism succeeded in their goals, their impact was still profound. They provide a useful case for understanding contemporary populist mobilization in Western Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere, and for analyzing the conditions that provoke or give rise to populist movements.

Drawing on these two historical examples, Betz (2013) suggests several points of similarity with contemporary populist movements (he refers specifically to parties in Western Europe at the time of writing). First, populism is about (or framed as being about) protecting “concerns of ordinary people against the dominant economic, political, and cultural elite” (Betz, 2013, p. 216). Second, populism is based on cultural anxieties; for example, there is often an embedded belief regarding incommensurability in the sense that another religion or worldview is “fundamentally incompatible with Western values...and should therefore be kept out” (Betz, 2013, p. 216). Finally, Betz (2013) finds that populism usually happens during times of socioeconomic turmoil and deep-reaching structural changes, often in relation to technological revolutions (p. 216).

A decade earlier, Kevin Phillips (1992) compared a populist resurgence in the 1990s to the 1890s case as well as the 1930s mobilization. He found similar elements across these examples as well, including, “exaltation of the ordinary American against abusive, affluent and educated elites; contempt for Washington; rising ethnic, racial and religious animosities; fear of immigrants and foreigners, and a desire to turn away from internationalism and concentrate on rebuilding America and American lives” (Phillips, 1992, p. 41; as cited in Berlet, 2011, p. 14).

A more recent study of populist support in Flanders (a region in the Netherlands) focused on the “demand-side,” or the attitudes of voters themselves. The Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck (2016) found three major indicators of support for populism. First, that “[t]hose that are more economically vulnerable are more likely to develop feelings of anomie and relative deprivation which then lead them to populism” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 342). Second, the authors identified “a strong relationship between education and the support for populism; with the less educated supporting populism much more strongly when compared with the higher educated” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 343). Third, they found that “support for populism is quite strongly embedded in different kinds of feelings of vulnerability (i.e., lack of external political efficacy, anomie, and feelings of deprivation) [, and] that populist attitudes are grounded in a deep discontent, not only with politics but also with societal life in general” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 344). Spruyt et al. (2016) note, however, that what really matters in this third finding is *subjectively experienced* rather than objective vulnerability, which means that “people who

[merely] identify with a [real or perceived] marginalized and stigmatized group find a safe haven in populism” (pp. 343-344).

Finally, the recent US presidential election is an interesting case, because although the party with the populist candidate won, the Republican Party itself is not a populist party but a well-established conservative party (though with recent substantial influence from the Tea Party movement within its ranks). Furthermore, Donald Trump’s campaign included much populist rhetoric, but he has also been labeled a demagogue, which is not the case for every populist leader. This makes the sort of empirical study that looks at party literature difficult, since what Trump’s campaign publications stated and what Trump actually said at rallies or Tweeted often differed. Some political commentators have called Trump the “perfect populist,” (Lind, 2016) while others have accused him of “pretend populism” (Bruni, 2016). Furthermore, this election cycle actually saw examples of populism on both ends of the political spectrum. In many ways, Bernie Sanders employed populist rhetoric, including anti-Wall Street, anti-establishment, and anti-corrupt-elites sentiments. Although, as is typical of left-wing populism, Sanders’ campaign was aimed at inclusion of subjugated and historically marginalized groups rather than scapegoating them (Kazin, 2016). As suggested in the previous section, the use of populism as an evaluation criteria seems to depend on pre-existing beliefs about populism itself and on which candidate or party one prefers.

In terms of explaining the success of Trump, many analysts and political commentators focus on two main causes: economic anxiety and xenophobia (see: Norris, 2016; Thompson, 2016; Newmyer, 2016; McElwee & McDaniel, 2017; Casselman, 2017; Marcotte, 2016; Roth, 2017). Proponents of the first causal explanation emphasize that globalization has created many “losers” in the American economy, particularly among blue-collar, less educated workers. Commentators point to stagnant wages, rampant international competition, the decline of coal mining and other industrial jobs, and specifically, the decline of manufacturing in the “Rust Belt” due to offshoring practices as contributors to a national economic anxiety primed for populist mobilization (for example, see: Thompson, 2016; Newmyer, 2016; Casselman, 2017). Proponents of the second causal explanation underline the role of pre-existing blatant or latent racism and xenophobia, often circulated in radical right-wing circles online, in producing a demand for ‘inward-turning’ policies like bans on immigration, “extreme vetting” of refugee

claimants and asylum seekers, deportation of illegal immigrants, and border walls. These analysts also point to the Trump campaign's rhetoric as validating or giving permission for racist language and sentiments and an "us/them" mentality, under the guise of a frustration with "political correctness" (for example, see: McElwee & McDaniel, 2017; Marcotte, 2016; Beauchamp, 2016). As will be demonstrated in the following sections, however, this one- or two-factor explanation of populism is incomplete.

Globalization and Its Consequences

Globalization, as a concept, is far from being uncontested. Debates around definition, explanation, measurement, and timing are widespread, as are disagreements about structures of production and governance. Many conceptions focus solely on globalization as an economic process, but these fail to account for other types of connectivity and exchange, render many important theoretical and empirical questions outside the purview of globalization studies, and limit researchers in their examination of dynamics of change. As such, for the purposes of this paper, I adopt Jan Scholte's (2005) approach that identifies globalization as a process of *respatialization*, which "entails a reconfiguration of social geography with increased transplanetary connections between people" (p. 16). This process includes linkages between and movements of people, things, structures, cultures, and ideas. Scholte's conception builds on previous work by David Held et al. (1999), who define globalization as "a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power" (p. 7). The strength of a broad definition of globalization along these lines is that it captures the interactive, processual, and multi-scalar nature of globalization that a narrow understanding simply ignores.

Some authors suggest that there are three central consequences of globalization: "increased economic competition, heightened cultural diversity and cultural competition, and increased political competition between the state and all kinds of supra-national organizations" (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337). Since the early 1990s, "voters' perceptions of concerns over immigration, trade liberalisation and the wider processes of globalisation have become an

increasing political pre-occupation” (Saull, 2015, p. 27). This section looks at some of the consequences of globalization at economic, social, and individual levels.

The economic impacts of globalization have been well theorized and researched. Most conclusions stress that “transnationally mobile manufacturing and financial enterprises as well as highly skilled professionals, technical personnel and managers are the ‘winners’ of internationalization” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 220). On the other hand, globalization also “generates losses and new economic insecurities for some occupational strata and sectors” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 220). It is no secret that globalization has led to structural economic transformations worldwide. In the U.S. and Western Europe, this has taken the shape of disappearing low-skilled rewarding work, leaving the less educated or trained economically vulnerable. Automation and other technological advancement has also contributed to wage stagnation and loss of jobs (Spruyt, et al., 2016). Spruyt et al. (2016) suggest, “that due to increased economic competition, innovation, and changing types of work, certain groups are simply ill-suited to function well in a contemporary globalized world [...] This may result in a structural crisis on the feeling of being represented. These experiences may be a first source of feelings of social, economic, and political vulnerability” (p. 337). These “losers of globalization,” – the traditional middle class and semi- and unskilled workers – are found to “disproportionately support radical right-wing populist (RRWP) parties” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 219). Interestingly, Swank and Betz (2003) argue that a strong welfare state acts as a kind of buffer against the negative effects of internationalization, thereby reducing support for radical right-wing populist parties. They find that “globalization has significant domestic political effects, but that these domestic consequences of international integration are themselves shaped by national political institutions” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 238).

Economic globalization, and especially financialization, have arguably made the world more vulnerable to financial crisis and volatility. Or at least, globalization means that the impacts of financial crisis are more widely felt across countries (Swank & Betz, 2003). The 2008 crisis is a case in point. An interesting finding from Swank and Betz (2003) points to the importance of *perceptions* about the costs and benefits of globalization, even over the factual costs and benefits, and that people tend to weigh the former more heavily than the latter: “there appears to be a

relatively widespread belief among electorates that internationalization plays a substantial role in adverse economic outcomes” (pp. 222-223).

In a recent study of systemic financial crises over the past 140 years, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2015) find that “financial crises are followed by important changes in voter behavior that in turn, contribute to high levels of policy uncertainty [...] After financial crises, voters seem to be systematically lured by the political rhetoric of the far right, with its frequently nationalistic or xenophobic tendencies” (p. 2). They also point to the finding that, no matter which parties are in power, governing generally becomes more difficult after a financial crisis due to a rise in political fractionalization, social unrest, and other governing constraints. This conclusion supports an argument that financial crashes combined with so-called globalization losses and wealth inequality lead to the rise of right-wing populism.

In addition to key socio-economic impacts, globalization has also led to much higher mobility of people. Migration is currently one of the most studied, discussed and contested subjects. It certainly had a place in the recent US election. For good or for ill, immigration has led to some cultural and demographic changes in western countries. While many countries, parties, and people maintain a liberal democratic position of openness and tolerance, others are expressing concerns about perceived high levels of immigration (legal and illegal) and its implications. According to Saull (2013), “issues of ‘cultural difference’ have come to play a very significant mobilising role for the far-right, especially since the 9/11 attacks” (p. 39). Of course, it is difficult to separate this effect from the changing security landscape that accompanied globalization.

