



Canadian Network for Defence  
and Security Analysis

# FORESIGHT & ANALYSIS

## In Canadian Defence and Security Policy

**REPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE**

Momani, Bessma (Editor)



February 2019



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## EDITOR

### Bessma Momani

Bessma Momani is Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. She is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation and a 2015 fellow of The Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. She is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Stimson Center and a Fulbright Scholar.

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## CONTRIBUTORS

### Amarnath Amarasingam

Amarnath Amarasingam is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, and a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Waterloo where he codirects a study of Western foreign fighters. He is the Team Leader of the Cybersecurity, Capabilities, and Terrorism research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

### David Black

David Black is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University. He has published widely on human security and development in Canadian international policy particularly in Africa, and on post-apartheid South Africa in Africa. He is the Team Leader of the Peace Operations and the United Nations research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

### Brian Bow

Brian Bow is Director of the Centre for the Study of Security and Development and a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University. Dr. Bow's expertise centres on Canada-U.S. relations and Canadian foreign policy. He is the Team Leader of the Canada-US Relations, NATO, and NORAD research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

### Maya Eichler

Maya Eichler is Canada Research Chair in Social Innovation and Community Engagement and Assistant Professor in Political and Canadian Studies and Women's Studies at MSVU. She was a 2013-2014 Lillian Robinson Scholar at the Simone de Beauvoir Institute at Concordia University. She is the Team Leader of the Gender and Diversity in the CAF research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

### Thomas Juneau

Thomas Juneau is Assistant Professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada's Department of National Defence. He is the Team Leader of the Africa and the Middle East research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

### Alexander Lanoszka

Dr. Alexander Lanoszka is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. He sits on the editorial board of the journal Contemporary Security Policy and is an Honorary Fellow at City University of London. He is the Team Leader of the Canada and Future Super-Powers: China, Russia, and the Arctic research cluster for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was written as a deliverable for the Canadian Network for Defence and Security Analysis, a network prototype established through Canada's Department of National Defence Targeted Engagement Grant. The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Cecily Pantin, Directorate of Strategic Coordination and Outreach for the Defence Engagement Program, for her support and guidance on this project. And special thanks to Matthew Markudis for his assistance in the compilation of this report, as well as providing the technical illustrations.

The authors would like to thank the following organizations for their collaboration on this project: The Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA), Centre for the Study of Security & Development (CSSD), Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS), Women in International Security Canada (WIIS-Canada), OpenCanada.org, and the Waterloo Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute.




- Cyberspace and the growing trend of Hybrid Warfare is an additional area that the DND should be immersed in. Not only is it essential for Canada to develop cyber defences that can respond to cyber threats, but digital literacy amongst DND and CAF personnel must be improved to protect against lapses in security throughout online operating spaces.

To combat contemporary defence and security needs, the DND and CAF must be able to recruit a diverse, healthy, and resilient personnel. Therefore, the CAF must develop a deeper conceptualization of diversity in their recruitment practices that crosses military and civilian spheres and generates qualitative rather than quantitative outcomes. To do this, the traditionally male-dominated culture of the military must be reformed in a way that addresses deep-rooted factors that have persistently resulted in the harassment of woman officers and in the hindrance of the participation of women in the CAF. Resources must be allocated not only on a material basis (e.g. adapting uniforms for women), but in terms of opening and monitoring channels of communication to enable voices of minorities promoting change to be heard.

## SURVEY RESULTS

We surveyed our CNDSA members asking them to evaluate the severity of future threats to Canada. A majority of members believe that China's rising power and our bilateral economic relations under the Trump Administration to both be a minor threat. Violent extremism constitutes a minor threat to Canada, primarily from 'lone wolf' offenders. While ISIS and jihadists are typically viewed to be the most prominent threat, the network believes far-right extremism is a much greater threat to Canada, as public perceptions of security have becoming increasingly polarized. State-sponsored cyber attacks are viewed to be a major threat to Canada by CNDSA, particularly from China and Russia. Canada is vulnerable to attacks on its critical infrastructure and its democratic system. A majority of network members believe that Russia represents a threat to the NATO alliance that is hostile militarily to NATO allies and Western democratic institutions.

**Figure 1: Global Threat Assessment Survey Results**




# 1. SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER

Government officials, academics, and pundits speak of great power politics once again dominating international politics and affecting the global balance of power. After the end of the Cold War, US pre-eminence is being challenged by rising powers in emerging market economies and those seeking to create a multipolar order. While there are many rising powers like India, Turkey, Brazil, and others who are taking on increased global roles in regional affairs, CNDSA members focused discussions on China and Russia. How might Canada manage its relationships with China, Russia and the United States—particularly when the US has recently identified China and Russia as its main competitors in major policy documents?

**CNDSA experts estimate that many opportunities for cooperation do exist and that much of the problems attending Canada's relations with those countries are largely managerial rather than existential.**

While Canada will likely manage these rising powers that challenge the existing balance of power, CNDSA members identified several issues that deserve greater geostrategic attention, namely: return of deterrence, the Trump effect, and Arctic cooperation.

**Figure 2: Spheres of Conflict and Coordination**



<sup>1</sup> Research provided by the *Canada and Future Superpowers: China, Russia, and the Arctic* research cluster, and written by team leader Alexander Lanoszka.

## 1a. Return of Deterrence<sup>1</sup>

To enhance Canadian security, CNDSA experts believe Canada should concentrate on confidence-building measures with respect to China, and burden-sharing measures within NATO to deter Russian aggression in northeastern Europe. To build confidence with China, stronger efforts toward promoting arms control measures and added transparency of each country's military exercises could be helpful. Nevertheless, one major issue of concern with regard to China is the future of Taiwan (discussed further in Future Flashpoints).

As for deterring Russia, burden-sharing within NATO will be essential. As a Framework Nation, Canada can play valuable leadership roles and its increase defence expenditures. **Increased defence spending should focus on purchasing key capabilities that could be useful in the Baltic region and the North Atlantic.** These capabilities include electronic warfare tools, logistics, and naval missile defenses; all to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces have greater confidence in accessing and moving within potentially hostile theatres of operations.

