KNOWLEDGE SYNTHESIS REPORT ON CANADA’S RACIALIZED IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND THE LABOUR MARKET

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Executive Summary

The number of racialized immigrant women in Canada has steadily increased over recent decades, from 55% of newcomer women immigrants (that is, those who arrived in Canada within the last 5 years) identifying as visible minorities in 1981 to 84% in 2016 (Hudson 2016; Statistics Canada 2016a), but their employment numbers lag. Even when women immigrants are employed, they are more likely to be underemployed, part-time, precarious, and poorly remunerated. The lack of participation of racialized immigrant women in the labour market represents a significant economic loss in communities across Canada.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary review of scholarly research, this report synthesizes existing research on the barriers faced by racialized immigrant women in the Canadian labour market. Previous research in this area has been conducted using a largely siloed approach, leaving knowledge gaps and overlooking opportunities to apply lessons learned. Disconnects in research also appear because of changing and disputed definitions of key terms relating to race and sex, which we discuss at length in Appendix A. In this report, we adopt the broad language of racialized immigrant women, only substituting in other terms like visible minority and ethnicity when the available data precludes the accurate use of this terminology. With an eye to the rapidly changing nature of the labour market, including the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the role of women in the workforce, we emphasize research conducted in this area in the past decade. In so doing, we offer insights into the underemployment of racialized immigrant women in Canada today.

To begin to rectify the labour market barriers faced by racialized immigrant women, this report also identifies both federal and provincial policies and policy recommendations designed to improve their labour market outcomes. In so doing, we find gaps in available policies and programs and identify challenges in evaluating their successes. We also briefly preview international policy research to shed light on some best practices to improve the labour market outcomes of racialized immigrant women.
2016 CENSUS INFOGRAPHICS

Immigrants Arriving in Canada in 2015-2016

- Visible Minority Immigrant Women: 43% (124,511)
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Women: 9% (26,555)
- Visible Minority Immigrant Men: 38% (111,965)
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Men: 10% (27,962)

Median Annual Employment Income by Sex, Immigrant Status, and Visible Minority Status

- Visible Minority Immigrant Women: $27,000
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Women: $36,000
- Visible Minority Immigrant Men: $37,000
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Men: $53,000
- Visible Minority Canadian-born Women: $23,000
- Non-Visible Minority Canadian-born Women: $33,000
- Visible Minority Canadian-born Men: $27,000
- Non-Visible Minority Canadian-born Men: $47,000

Unemployment Rates of Newcomer Groups

- Visible Minority Immigrant Women: 9.0%
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Women: 6.3%
- Visible Minority Immigrant Men: 7.7%
- Non-Visible Minority Immigrant Men: 6.0%
- Visible Minority Canadian-born Women: 9.9%
- Non-Visible Minority Canadian-born Women: 6.2%
- Visible Minority Canadian-born Men: 12.0%
- Non-Visible Minority Canadian-born Men: 8.2%
Introduction

This report reviews the challenges racialized immigrant women face in Canada’s labour market and identifies several government policies attempting to address their underemployment. Immigration is essential to the health and sustainability of the Canadian economy. Without sustained immigration our population would decline and our labour force would shrink by 1.8 million by 2040 (McArthur-Gupta et al. 2019, 3). Moreover, immigration will continue to play an important role in contributing to Canada’s real GDP growth between now and 2040 as it will account for all of Canada’s net labour force growth, adding 3.7 million new workers to the labour market. To continue to provide Canadians with strong social protections and a high standard of living, Canada will need to maximize the economic potential of its human capital. Within this pool, racialized immigrant women are a significant and understudied source of underutilized talent.

In 2016, 84% of the approximately 458,000 newcomer immigrant women in Canada (that is, those who arrived in Canada within the last 5 years) identified as visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2016a). These women face significant challenges entering and progressing within the labour market. Racialized immigrant women have lower rates of labour force participation and higher unemployment in relation to comparator groups. For example, racialized immigrant women aged between 25-64 had participation rates of 65% in the Canadian labour force in 2016 compared to 72% for all immigrant women. Immigrant women also earn less on average than both immigrant men and the Canadian-born population. Moreover, wage gaps are significantly wider for racialized immigrant women (Hudson 2016). Indeed, racialized immigrant women are “triply disadvantaged” because of their race, immigrant status, and sex, and as a result “are consistently the lowest earners in the Canadian labour market” (Boyd and Yiu 2009, 208).

The success of immigrants in the Canadian labour market has deteriorated steadily since the 1980s, with studies after 2000 suggesting “that the gap between immigrants and the Canadian-born population is widening,” a trend that is more pronounced among visible minorities (Sethi and Williams 2015, 135-136; see also Raza et al. 2013, 263). A Statistics Canada...
Canada survey mapping the labour market outcomes of immigrants from 2006 to 2017 shows a consistent gap between immigrants and individuals born in Canada, with the employment rates of immigrant women lagging behind those of men in every province (Yasaad and Fields 2018). Lightman and Gingrich (2013) also found that immigrant workers, in general, are more likely to work under precarious conditions and that women immigrants and racialized immigrants hold disproportionately more precarious jobs. A study by Goldring and Landolt (2011) examined 300 Latin American and Caribbean workers in Toronto and noted the longevity of these precarious positions. These trends evidence the reality that workers to full and meaningful participation in the Canadian labour market. Macroeconomic data and academic studies will be valuable to this effort, as will lesser-known studies that note the challenges faced by racialized immigrant women in the workplace and the benefits gained from their full participation. With this data, policymakers and stakeholders will be better placed to understand and address the challenges faced by racialized immigrant women.

In what follows, we synthesize academic literature and policy papers on the barriers faced by racialized immigrant women in the Canadian labour market, with a temporal emphasis on the past decade. The added focus on the past decade is meant to account for more recent immigrant cohorts, which have tended to favour more educated and skilled workers (See Ferrer, Picott, and Riddell 2014). New immigrant cohorts tend to be more

educated than Canadian-born workers and yet the former continue to face disadvantages in labour market outcomes (See Girard and Smith 2013). This report also seeks to synthesize a number of Canadian policies and select international programs that have attempted to assist racialized immigrant women to succeed in the labour market.