Among right wing voters, one author found that “cultural protectionism was a more significant motivating factor [...] than economic protectionism” (Oesch, 2008, p. 369; cited in Malone, 2014). Another author found that “cultural factors are the primary predictor of the success of right wing populism. When asked directly on the subject, right wing populist voters consistently revealed that they were more concerned about the cultural implications of immigration rather than the economic implications” (Malone, 2014, p. 60). In radical right-wing populist parties across Western Europe, “immigration and homogenizing forces of internationalization are opposed on the grounds that rights of citizens to cultural identity within the nation state should be defended” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 223). One interesting finding from

Berning and Schleuter (2016) states that, “perceptions of threatened group interests are temporally prior to [radical right-wing populist party (RRP)] preferences” (p. 85). In other words, “the more that citizens perceive immigrants as posing a threat to the interests of their ingroup, the more they prefer RRP parties” (Berning & Schleuter, 2016, p. 85).

Finally, globalization also has consequences or impacts on the level of the individual. One study suggests that globalization promotes a certain cosmopolitan identity – one “characterized by a general open-mindedness, a fascination for new and different experiences, individualism, the exploration of the [sic] own uniqueness, and so on.” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337). Those who espouse cosmopolitanism search for meaning, community, and belonging in ways that are often dissimilar to the traditional working class or less educated populace. This may yield feelings of vulnerability around social identity insecurity and stigma consciousness.

Some of this dynamic is represented in the typical urban-rural divide where rural or “working people” are stigmatized as irrationally closed-minded and cosmopolitan “city-folk” are counter-stigmatized as rootless and snobbish. This divide also has an education element. For example, “in societies that put [a] heavy emphasis on education, the label “less educated” carries social stigma” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337). In one study, those with less education reported “more political discontent, higher levels of feelings of a lack of political efficacy, and less interest in politics” (Coffe & Michels, 2014; cited in Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337). In terms of support for populism, then, it seems likely that there is an educational element; this support may be borne out of less educated people’s frustration about “the political dominance of the higher educated or the experience of being held in contempt due to their lack of education” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337).

A Coping Mechanism

Spruyt et al. (2016) suggest that to deal with these feelings of vulnerability, people may employ a particular coping mechanism based on dichotomization (drawing on Panizza, 2005) and the use of empty signifiers (drawing on Laclau, 2005), both key characteristics of populism. As elaborated in the first section of this paper, “populism structures social and political space by dividing it between a homogeneous block of straight-thinking “ordinary people” and the established elite, creating us and them, friend and foe” (Spruyt et al., 2016, p. 337). Those who

experience vulnerability, who need to figure out ways to cope with frustration, will be drawn to narratives grounded in a sharp us/them divide. Spruyt et al. (2016) point out that,

Coping strategies depersonalize experiences by representing the perceived personal vulnerability in such a way that the responsibility is put outside of the individual. One of the easiest ways to achieve this is to represent the personal situation as part of, or even as, a consequence of the opposition between groups in which one group disfavors the other group. When “my” problems are represented as “our” problems, “my” responsibility in the experienced vulnerability decreases automatically. In this way, “uncertainty . . . ‘drives’ people to join groups.” The further specification of that group does not need to be exact. “We, the people,” for instance, can serve as a rhetorical means to put oneself under the safe umbrella of a group. (p. 337)

This coping mechanism might be employed genuinely and organically, or it may be exploited and employed in a manipulative sense by populist leadership. In other words, the mechanism may be internalized or instrumentalized. In this way, populism functions as a coping tool for those with feelings of vulnerability due to consequences of globalization, while also uniting very different grievances (Spruyt et al., 2016).

The Role of Conspiracy Theories

One of the forms that this coping mechanism can take is conspiratorial thinking. While the concept (and practice) of *conspiring* has nearly always been with us, conspiracy theories are a relatively newer phenomenon. Elements of conspiracy narrative were woven into the populist rhetoric of the Know Nothing Party in 1840s America, suggesting that Catholic immigration was a Trojan horse, “the cornerstone of a vast papist conspiracy aimed at subverting, undermining, and ultimately overthrowing the American republic and its institutions and subjecting the country to despotism” (Betz, 2013, p. 204). The term “conspiracy theory” itself can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, in American newspapers’ crime reports. However, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that conspiracy theories were understood and treated as a problem of public opinion (Moore, 2016; McKenzie-McHarg, 2011; Knight, 2000; Butter, 2013). Some US-specific examples include:

the view that the Central Intelligence Agency was responsible for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; that doctors deliberately manufactured the AIDS virus; that the 1996 crash of TWA flight 800 was caused by a U.S. military missile; that the theory of global warming is a deliberate fraud; that the Trilateral Commission is responsible for important movements of the international economy; that Martin Luther King, Jr., was killed by federal agents; that the plane crash that killed Democrat Paul Wellstone was engineered by Republican politicians; that the moon landing was staged and never actually occurred.

(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008, p. 4)¹⁶

Of course, by no means does the US have a monopoly on conspiracy theories or conspiratorial worldviews. For example, 9/11-related conspiracy theories are widespread in the Middle East, conspiratorial anti-Semitism was very strong in 1930s-Germany, and, more recently, conspiracy theories surfaced about the causes of and public health responses to the Ebola outbreak (Moore, 2016, p. 5).

In his second edition of *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1952), Karl Popper described the “conspiracy of society” as “the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon [...] and who have planned and conspired to bring it about” (p. 306). This sort of view also partially constitutes Hofstadter’s “Paranoid Style,” which is “motivated by a set of inchoate resentments and anxieties, and characterized by Manichean dualism, apocalyptic visions, and a pedantic and obsessive accumulation of evidence combined with remarkable leaps of imagination” (cited in Moore, 2016, p. 4). By nature, conspiracy theories generally ignore the unintended consequences of action, and instead assume that all consequences are in fact intended and deliberately created (usually overestimating the competence of the “conspirers” in the process). In doing so, “conspiracy theorists avoid confronting a world in which there is typically not a strong correspondence between outcomes and the intentions of any of the people whose interaction

¹⁶ Lest readers think that conspiracy theories are mostly about historical events, or that ‘there’s no harm in just believing something,’ take the recent example of “Pizzagate” – the conspiracy theory about Hilary Clinton running a child sex ring in the basement of a pizzeria in Washington, D.C. – that recently led a lone gunman to ‘investigate’ for himself and open fire in the shop. See German Lopez, “Pizzagate, the fake news conspiracy theory that led a gunman to DC’s Comet Ping Pong, explained,” *Vox*, 8 December 2016. Available at: <http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/12/5/13842258/pizzagate-comet-ping-pong-fake-news>.

produced them” (Moore, 2016, p. 4). People largely prefer simple causal stories to randomness, good/bad luck, or emergent outcomes.

The compatibility of conspiratorial thinking with populism should already be obvious. In fact, they share several core tenets; they are both typically anti-elite, they both rely on heavy dualisms, and they both engage in scapegoating and demonization of target groups. US populism is often clearly founded in and emboldened by conspiracy theories, drawing on a “‘producerist’ narrative that portrays a noble middle class of hard-working productive citizens being squeezed by a conspiracy involving secret elites above and lazy, sinful, and subversive parasites below” (Berlet, 2011, p. 17). Conspiracy theories have been linked to several attributes: a crisis of trust in government, motivating non-compliance, group polarization, promoting a “vicious cycle of cynicism” (Moore, 2016, p. 5). For Fenster (1999), conspiracy theories are “‘an ideological misrecognition of power relations’ involving a populist identification of believers with ‘the people’ as opposed to a secret elite ‘power bloc’” (p. 67). Conspiracy theorizing has been called the “poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age” (Jameson, 1990, p. 355).

In line with my previous discussion on the consequences of globalization, Moore (2016) suggests that, “[t]he expansion of capitalist markets, the increasing speed of communications, and the growing division of labor have created a situation in which it is difficult to make sense of profound changes that have a direct impact on people’s lives” (p. 8). Tim Melley (2000) characterizes this “sense of powerlessness in the face of anonymous and large-scale economic and social changes” as “agency panic.” (p. 12). We can see this kind of dynamic illustrated in a scene from *The Grapes of Wrath*,

where a man on a tractor comes to remove tenants and destroy their homes. The farmer gets his gun, but the tractor driver pleads that he’s only doing his job. Well, what about your boss? He’s only doing his job too. And so on and so on. Behind every action in the chain is a yet more distant cause, and at no point does there seem to be anyone capable of taking responsibility for the entire collective product. As his home is being leveled, the farmer pleads: “Who can we shoot?” (Moore, 2016, p. 8, citing Steinbeck [1939] 2006, pp. 38-39)

Of course, it is important to differentiate between appropriate levels of skepticism and healthy critique, and conspiratorial thinking (Moore, 2016). A key way to do this is to recognize the “self-sealing” quality of conspiracy theories that render them largely immune to challenge. Sunstein and Vermeule (2008) note that “conspiracy theories generally attribute extraordinary powers to certain agents [...and those who believe this] are especially unlikely to give respectful attention to debunkers, who may, after all, be agents or dupes of those who are responsible for the conspiracy in the first instance” (p. 5).