CNDSA researchers believe that tensions with China and Russia will persist in the cybersecurity domain, hence the need for deterrence through the protection of computer systems from data theft, disruption and misdirection will be essential. Similarly, Canada's ability to conduct democratic elections, to enact laws, and to enforce legislation free from direct political interference will be at risk of continued cyberattacks that are most likely state sponsored by China and/or Russia. Canada does have a shared international interest in curbing cybercrimes and illegal data flows in and out of national borders that could lead to global cooperation with allies. Nevertheless, **CNDSA specialists are concerned about the activities of so-called "patriotic hackers"** who, with or without state support, carry out disruptive operations aimed at pilfering Canadian citizens' or companies' confidential data. Deterring these cyberattacks through added defence is key.

## Areas of Cybersecurity Deterrence could include:

- Allocating resources to research and development aimed at reducing Canada's dependence on foreign technologies.
- Work with Canadian firms to boost cyber defenses and develop capabilities in artificial intelligence.
- Develop a strategy for quantum computing, given its promise to render existing encryption codes obsolete.

Although Canada may foster national cyber security champions, it should also work with NATO research and development so as not to over-rely on the United States. Finally, CNDSA experts believe Canada should contribute to efforts that counter Russia's disinformation campaigns on social media and possible election meddling.

### **1b. *The Trump Effect***<sup>2</sup>

The Canada-US relationship has long been an anchor of certainty in a turbulent world. Fundamental geographic, economic, and other structural realities remain essentially unchanged, but the last few years have raised troubling questions about the political and diplomatic underpinnings of the bilateral relationship. The Trump administration's disdain for international institutions in which Canada is deeply invested, its feuding with

traditional partners and warming up to dictatorships, and its willingness to overturn established trade and investment agreements force us to ask whether the Trump administration is a reliable and like-minded partner for Canada, and how Canada can adapt to the ongoing reorganization of global hierarchies and alliances.

Virtually all of the defence and security challenges facing Canada today involve some kind of deep interdependence with the United States, and cannot possibly be addressed without some kind of close cooperation. This is clearly the case for continental defence and security issues, but also for Canada's involvement with other western allies in general and NATO in particular, and in virtually all contexts for Canada's involvement in overseas defence and security operations. Trump has challenged most US-Canadian ties in his rhetoric, in his policy priorities, and even in the mechanisms by which the bilateral relationship is managed. The pivotal questions for Canadian policy-makers now are: **Which parts of this divergence and disruption are specifically attributable to Trump, and which represent more deeply-rooted and durable shifts in US politics?** This would help us determine what can be done to protect parts of the old relationship that still work and to cope with those that may be broken.

President Trump has tightened his inner circle to a few very loyal White House advisors and keeps the National Security Council and the intelligence services at arm's length. The State Department has faced significant financial and staffing cuts, with budgets slashed and more than half of the top officials driven out. Dozens of key ambassadorships have gone unfilled. While the US military has been promised large budget increases there are still troubling questions about civil-military relations in the US. On the homeland security side, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have pursued aggressive campaigns against undocumented immigrants, while counter-terrorism and law enforcement agencies have been left without clear direction or adequate resources. Canada was quick to try to adapt to this reality, by seeking to find allies within the Trump administration, but it seems that there is no stable footing to be found, and Canadian officials have been forced to work through remaining formal institutions (e.g., NAFTA renegotiation) or "go

<sup>2</sup> Research provided by the *Canada-U.S. Relations, NATO, and NORAD* research cluster, and written by team leader Brian Bow.

around” the White House to engage with other centres of power and US government agencies.

A pivotal question is what to do about the Trump administration’s deep skepticism about the NATO alliance and enthusiastic support for Putin’s Russia. It is important to remember that the United States has been somewhat ambivalent about NATO since the end of the Cold War, and that this, in combination with Europe’s consolidation as a global actor with a common defence and security agenda, puts Canada in an awkward position within the Alliance.

### 1c. Cooperation in the Arctic<sup>3</sup>

Though Russia and China pose threats to Canada in other domains, there are opportunities for Canada to cooperate with each of them in the Arctic. CNDSA Arctic experts see opportunities to cooperate with China and Russia on areas of human security, such as development, human rights, and countering the effects of climate change.

**Some Canadian Indigenous communities have expressed their desire for China's investments in infrastructural projects, but worries abound as to whether Chinese investors understand Canadian regulations and how to interact with Indigenous communities.**

Arctic Indigenous communities have already expressed interest in working with China on a number of issues. Note that these priorities that may not be congruent with either Ottawa or Moscow’s interests, such as carrying out military activities and enhanced autonomy in the Arctic region. Canada also has a shared interest with Russia (and possibly China) to develop a common vision of the North that tackles issues such as protecting Arctic infrastructure and ecosystem. Indeed, Canada’s Arctic policy largely aligns with that of Russia’s inasmuch as both prefer regional governance mechanisms that seek to contain influence by outside actors. Canada could invest in logistical infrastructure and surveillance technologies to monitor activities in the Arctic region. Considering the harsh environment, Canada may need to explore

<sup>3</sup> Research provided by the *Canada and Future Superpowers: China, Russia, and the Arctic* research cluster, and written by team leader Alexander Lanoszka.


technological solutions that would allow it increased drone usage in the North.

CNDSA experts do not expect China to play more than a token military role in the Arctic region since the greater share of China’s interests and priorities lie in other regions. Finally, with the increasing rate of ice melting, northern sea routes could open further prompting a renewed incentive for cooperative mechanisms to manage those seaways. Nevertheless, disagreements might emerge between Canada, NATO aligned Nordic countries, and Russia on those seaways. Some disagreement among CNDSA members exists as to whether Chinese critical infrastructural contracts pose a national security challenge. Certainly, such investments could create debt traps of the sort seen in Sri Lanka with the Hambantota port. Whether Indigenous communities could reach out to China for funding needed infrastructure projects is an issue to watch.

