<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kenneth Klassen</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Petro Lisowsky</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Devan Mescall</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The role of auditors, non-auditors, and internal tax departments in corporate tax aggressiveness</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Accounting Review</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">91</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">179-205</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Using confidential data from the Internal Revenue Service on who signs a corporation’s tax return, we&amp;nbsp;investigate whether the party primarily responsible for the tax compliance function of the firm—the auditor, an&amp;nbsp;external non-auditor, or the internal tax department—is related to the corporation’s tax aggressiveness. We report&amp;nbsp;three key findings: (1) firms preparing their own tax returns or hiring a non-auditor claim more aggressive tax&amp;nbsp;positions than firms using their auditor as the tax preparer; (2) auditor-provided tax services are related to tax&amp;nbsp;aggressiveness even after considering tax preparer identity, which supports and extends prior research using tax&amp;nbsp;fees as a proxy for tax planning; and (3) Big 4 tax preparers, in particular, are linked to less tax aggressiveness when&amp;nbsp;they are the auditor than when they are not the auditor. Our findings help policymakers and researchers better&amp;nbsp;understand an important feature of tax compliance intermediaries; particularly, how the dual role via audits is related&amp;nbsp;to observable corporate tax outcomes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>