Another view is that conspiracy theorizing represents a kind of “‘crippled epistemology’ in the form of a sharply limited number of (relevant) informational sources.” (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008, p. 7). Sunstein and Vermeule (2008) make the argument that conspiracy theorizing is more likely to happen in closed societies with a lack of free press and civil liberties; on the other hand, open societies mean that it is more difficult for governments and other leaders to keep secrets. While this argument makes sense given a clear open/closed society dualism, the reality of democratic/autocratic polities is much more fluid. For example, there has been much recent work on the effect of “online echo chambers” on voter attitudes. In this high-tech information age, many people obtain their news from news aggregators or even via their social media platforms. Platforms like Facebook, however, generate a user’s “newsfeed” based on what they have previously liked or read. The result is a highly personalized, algorithm-based collection of articles and posts that fall into the user’s preferences. This creates a kind of “echo chamber” where the user’s own worldview is reflected back at them all the time, reinforcing their existing beliefs, and not exposing them to a diversity of perspectives or information. This may sound like a somewhat isolated technical issue with a simple technical solution, but echo chambers have (and have already had) significant impact on society, in the form of entrenchment of positions and polarization, complete ignorance of other views, increased stereotyping of “others”, and decreases in empathy and democratic debate (see Vergeer, 2015; Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016; Garrett, 2009).

One final point is critical here. With the advent of the internet, conspiracy theorizing has proliferated to a never-before seen degree. What used to be limited to in-person or phone conversations and meetings, physical pamphlets and DVDs, is now circulated via YouTube videos, “Reddits” and “Subreddits,” and even the “Dark Web.” In an age of “infotainment,”

“clickbait,” and never-ending novelty, the wildest conspiracy theories are now at users’ fingertips.

Factor and Causal Analysis

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full model of populism, the discussion thus far allows for a more integrated approach. Rather than treating populism as ideology, political strategy, or discursive frame, this section incorporates aspects of all three approaches by highlighting the interactions between various supply-side and demand-side factors and mechanisms leading to populist mobilization. Drawing on work by Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu (2009) on causation and historical explanation in the social sciences, this section brings these approaches and factors together in an INUS causation model.

Table 1. Summary of Populism Factors and Mechanisms

Context factors (supply-side)	Audience factors (demand-side)	Mechanisms
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic structural change • Financial crisis • Heightened cultural diversity • Media echo chambers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fear of imported change (including anomie) • Feelings of vulnerability (including feelings of relative deprivation, identity insecurity, and stigma consciousness) • Political discontent and feelings of lack of political efficacy • Lower education levels • Lower economic position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conspiracy theorizing and “Paranoid Style” (including the heightened use/role of imagination/fantasy) • Us/Them dichotomization (including appeals to natality) • Use of empty signifiers

It would be inaccurate to say that globalization is the cause of the recent wave of populist mobilizations. It would also be generalizing to say that today's populism is simply a distinct 'counter-punch' to globalization. A much more accurate statement is that contemporary populism is the result of: (1) various mechanisms (specifically us/them dichotomization and empty signifiers) that people employ in order to cope with their (real or perceived) vulnerability to globalizations' consequences (economic, cultural, and identity-based), and (2) information echo chambers and "paranoid style" that serve to reinforce/entrench worldviews while potentially magnifying perceived threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, globalization forces can exacerbate the conditions and feelings of vulnerability that lead to populism, while echo chambers represent a kind of disintegration or fractionalization within a highly integrated and connected world.

Globalization in and of itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for populism (P) – it has to be broken down further. 'Us/them dichotomization (D)' and 'feelings of vulnerability' (V) are each necessary conditions. Both 'economic structural change' (E) and 'heightened cultural diversity' (C) are INUS causes of populism – they are each "an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for" (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009, p. 125) populism. They must be combined with dichotomization and vulnerability. 'Paranoid style' (PS) and 'echo chambers' (EC) are contributing factors to all the other factors – they are each a "sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for" (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009, p. 126) populism. Using a Boolean equation, this causal explanation is as follows:

$$P_1 = D_1 \& V_1 \& (E_1 \vee C_1); D_1 \vee V_1 \vee E_1 \vee C_1 = PS_1 \vee EC_1$$

Final Thoughts: Populism as Corrective and/or Threat?

In a colourful metaphor, Arditi (2007) suggests that populism can be seen as 'the awkward dinner guest,' "the one who gets drunk and asks inappropriate questions, which may in fact point to important hidden problems" (as cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 19). What is captured here is "the duality between populist politics and democracy: populism challenges the common sense of liberal democratic practice and may have ominous implications for liberal democracy; at the same time, populism may serve to identify otherwise overlooked political

problems and give marginalized groups a legitimate voice” (Gidron & Bonikowski, n.d., p. 19). Furthermore, Kaltwasser (2013) argues that populist politics revolve around two key democratic dilemmas: “the definition of the people and the limits of self-government.” But the answers to these questions vary across populist leaders and contexts, meaning that populism has the potential to “be both a corrective and a threat to democracy” (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2012, p. 16).

Conclusion

In exploring populism and its relationship to globalization and conspiratorial thinking, this paper offers several contributions. First, examining these three elements—globalization, populism, and conspiratorial thinking—together allows for a better understanding of the multi-scalar, interactional nature of populism that better accounts for macro structural forces, social dynamics, and individual psychological phenomena. Second, a discussion of the three main conceptual approaches to populism highlights the need for clarity in how the term is used in scholarly work and public media, but also points to fruitful insights that come from a multi-pronged analysis that examines the content, strategic use, and broader discourses of populism.

Third, I find that the current wave of populism across Western Europe and North America (among other places) is not a distinct backlash to globalization. There are many causal pathways to populism (it is an “equifinal” outcome), but the characteristics of globalization are insufficient but necessary parts of a set that is unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) for the rise of populism. Rather than a backlash, contemporary populism can be understood as exacerbated by feelings of vulnerability and fear of change that accompany various forces of globalization. Importantly, the *perception* of vulnerability in the context of subjectively experienced globalization is a more important factor in understanding populism than *actual* economic (or cultural) vulnerability as a result of tangible globalization dynamics. In a feedback dynamic involving us/them dichotomization and other coping mechanisms, populism then fuels xenophobia and conspiracist scapegoating. In this context, individuals and societies are then more vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies (or at least to personality politics), as political leaders take advantage of populist rhetoric in an emotionally charged environment. This dynamic is not particularly unique to the current period, but one of the distinguishing contemporary elements is the level of communication technology that enables and facilitates the spread of fear and conspiratorial thinking.

Given what we now know about the causal mechanisms behind contemporary populism, I suggest that there is cause for concern about not only the well-known economic and cultural impacts of globalization and feelings of vulnerability around them, but also about the mechanisms that serve to amplify or reinforce those feelings and perceptions. Many current populisms have the potential to weaken democratic institutions and even contribute to the conditions for a rise in authoritarianism, particularly in “unconsolidated democracies” (Levisky & Way, 2010; Loxton & Levistky, 2012) or democracies with high levels of factionalism. For those interested in maintaining liberal democracy and egalitarianism, and in encouraging cooperative approaches to solving contemporary challenges, it will be important to figure out how to meaningfully address fears and vulnerabilities about economic and cultural globalization, dampen the “paranoid style” of politics, and break up information echo chambers that prevent cognitive diversity.

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Immigration Policy in France

The Case of the Roma as an Ethnic Minority

Laura Montserrat Sanchez Martinez

Introduction

Roma, Romani, Bohemien, Gitani, Gitans, Tsigani, Kalo, Gypsies, a group that go by many names around the world. A minority that has seen oppression in many forms, and in many times in history. In this article, we look at the case of immigration policy in France, and its impact on the Romani people. This research is based on qualitative field, examining why the Roma were expelled from France. In order to understand this topic, it was necessary to look beyond the Roma deportations and how they happened; it was necessary to review, at the historical French context, the development of the French migratory policies, and the relation between the Roma in France, and in the European Union (EU), therefore the influence that the EU has in this country.

The origin and history of the Roma is distinguished from other ethnic minorities, because it is very antique¹⁷ besides, it has several special features, shades and versions. Indeed, there are various studies and publications however, they cover more anthropological, social and cultural aspects than political; for this reason, plus a personal interest, the following article was done.

The emergence of the Roma dates back more than 1000 years, in a migration that began from India¹⁸ to the territory now occupied by the EU. In this journey, the Roma assimilated many cultural elements that were found along their journey, and certainly today's culture has been influenced by these elements. This ethnic group has been affected by a stigma with the passage of time, and today most Roma are settled in camps away from the community, this situation has perpetuated this stigma and racial stereotype.

¹⁷ It dates from the fifteenth century

¹⁸ In order to trace and understand the origin of this ethnic group, a text linguists was needed in order to clarify the certificate of origin of the name of this group

The Roma traditions and lifestyles coupled with low levels of education about their culture, have resulted in, the failing to exercise their citizenship on an equal level with that of other citizens. On one hand, the Roma should understand the obligation that entails living in society, which implies fulfilling the duties and rules laid down by that society, but on another hand, they have to enforce their rights as human beings and embrace their unique culture.

Today, the Roma is the largest minority in the EU, there are around 12 million people (Europa.eu, 2013); however, they do not have a territory which can be considered a nation-state; this has resulted in no uniform law or jurisdiction that governs the Roma people. Although, they do have some organizations that unify them as a community, this community is scattered within a variety of nation states, such as France; this situation poses questions to the International System (IS), since one of the major players is the nation-state, which has its own regulations.