## 2. DEFENCE PARTNERSHIPS<sup>4</sup>

NATO remains a crucial pillar of Canada’s foreign and defence policy, as has been confirmed through its commitments to increased military spending and significant contributions to NATO initiatives in Latvia. Canada’s diplomatic and political relationships with Britain and France have consistently been good predictors for Canada’s participation in overseas military interventions.

**Figure 3: Examples of Recommendations for Increases to NATO Capacity Building**



<sup>4</sup> Research provided by the *Canada-U.S. Relations, NATO, and NORAD* research cluster, and written by team leader Brian Bow.

An issue to watch is how to better understand the sources of Trumpism and Brexit, and their long-term implications for the North Atlantic alliance. The rise of these populist movements may have to inform Canada’s choices about diplomatic priorities, overall military spending, and the inter-operability dimension of ongoing procurement decisions.

**If the primary defence and security challenges for the alliance, from Canada's point of view, are the kinds of "out of area" threats NATO has focused on in the Middle East and North Africa, then the focus should continue to be on training, helicopters, and airlift capacity; if in the Mediterranean, then on naval and littoral capabilities; and if in Eastern Europe, then perhaps on rebuilding Cold War-era capabilities like strike fighters and tanks.**

The United Kingdom leaving the European Union, or Brexit, raises many difficult questions about political currents in Europe that might seriously undermine NATO. Illiberal nationalist movements have taken power in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, and are putting serious pressure on embattled governments throughout Eastern Europe, many of which are being actively undermined by Russia. Canada has always seen NATO not only as an alliance but also as a political organization and will need to redouble its efforts to help strengthen democratic institutions and good governance in member states.

The state of North American strategic defence has traditionally focused on aerospace command. The CNDSA US-Canada group believes it is important to frame this continental agenda in terms of three layers: aerospace, maritime, and cross-border. We examined ways of strengthening bilateral cooperation in better integrating of each layer.

Aerospace defence cooperation reached a post-9/11 equilibrium in the mid-2000s, with the consolidation of USNORTHCOM and new Canadian national commands (CANCOM and then CJOC), the decision to opt out of the US missile defence program, and the indefinite renewal of NORAD. There are some troubling ambiguities in aerospace defence cooperation, but neither Canada nor the US seems interested in disturbing this equilibrium for now. This continues to be an important set of policy concerns, particularly as the technological and diplomatic context evolves for missile defence, and future military and non-military uses of outer space. There are also more

routine issues to be discussed about procuring interceptors and developing satellite surveillance capabilities.

The US Navy started discussing “maritime NORAD” soon after 9/11, and it was a topic for bilateral consultation through the next decade, but so far it is still in a conceptual phase. Moreover, the concept of a maritime NORAD has never been clear. It was an idea to try to create a “shared picture” for domain awareness akin to NORAD in aerospace but not necessarily through a binational command. The concept was something the US Navy also wanted to do on a global scale, not necessarily specific to North America. There has been some progress in building mechanisms, at the national level so far, for acquiring and pooling vessel-tracking and other maritime domain intelligence, but progress is slow and difficult because of the inherent practical difficulties, the number of agencies involved, and the overall lack of political urgency.

**Figure 4: NORAD as a Model or Mechanism in North American Defence & Security**

	MODEL	MECHANISM
AEROSPACE		
MARITIME		
CROSS BORDER		

On cross-border security, there has been some discussion about extending the NORAD model in this issue area. After the initial post-9/11 disruption, there has been an effort—pushed most prominently through the Security and Prosperity Partnership (2005-09) and then the Beyond the Border initiative (2010-15)— to tighten up the border against terrorism, transnational crime, and undocumented immigrants, while streamlining the border for trade and travel. Progress in policy coordination has come through a series of ad hoc technical fixes—e.g., trusted-traveler documents,

shipping pre-clearance programs, entry/exit information-sharing, border infrastructure improvements—rather than any centrally-managed border security initiatives. It might be helpful to use the metaphor of a “binational command” to relay a sense of urgency to further refinements of these information-sharing and joint/coordinated-enforcement projects, but there is little reason to expect them to be consolidated and deepened in a way that resembles NORAD.

## **2a. Multilateral Peace Operations**<sup>5</sup>

The CAF and the Canadian government have approached the process of re-engagement with United Nations and related multilateral peace operations with a high degree of caution. In November 2017, however, Canada hosted the Vancouver UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference, with over 500 delegates from more than 80 countries, thereby underscoring its intent to re-engage. The challenge is to build steadily and persistently on this opening with an approach that draws on the depth of the Canadian Armed Forces’ specialized capabilities while maintaining a willingness to engage in a breadth of operations over time.

**“United Nations peace building operations are now often portrayed as a high-risk, low-reward, and fundamental discretionary policy priority, tenuously linked to conceptions of Canadian ‘national interests.’”**

CNDSA experts believe this high-risk, low-reward view is an over-correction. Our belief is that Canada’s “self-interest rightly understood” lies firmly in working towards, and contributing to, the increased effectiveness of multilateralism, including in this case multilateral peace operations. The zones of insecurity and instability in which UN peace operations are deployed have had destabilizing repercussions within and well beyond their own regions. These repercussions are among the key reasons why some of Canada’s ‘like-minded’ European partners and allies (e.g., the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Sweden, etc.) are themselves re-engaging in UN peace operations. They are ahead of Canada in doing so. Moreover, these conflicts have significantly exacerbated the strains on the liberal international order, which the

Canadian government prioritizes as the foundation for this country’s post-World War II security and prosperity.

CNDSA experts on Multilateral Peace Operations focused on how initial steps toward re-engagement can form the foundation for a durable and meaningful Canadian contribution to one of the most challenging but vital tasks of the contemporary United Nations: stabilizing and rolling back zones of protracted armed conflict and human insecurity, through complex and multi-dimensional peace operations. We recognize the strains and capacity limitations facing the Canadian Armed Forces, and the complex and relatively high-risk environments in which today’s peace operations function. With the deployment of Operation PRESENCE in Mali in July 2018, including 3 Chinook helicopters, 5 Griffon helicopters, and just over 250 military personnel, Canada is “back” in UN peace building – albeit in a cautious and limited way.