Unpacking Underemployment

The definition of underemployment varies; however, it is often seen as a measure of underutilized skills, experience, and availability to work in the labour market. In the field of economics, underemployment can refer to three broad categories: time related underemployment, skill related underemployment, and underemployment of those unemployed or out of the labour force.

- **Time related underemployment** implies that a worker is in an occupational field that matches their skill set and experience but works fewer hours than they would like. These workers may have to settle for one or multiple part time jobs. The Canadian Labour Force Survey defines time related underemployment as a combination of “people who remained employed but lost all or the majority of their usual work hours as a proportion of all employed people” (December 2020, 16).

- **Skill related underemployment** pertains to workers who are content with the number of hours they work, but who are employed in positions incommensurate with their skill set and, in most cases, therefore earn less.

- **Underemployment** refers to individuals who are unemployed but still actively looking for work or who are out of the labour force entirely due to an inability to find employment in their occupational field or the abandonment of job searches after a repeated lack of success. This form of underemployment is difficult to measure and identify because of insufficient collection of data, but it is important to distinguish unemployed individuals from those voluntarily refraining from joining the labour force.

Unlike the term unemployment, underemployment is often less clearly defined or measured. Regardless, the impact of underemployment on workers and the economy can be detrimental.
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Racialized Immigrant Women and Labour Market Outcomes

Immigrants are known to be “systematically discriminated against in the labour market” (Cukier 2019, 217). The specific forms this discrimination takes in the Canadian labour market are well documented, but this literature often focuses primarily on the challenges faced by immigrant men, with less academic and policy attention paid to the unique challenges faced by immigrant women (Adserà and Ferrer 2016). This is the case despite the fact that immigrant women are less likely to be able to secure permanent, full time employment than immigrant men and the reality that they generally earn less than both men and non-racialized women across occupational categories (Ng and Gagnon 2020, 8, 13). As noted in this report, overlooking the challenges faced by immigrant women and racialized immigrant women is problematic. The experiences of immigrant women differ markedly from the experiences of immigrant men, and the added consideration of race further shapes their labour market outcomes.

As a demographic group, racialized immigrant women are highly differentiated. Their experiences in the labour market depend on many factors, including their reasons for immigrating to Canada, the source country they immigrate from, the length of time they have lived in their current communities, their language proficiency, their education and skill level, the age at which they migrated to Canada, their marital status, and the number of children and dependents they may have. Thus, any conclusive assertions about racialized immigrant women’s labour market experiences must acknowledge that commonalities are often uncertain or tenuous. After all, as is often noted, the “immigrant experience” is highly heterogeneous (Essers and Benschop 2007, 56) and any meaningful study of their experiences requires an intersectional approach (Ragin and Fiss 2017). In pursuit of an intersectional approach, this report is informed by the academic work of political scientists, economists, sociologists, business studies scholars, geographers, and gender scholars.
What are the challenges immigrant women face in the labour market?

Parsing out the challenges faced by racialized immigrant women is complex as many of these challenges are mutually constituting. In this section, we highlight some of the most significant challenges faced by racialized immigrant women, recognizing that these barriers are by no means unique to this demographic group and that the intersecting identities of racialized immigrant women can further shape their experiences. There can also be significant overlap between the identified categories. We loosely group the challenges faced by racialized immigrant women in the labour market as related to three types of barriers:

1) Barriers related to individual characteristics;
2) Institutional barriers impeding career advancement and mobility; and
3) Cultural barriers.

It is important to distinguish between these types of barriers because they provide different explanations for unemployment or underemployment and have vastly different policy implications. Economic research on the labour market outcomes of immigrants seeks to determine the specific explanation for any differences in outcome, such as education, language barriers, family composition, culture differences, racial and/or religious discrimination, or other reasons.

**Barriers related to individual characteristics**

A significant fraction of the observed employment differences between immigrants and the Canadian-born is related to the individual labour force attributes of the immigrant population. By these we mean those characteristics recognized to augment productivity in economic activity, such as ability and skills. A direct measure of “productive”

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Labour Force Outcomes</th>
<th>Canadian-born Men</th>
<th>Canadian-born Women</th>
<th>Immigrant Men</th>
<th>Immigrant Women</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some postsecondary</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary certificate</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above bachelor's degree</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age, 15-25</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 25-54</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 55 and more</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some postsecondary</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary certificate</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above bachelor's degree</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 15-25</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 25-54</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age, 55 and more</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participant rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some postsecondary</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary certificate</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above bachelor's degree</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 15-25</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 25-54</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, 55 and more</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ tabulations using the October 2019 LFS PUMF files.
skills is rarely available in the data, or even observable to the employer. Instead, it is usually approximated by observable attributes such as education, previous job experience, or linguistic proficiency, which might be poor proxies for ability. These characteristics, however poor they might be as measures of ability, offer some understanding of the differences in labour market outcomes between immigrants and the Canadian born.

Table 1 summarizes participation, employment, and unemployment rates by age group (a typical proxy for job market experience) and education using the monthly information in the Labour Force Survey taken immediately before the COVID-19 pandemic. It shows that factors such as education and age play an important role in the labour market outcomes of immigrant women, whose employment and participation rates are typically lower, and unemployment rates higher, for all levels of education and age groups. Because immigrants and Canadian born individuals are not equally represented in these groups, the first step in any analysis of the differences between the two groups is to account for the “productive” characteristics through multivariate analysis, which removes such compositional effects. In general, but also specifically for immigrant women, once education and age/experience are taken into account, gaps in labour market outcomes persist, although they are substantially reduced for higher levels of education, experience, and language fluency (Adserà and Ferrer, 2016; Frenette and Morissette 2005).