However, in the current scenario, the nation-state is not a unitary actor and this represents complexity; an example of this is the influence of the EU as a supranational entity, which together with the Council and European Parliament created the directive 2004/38/EC, where the members of the EU cannot expel any person for not meeting the residency criteria.

The country that has consistently presented the expulsion of Roma has been France; this country has several immigration regulations concerning this group, but only focusing on certain characteristics. Therefore, this work is aimed at studying the analysis of French immigration policy, and the decision of the ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy to expel the Romani people from France as the main point of focus.

The history of Roma migration in France, dates back around the early nineteenth century; this review is based on six periods provided by the "Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration" Museum of the history of immigration in France, where different policies are classified such as: politics of conjunction, admission, regularization, of control, integration and explicit. We assess how some of these policies give further rise to discrimination.

In many situations, the discrimination emerges because the Roma are still considered as foreign. This is due to the historical link between the concepts of all Roma being migrants;

however, migration is a phenomenon that has always existed in the IS and it is not exclusive of the Roma. This does not mean that Roma are in constant motion; in other words, a Roma is not necessarily a migrant and a migrant is not necessarily a Roma; however, this label has been assigned causing a problem of social adaptation, and a legal dispute within the adjustment of policies.

This research was based on a comprehensive, theoretical, and methodological approach. The theory of the constructivism states that, the IS and its actors are mutually transformed through shared practices; this theory was applied, in order to understand how the processes of marginalization, exclusion and discrimination were given through the speech. As well, the theory of institutionalism helped to analyze the relation between France and the EU.

The main questions of this investigation were answered as it follows: How can the situation of the Roma be explained by the immigration policies in France? What was the cause of the expulsion of the Roma from France in 2012? Therefore, the hypothesis that states in this research is that: The state of France bases its Romani immigration policies in prejudices that originate discrimination against them. In addition, there is an information gap between the French migratory policies and the Roma; therefore, in some cases the consequence is deportation. This brings to light, the fact that French society has a negative image of this group and they do not wish to achieve an inclusion of the Roma in its society, nor an integration.

This article is organized as follows under three sections: Section I looks at the methodological tools used, and the interrelationship between the EU institution, the Particular Organism of change *The European Network* and Roma, with support from the approaches of institutionalism and constructivism of International Relations. Section II of the study describes the historical origin of Roma. It presents the characteristics that they acquired and that identify them today as an ethnic minority group. Section III introduce an analysis between the migration policies and the Roma through a historical review based on the six periods provided by the Museum of the History of Immigration in France; in here, the evolution of the French migratory policies is reviewed towards the Rom; concluding with an analysis of discrimination and expulsion during the administration of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Finally, the study concludes with an analysis of the outcomes that were taken during the period studied.

1.1 The Institutions and the Formal Rules of Immigration Legislation Within the European Union

The approaches of International Relations, the Institutionalism, and the Constructivism served to understand the interaction between the EU, France and The Roma. However, we need to start by defining the term ‘institution’ as used in the context of this paper. According to North, an institution is a man-made limitation that shapes the human interaction. Similarly, if there is an institutional change, it is because societies develop over time, and this is how we are able to understand historical changes (North, 2001).

In addition, the institutions have the possibility of evolving (Ibid., 2001). In this scenario, the EU is an institution that was created with the purpose of preventing any type of conflict in the region since the 1940s. Its main objective was to unite and prioritize the common cultural, legal and moral values, defined as democracy, and respect for human rights (Renout, 2009). Furthermore, it also sought to leave behind the concept of a nation-state and to reconcile the European people, and to prevent any type of conflict in the continent (Ibid., 2009).

Until 2013, the EU evolved a set of rules and structure regarding the treatment of foreign peoples. In other words, it has constituted a guide for human interaction; also one basic unit that the EU has considered a component since its creation, has been the nation-state. Nonetheless, the role of the nation-state has been questioned, since it has faced processes that it can no longer dominate, and that steadily have lost power from an up¹⁹ and down²⁰ perspective (Carbonell and Kymlicka, 2001). Currently, the EU is an institution that includes nation-states and organizations that have been formed by different interests, it is an example of why institutions are not created by force. Also, it indicates that, it is through the rules that the interests are managed (North, 2001).

The imposed rules are an element that set out to configure institutions; they are also defined as the coordination of policies and norms; Its role within the institutions, is based on how

¹⁹ Some examples of this are: free trade treaties, monetary and political unions, transfer of powers to supranational authorities, the subordination to transnational corporations, etc.

²⁰ Examples of this are: risk of secession, peripheral nationalisms, neo corporatization of society, lack of regulation etc.

they manage the behavior of the agents, because they restrict their activity, and configure the expectations that the members perform. The rules also provide a framework of executing activities; in the same way, they are the ones that define an institution.

There are some situations where there could be an appeal of the rules themselves (Keohane, 1984). The rules can be defined as "how the game will unfold" (North, 2001, p.66). The rules are divided into formal and informal. The formal includes political, economical, and judiciary rules, such as constitutions, statutes, common laws, special provisions, and individual contacts.

The formal rules within the EU are built on three pillars:

1. The European Parliament, whose members represent the citizens of the EU; these are directly elected by the citizens.
2. The Council of the European Union, represent the Governments of each of the Member States.
3. The European Commission represents the interests of the EU as a whole.

Together, the three institutions prepare through the "ordinary legislative procedure" the policies and laws that are applied throughout the EU. In principle, the Commission proposes new laws to which Parliament and the Council adopt them. The Commission and the Member States then apply this legislation. Finally, the Commission ensures that the laws are correctly implemented and enforced. (Europea.eu, 2014).

Regarding the subject of the free movement of persons, asylum and immigration; the EU stipulates the following:

The free movement of persons, is a fundamental right, which the EU citizens enjoy under the establishment of the treaties. The abolition of the internal borders implies, a strengthened management of the external borders of the EU, and the regularization of the entry and residence of persons from non-EU countries through measures such as: the common policy of asylum and immigration.

The concept of free movement of persons stems, from the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention, which

marked the beginning of the abolition of border controls, between participating countries. The Schengen cooperation, as part of the EU legal and institutional framework, has gradually expanded to include most Member States and some non-EU countries (European.eu, 2014, para.1)

The three institutions above created the Directive 2004/38 /EC on 24 April 2004, which governs the rights of the citizens of the EU, and their family members; it specifies that they have the right to circulate and to spend a season freely in the territory of Member States. The directive has 42 articles and 31 fractions. In the fraction 6, it mentions the following:

In order to maintain the unity of the family in a broader sense and without prejudice to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, the situation of those persons who are not included in the definition of family members under this Directive, and who therefore do not enjoy an automatic right of entry and residence in the host Member State, should be examined by the host Member State on the basis of its own national legislation, in order to decide whether entry and residence could be granted to such persons, taking into consideration their relationship with the Union citizen or any other circumstances, such as their financial or physical dependence on the Union citizen.

Section 22 specifies that there are certain limitations to the right of free movement and residence, justified on grounds of public order, security or public health, issued by the treaty. This deprivation of the right to enter a country or to be expelled is preceded by Council Directive 64/221 / EEC of 25 February 1964 for the coordination of special measures on travel abroad and residence for reasons of public policy, Public safety and public health.

In the section 24 it states that:

[..] the greater the degree of integration of Union citizens and their family members in the host Member State, the greater the degree of protection against expulsion should be. Only in exceptional circumstances, where there are imperative grounds of public security, should an expulsion measure be taken against Union citizens who have resided for many years in the territory of the host Member State, in particular when they were born and have resided there throughout their life [...]

In addition, the section 31 states:

This Directive respects the fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in the Charter, Member States should implement this Directive without discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion or beliefs, political or other opinion, membership of an ethnic minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation,

The above directive, approved by the three competent institutions, affirms four main points:

1. There is a respect of free movement, for persons with a nationality of a member-state.
2. That residence is durable, for at least three months in another State of the European Union.
3. It is important for the EU to strengthen family unification, since the expulsion is reduced.

However, each member-state has the power, by its own legislation, to decide who to consider a family member.

4. Expulsion takes place in special cases, but it is forbidden by cases of discrimination.

1.2 The Limitations of the Rules and Their Consequences: The Particular Organism of Change the *EU Roma*, and Other Elements of the Institutions.

As was stated in the previous section, there is a difference between the formal and informal rules; which lie in their depth of measure. For example, within the informal rules there are taboos, customs and traditions, and in the formal, are the written constitutions. This can create a gap, but at the same time an incentive. As a result, the particular organisms of change are incentivized. The organisms include political, economical, social and educational bodies. They are groups of individuals linked by some common identity towards certain objectives (North, 2001). The organisms are also created by opportunity, which is created by the existing

limitations of the Institutions, and this is the reason why the organisms can also be affected by these limitations. An example of this situation can be found in the *EU Roma Network*; whose objective is to advance jointly among its members, in terms of social inclusion of the Roma population in the EU, which has been a limited theme within the region.

Before describing under what context, the EU Roma was formed, it is important to mention that the Roma population is the largest ethnic minority in the EU, with almost 12 million citizens (Euroma, 2013); during this research, no document has been found to indicate that the Roma intend to form their own self-governed community through an independent state. In fact, what has become evident is the need for recognition and appropriate treatment by non-centralized States. Thus, the EU is assumed as a transnational institution, which moderates the relationship between the French State and the Roma minority. The Roma have had a voice within the Union, specifically in November 2006 during the European Roma and Gypsies Forum (a Non-Governmental Organization supported by the Council of Europe) where for the first time there was a legal symposium, to expose the lack of rights towards the Roma (Vie Publique.fr., 2014).

