Department seminar by Marcel Nutz, Columbia UniversityExport this event to calendar

Tuesday, April 9, 2019 — 4:00 AM EDT

Convergence to the Mean Field Game Limit: A Case Study


Mean field games are generally interpreted as approximations to n-player games with large n. Indeed, n-player Nash equilibria are known to converge to their mean field counterpart when the latter is unique. In this talk we study a specific stochastic game where both the finite and infinite player versions naturally admit multiple equilibria. It turns out that mean field equilibria satisfying a transversality condition are indeed limits of n-player equilibria, but we also find a complementary class of equilibria that are not limits, thus questioning their interpretation as large n equilibria. (Joint work with Jaime San Martin and Xiaowei Tan)

Location 
M3 - Mathematics 3
Room: 3127
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Canada

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