@article {35650,
	title = {The optimal reinsurance strategy with price competitionbetween two reinsurers},
	journal = {Scandinavian Actuarial Journal},
	year = {Accepted},
	month = {2024},
	abstract = {We study optimal reinsurance for an insurer and two reinsurers in the market through stochastic game theory. The relationship between the insurer and reinsurers is described by a Stackelberg model, where reinsurers, as market leaders, set prices for reinsurance treaties, and the insurer, as a price taker, determines reinsurance demand. Furthermore, we employ a Nash game to model the price competition between the two reinsurers who adopt different premium principles: the variance premium principle and the expected value premium principle. Both the insurer and reinsurers aim to maximize their respective mean-variance cost functions, leading to a time inconsistency control problem. This issue is resolved using a corresponding extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the game-theoretic framework. We find that the insurer will adopt propositional and excess-of-loss reinsurance strategies with two reinsurers, respectively. Moreover, under an exponential claim size distribution, there exists a unique equilibrium reinsurance premium strategy. Our numerical analysis illuminates the effects of claim size, risk aversion, and the interest rates of the insurer and reinsurers on the equilibrium reinsurance and premium strategies, enhancing the understanding of competition in the reinsurance market.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/03461238.2024.2389181},
	author = {Liyuan Lin and Fangda Liu and Jingzhen Liu and Luyang Yu}
}