Moreover, a fundamental fact occurred in 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU. This is important since the vast majority of European Roma come from these two countries (Ibid., 2014). This situation had an impact on the EU, as this made even more Roma into European citizens. In June of that same year, the Spanish Government, through its Administrative Unit of Structural Social Funds, (which is the main financial instrument available to EU Member States to implement policies aimed at improving Social cohesion within the EU,) and with the collaboration of Fundación Secretariado Gitano (Foundation Secretariat of Gypsies) and the support of the European Commission, launched an initiative to create the EU Roma. The goal was to create a joint effort in setting the basis for a common strategy, in terms of social inclusion of the Roma population (Europea.eu, 2014).

The objectives of the EU Roma are as follows:

- Transmission and exchange of information, through internal and external communication channels.

- Mutual learning: sharing of approaches and strategies, identification and transfer of experiences, creation of a forum for the organisation and management of projects, development of common and transversal products.

The participating States in the EU Roma (2013) include: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia and Sweden. The creation of the EU Roma can be the result of two situations. The first one being that the Roma have caused a change in the IS, specifically in the EU and consequently formed this organism. The second is that, the EU pushed to form public policies in favor of the Roma, and through this there has been a legitimization of the group.

Regardless of origins the EU Roma was created and has evolved. This has been determined fundamentally by the institutional framework that was put in place. At the same time, the organism's influence also influences the framework that created it; in other words, a correlation exists, since one affects the other (North, 2001). In summary, it can be said that the Institutions are the rules of the game, and the Organisms are the agents of institutional change.

Another element that composes the institutions, is the participation levels of the agents. Thus, the interest and participation between the members gives rise to cooperation; for the cooperation to exist, there must be an understanding between the parties, with or without conflict between them, in order to give continuity to the common goal. Finally, there must be transparent information (Keohane, 2003).

In this article we can observed that even though France belongs to the EU and agrees with the rules, it does not belong to the EU Roma; this situation did not prevent the achievement of other members' goals, but does show a conflict in their behavior, as well as a different interest.

This leaves some questions to be answered, since if the cooperation is given when the agents have enough information, there is a possibility that France has not obtained it, and therefore, this is the reason why it is not part of the EU Roma. Another possibility is that an agreement was not possible between the agents; or simply France was no interested in cooperated.

Finally, international institutions can be defined in terms of rules; but they must be recognized that they are inscribed in/ under practices; practices in itself are the last point that create institutions (Ibid., 2003). In modern world politics, one of the most important concepts is

sovereignty. Therefore, the evolution of an institution can be established/ visualized through the practices in general or in other words by the practice of sovereignty.

The EU, the social movements, and the ethnic groups have caused the function of the nation-state within the IS to change continuously. Under that logic the nation-state has to share political space with other decision-making centers; each one providing a place for democratic political action (Kymlicka, 2001). By sharing political space with other decision-making centers, nation-states give up part of their sovereignty.

Relating to the concept of sovereignty, Santa Cruz states that it is an evolving quality. In addition, it refers to the practices that a State must adopt in order to be recognized by others (Wendt, Santa Cruz, 2002). By being recognized as sovereign, the nation-states will benefit an equal treatment on the part of its peers (Santa Cruz, 2002).

According to the work of Keohane and North, there are four basic elements within the institutions, that are summarized in the following:

- The rules and norms are the institutions.
- The agents found the institutions through cooperation, whether it is based on harmony or discord.
- Institutions are born out of cooperation.
- The result are the practices

Despite the rules and agreements within the EU, the nation-state will still have sovereignty to decide and legislate on issues affecting their own population; this represents a challenge in order to coordinate policies and practices, when local interests take priority over the panoramic legislation.

The actor, that over time has changed the relationship between the agents (nation-states) of the EU, has been the Roma. This situation once again leaves open questions, as to whether the EU (EU Roma) has contributed to reduce the challenge (within the State) on legislating the situations that affect the Roma; it should be stressed again that France is not part of this network, which also leaves the question if the French State, seeks to include them as part of their population.

1.3 The Constructivist Approach.

In 2013, it was registered that the Roma was the largest minority in the EU; however, as previously mentioned they do not have a territory nor a Nation-State, this is one of the main reasons why they do not possess norms nor legislations for their population, therefore they are inserted in another conformed nation. Some studies claim that more than half of the Roma population live in slums, where employment and schooling opportunities are low. In some cases, the national migratory legislation of the states is in contradiction with the EU, this is the main reason why the Roma have been continuously expelled. In order to understand this dynamic, it is necessary to analyze it from the constructivist theory of International Relations.

Constructivism is an analytical framework for studying world politics (Santa Cruz, 2009); this approach is divided in two branches; the conventional and the postmodern. The present investigation is based on the conventional one, which has the following questions raised by Santa Cruz:

1. Philosophical Realism: states that social objects can not be studied in the same way as natural objects, since social phenomena are dependent on concepts (Ibid., Pp. 13). In this way, the institutions depend on what they mean to the actors (Sayer, Santa Cruz, 2009). Therefore, institutions are intersubjective structures; that is, that they are realities whose interpretation is shared thanks to the stability of their concept (Klotz and Lynch; Santa Cruz, 2009). Moreover, their meaning is constitutive, since their process of interpretation

constitutes them as social referents (Sayer, Santa Cruz, 2009) It is stated that the current norms and practices, cause human action, as social subjects (Adler, Santa Cruz, 2009)

2. Ontology: it is understood as the concrete referents of an explanatory discourse; they are unobservable structures that have observable effects (Santa Cruz, 2002)
3. Epistemology: it is about the way the knowledge is constructed, in other words the guidelines that direct the choice of methods that will be used (Ibid., 2002).
4. Hermeneutics: this concept is based on interpretation, whether the object of study is social or material; in both cases it should be considered its use and function within society, and this will depend on the meaning that has been assigned (Santa Cruz, 2009). Thus, material factors matter, but the way in which they do will depend on ideas (Fearon and Wendt, Santa Cruz, 2009)

Under this logic, since the social actions are interpretive, two instruments are necessary to perform them:

1. States must have the resources; which they constitute their material capacities.
2. States should have at their disposal the rules; through them, they communicate and coordinate their actions (David Dessler, Santa Cruz, 2009)

Beyond reading the social action, it is important to consider the context in which the social action takes place, and under which norms. This is why, the last approach of conventional Constructivism is the norm:

5.- The norms as a social structure, are the ones that make provides meaning to the action. They also contribute to have constitutive effects on the actors (on their identity and interests), and recursively on their structure itself (Ibid., 2009).

The norms are also perceived as, a collective expectation, about the appropriate behavior that other actors should have. In other words, they are guidelines for behavior or action, and are generally respected by members of society (Ullmann-Margalit, Santa Cruz, 2009). In general, there are two types of rules: the constitutive and regulative.


- The constitutive: they establish the social actors; they define them as participants in each social activity, as well they establish the criteria for participants. Thus, these norms create and define forms of behavior, while manufacturing the individual in themselves (Foucault, Santa Cruz, 2009)
- Regulatory: which prescribe behavior in given circumstances.

In addition, norms serve as a link between discourse and practice (Kratochwil and Hall, Santa Cruz, 2009) and in the same way, they contribute to the formation of the identity of sovereign states (Santa Cruz, 2009).

After examining Constructivism approach, it can be said that this approach is structural, and its central statements are the following:

- The States are the main units of analysis for the international political theory.
- The structures of the international system are intersubjective.
- The identities and interests of States, are fundamentally constructed by social structures (Wendt, Santa Cruz, 2009)

The following diagram, intends to illustrate how the International System is understood by the Constructivist approach:




There is a symbiotic relationship between the structure and agents; one does not exist without the other. The structure is social, and it is classified by different theorists as third image within the IS, in other words the structure is a whole, and the elements which arise and change (Santa Cruz, 2002).

According to Wendt, and stated by Santa Cruz, the structure, has three fundamentals:

1. Shared Knowledge: which means that, the interest and power can not be understood without considering the shared understandings that constitute any social system, since social actors are related to other objects. In addition, the shared knowledge constitutes the structures, that organize the actions of the actors.
2. Material resources: the constructivist approach affirms, that the structure is constituted by something more than the material capacities.
3. Social practices: through them, the identity of the actors is generated. Therefore, the agents play their role, since they are the ones that reproduce or alter the system (domestic or international) through their actions; however, their practices must be standardized by the rules, provided by the structure; this is known as normativity.


Within this article there are two main structures, the first being the French State and the second the EU. The French State is considered a structure, since States are the main units of analysis in the Constructivism; on the other hand, the EU has elements of a structure since it is constituted by nation-states and among them they also shared knowledge, which is reflected in its objective "to reconcile the European peoples in order to prevent any type of conflict in the continent" this demonstrates that they are unify by a resource that is more than material.