Additional studies have pointed out other important determinants of labour market opportunities for immigrants, such as their path to immigration (i.e. their Visa category). Boyd and Pikkov (2005, 1) explain that the “modes of entry” into Canada are gendered, such that “women often enter as wives and dependents of men who sponsor their admission, and they are usually less likely than men to enter on humanitarian or economic grounds”.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Category</th>
<th>Number of Admissions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>331,145</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored Family</td>
<td>150,540</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled Refugee &amp; Protected Person in Canada</td>
<td>82,760</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Immigration</td>
<td>9,275</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>573,720</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1. Further, whatever the shortcomings of these measures for the general population, they are compounded when applied to immigrants or racialized women immigrants. For instance, a degree could be a reasonable proxy of the technical skills of a Canadian graduate, as it integrates contextual information, such as standard curriculum or the reputation of the school or program granting the degree. However, a foreign degree can be devoid of such information and becomes a poor indicator of the technical skills of the immigrant. Nevertheless, some agencies and professional associations accept credentials from approved-jurisdictions because these foreign programs are deemed to be well accredited or universal. For example, the Royal Surgeons and Physicians of Canada has approved medical training in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and Hong Kong, provided there is an assessment.
the other hand, may have had little opportunity for preparation and will have a much harder time adapting to Canadian society. This distinction is significant, “because principal applicants are the subset of immigrants with the highest labour force participation rates in Canada, a natural consequence of the fact that they are typically admitted based on their skills and ability to contribute to the economy” (McKinsey & Company 2017, 43). Aydemir (2011) reports that around 71% (87%) of immigrant women (men) arriving as skilled workers have a bachelor’s degree or more, versus 12% (20%) of refugee women (men). Similarly, the fraction of skilled immigrant women (men) with high language ability is 61% (74%) whereas the fraction of refugee women (men) with high language ability is 18% (40%). The study also shows that among all immigrants, refugees experience the worst entry labour market outcomes, but the fastest growth after two years in the country in terms of participation rates, particularly refugee women. This progress, however, is not followed by increasing wage growth, suggesting that their labour market position remains precarious.

It is worth noting that the impact of Visa categories depends on other factors such as the host country’s labour market integration strategies and whether there are barriers to entry into an immigrant’s desired field of employment. For example, many immigrants arrived in Canada as refugees (30,000 resettled in 2019) and the circumstances of their arrival period and their reasons for migration can have a vast effect on their experiences. Thus, their outcomes may not be directly caused by their status as refugees, but rather indirectly through the relationship between their source and destination countries at their time of arrival, as well as the size of the cohort of immigrants arriving at the same time. A study describing this impact is noted in Pendakur’s (2020) analysis of the labour market outcomes of Afghan immigrants in Canada who arrived as refugees after 2000. Pendakur compares the circumstances of Afghan immigrants (arriving after 9/11 when racial and religious tensions were highest and who had more than a 90% rejection rate of their applications) to that of the Vietnamese refugees (arriving in the mid-1970s which benefited from the “Private Sponsorship Program” where Canadians were encouraged to take part in integrating Vietnamese refugees into the Canadian economy). Pendakur speculates that Afghan immigrants faced a more difficult initial landing than Vietnamese refugees and may therefore have suffered long term effects in their labour market outcomes.

Women immigrants in particular tend to enter more often as “dependents” of their partners rather than principal applicants. This trend already points out two factors that may reduce their labour market integration. One relates to the characteristics of immigrants who are not assessed by the point system. Although Sweetman and Warman (2014) suggest that the educational attainment of spouses is likely to match that of their partners (and principal applicants) through assortative matching, other characteristics such as experience or language fluidity may not, rendering dependents less “labour market ready” than principal applicants. The second point relates to their additional duties as household producers that we explore in more detail below. Hence, despite more women being admitted as immigrants overall, the fact that they are less likely to arrive as principal applicants “suggest that immigrant women need more targeted support to reach their full working potential” (McKinsey & Company 2017,
43). That said, there is evidence that the skills of immigrant women are less likely than those of immigrant men to be valued in the immigration selection process (Boucher 2007, 388). The chief reason for this concerns the types of skills that are rewarded within Canada’s point-based system, where occupational skill is tied to paid work experience and can “ignore the private sphere work of women” (Boucher 2007, 392). This type of recognition disproportionately harms women, who may need to take time away from work to have and care for children. Moreover, as Boucher (2007, 392) points out, women also face more general disadvantages in securing access to the necessary “education, work experience and mentorship” favoured by points-based systems, even before their child-rearing years. 

Language acquisition is also deemed to be a likely variable in determining immigrant women’s labour outcomes (See Dustmann and van Soest 2002; Skuterud 2011). Skuterud (2011) shows that women (but not men) tend to concentrate in occupations where verbal skills are the least crucial, further contributing to earnings differentials. Immigrant women whose first language is neither English nor French earn substantially less than Canadian-born women, and this difference has been increasing over time for subsequent arrivals, suggesting a growing importance of language skills in the Canadian labour market. As mentioned above, Visa category has a role to play in their language skills at entry, since women immigrants are less likely to be assessed by the point system since they do not tend to arrive as principal applicants (Adamuti-Trache et al. 2018, 18). This fact further stresses the importance of integration services for women.

**Structural barriers to Advancement and Mobility**

One of the main premises behind Canada’s immigration policy is that immigrants can easily integrate into the Canadian labour market. Hence immigration reforms in the 1990s through to the 2000s began to favour the admission of skilled immigrants. However, the reality is that labour market integration can be difficult even for these highly skilled immigrants, a fact that is well documented for immigrant men (Aydemir and Skuterud 2005) and to a lesser extent for women (Frenette and Morisette 2005). For the most part, changes in the fortunes of immigrants arriving to Canada have been linked to shifts in the most common source countries of immigrants, from Europe to Asia and the Middle East (Picot and Sweetman 2005), but also to increasingly skilled and educated migration where credential recognition is a contention. Besides the obvious impact on cultural differences that this shift implies, it also affects the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration Category</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic — principal applicant</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic — spouses and dependants</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored family</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettled refugee and protected person in Canada</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other immigration</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Permanent Immigration- Principal Applicants by Gender (2017)
human capital immigrants bring upon arrival, thereby introducing further hurdles and rigidities to their labour market integration. In this subsection we focus on those rigidities affecting the ability of immigrants to put their human capital to work: credential recognition, affordable childcare, and discrimination.

