<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Travis Chow</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kenneth Klassen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Yanju Liu</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Targets&amp;rsquo; tax shelter participation and takeover premiums</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contemporary Accounting Research</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">34</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1440-1472</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This paper examines the effect of targets’ participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums&amp;nbsp;in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel data set in which targets disclose that they have&amp;nbsp;not participated in tax shelters, we find that targets that make this statement in their merger&amp;nbsp;filings are associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average. These findings&amp;nbsp;suggest that acquirers are concerned about the potential future liabilities when targets have&amp;nbsp;engaged in tax sheltering. Consistent with this interpretation, the results also indicate that the&amp;nbsp;positive association between targets’ nonsheltering disclosure and acquisition premiums is&amp;nbsp;stronger for less tax-aggressive acquirers. This paper demonstrates the importance of targets’&amp;nbsp;aggressive tax positions in the determination of premiums offered to targets’ shareholders.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue></record></records></xml>