@article {17766,
	title = {Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?},
	journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
	volume = {95},
	number = {May},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {153-177},
	abstract = {Solar geoengineering\&nbsp;has received increasing attention as an\&nbsp;option\&nbsp;to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment\&nbsp;costs\&nbsp;may allow the country with the strongest\&nbsp;incentive\&nbsp;for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial\&nbsp;externality\&nbsp;on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of\&nbsp;counter-geoengineering\&nbsp;technologies\&nbsp;capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favour of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with\&nbsp;asymmetric\&nbsp;preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the\&nbsp;strategic interactionsurrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or\&nbsp;cooperative\&nbsp;deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069618305035},
	author = {Daniel Heyen and Joshua Horton and Juan Moreno-Cruz}
}