**Credentials Recognition**

Upon entry to Canada, many immigrant men, but more immigrant women, are required to start their lives and careers from scratch, a process that one woman in a study described as “disheartening” (Dyck and McLaren 2004). An immigrant woman in Dyck and McLaren’s (2004, 520) study captured the bleakness of the struggle that many immigrant women face in the labour market, saying “every day is worse than the last one” because, despite being educated and skilled in their countries of origin, the task of translating their abilities to the Canadian labour force is demoralizing. In focus groups, many women mentioned that they may have reconsidered migrating to Canada had they known they would face these challenges. Rather than feel power and agency to carve a destiny based on a meritocracy, many experienced economic pressures, isolation, and even health problems (See also, Garcia and Welter 2013; Gupta, Wieland, and Turban 2019). Guo (2013) writes that, although a global market for talent has created a competition for skilled workers, the potential value of human capital is not fully realized due to the differential evaluation of credentials based on gender, race, and immigrant status.

Warman et al. (2015) find that, if an immigrant is able to match their pre-immigration occupation with a similar occupation in Canada, this substantially increases their return to productive characteristics. This result points out the obvious difficulties for those who cannot match their occupations due to barriers to entry. In some cases, highly skilled immigrant women with post-secondary training and professional experience in their countries of origin can secure employment in their fields, but in many cases they remain unemployed or need to accept non-skilled jobs (Mojab 1999, 123). This is often the case even when these women have access to good education programs that provide them hope for future employment. Unfortunately, the necessity of meeting their immediate economic needs necessitates them taking jobs that were not commensurate with their skills (Mojab 1999, 213). This is a conclusion that was concurred by a 2018 report on immigrant women in the Greater Toronto Area. This study found that immigrant women with degrees from outside Canada “are the least likely to be working in a job that requires a degree” and that women immigrants with university degrees “earn on average half the amount of their Canadian-born counterparts,” a trend that “has barely change in 15 years” (TRIEC 2018, 7).

Despite having strong language proficiencies and credentials, the ability of highly-skilled professionals to pursue reskilling, such as technical training that is necessary to enter the workforce, can be inhibited by the cost and length of the reskilling process, especially if they are mothers who need access to childcare. A 2013 report by the Wellesley Institute examined immigrant women in Toronto and found that many women, especially those with young children, “miss the window for [language training],” because of strict criteria regarding eligibility that relates to length of time in Canada and to their immigration categories (Akter et al. 2013, 16). The resulting disappointment felt by immigrants is called the migrant expectations-reality gap, wherein immigrants prepare and move to Canada
expecting their previous training to be valued and recognized only to find that it is not and that the road to re-skilling is time consuming, expensive, and demoralizing. Guo (2013, 103) adds that there is messaging that “these recent immigrants should expect their high educational attainment to deliver in terms of occupational achievement and upward social mobility,” but it seems that ‘this scenario has, to date, been overly optimistic”. These realities are well documented by broad trends captured in economic studies as well.

Since the 1990s, studies on the economic assimilation of immigrants have documented this disconnect between the skills immigrants bring to Canada and the jobs they are able to secure. These trends show up in quantitative studies as immigrant’s lower returns to common measures of labor market productivity, such as language ability, education, or experience. Studies point out to penalties of around 2.9% lower earnings per year of experience and up to 3.1% lower earnings per year of education for immigrant women, relative to Canadian-born women (Ferrer and Riddell 2008). This penalty is often believed to be the result of lack of Canadian experience; the earnings of immigrant women with previous Canadian experience are about 16% higher than those with no previous Canadian experience. The education of whom is also more valued than that of those with no Canadian experience (Pandey and Townsend 2018). Whether or not experience and education are the real motivations for this disconnect, however, is disputed. In a study focusing on within establishment wage differences, Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) found a substantial wage penalty for immigrant women that is not explained by differences in education or experience, and even higher differences for immigrants from non-traditional source countries, who are more likely to be racialized. Similarly, Boyd and Jiu (2009, 229) found that a persistent wage gap experienced by immigrant women, especially those who are racialized, even when differences in skill, experience, and education were accounted for, “suggest[ing] that systemic discrimination may be at work”.

**Affordable Childcare**

One of the structural barriers affecting women’s outcomes in the labour market is the lack of affordable childcare. While this difficulty is general to all women, immigrant women are most significantly affected because immigration often obliterates family support in childcare. In Suto’s (2009) study of immigrant women in Canada, most of whom had post-secondary degrees and held professional occupations in their countries of origin, she found that immigrant women who gained employment in Canada had taken jobs below their capacity, or faced time related underemployment, particularly those in regulated professions, such as engineering or law, because of childcare responsibilities. Many women had previously relied on their co-ethnic communities and family to support them in childcare and immigration to Canada had negated this support and childcare (Martins and Reid 2007, 208).

In addition to entering the labour market, childcare responsibilities also create barriers for women pursuing retraining. The need to arrange for care to participate in reskilling workshops and programs creates an added challenge, a reality that is exacerbated by the need to pursue multiple avenues of reskilling. For example, a 2013 roundtable by the Toronto Immigrant Employment Data Initiative revealed that many employment programs were amalgamating to stay afloat in the wake of budget cuts, resulting in immigrants needing
to “move from one program to another, often with long waiting periods between programs” (TIEDI 2013, 6). The challenges these changes pose are often particularly onerous for women, whose care work can “make it difficult for them to change the time and location of their programs” (TIEDI 2013, 6). In addition to these scheduling burdens, Boyd (1984, 1092) explains that the double burden of paid work and unpaid care work “manifests itself in fatigue, overwork and psychic disorders for all women,” with particularly significant ramifications for immigrant women who may not have the “time or energy” to reskill.