Also, it can be argued that there is a structure within a structure: the French State within the EU, where both have rules that regulate the social practices of agents, and at the same time create part of their identity. The agent in common, is the Roma. However, an agent that belongs only to the Union is the European Network. The following diagram shows this relationship:




On the other hand, we should allude again to the interrelation between the state and the structure, since one is not without the other. In this way, as a member of the EU, France has adopted regulations by adjusting its policies to those of the EU and, conversely, the EU has had to adopt the characteristics of all its members in order to have one in common.

The actors reproduce or alter the system (national or international) through their habitual actions; in this sense, the structures are dependent for their reproduction of the practice (Hopf, Santa Cruz, 2009). The regularized practices are the link between agents and structure, since they act as a mechanism of mutual reproduction (Santa Cruz, 2009). This will be reflected in the following diagram:



The constructivist approach is complemented by the constitutive theories, which explain that certain recognized actors, have the attribution of performing practices that are denied to others; those practices reproduce the structure. The Roma are recognized by the EU and the particular body of change the European Network and as such, their practices affect the structure and therefore the agents that compose it (the states). However, they also influence in the identity of the structure; This piece is also a change at the structural level because a change in the identity of internal agents can alter the international norms; this is confirmed with the creation of the European Network, represented below with the following diagram

Diagram # 5



Through the power of ideas, culture and language; the Roma have changed the structures in which they interact with. Because of this, certain bodies have been formed; these organisms empower and recognize the Roma as social actors subject to international, European and inter-European politics. By analyzing the origin of the Roma, it is possible to perceive the continuous change of perception that this group has faced through the migratory policies; also, it is possible to see the effects that these policies have originated towards them.

2.- Conceptual Foundations on the Roma and Their Relationship With Public Policies.

The origin of the Roma is formed based on legends and oral stories that have been transmitted from generation to generation. These stories contain characteristics and customs that continue to be attributed to them today, such as nomadism, the flamenco dance, their being festive and in some cases the animal raising. In order to understand their origin, it was pertinent


to analyse the linguistics. Researchers Grellmann and Clanet affirmed that, within the Roma it is possible to understand their history through their language; Romani. While examining Romani, it is dates their origin dates back more than 1000 years to the north of India.

According to the linguists Grellman and Clanet there were three nomadic groups:

- The Romas, which are part of the history of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. This group emigrated all over the world, and their descendants can be found in North and South America, even in the countries that comprised Yugoslavia.
- Egyptians, Manouches, Hungarians or Synes are a group of descendants of those who settled in the territory that currently occupies Germany, although it is probable that its origin, was in the so-called “Little Egypt”.
- The Kalé, Iberian origin from the Iberian side, territory that currently occupies Spain, Portugal and southern France.

In map 1, Distribution of the three large nomadic groups, there is a better appreciation of its distribution in Europe:

Map#1



The Egyptians are the group that were mainly identified in France. They arrived in Paris, as the testimony in the *Journal d'un bourgeois de 1427* (Diary of a bourgeois of 1427) expresses (ibid., 2009):

[...] twelve penitents arrived in Paris: a duke, a count, and ten men on horseback, were said to be very good Christians; they came from Lower Egypt. They said they had been Christians before; But it had not been long since the Christians themselves had subjugated them, as well as their country; All of them were to convert to Christianity again and those who refused should die.

Those who were baptized could remain as masters, owners of their land ... However, some time after having resumed the Christian faith, the Saracens induced them; They surrendered to the enemies and so they changed their religion, repudiating our Lord.

Own translation from French to English (Ibid., 2009, p.10).

From the previous testimony, it can be deduced that the Egyptians changed successively from religions, and consequently they were kept in the classification of "penitents of religion", and they were subjugated. This testimony confirmed that for more than 6 centuries, the Roma have been assigned stereotypes, and in the same way the group have adopted some as their own.

Another text from the *Journal d'un bourgeois de 1427*, highlights two important points for this analysis: firstly, that their pilgrimage lasted for years, and secondly that since that time, they were considered a "dangerous" group, to which they were not allowed to enter:

They left and spent five years touring the world before arriving in Paris on August 17, 1427, the twelve of whom I have spoken; But on St. John's Day, the common idea was that they would not be allowed to enter Paris, but by judicial and judicial resolution, we let them stay in the Chapel of Saint-Denis.

During their stay in the Chapel, we never saw such a large group of foreigners coming to Paris just to see them [...]

The Egyptians were soon expelled from Paris for the reasons explained below, again in the Journal d'un bourgeois de 1427 (Ibid., 2009):

The penitents were the poorest beings, who have come to France in adulthood.

But despite of their poverty, there were witches in this company who looked at the hands and who predicted the past or the future, they created conflicts in different marriages and homes because they said: your wife deceives you or the woman, your husband deceived you and what was worse: they spoke to creatures by magic, or even spoke to the enemies who lived in hell. They also emptied the belongings of people's bags and put it in their own. It was that, what was said.

Actually, I talked to them three or four times, but I never lost a penny, nor did they look at my hands, but this was said everywhere. The news came to the bishop of Paris, so he brought with him a younger brother named Little Jardoine who, by order of the bishop, made a beautiful sermon and excommunicated all those who practiced the above, also excommunicated those who believed and those who showed her hands. In the end, they had to leave; Left on the day of Notre-Dame, in September towards Pontoise.

Evidently due to these displacements, the great group that emigrated from India, took and mixed elements along the way; however, what persisted was the historical memory of the language around 1000 years, which allows exploring its route.

In the present article, the Roma are considered an ethnic minority. This concept is understood as, a human collective, that counts on a union of certain special ties, in the bosom of a greater group. In addition, a minority will generally find themselves physically and socially isolated from the community where they are settled, which is why situations of discrimination may arise. As a matter of fact, in June 2007, an event occurred that allowed the Roma to develop certain strategies of inclusion, incorporation and participation in the European community, with the creation of the European Network (Mentioned above).

In short, the Roma continue to preserve certain cultural aspects, while at the same time (through certain organisms) they have an active participation and adoption of different societies.

2.1 The Ethnic Group of the Roma as Subjects of Migratory Policies.

In order to understand why the Roma are actors (subjects) that require migratory policies, it is necessary to analyze how French citizenship can be acquired. French citizenship is linked to the possession of French nationality, according to the French Legal and Administrative Information Office. French nationality is acquired by several ways:

- For the right of blood or *ius sanguinis*: which specifies that every child who has a French parent is French consequently (Vie Publique.fr., 2014).
- By right of land *ius solis*: a child born in France from a foreign is French by birth
- By the naturalization procedure: a foreigner of legal age, who has resided on French soil for at least five years may apply for naturalization (ibid., 2014).

It should be mentioned that the French State must comply certain legislation; one of them is the recognition of European citizens. The first elements of European citizenship were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on November 1st, 1993, which was complemented by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force in December 2009 (Ibid., 2014).

Therefore, any person holding the nationality of a Member State of the EU is automatically considered as a European citizen. The European citizenship complements, but does not replace, the national citizenship. In fact, France claims that this is a superimposed citizenship.

The attributes of the European citizenship, according to the norms are:

- Freedom of movement, residence, study and work in the member countries of the EU.

- The right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State where the election is held.
- The right to diplomatic protection: in countries where a Member State of the Union is not represented, its citizens can benefit from the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of another EU Member State, present in its territory in the same than the nationals of that State.
- The right to complain to the European Ombudsman, who is responsible for settling disputes between European citizens and the European institutions.
- The right to write to any EU institution and receive a response
- The right of citizens' initiative: as of April 1st, 2012, a minimum of one million citizens of at least one quarter of the EU Member States is allowed to call on the European Commission to adopt a text which they consider necessary.

Under this logic, the Roma are citizens of the European Union, and for this reason they are subjects of migratory policies. Nevertheless, they are still culturally foreign, which makes them subjects of discrimination. In other words, the Roma have been perceived by what they are not, as nomads, even when they have begun to settle. The origin of this situation is complex and hard to understand, but it helps to identify them as a group. In addition, it seems that their situation in 2013 did not change much, and as a consequence of this characteristic they are still discriminated.

It is proposed that, because of their lifestyles that Roma continued to be expelled; as well, they also think of themselves in opposition of others, which produces their ethnic identity. This is a historic opposition, that brings political and economic consequences between a minority, a majority, and the State where they reside. Consequently, a situation of ethnic marginalization can arise, if the majority prevents the entry of the minority into the system (San Román, Trigueros, 1995)

This situation has been constant in the Roma's history. Thus, in the development of this article, it can be perceived that the representation on the Roma, is supported by the Constructivist

theory; this drives the actions by the French State. However, this is reflected in the migration policies of France, which will be analyzed in the following section.