Given the many strains on the modestly sized Canadian Armed Forces, there will always be additional demands for Canadian contributions to the UN’s widely dispersed (though heavily African-focused) operations. This will inevitably limit numbers of Canadian “boots on the ground.” And there will continue to be a structural imbalance in both the force contributions and risks undertaken by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) from the Global South, compared with those faced by Canada and its traditional Western allies from the Global North.

On the ground experience and recent research make clear that **operational effectiveness demands deep understanding and long-term commitments to particular operational environments**. Thus, as part of a renewed emphasis on training and education for peace operation effectiveness, greater emphasis needs to be placed on contextual and cross-cultural understanding both prior to and during deployments.

<sup>5</sup> Research provided by the *Peace Operations and United Nations* research cluster and written by team leader David Black.

## What to Watch for in UN Peace Operations:

### 1. Lesson Learning

One of the Canadian Armed Forces' handicaps in re-engaging with UN peace operations is that the base of continuous experience on which Canadian deployments used to draw has been sharply diminished, through a period when the size, range, and tempo of UN deployments has significantly grown. This is also a constraint in relation to Canada's stated intent to take on a significant role in peace operations training. This Canadian handicap can be mitigated by drawing appropriately qualified lessons from the CAFs extensive and hard-earned experience in Afghanistan. Especially in the context of the important 'whole of government' lessons this experience offers, there are important insights that were collected, but have not been fully explored or exploited. There are useful comparative experiences and lessons that should be carefully consolidated and considered. Similarly, Canada could draw on the experiences of the relatively small number of Canadians who were continuously deployed in a range of UN operations through the 'decade of disengagement.' The CNDISA sees an important opportunity to undertake oral histories with those who served in these operational environments (e.g., the DRC, Darfur, South Sudan, etc), and to ensure that these findings are fully integrated into both the training needs of Canadian forces and the wider public understanding of the nature of contemporary peace operations.

### 2. Training Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders


The Trudeau government has signaled from the outset its intent to make training a key priority for Canada's peace building re-engagement. Ironically, training is being highlighted as a Canadian policy priority when, over the course of the previous decade, Canada dismantled much of its historic institutional and human capacity as a leader in peace keeping training. Through the Elsie Initiative and the Vancouver Principles, the government has clearly signaled its focus on training and capacity building in relation to gender and child soldiers, respectively. These are important priorities, and Canada is well positioned to contribute to training in these areas – although with regard to gender in particular, doing so will depend on a deep understanding of the gendered nature of UN operations and operational environments, and how best to engage with these deeply rooted dynamics. In addition, however, and bearing in mind that Canada's most promising operational 'value-added' is likely to come through the effective and efficient integration of specialized capacities in complex multi-dimensional operations, there is a particular need for training (of both Canadians and others) that focuses on the exceptional demands of interoperability – human, institutional, and technical.

### 3. Relations with Regional Economic Communities

As an extension of the focus on interoperability, there is a requirement in the African context, where the UN's largest and most intractable operations are concentrated, to focus on the nature, strengths, and challenges associated with the African regional and sub-regional groupings that have become important players in these challenging environments. The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (REC's) like ECOMOG (West Africa), IGAD (the Horn of Africa) and SADC (Southern Africa) are now active and influential participants in African operational environments, both enabling and complicating the work of multilateral peace operations. In the past, Canada made an important and welcome contribution to the operational capacity of ECOMOG. Understanding and enabling these (sub-)regional structures, by focusing on their capacity for effective coordination with UN and other extra-regional organizations (e.g., NATO and the European Union), is a role that Canada, might be well suited to play due to its non-imperial and bilingual identity in Africa.

This is consistent with the "smart pledges" approach adopted in the Canadian government's current commitment to Mali.

**Figure 5: Project Future Trends in Peace Operations**



What is the appropriate balance of breadth, versatility, and depth in UN peace operations commitments? The consensus among our group members was that **Canada's most useful contribution could be made by focusing on deep and specialized capabilities**, which can be rapidly deployed to a range of specific operational environments and integrated into larger mission structures and objectives. In other words, the most appropriate balance is a depth of specific capabilities, and the capacity to apply them across a range of operational environments on an 'as-needed' and 'as-able' basis.

As a concerned "UN citizen," and one that aspires to a seat on the UN Security Council, Canada has both an interest and an obligation to participate more energetically in these processes. Canada could focus on mobilizing research and analysis concerning pivotal challenges that make historic and political sense such as:

1. Marshalling careful evidence-based analysis on how to assess the utility, complexity, and unintended consequences of the use of force in peace operations
2. Renewing Canada's historic leadership role on the Protection of Civilians, which has continued to be a vitally important issue operational

mandates, planning, practice and Canada's emphasis on gender, children, and youth.

3. Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by UN-mandated forces. Canada's operational disengagement through much of the last 15 years enhances its ability to address this issue in a relatively unencumbered way. It also resonates strongly with broader efforts to advance a Feminist foreign policy.

### 3. FUTURE FLASHPOINTS <sup>6</sup>


CNDSA experts believe that the South China Sea could be a flashpoint but also believe that China benefits enormously from freedom of navigation, so it has an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the **South China Sea**. They are concerned, however, that one overlooked hotspot is Taiwan.

China's growing demand for seafood has resulted in its fishing fleets exploiting the exclusive economic zones of distant countries. Violence has even erupted between China and Argentina over fishing access. Canada should prepare for potential conflict in its own waters and consider supporting international regimes such as the recent Central Arctic fishing moratorium.

An area worthy of exploration is how Canada could engage more with Japan in continued competition with China in the greater China Sea. Japan is eager to accept Canada's political support and receive an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Canada could potentially join Japan and South Korea in **patrolling the East China Sea**, but this issue must be handled carefully since doing so could be read as aggressive towards China and undermine opportunities for cooperation in other issue areas where Canadian and Chinese interests align.