In addition, a lack of community support is often identified as a barrier that racialized immigrant women face. This can add to prevailing stress, loneliness, and social isolation that has been well documented as experiences of new immigrants. These health stresses occur even amongst those coming to Canada with strong health baselines, suggesting that adapting to life in Canada can put a strain on the health of immigrants (See Glazier et al. 2004; Ponizovsky and Ritsner 2004). These challenges, however, have been shown to ease with improved economic outcomes and the development of community supports (Maheux and Schellenberg 2007).

Dependencies on others are another barrier faced by immigrant women, especially sponsored women. Research shows that the settlement experience involves significant generational differences among women and girls, and that sponsored women are more vulnerable, particularly to domestic violence, which can all negatively impact their labour market outcomes (Dyck and McLaren 2004).

In a study designed to assess the value of credentials for immigrants to Canada, Ferrer and Riddell (2008) showed that there is indeed a significant loss in the value of a bachelor’s degree for immigrant women, who earn around 3% less than similarly educated Canadian-born women. The penalty increases for older immigrants arriving to Canada, presumably due to the additional difficulties acquiring or updating credentials. Notably, there is no penalty in wages for lower-level degrees and a substantial premium exists for immigrant women with post-secondary degrees.

Of course, the study above only analyzes wages, which obscures the influence that lack of credential recognition has on employment or career progression. Guo (2013, 109) writes that “foreign credentials held by majority member immigrants (e.g., British, North and West Europeans) bring a net earning advantage; only those held by visible minority immigrants (e.g., Black and Chinese immigrants) suffer an earnings penalty.” According to Guo (2013, 111):

Among a number of players and institutions that may be blamed for the devaluation of immigrants’ foreign credentials and prior work experiences are professional associations and prior learning assessment agencies, which often function as gatekeepers by restricting immigrants’ access to high-pay professional jobs. By the exercising of technologies of power, such as invisible surveillance, examination, encouragement, and normalization, professional associations and prior learning assessment agencies have created a system of governing in devaluing and discounting immigrants’ prior learning and work experience (Andersson and Guo 2009). These techniques function as practices
that place strong emphasis on human capital, policymakers need to recognize difficulties in the advancement of immigrant women if they want to take full advantage of their potential.

Discrimination
Foreign credential recognition is not a guarantee for successful integration. As Turcotte and Savage (2020) note, many newcomers with higher levels of education (at least a bachelor's degree) or who trained as nurses in their home countries, are admitted as nurse aides, care aides, or personal support care workers. Although these are good jobs, immigrant women in these positions are much more likely than their Canadian-born counterparts to be overskilled for these positions (Turcotte and Savage 2020). Indeed, when we look at individuals with nursing degrees from abroad versus those who earned their credentials in Canada, we find that “82.6 percent of internationally educated immigrant nurses were working below their skill level, compared to only 37.6 percent of the Canadian born and educated” (Augustine 2015). A large-scale study of migrant entrepreneurs in the Netherlands also provides evidence that discriminatory dynamics have a negative impact on immigrant women in the European Union. The study found that regulatory controls in the Netherlands created barriers for migrants to access markets even when they hold the required credentials (Beckers and Blumberg 2013, noted in Ram, Jones, and Villares Varela 2016).

Research is mostly unanimous in identifying the serious challenges that immigrant women face in the labour market. It also concurs in the substantial heterogeneity of this group. Not all immigrant women arrive with the same levels of language ability or credentials. Acquiring

Although foreign credential recognition information can be found on government websites, the realities of not having credentials recognized, facing a long and uncertain process of having credentials being evaluated, and navigating the process of English language acquisition are not described in detail. Guo (2013, 108) interviewed Chinese immigrants in Calgary and Edmonton and found that respondents received assistance first from friends and family, then from non-governmental organizations, and lastly from governmental organizations. Adserà and Ferrer (2014, 363) note that in the Canadian context, a large presence of educated immigrant women in low-skilled occupations suggests the existence of significant obstacles at entry. However, judging by the gradual convergence between the tasks required for their jobs and those of natives, these barriers seem to ease over time and lead to some wage assimilation (up to 80 percent of the wages of similar native-born women after 15 to 20 years in Canada). For the less educated, skill progression does not happen, although wages still rise gradually over time, reaching 90 percent of the wages of similarly educated native women. In countries with immigration policies dividing between acceptable and non-acceptable knowledge and competence, and thus between acceptance and non-acceptance as a professional. Rather than hitting a glass ceiling, it seems clear that immigrant professionals hit a “glass gate” which denies them access to the guarded professional communities because their knowledge and experiences are deemed different, deficient, and hence need to be devalued.
Care Work

A common theme of research into racialized immigrant women and the labour market are the added demands that care work, especially child bearing, child rearing, and the need to care for older dependents and family members, place on women attempting to enter or progress in the labour market. As discussed elsewhere in this report, such unpaid domestic work often delays the attainment of credentials, including the development of language skills, reskilling, and the paid work experience necessary to successfully enter the Canadian workforce (TIEDI 2016, 6; Akter, Topkara-Sarsu, and Dyson 2013, 16). The multiplicity of skills necessary to perform unpaid care work also go unrecognized by the Canadian immigration points system, meaning women are less likely to enter the country as primary applicants, with all the benefits and advantages that entails (Boucher 2007).

