@article {976,
	title = {Complacency and giving up across repeated tournaments: Evidence from the field},
	journal = {Journal of Management Accounting Research},
	volume = {25},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {143-168},
	abstract = {<p>Tournament incentive schemes involve individuals competing against each other for a single or limited number of rewards (e.g., promotion, bonus, pay raise). Although research shows tournament schemes can have positive effects on performance, there is also evidence of dysfunctional intra-tournament behavior by top performers (complacency) and weak performers (giving up). However, few studies have examined behavior in organizational settings, not uncommon in practice, where tournaments are conducted on a repeated basis. We predict that complacency and giving up will generalize to settings where individuals repeatedly compete in successive short-duration tournaments. We test our predictions using archival data from a reservation center of a major hotel chain that employs repeated four-week tournaments where performance does not carryover from one competition to the next. Results show top performers quickly become complacent in response to success in early tournaments. The lowest-performing losers in early tournaments eventually appear to give up, but additional analysis indicates they only do so after unsuccessfully changing task strategy. Our results contribute to a better understanding of individual behavior in settings where individuals\&nbsp;repeatedly compete against largely the same group of employees. Our evidence also suggests that tournaments are less\&nbsp;effective at sustaining the motivation of the most capable performers and other approaches may be necessary.</p>},
	author = {Leslie Berger and Kenneth Klassen and Theresa Libby and Alan Webb}
}