CNDSA members also suggest not taking medium-term stability in either Russia or China for granted. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, has seen public approval of his leadership decline dramatically over controversial pension reforms, and no one knows how **Putin's succession might unfold over the course of the next decade**. Similarly, many sources of instability—environmental degradation, elite discord, collapsing social services, and slowing economic growth—could also undermine the Communist Party of China's hold on power.

**Figure 6: China, Taiwan & South China Sea**



<sup>6</sup> Research provided by the *Canada and Future Superpowers: China, Russia, and the Arctic & Africa and the Middle East* research clusters and written by team leaders Alexander Lanoszka and Thomas Juneau.

**Figure 7: Ukraine, Russia, & the Baltic States**



Canada could still provide the appropriate military assistance to the Baltic countries in its role as a Framework Nation in Latvia. Canada should invest in electronic warfare capabilities but may wish to contemplate hardening and dispersing the NATO Battlegroup’s forces to ensure that Russia would trip over them if it does decide to seize areas in Latgale, Latvia. Moreover, Canada should attend to political developments in Ukraine to avoid becoming entrapped in its war against Russia.

Canada will have to maintain the capacity to provide military support that is perceived to be useful, which depends in turn on deep inter-operability and the filling of functional niches in coalition operations. Over the last twenty years, Canada’s military, like its western counterparts, has been forced to focus on post-Cold War challenges like intra-state conflict, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and security sector reform.

**As perceived geopolitical challenges from Russia and China intensify, however, there are grounds for shifting the focus to entirely different capabilities, ranging from front-line forces that affect conventional deterrence to hybrid and grey zone options.**

Canada’s defence planners face the double challenge of properly diagnosing complex future threats and trying to anticipate the way that their American counterparts will view those threats, including the US’ response and their expectations of Canada.

There is nothing new about this dynamic, of course—it has been the core defence and security problem for Canada for at least 75 years — but it has become much more difficult now, mostly because the US has become more unpredictable, often in ways that seem profoundly short-sighted and self-defeating.



**Syria**

- The military phase of the war is winding down, however experts agree that the country will remain volatile and fragmented for the foreseeable future.
- It is unlikely in the short-term for the current regime to retake the Idlib province, resulting in it remaining a haven of opposition and extremist groups.
- Given Turkish investment in infrastructure in Northern-Syria, a financially constrained Turkey might look to the US and NATO allies for support in the form of burden-sharing.

The military phase of the war in Syria is winding down, but the country will remain highly volatile and fragmented for the foreseeable future. Notably, **CNDSA experts do not anticipate that the Syrian regime will take back Turkish-controlled Idlib Province in the short-term**, implying that a range of opposition and extremist groups will keep their haven in the area. Many Turkish-sponsored rebel groups have withdrawn from strategic positions in Idlib, as per the stipulations outlined in the 2018 Russian-Turkish brokered deal to transform the province into a “demilitarized zone”. However, Idlib city and a number of areas in its immediate vicinity are likely to remain under Turkish administration, signifying that, in this context, Turkey will likely maintain a long-term presence in northern Syria. Having invested in developing a civilian and military infrastructure—from universities to local military and police forces—a financially constrained

Turkey is likely to look to the US and, possibly, to NATO for burden-sharing. This would raise difficult questions—for example, what would be the legal basis for NATO military presence? Yet it would touch on key European priorities (especially the issues stemming from Syrian refugees and the prospect of facilitating their return) as well as US-Turkey relations.



### Libya

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- Given Turkish investment in infrastructure in Northern-Syria, a financially constrained Turkey might look to the US and NATO allies for support in the form of burden-sharing.

Migration is a major source of concern for Canada's European allies. In North Africa, a stretch through which a significant proportion of migrants seeking to reach Southern Europe transit, **the weakest link is Libya** where there has been no effective government since 2011. Most efforts to deal with the migrant crisis have focused on preventing migrants from reaching the border with Libya or on countering them at sea. The real driver of migration, however, is found at the level of poor governance and difficult economic conditions in the many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region from where most of the migrants originate. Most measures, in other words, have mostly dealt with the symptoms of the problem and not the causes.

**The mission in Mali to which Canada contributes, represents an example of the necessary, more holistic approach aimed at promoting stability and developments.**

CNDSA specialists do not expect that state authority will strengthen in Libya for the foreseeable future. As such, we expect that Libya will remain a funnel through which many migrants from the African continent will transit to reach Europe.

This has important policy implications. Canada, like the United States, has limited interests in Libya, but the situation in Libya is and will remain highly important for its European NATO allies. Small-scale contributions to rebuilding efforts in Libya could represent a small but positive step in efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Europe. This could take the form, for example, of capacity-building programs for forces associated with the UN-recognized government.

The continuing threat that the Taliban poses to security and stability in Afghanistan remains of concern to Canada, as is the growing presence of the Islamic State in the north-east of the country. Having withdrawn from Afghanistan, Canada is reluctant to once again commit



### Iran

- CNDSA were unable to reach a consensus on the likelihood of future escalation between the US and Iran.
- Such a confrontation would have important consequences to the security of the CAF and Canadian ships part of multinational task forces in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.
- As Iran's ballistic missile capability remains far from being able to reach North America, the issue of Canada's participation in missile defense may arise again.

Although there was no consensus among CNDSA members on the likelihood of a future escalation of tension between **Iran and the United States**, with members assessing the probability of escalation between moderate and high, CNDSA network members agreed that such a scenario would carry important consequences for Canada. At a general level, the United States could ask Canada for support, ranging from political backing to various military contributions. In Iraq, an escalation of American-Iranian tension could have implications that ultimately threaten the security of CAF troops. Most pro-Iran Shia militias are not currently targeting Western troops, and they generally differentiate between Canadian and American troops. But in worst-case scenarios, CAF troops could be targeted, eventually requiring their evacuation. This worst-case scenario is amplified by the levels of entanglement between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shia militias; their operations against ISIS demonstrated the difficulty in drawing a demarcation line between the two forces. Canada also considers that it has an interest in the maritime security of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, where it frequently deploys ships as part of multinational task forces. Should tension escalate to the point of conflict, Canadian ships in the region would face significant force protection challenges, while Canada may receive a request from the United States for maritime support. Finally, although Iran's ballistic missile capability remains far from being able to reach North America, if or when this threshold approaches, the issue of Canada's participation in ballistic missile defence (BMD) may arise again.

ground troops. The United States, however, may request a renewed contribution from Canada in the future. Should this arise, Canada's main interest would be the need to manage its relationship with its most important ally rather than the situation in Afghanistan. Should Canada respond positively to such a request, it would likely be by contributing to a training mission. This decision would have important policy implications. **The lessons of the past 17 years of involvement in Afghanistan emphasize that the "build" dimension of the "clear, hold, build" approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) is essential, and has not been successful so far; without security, COIN cannot succeed.** This can only be achieved through a whole-of-government strategy, which the Canadian government has yet to fully master. The success of COIN can only be achieved with a detailed knowledge and understanding of local conditions and dynamics.