If they are able to secure paid employment, racialized immigrant women are also disproportionately likely to work in the care sector, as childhood educators, nurses, and home care and support workers (The Canadian Women’s Foundation et al. 2020) and to work in positions for which they are overskilled (Suto 2009; Turcotte and Savage 2020). These jobs are often poorly remunerated and precarious with little, if any, opportunity for growth. Many of these jobs are also filled by women from countries in the Global South, who migrate for work but “are not afforded the right to care for their own families and/or a clear, secure path to permanent residency in Canada and family reunification” (The Canadian Women’s Foundation et al. 2020).

Although it is fundamental to the success of all societies, care work is often unpaid or underpaid and its economic and social value overlooked. However, the COVID 19 pandemic has thrown the significance of care work, as well as its still deeply gendered nature, into sharp relief. Women still perform the overwhelming majority of childcare and domestic work, as evidenced by the devastating implications of pandemic lockdowns for women’s labour market participation (See Impacts of COVID-19 on page 28) and many workers have been unable to return to work, or unable to return at full capacity, without the availability of childcare. Canada’s pandemic economic recovery plan must therefore address not only the significance of care work to the Canadian economy generally through, for example, the creation of a national childcare program, but also create targeted initiatives to get marginalized communities into the workforce, including racialized immigrant women, who were hardest hit by job losses in the pandemic and are most likely to face barriers to entry and re-entry (The Canadian Women’s Foundation et al. 2020).

The Canadian government has promised to take a “feminist, intersectional response” to pandemic recovery through an Action Plan on Women in the Economy, including reopening the possibility of a national childcare program, but the specific forms these initiatives will take remain to be seen (Canada 2020, 13). In thinking about the nature of these changes, a recent report, Resetting Normal: Women, Decent Work and Canada’s Fractured Care Economy (The Canadian Women’s Foundation et al. 2020) advocates for the need to “[r]evitalize social, not only physical, infrastructure through care sector investments” as well as the need to “[e]nsure care work is decent work.”
these skills is a challenge, especially for those with family responsibilities. Even those with high levels of education or language fluency encounter difficulties securing jobs commensurate with their human capital, facing different forms of discrimination. Finally, cultural differences also matter in determining the degree of their labour force attachment or career progression.

Even when immigrant women are fluent, they describe discrimination for having accents or for how they speak English/French in their search for work (Suto 2009, 425). These barriers to immigrant women entering and advancing in the labour market are prominent reasons for their stalled or downward mobility (See, for example, Creese and Wiebe 2012; Gans 2009; Preston and Man 1999; Salaff et al. 2002; Salami and Nelson 2014; Sethi and Williams 2015; Slade 2008).

In Canada, indirect evidence of discrimination suffered by racialized immigrant women in the labour market is provided by Philip Oreopoulos 2011’s study. In an experiment using fake resumes in Toronto, Oreopoulos found that applicants with English-sounding names (versus foreign-sounding names) were much more likely to receive a call from prospective employers. Call back rates dropped by 4.4% when a foreign-sounding name was used in favour of an English-sounding name, a detail that recruiters attributed to “signal[s] that an applicant lacks critical language skills for the job” (2011, 168). While this was the justification offered, Oreopoulos points out, “[w]e cannot rule out that the stated reasons for discrimination belie underlying prejudice” (2011, 169).

Cultural Barriers

One of the most widely debated topics surrounding immigration concerns acculturation: assimilation to a different culture which is generally defined as a collection of beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and practices shared by a community. Research on the role of culture in the economic outcomes of immigrants has been limited by the difficulties in separating the impact of culture from the impact of surrounding environmental and individual characteristics such as inherent ability. The points addressed above, for instance, highlight differences between immigrants and between immigrants and Canadian-born individuals due to the individual characteristics of immigrants or to failures in market institutions that impede the ability of immigrants to fully integrate in the labour market. However, most of those studies acknowledge that these are unlikely to be the only determinants of observed differences in labour market outcomes. The remaining differences have often been collected under indicators such as region of birth, a proxy for “everything else” that the researchers may not have information on, such as religion, cultural norms regarding gender roles, existence of local networks (See Raza et al 2013), or the quality of the educational systems in the home country. Whether immigrant women are less likely to choose work or seek promotion or job advancement because of cultural preferences is intrinsically different from whether they are less likely to find work or be promoted to a position they are seeking. Each of these factors affecting labour market outcomes requires a distinct political response.

Among studies that have tried to disentangle the role of culture on labour market performance of women immigrants, Kessler and Milligan (2020, 10) tried to assess the effect that culture has on the labour market outcomes and fertility choices of second
generation immigrant women to Canada. Second generation immigrants face the same economic landscape as the children of Canadian-born parents, but hold different cultural influences passed on to them from their parents or through geographic clustering. The results of their study indicated that there was no cultural impact on labour market participation and number of children for second generation married immigrant women who held a university degree, whereas it was four to eight times higher for second generation married immigrant women who dropped out of secondary school than those with the average level of education (some post-secondary education). Indirectly, this suggests that part of the differences in labour market outcomes between first generation immigrants and the native born are likely related to cultural differences, differences that diminish for the university educated in the next generation. It is of particular note that differences between source-country and Canadian gender attitudes did not seem to cause this effect. Further research into the cause of this educational gradient could improve our understanding of cultural assimilation of immigrants. Blau et al. (2020) also used data from second generation immigrants in the United States to determine the longevity of the impact of source-country characteristics and culture, finding that the amount of non-market work performed by second generation immigrants was much closer to that of native-born Americans than first generation immigrants. Interestingly, while they found no significant impact of source-country “gender equality” on the non-market labour supply of second generation immigrant women, they did find that fathers with immigrant parents from

Glass Barriers
Barriers to career advancement and mobility of immigrant women have been described using metaphors like the glass ceiling, the glass floor, the glass wall, and the glass door.

- **The glass ceiling** describes a phenomenon whereby women and minority men can see a desired management position, while looking up the so-called corporate ladder, but cannot get through the impenetrable barrier of glass representing gender discriminatory or racially motivated hiring decisions (Wong 2006, 23 in Guo 2013, 98). The concept also refers to the earnings disparity between white men, white women, minority men, and minority women (Pendakur and Pendakur 2007).