3. Analysis of the Migration Policies and Political Actions of France, and Their Relationship with the Roma Ethnic Minority

The analysis of what type of Migratory Policies were applied to the Roma in France, is explained in the following chart. This examination was created with the support of the six migratory waves to France listed by CITÉ, with the typology of migration policies worked by Mármora,

<u>Period</u>	<u>Type of Policy</u>	<u>Fact / Policy Implemented</u>
<p><i>XV Period 1401- 1500</i> <i>XVI Period 1501-1600</i></p>	Persecution period (exclusion).	First records of Romas.
<p><i>First period</i> <i>1820-1914</i></p>	<p>Policies of regularization: these policies are aimed at influencing the established migratory flows; they revolve around two interests and rights: those of the State and the migrants (Mármora, 2002). On one hand, France allowed the entry of migrants, but in a regulated way; specifically, to the so-called "nomads" in reference to the Romas.</p>	<p>Ius solis / Beautiful epoch</p> <p>Establishment of: 1912 Policy for the circulation of nomadic people, identified with the <i>Carnet anthropometrique</i>.</p>
<p><i>Second period</i> <i>1914-1918</i></p>	<p>Contextual policies: They are shaped as an institutional response to the migratory phenomenon. In addition, this policy needs to answer the following question: what migratory group does the society needs? And why is it</p>	<p>First World War / called to the ex-colonies.</p> <p>1917 protection measures / residence permits.</p> <p>Controlled Will.</p>

	<p>required? (Ibid., 2002).</p> <p>The World War I, generated pressure to fight and to generate labor; this is the reason why France decided to call its ex- colonies. France needs migrants for long term, and this country provided residence permits, to the majority of migrants.</p> <p>However, this alluded to a controlled will, which gives rise to the establishment of control policies.</p> <p>Control policies: They are defined as control actions that are based on a strict border control and / or residence (Ibid., 2002).</p>	
<p><i>Third period</i></p> <p><i>1919-1939</i></p>	<p>The third period is contrasting in France; on one hand, the migrants located in French territory rebuild the country, but on the other hand the government tries to protect the national workforce. As a consequence, new forms of racism emerge, specifically when obtaining an employment.</p>	<p>Reconstruction of France</p> <p>Period between wars / contradiction between naturalization of foreigners and restrictive policies.</p>

	<p>At the same time, the eve of the World War II causes a refugee wave</p> <p>1919-1924 Contextual policies.</p> <p>1919-1924 Incorporation policies: their main objective is the active participation of migrants in the social, cultural, political and economic area of the immigration country (Ibid., 2002).</p> <p>1924-1939 Immigration restriction policies: They are based on the impediment of entry, to a determined territory. In addition, they are implemented through different actions, such as the punishment of the unauthorized migrant or the expulsion of undocumented immigrants (Ibid., 2002)</p> <p>These types of policies reveal contradictions</p>	<p>1924 Private Sector is a platform to obtain a migratory document.</p> <p>Establishment of the 1932 law, named: "Law for the protection of National labour" / wave of racism.</p> <p>Beginning of the Second World War / refugees arrive.</p>
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	<p>between the right of states (to determine who enters, who leaves or who stays in their territory), and the right of individuals. Similarly, these policies will appear as the first response that states articulate when viewing immigration as a problem (Ibid., 2002).</p> <p>France faces a paradox; it is the beginning of the Second World War, as the refugees begin to arrive</p> <p>(1939) Immigration policy and regulations (refugees): Specifically, with refugee, even though until 1951 the refugee status was defined.</p>	
<p><i>Fourth period</i></p> <p><i>1939-1945</i></p>	<p>1936-1939 Constitutive norms: their objective is to train the actors, in this case they establish the gypsies as part of the participants, even they are</p>	<p>Nazi debate on the Roma question / they are categorized as "degenerate" or "pure" Romas.</p> <p>1936 creation of the Research Institute on racial hygiene.</p>

	<p>designated an own institute to corroborate who is gypsy pure or not pure. In addition, they are assigned and identified with a form of behavior, nomadism.</p> <p>1940-1944 Migration control policy: this policy exists because a strict border control and / or residence is generated during this period.</p> <p>1941-1945 Migration policy (refugees): the rights of migrants are defined and institutionalized in two lines: an operational, protection and assistance to migratory movement, and another, the search for an international consensus on rights of the migrant worker with respect to refugee status (Ibid., 2002).</p>	<p>1938 Decree: The fight against the “gypsy plague”.</p> <p>1940 Vichy policy / the north is the "French State" where documentation was required.</p> <p>1940 The Roma are only considered as nomads, and they are prohibited in the territory by the law of 1912 (carnet).</p> <p>The Geneva Convention is signed; in 1951, the refugee status is defined.</p>
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<p><i>Fifth period</i></p> <p><i>1945-1974</i></p>	<p>1945-1957 Regulatory Immigration policies (family reunification): this is a consequence of the previous stages. Indeed, in the 1970s, the family reunification is a constant movement; the families became vehicles for integration (Ibid., 2002).</p> <p>1969-1971 Immigration control policies: France had an accommodation crisis, resulting in an immigration policy control. In addition, the concept to define the Roma changes; from being</p>	<p>France of the thirty glorious Control or open borders?</p> <p>Creation of the National Immigration Office.</p> <p>1956 regularization of documents with an employment contract</p> <p>1957 The Coal and Steel community is founded.</p> <p>1960s, wave of racism / creation of OFPRA -French institution- (office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons)</p> <p>Accommodation Crisis.</p> <p>The 1969 Law, distinguishes three groups of people that circulate in France. The Roma community is no longer considered “nomads”, but people "without fixed address", they are granted a title of circulation</p>

<p>"nomads" they become people "without fixed address", although it is less pejorative they are still being assigned a characteristic.</p>	<p><i>titre de circulation</i>. France seeks a progressive sedentarization.</p>
<p>France seek to change Roma “customs” in order to make them sedentary.</p>	<p>1970 Creation of "parking lots" / Inclusion of Roma community within the territory</p>
<p>France decides for greater border control and / or residence. Nevertheless, it tries to realize a passive integration of the Romas through territory policies, and national construction policies.</p>	<p>« Territory policy »</p>
<p>The passive integration is the introduction of modalities, as well as customs, of a certain group that because of their number, they modify the environment in which they are settled (ibid., 2002)</p>	<p>Term « <i>gens du voyage</i> » (<i>Travellers</i>)</p>
<p>1969-1971 Policies of passive integration combined with territory policies: the territory</p>	

	<p>policies, seek to integrate the Roma in a gradual way, but without leaving aside their sense of national belonging.</p> <p>1969-1971 Policies of passive integration linked with national construction policies: In some cases, the construction of national policies, violated the basic civil and political rights of the people (Kymlicka, 2001).</p> <p>There are different forms of national construction of the State:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colonization policies / internal migration. • The boundaries and powers of internal political subunits. • Official language policy. (Ibid., 2001) 	<p>1971 Gypsy World Congress</p> <p>1974 Economic crisis that originates a Policy of "closure".</p>
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	1974. Closing Policy	
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<p><i>Sixth period</i></p> <p>1974-2006</p>	<p>1974-1981 Contextual and incorporation policies through regularization and reunification: during the first seven years of this period, France opted for contextual policies, trying to respond to migratory pressure, marked by migrant descendants and their family reunification; it was also a response to the increase of undocumented migrants.</p> <p>1980-1985 Area of regularization of migratory flows; processes of free movement of persons: France's actions were also affected by its incorporation into the European Union (EU); the EU establishes a set of rules that affect, directly or indirectly the status of the migrants within the integration area; this was considered a regularization of migratory flows in processes of free movement of people.</p> <p>Within the Schengen Agreement, there are rules</p>	<p>1974 "Return aid", there was limited response 1980 Two objectives, reduce flows and integrate immigrants. 1981 the law of 1932 is suspended and a letter of residence is granted for 10 years.</p> <p>1981 Questiaux law / family reunification 1983 Second generation of migrants.</p> <p>1986 visas are generalized 1985 Schengen Agreement</p>
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related to the free movement of persons in participating territories, which implies that France must respect those rules. However, this does not prevent the development of internal policies.

1990 Roma insertion through policies of assimilation within a socio-cultural insertion program.

In the insertion policies, there are several stages proposed by Park and Burgess: (Park; Marmora, 2002).

- Contact; which is generally peaceful, and exploratory. The contact with the Romas has existed for more than six centuries.
- Competition, determined by presumably scarce of jobs and resources. The first four periods in the analysis were immersed in this stage.

1990 Law Besson + than 5000 habitants are capable of building a parking lot.
March 1992 Creation of the National Consultative Commission for Traveling Persons.

- Conflict, resulting from competition, generating discrimination, struggles and disorders. Like the previous stage, in the first four periods, this situation was perceived; in which the Romas were classified as nomads.

- Accommodation, usually based on a group within their occupations. This stage was mainly seen in the fifth period, where France established a territory policy, but at the same time a closure policy.

- Assimilation consisting of a progressive mixture of groups, becoming invisible and ethnically distinct. This point is in the present period.

The reflection of the assimilation is clear during the Besson policy; in there, the Roma were granted a parking lot. A mixture between Roma groups begins to exist. There are divers combinations of assimilation in different areas of

the receiving society (J. Martin, Marmora, 2002)

The Roma are at an insertion stage, which is initially located within the participation-marginality dichotomy. The participation of this group is passive, since the Roma obey and accept the French policies; this can lead to Integration and assimilation.

On the other hand, marginality is a non-participation, where there is a lack of contacts.

To sum up, during 1990, the Roma started an insertion, through a policy of assimilation built on a socio-cultural insertion program.

This program seeks to be included in areas where spaces that specifically address the social (education, health, housing) or political sphere are

shared. Also, an insertion is admitted in which the immigrant maintains and practices its own customs and habits. However, it is also possible that within these programs, there is an attempt to erase the group culture (Mármora, 2002) (which also refers to national construction policies).

1993-1995 Restrictive and migratory control policy: they have as objective, the impediment or the entry to a determined territory; However, this is a contradictory fact in France, since in 1990, this country implemented passive integration policies.