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### 3a. Hybrid Warfare<sup>7</sup>

Broader discussions around cyber security and cyber-terrorism are front and centre when it comes to policy debates and law enforcement concerns in Canada. Department of Defense, like all government agencies in Canada and around the world, must incorporate cyber-related issues into their overall threat assessment. Below, we focus on three of these challenges that, we argue, are particularly urgent, as well as some that could benefit from further research and attention.

One of the primary issues that **DND should be concerned with is the increased threat of influence operations** in arenas where Canadian forces are going to be active. Even before Canadian soldiers go into a region, rumors and conspiracies could be floated amongst the communities online so that Canadian forces arrive in a hostile environment they are unprepared for. Influence operations are perpetrated not just by states, but by sub-state actors as well. The challenge here is that many of these actors do not follow the rules of war. DND needs to better understand this threat environment and design a policy response around whether Canada should consider offensive counter-measures. Can active cyber operations be used to pre-emptively neutralize potential threats? Is CAF willing to use disruption measures and how will all of this be overseen?

Underlying these concerns is the question of whether the bureaucratic and sluggish ways in which governments typically respond to such threats will hamper any counter-measures. Perhaps a speedy response by a low-level member of the Canadian Armed Forces could cause more harm than good, as many of these young people may not have the cultural sensitivity to respond in ways that are appropriate. The notion of speech as an unambiguous good is emphasized by the tech industry and in today's society, but in conflict zones, it could backfire in ways that cause irreparable harm.

One of the ways to approach this problem is to be proactive, rather than reactive. The Canadian Armed Forces have often worked with locals to kick-start their own influence operations on the ground, in places like Afghanistan. Approaches like this could be beneficial – in addition to helping the local populations discern misinformation through digital literacy – so that the Canadian government is not simply waiting to be hit with a wave of "fake news" before deciding how to and whether to respond. Canada should also talk to countries that have dealt with this for years (e.g. Hybrid Centre of Excellence in Finland, NATO cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Estonia).

While critical infrastructure is not in the mandate of DND per se, the issue is part of a larger family of questions as to whether DND is going to have to get involved in domestic facing operations.

**If we look to history, there have been cases when DND has taken on the role of infrastructure protection, and there might be a situation where it might have to again.**

Public Safety Canada, for example, is trying to get a handle on the issue of minimum standards for infrastructure. How interested is DND in getting involved in this discussion? Historically, it seems that whenever there is an incident like 9/11 or the October crisis, DND does become interested in maintaining/protecting public infrastructure. **Does DND have a sense of under what conditions they would need to mobilize to protect critical infrastructure?** It might be useful to engage in some historical analysis to elucidate the kinds of conditions which would force DND to take on the role of infrastructure protector. Would it be preferential for DND to get involved with preventing this sort of thing occurring

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<sup>7</sup> Research provided by the *Cybersecurity, Capabilities, and Terrorism* research cluster and written by team leader Amarnath Amarasingam.

in the first place, rather than planning for how to step in after the fact? Much of our critical infrastructure is in private or semi-private hands. The government needs to interface with these private companies, not just in developing standards, but by helping companies to attain the appropriate level of security.

One of the big issues we currently have is Huawei. Do we want to allow Chinese state supported firms to develop infrastructure in Canada? Unfortunately, there are not many other companies operating in this space (basically, the only other option is Siemens). Chinese companies by law are required to help China in national emergencies (Russian telecoms are subject to a similar law). The US/Australian approach is to ban companies like Huawei outright. The current Canadian approach is to force these companies to allow the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to inspect for “back doors”. Chinese companies can undercut other companies with state subsidized prices, skewing the whole market. This is part of the broader question of who we should allow to build our infrastructure, and why? It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which DND would have to get involved domestically in these kinds of instances.

Perhaps a less important, but also significant issue, is the question of digital literacy amongst CAF personnel. There is a fear that Canadian soldiers in foreign countries are revealing too much about themselves in the online space, including their locations, their travels, and who they are in contact with. These lapses in operational security, by us and our allies, could be taken advantage of by foreign governments and be used to cripple critical infrastructure.

### **3b. Gaps in Cyber Knowledge<sup>8</sup>**

While the known aspects of cyber security are vast and complex, we also have the added difficulty of having to prepare for unknown and new threats. There is a lot of talk about the internet of things, about the link between cyber security and outer space, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. With quantum computing on the horizon, a lot of information that has been digitized in the past may now become accessible, but there will be quantum encryption as well as quantum decryption. Quantum computing requires quantum infrastructure. Notably, in these cases and others, the nature of the threat is hard to pinpoint and, as such, hard

to anticipate. In general, though, there is a paucity of Canada-specific research when it comes to cyber-security and the future of the cyber threat.