- **The glass floor or sticky floor** is often used to account for factors that keep skilled or less skilled immigrants in low-level, low-wage jobs and prevent them from obtaining upward career mobility (de la Rica et al. 2005).

- **The glass wall** is described by McCoy and Masuch (2007) as an invisible barrier that keeps well-educated immigrant women seeking work in non-regulated professional occupations on the outside. Without policies in place to support their entry into these fields, the status quo that keeps them at the margins and unable to utilize their skill sets and gain self-confidence climbing the ladder remains firmly in place.

- **The glass door**, as described by Pendakur and Woodcock (2010), is a barrier that limits immigrant workers’ access to employment at high-wage firms. They argue that a glass door is the barrier to options or variety in the firms from which an educated immigrant worker can secure employment.

- **The glass gate**, according to Guo (2013, 111) is a barrier that denies immigrant professionals access to certain professional communities by devaluing their experiences and credentials.

Collectively, these metaphors draw attention to the challenges to both entering and prospering in the labour market faced by immigrant women.
countries that are more “gender equal” supply significantly more non-market labour (i.e. housework and taking care of their children). Pendakur’s (2020) analysis of the labour market outcomes of Afghan immigrants to Canada, also looked at the labour market outcomes of second generation workers with Afghan immigrant parents, finding that the children of Afghan immigrants do better than their parents. Moreover, the daughters of Afghan immigrants both show higher employment probabilities and earnings, than sons of Afghan immigrants, other things equal.

Lacroix et al. (2017) conducted an analysis of the speed of access to a first job of immigrants in Quebec between 1997 and 2000. Their study focused on principal applicant women, most arriving in Canada with no spouse or dependents, thus alleviating many of the gender based cultural impacts mentioned in the above studies. Once individual characteristics were taken into account (such as official language ability) the impact of source-country on time to obtain initial employment for immigrant women was found to be insignificant, with the exception of those from Africa (particularly from the Maghreb), confirming the previous results about the role of culture. In terms of finding employment matching their level of education, an immigrant’s source country was significant and impacted both genders equally, even after controlling for individual characteristics. This suggests that gender cultural norms are less likely to be the reason driving the lack of occupational matching for women. Although the study did not draw conclusions as to why these impacts differed, they cited previous studies indicating that religious and cultural differences caused barriers to employment for both men and women.

Frank and Hou (2015) looked at the impact of both women’s labour force participation rates and gender-equality attitudes in their source-country (a measure of cultural gender norms) on the wages of immigrant women. They found a positive relationship for both – that is, women’s salaries in Canada were higher when immigrant women had both high labour force participation rates and positive attitudes towards gender equality in their source countries. These positive relationships were due largely to the fact that these women tend to work in higher-paying industries. The authors theorize that a high rate of women’s labour force participation in a country may give women more access to important skills and knowledge that could help them obtain a better job upon immigration. Notably, the impact of source-country gender role attitudes on wages remains significant, even when controlling for occupation and industry, suggesting further effects related to cultural or ethnic background.

Norm expectations can also be influenced by a woman’s marital status, as well as who they marry, and these variables are also shown to be correlated to women’s labour market outcomes. For example, Sethi and Williams (2015, 134) find that immigrant women “often delay validating their own credentials until their husband is established in the labour market,” as suggested by the family investment hypothesis (Long 1980). These immigrant women are then more likely to hold “survival jobs to support their husbands while they retrain and search for jobs,” a reality that can lead to many immigrant women becoming “deskilled” as time progresses when entering the Canadian labour market. They can also miss crucial cutoffs to acquire potential training benefits that could advance them in their own careers (TIEDI 2013, 7). Adserà and Ferrer (2014) find further evidence that immigrant women’s
employment choices in Canada, particularly those of less educated women, are frequently conditioned by their partners’ needs, resulting in lower wages and occupational status than that of immigrant women married to native-born men (see Adsera and Ferrer 2016). There are also differences in the outcomes of immigrant women married to immigrant men based on their pathways to immigration. Women who enter the country as spouses or partners of men through economic immigration pathways tend to fare better in the job market. This is likely because “economic immigration programs, which assess and select principal applicants based on their human capital, also indirectly selected immigrant spouses with high levels of human capital and labour market involvement” (Bonikowska and Hou 2017).

Overall, studies trying to understand the effect of culture on labour force participation, the length of time it takes to secure an initial job, and wages, point to potentially significant effects that appear to be related to a woman’s choice of partner, suggested partly by the lack of such effects for second generation immigrant women. Further research is needed to determine the ways gender role attitudes influence the wages earned by immigrant women, whether it be through higher expectations, greater confidence and assertiveness when asking for a raise, or other explanations. The role of additional determinants of labour market outcomes that might be masked under the “country of origin” indicator also remains to be analyzed. These will likely include factors such as race, which can trigger discrimination at different levels of the integration process.

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<th>Top 5 Countries of Citizenship by Number of Admissions of Permanent Residents into Canada</th>
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<td><strong>Total Admissions of Permanent Residents into Canada</strong></td>
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Household Division of Labour and Gender Roles

Like all Canadian households, immigrant households must establish which members will provide labour market services and which will provide household (unpaid) services. These arrangements are deeply connected to cultural norms regarding gender roles in society. To determine potential explanations for how these decisions are made, many economists have studied the characteristics and circumstances of immigrants. For example, Frank and Hou (2013) analyze the relationship between the labour market activity of immigrant women and indicators of how “traditional” their country of origin is in terms of adherence to traditional gender roles. The variables they use to compare gender equality and labour market activity in a given country are the ratio of women’s to men’s labour force participation rate (labour activity ratio) and the ratio of women’s to men’s secondary school enrolment rate (education ratio). They found that high female-male labour activity ratios and high female-male education ratios in the immigrant women’s countries of origin were positively correlated with increased labour market activity and negatively correlated with unpaid household work (though the source country labour market activity was more correlated than the education indicator). This means that if an immigrant woman came from a country where women generally do relatively more paid work and less unpaid household labour, then they are more likely to follow those patterns in Canada. In a subsequent study however Frank and Hou (2015) could not correlate this finding with gender-role attitudes in the country of origin, as measured from the World Values Survey. This is consistent with prior studies (such as Antecol 2000; Blau, Khan and Papps 2011).