1993-1995 Explicit policy: This is defined when an immigration policy is formalized in terms of its objectives and actions, through an official

1993 Policy of zero immigration / contradiction with the Amsterdam Treaty.

August 1995 A Serbian Roma refugee is killed.

	<p>discourse or relevant legislation.</p> <p>In 1995 the death of a Serbian Roma refugee in French territory, triggered several protests in France, which can be analyzed as a way to make evident that the Roma had taken over the integration policies, which were contradicted with that event.</p> <p>2000- 2006 Insertion policies: The Roma are again in the insertion stage. They obey and accept policies which can lead to integration and assimilation; this is verified with the policies of this stage.</p> <p>2000- 2006 Control and restrictive policies: new events occur in the year 2000. On one hand, the second Law Besson was established, which mentions the creation of territory granted to the Rom but five months later, more than 100 Roma were evacuated from France.</p>	<p>July 2000 Second Law Besson was released, urbanization plan</p> <p>December 2000 Val-de-Marne was evacuated,163 Roma were settled Nicolas Sarkozy is Ministry of the Interior</p> <p>March 2003. Law of internal security. A vehicle can be confiscated.</p> <p>November 2003. Law 2003-1119 or Sarkozy I, of the immigration control, and the stay of foreigners in France.</p> <p>July 2004 Law of the expulsion of persons enjoying protection</p> <p>December 2005 Finance Law of 2006 imposes a miniature tax on mobile homes 2006 Sarkozy Act II Concerning immigration and integration.</p>
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Thus, three years later, there is a greater immigration control with strict border control and / or residence with the laws on internal security; with the laws Sarkozy I, on the expulsion of people who enjoyed protection, and Law Sarkozy II Concerning immigration and integration

One of the consequences of the control policies may lead to the expulsion of undocumented immigrants. Their development is based on the principle of sovereignty, expressed as control, in response to the migratory problem (Ibid., 2002).

The Timeline allows us to understand the reaction of France against the Roma ethnic minority over time. It is also evident that this country has been very aware of the existence of this group and have established policies directed towards them; these original regulations shaped how the Roma participated in France.

While doing the analysis in the chart, the existence of previous concepts (such as the concept of nomadism) generalized the Roma time and time again. This contributed to fostering discrimination, which is understood as: any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based on ethnic or national origin, gender, or any other trait that prevents or nullifies the rights of the people who belong to a group that possesses any of these features (Gutierrez, 2005 and Salazar, 2005).

However, stereotypes assigned to the Roma are born from discourse, since the language produced undervaluation, rejection and exclusion (Ibid., 2005). The type of discursiveness exercised by the French State generates discrimination towards the Roma culturally, as can be seen from the analysis of the names given to policies such as: "movement of nomads", "protection of the national workforce", "fight against the plague Gypsy" and "return aid. This implies that from the discursivity, a prejudice is created inciting discriminatory practices within the French society.

In other words, these discriminatory practices establish power relations in which a particular feature of identity, is used as a symbolic justification for submission and marginalization. As well, discrimination can trigger situations such as isolation, persecution and moral and / or physical lynching, which may even reach the limit of annihilation (Ibid., 2005).

However, in addition to discrimination through discursive practices, there is also the process of industrialization and urbanization that worsened the Roma's marginalization as they occupy the lowest scales (Trigueros, 1995).

Field work, carried out by the anthropologist San Roman, defines the indicators, and how the Roma community is classified:

- Poverty in housing
- The isolation of the neighborhood

- The abundance of archaic elements in the house, such as the use of firewood for cooking or the existence of a stable.
- The existence of kinship as the structural basis of community life.
- The existence of ethnic tensions.
- The supremacy of marginal jobs to the "payo" labor system
- Absence of citizen participation
- The absence by associative entities

Through these indicators, three situations have surfaced regarding this ethnic group:

1. They have remained marginalized, in remote areas, but have safeguarded their identity, this situation is the most common.
2. When the society eliminates some of the elements considered as their own, such as large families; better relationships are created with the neighborhood where they are settled, but they become “less” Roma.
3. Sometimes the Roma try to relate to a non-Roma society to defend their culture. However, when this situation arises they become “distinct”

Conclusion

Thus, it is concluded that the marginalization of the Roma is an act of discrimination, that arises discursively from the migratory public policies of France.

In conducting this investigation, we noticed how France has perceived Roma migration and how this country adapted its migration policy towards the Roma. The impression of the migration flow, changes accordingly with the historical events and of the social actors that are

present. Below there is a table based on the facts and the policies of each period, which sums up the main features of the French state migration policy regarding the Roma:

Period	Historical Events	Action and Perception
<i>C.XV 1401- 1500</i> <i>C.XVI 1501-1600</i>	Monarchy of Enrique IV and Luis X II.	Persecution, expulsion. Threat and territorial invasion.
<i>First period</i> <i>1820-1914</i>	<i>Industrial Revolution.</i>	Regulation. Need.
<i>Second period</i> <i>1914-1918</i>	<i>World War I.</i>	Controlled will. Need but controlled.
<i>Third period</i> <i>1919-1939</i>	<i>Post-war reconstruction and depression of the 30's</i>	Reconstruction of France. Progress and Threat
<i>Fourth period</i> <i>1939-1945</i>	<i>World War II.</i>	Romas persecuted. Cultural destruction
<i>Fifth period</i> <i>1945-1974</i>	<i>Creation of the ECSC community</i>	Control borders or free passage? No alternative for inclusion
<i>Sixth period</i> <i>1974-2006</i>	<i>Schengen agreements (Treaty of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Niza).</i>	Expulsions. Threat
<i>1974-2013</i>	<i>Entry of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU (countries with the highest number of European Romas)</i>	Evacuation of Roma's camps. A struggle against racism is restored to this group

	<i>Period of Nicolas Sarkozy and start of François Hollande.</i>	
		Threat

From the table above, it is evident that most migration periods the Roma were perceived as a threat, and therefore there were problems in legislating and integrating this group. This is where the hermeneutics of the Constructivist Theory was applied, which is based on the interpretation. The policies that the French government laid out through different time periods was a good representation of the cultural perception of the Roma people. In particular, the names given in the migration policies that relate to the Romas, reveal the discrimination: "movement of nomads", "protection of the national labor act," "fight against the Gypsy plague" and "return assistance".

The cultural distaste and rejection of the Roma people in France is brought to life by the names of the migration policies that were put in place by the government. This racially charged viewpoint of the Roma people has had a reciprocal effect. It has also shaped the Roma culture, and perpetuated their exclusion.

While delving deeper into the French laws regarding the Romani peoples, we see that they are constitutive, meaning that ever since the expulsions from the fifteenth century, the label of nomad was given to the Roma, therefore they were built based on this concept and for this reason they are still considered to be culturally foreign. Most cases the discrimination were likely derived from this notion of separatism.

As a consequence, the central hypothesis is corroborated because in effect; the French State bases its Roma immigration policies in prejudices that originate from the discrimination against them. In addition, these policies, entail increasing bureaucracy that hinder the flow of information and acceptance of the Roma, therefore in some cases the consequence is deportation. This also reinforces the cultural exclusion of the Roma people within the French society.

The role played by the EU towards France and the Roma has changed the European panorama in relation to this group. The conflicts and constraints between domestic laws and international agreements, help to build the particular organism of change *The European Network*

Certainly the EU creates pressure for respect of the Roma's rights, however, France has utilized non-standard practices expelling Roma from its territory, violating regulation No. 562/2006 of 15 March 2006, which establishes a Community Code of the movement of persons across borders (Schengen borders Code, freedom of movement) and the law of November 26, 2003, called law No. 2003-1119 also called Sarkozy I, in particular its Article 49, which states that the person that has a deportation order, cannot immediately leave the French territory.

The expulsions of Roma in this research, are due to the belief that they are still nomads. This stigma also contributes to the Roma's perception of themselves in opposition to others, resulting in part of their separate ethnic identity. This is part of a history of opposition as political and economic consequences in between a minority people and a majority that lives in a State. In this scenario, an ethnic marginalization can appear if the majority prevents the entry of the minority into the system.

The current situation of Roma against immigration policies in France and the causes of the expulsion of this group, occurs because of the prejudice that is historically rooted and is represented in the immigration policies of France.

In addition, the deportations of Roma peaked during the period of the ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy, who belonged to the political party UMP (L'Union pour un mouvement populaire²¹) a French political party of the right, where the link between his discourse and practice remained consistent during his tenure; as even stricter laws were made. This situation was not a surprise but it needed attention since the above policies were violated.

In light of these facts, and with the arrival of François Hollande, member of the Socialist Party (PS²²) classified as left-wing, we could thought to have decreased Roma expulsions but this was not the case. By contrast, in the current media they are continually revealing new deportation cases including the case of the student Leonarda Dibrani, when in October 2013 was

²¹ The union for a popular movement

²² Parti socialiste

taken from a school bus by the French police (in Paris) to be deported and sent to her parents and siblings to their country of origin; Kosovo where she had never lived and whose language is unknown to her. This brief example illuminates that prejudices can still be politically perpetuated and are spread in a unified manner by the French society in this case. However, it is necessary to go deeper and continue research various aspects of the social and cultural characteristics of the Roma, to complement this study.

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