## **To Enhance Cybersecurity, CNDSA Experts Recommend:**

1. Additional research is needed on Canada-specific issues related to cybersecurity. A Canada-specific incident database with some analysis would be valuable (what kinds of attacks have occurred in Canada, the cost of the damage, what caused it, and what are the trends clear in the database).
2. DND should interface more with private companies responsible for our critical infrastructure to not only share best practices but anticipate the nature of future threats.
3. Strategize ways to generate interest amongst tech and computer savvy young people so that they will want to work in DND and CAF. This might partly be a marketing issue, but there will need to be changes in hiring practices as well, so that new threats can be addressed quickly and by the right people.
4. Strategize ways to anticipate and address the possibility of influence operations against CAF in places where they are deployed. Mechanisms for either addressing these operations quickly need to be devised, or pre-emptive messaging operations need to be put in place. DND and

A concern for the DND, linked to the increased probability of cyber and hybrid warfare noted above, is the question of how DND and the CAF will recruit individuals with the right skills to keep Canada safe in this new threat environment. There are several difficulties here. First, the DND cyber force recruitment may come into direct competition with CSE. Second, many of those individuals with skills in cyber security are able to make much higher incomes outside of the government and it is not entirely clear how Canada should seek to attract this talent. There may be ways to institute a kind of “cyber reserve force,” which is called on when the need arises, or to restructure recruitment so that cyber focused personnel perhaps do not need to go through the regular training process.

<sup>8</sup> Research provided by the *Cybersecurity, Capabilities, and Terrorism* research cluster and written by team leader Amarnath Amarasingam.

**Figure 8: Increasing Cyber Security Talent**



While there may be an issue of “brain drain” to other countries and other sectors, DND should continue striving to be a top employer, and make the well-being of its personnel an important component of talent retention. This focus on wellbeing may lead Canadians, who left for the US to look for work, to return to Canada, looking for public sector jobs with better hours than the private sector. It seems to be the case that the Canadian government is generally struggling with how to take mid-career individuals and bring them into the government, and as the CAF does not have separate employment status, they may be continually hamstrung by general problems faced by the government in terms of hiring. DND could look into hiring people for project-centric tasks (more Class-B contracts).

The DND, much like what the CSE is already doing, should bring in more co-op students and bridge them into working there. There is also an artificial divide at the university level between people who study tech and people who study world events. The DND could potentially fund interdisciplinary programs in universities, certified programs designed to train individuals more holistically so that they are better prepared to understand and address the threat environment. There is potential in this space to design a program that works and addresses the needs of the DND and “whole of government.”

## 4. CULTURE CHANGE IN THE CAF <sup>9</sup>

Successfully addressing diversity and wellbeing is key to the continued legitimacy of the armed forces and its ability to maintain recruitment. The diversity and wellbeing of CAF members has been a core concern since the 1990s, for policymakers and DND/CAF leaders as well as the Canadian public. The end of the Cold War increased the tempo and scope of CAF operations, often with negative repercussions for the health and wellbeing of members and their families. Canada’s participation in the war in Afghanistan put further pressure on CAF members and their families.

By the height of the Afghan war, 25 percent of military members were released for medical reasons. Gender, diversity, and wellbeing are intrinsically linked to the issue of **military culture**. Today, the military’s culture is recognized as a core concern and culture change has been identified as a top priority. The Deschamps Report, released in 2015, most prominently led to today’s renewed concern with culture change. As the Deschamps Report has shown, as well as Canadian and international research, the problem is not just that militaries are male-dominated organizations. Instead, it is the kind of masculinity promoted by most militaries that is problematic. It is one that privileges toughness, aggression, and violence. It is a kind of masculinity that is

<sup>9</sup> Research provided by the *Gender and Diversity in the CAF* research cluster, and written by team leader Maya Eichler

defined in opposition to what our society stereotypically associates with femininity: weakness, vulnerability, and emotion. This 'tough' version of soldiering limits tolerance towards military members who do not 'fit': women, LGBTQ2, racialized people, as well as those suffering from PTSD and other injuries. Arguably, the military's culture also hurts male-identified military members. It limits opportunities to talk about emotions and pain and may discourage help-seeking. When soldiers leave the military and return to civilian life, they have to find ways to leave this culture behind and adapt to civilian life. Military culture is central to understanding gender, diversity, and wellbeing because it shapes the identity of military members during and after service *and* the treatment they receive by peers and the Chain of Command.

Pivotal questions about culture change remain unanswered, including the definition of key terms, the measurement of change, and the justification of change. Group members discussed the need for broader investigations of what constitutes the military's culture, including qualitative investigations of micro-cultures within the larger organizational culture. We need a more fine-grained analysis of which elements of this culture or these cultures are toxic, and which are potentially positive drivers of change.

The group also discussed the need for a deeper conceptualization of diversity. In CAF's definition, diversity, it is seen as an attribute of individuals rather than a feature of institutional culture. Such an individualist definition of diversity lacks an understanding of power relations and of intersectionality. Group members noted CAF would benefit from a conceptualization of diversity that draws on a range of theories (in particular, critical and intersectional feminist) and allows for more than an 'add and stir' approach to diversity. In this context, our group also noted the importance of examining diversity across military and civilian spheres: For example, how does the resurgence of white nationalism affect the retention and recruitment of CAF members who are visible minorities? How does diversity interact across military and civilian spheres?

**CAF and DND have focused, both past and present, on quantitative rather than qualitative outcomes by setting numerical targets. Members see the importance of providing the material resources needed to enhance wellbeing as well as diversity.** We recognize that institutions often have a need for quantitative measures and there is a requirement to fulfill employment equity

goals, but we see room for a more qualitative way of measuring change. Rather than emphasizing numbers and targets, such an approach would be more focused on considering parental leave policies, religious accommodations, and other policies that can facilitate greater diversity. It is important to distinguish not only. CNDSA experts argued for the importance of distinguishing qualitative from quantitative goals, but also and short-term from long-term goals. We concur with other Canadian researchers such as Allan English who recently argued, "the CAF 'Diversity Strategy' uses some of the same approaches as Operation Honour and other failed CAF culture change initiatives, for example it focuses on achieving short term, numerical Employment Equity goals, similar to the unsuccessful CAF Gender Integration initiatives in the 1990s and it does not address either systemic issues or the wicked problems of culture change".

We suggest that the military ask itself the following questions: **What does a diverse military look like?** For example, what would a military with 25% women look like in concrete terms? Where would the women be in terms of trades and leadership roles? What policy and other changes would have to be made to support a more diverse military workforce? The CAF may end up with 25% women, but without having fundamentally transformed its culture. Our group is skeptical of the critical-mass argument as there is no clear evidence for it *and* it does not consider that it matters where in the CAF women end up. If all the additional women end up serving in clerical trades, is that a fundamental change or have we just deepened the gendered culture of the military? Our group also noted that there is a material basis to cultural change. **We cannot overemphasize the importance of providing the material resources needed to enhance not just wellbeing but diversity.** For example, if the military aims to recruit more women, it will need to make sure it can provide facilities (e.g., washrooms) and uniforms that function for them. Too often the military measures success through measures taken, e.g., a new program or initiative rather than by the outcomes of the program or initiative. ***Mechanisms of culture change are not evidence of culture change;*** for example, having a diversity or gender champion does not indicate culture change per se. We argue that there is an urgent need for outside, independent evidence-based research on culture change initiatives taken in the context of targeted recruitment, Operation Honour, the Diversity Strategy, and various wellbeing initiatives.

**The CAF/DND leadership needs to move from a rhetoric of change to providing resources for change.**

The DND/CAF leadership has recognized and identified culture change as a top priority. Yet, there are three main problems with the way culture change has been approached so far that will continue to bog down its successful implementation. First, the lack of definitional clarity about what constitutes culture, diversity, and wellbeing means that measures are taken without a clear conceptual understanding of the status quo or the end goal. Second, the preoccupation with numbers and targets is a losing game – both because targets always fail and because numerical targets do not ensure *qualitative* change to an organization’s culture. Furthermore, measures aimed at culture change are mislabeled as evidence for culture change without evidence-based research to assess the effectiveness of measures. Third, the preoccupation with operational needs offers a narrow and problematic approach to culture change.

Resources are complex and include not just financial resources, but the material basis needed to change culture and create more diversity (e.g., adapting facilities to the needs of women, adapting uniforms, introducing policies aimed at the wellbeing of diverse members etc.). Material resources to support change also include time (e.g., workload issues) and expertise (e.g., gender expertise, outside expertise). There needs to be more emphasis put on the responsibility of the institution to bring about change, and less on the individuals (e.g., women and other minority groups) to help change the institution. Instead, what is needed are channels that enable the voices of members from minority groups to be heard as well as ways to hear from those resisting change. Research that is interdisciplinary, longitudinal, and qualitative can help provide a venue to collect these voices and learn more about how individual members see change happening or why members resist change. There is broad agreement among the research community in Canada that transformative culture change within the military will require institutional leadership and external monitoring in addition to external, independent evidence-based research on the measures taken towards culture change.

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## CNDSA MEMBERS

### **Amarasingam, Amarnath (Team Leader)**

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Dialogue

### **Baechler, Jennifer**

Senior Instructor, School of Public Administration, Dalhousie University

### **Baker, Matt**

Senior Research Associate and Projects Manager, Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies

### **Black, David (Team Leader)**

Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University

### **Bogaert, Kandace**

Assistant Professor and Cleghorn Fellow in War and Society, Wilfrid Laurier University, Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies

### **Boulden, Jane**

Chair, Department of Politics and Economics, Queen’s University

### **Bow, Brian (Team Leader)**

Professor of Political Science and Director, Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University

### **Boyle, Philip**

Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo

### **Caron, Isabelle**

Assistant Professor, School of Public Administration, Dalhousie University

### **Carvin, Stephanie**

Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University

### **Choi, Timothy**

Research Fellow, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

### **Dawson, Lorne**

Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Waterloo

### **Diallo, Ousmane**

Ph.D. Candidate, Balsillie School of International Affairs

**Donais, Timothy**

Associate Professor, Department of Global Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University

**Ebadi, Bushra**

Research Associate, Centre for International Governance Innovation

**Edgar, Alistair**

Associate Dean, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University

**Eichler, Maya (Team Leader)**

Assistant Professor, Department of Political and Canadian and Women's Studies, Mount Saint Vincent University

**Ettinger, Aaron**

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo

**Humphries, Mark**

Associate Professor, Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University

**Johnstone, Rachael**

Postdoctoral Fellow, Balsillie School of International Affairs

**Juneau, Thomas (Team Leader)**

Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa

**Kitchen, Veronica**

Associate Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo

**Lane, Andrea**

Ph.D. Candidate, Dalhousie University

**Lanoszka, Alexander (Team Leader)**

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo

**Leprince, Caroline**

Executive Director, Women in International Security Canada

**Leuprecht, Christian**

Professor, Department of Political Science, Queen's University

**MacDonald, Adam**

Ph.D. Candidate, Dalhousie University

**MacLellan, Stephanie**

Senior Research Associate, Centre for International Governance Innovation

**Malkin, Anton**

Research Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation

**Mangat, Rupinder**

Ph.D. Graduate, Balsillie School of International Affairs

**Marijan, Branka**

Program Officer, Project Ploughshares

**Massie, Justin**

Professor, Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal

**Merand, Frédéric**

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Montreal

**Momani, Bessma**

Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo

**Mufti, Mariam**

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo

**Overton, Matthew**

Executive Director, CDA Institute

**Sarson, Leah**

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University

**Spooner, Kevin**

Associate Professor, Department of History, Wilfrid Laurier University

**Suarez, Carla**

Postdoctoral Fellow, University of British Columbia

**Tsamenyi, Elikem**

Ph.D. Candidate, Dalhousie University

**Welch, David**

Professor, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo

**Zahar, Marie-Joëlle**

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Montreal

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## CNDSA RAPPORTEURS

### Khammad, Violette

Master of Global Governance Candidate, Balsillie School of International Affairs

### MacInnes, Morgan

CIGI Research Associate

### Mohamad, Nizar

Master of Political Science Candidate, University of Waterloo

### Pearson, Naomi

Master of International Public Policy Candidate, Balsillie School of International Affairs

### Wei, Steven

Master of Political Science Candidate, University of Waterloo

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## CNDSA PROJECT COORDINATORS

### Cooper, Stephanie

Project Manager, Balsillie School of International Affairs

### Markudis, Matthew

Project Design Lead, Balsillie School of International Affairs

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