Similarly, Blau et al. (2020) performed a study using the 2003-2017 waves of the American Time Use Survey and gender equality scores from the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index to estimate the impact of source-country gender equality on division of non-market labour between immigrant spouses in the United States. They found that immigrant women from more “gender equal” countries spent fewer hours per week on average doing household labour (including childcare) than those from less “gender equal” countries, and the reverse for immigrant men. These effects were especially strong for households with children. Evidence shows that “the paid and unpaid labour activities of immigrant women … continue to be influenced by the gender roles of their source countries” (Frank and Hou 2013, 7).

...women from source countries with more “traditional” gender roles (i.e., the male breadwinner/female caregiver model) are less likely to participate in the labour force and also perform a larger amount of housework than women from countries with less traditional gender roles. Immigrant women who arrive from source countries with higher ratios of of female–male secondary education also experience greater equity with their husbands with respect to their share in paid work and housework. (Frank and Hou 2013, 6)

In short, immigrating to Canada does not erase or perhaps even weaken deeply held norms about gender role responsibilities in the home. These expectations can have a significant impact on immigrant women’s ability to enter and succeed in the labour market.
In the previous section, we outlined the challenges to the greater inclusion of racialized immigrant women in the labour market. In this section, we review selected policy initiatives in Canada, European Union, Australia, and the United States that have been used to address some of these challenges.

When creating policies and programs to promote the success of racialized immigrant women in the labour force, we should be wary of conclusions that suggest the need to make women behave like men in the labour market. Likewise, programs that start from assumptions of rigid gender roles can be problematic. For example, we know that women are still disproportionately responsible for childcare, and policies and programs targeting women must recognize this, but they must do so without assuming that all women will or should take on these responsibilities. Such recognition is crucial because, as Boucher (2007, 392) notes, Canada's points-based immigration system rewards paid work experience but excludes “unpaid domestic or child care as work experience”. At the same time, this division of labour often reflects discriminatory assumptions about the abilities and priorities of women in the society as well as power imbalances in the domestic sphere. We must therefore walk a fine line between recognizing existing dynamics and pushing for inclusive change.

With these considerations in mind, questions remain about the appropriate metrics to measure success and what the use of different metrics means for the future of immigration in Canada. There are two main approaches to measuring the success of different programs: outputs and outcomes. Outputs, which might include the number of participants who completed a program or the skills they were exposed to, are much easier to measure, but often tell us little about the effect of a program. Outcomes focus on the impact of a program on the individuals taking part or the labour market more generally and might include statistics on labour market participation or interviews with candidates reflecting on their perception of the program's effects. While more difficult to measure, these metrics can tell us more about the impact of a given program. Of course, even with a commitment to measuring program outcomes, the specific metrics being used shape our understanding of the results. This is especially evident when exploring the intersection of multiple identity factors.
Canada

This section explores recent policy initiatives supporting racialized immigrant women in Canada both federally and provincially, as well as a sample of international policy addressing the challenges faced by this group.

Federal

The 2014 Economic Action Plan proposed $150,000 “to increase mentorship among women entrepreneurs” (Flaherty 2014, 77) and the 2012 Economic Action Plan announced “the creation of an advisory council of leaders from the private and public sectors to promote the participation of women on corporate boards” (Flaherty 2012, 143). There was no programming to specifically improve the outcome of immigrant women or racialized immigrant women in the labour market. This changed in 2015, as the federal government announced the Economic Action Plan for Women Entrepreneurs, designed to help women succeed “through mentorship and increased access to credit and international markets” (Oliver 2015, 132). The 2017 budget highlighted some of the challenges women face in the labour market, including the continued prevalence of a gender wage gap, the underrepresentation of women in lucrative occupational fields and in holding fulltime work and, relatedly, added challenges to care work (Morneau 2017, 220-221). This budget expressly noted that immigrant women “have comparable education levels to Canadian-born women, they have lower rates of labour force participation and higher unemployment rates” (Morneau 2017, 221). This passage cited potential reasons for these discrepancies, including “significant language barriers and literacy challenges, credential recognition and lack of Canadian work experience” (Morneau 2017, 221). To address these barriers, ongoing strategies including the Canadian Child Benefit and investments in early learning and childcare were noted and commitments were made to continue addressing the challenges. Notably, more flexible EI parental leave measures were introduced (63). It is important to note here that research controlling for discrepancies in skills, experience, and credentials continues to find differential treatment of racialized immigrant women, a reality that suggests the presence of systemic discrimination rather than simply a need to retrain or recognize credentials (Boyd and Jiu 2009, 229). As such, without targeted interventions for racialized immigrant women, some scholars fear that policy initiatives which seek to address wage discrepancies more generally, even for all immigrants, are “not likely to substantially diminish the earnings gaps” (Boyd and Jiu 2009, 229).

The 2018 federal budget expanded policy attention on gender issues. Specifically, the budget highlighted the challenges immigrant women in Canada face in participating in the labour market, including “both gender- and race-based discrimination, precarious or low-income employment, lack of affordable and accessible child care, lower language and literacy levels, lack of community and social supports, and limited or interrupted education in their home country” (Morneau 2018, 62). In response, the government committed $31.8

2 When changes to parental leave were enacted, the leave offered under EI was amended to include a use-it-or-lose-it option for the non-birthing parent (often fathers). Under the new plan, if both parents share a certain amount of leave, they are entitled to between five to eight weeks of additional leave, depending on the length of parental leave they take.
The budget also proposed a $5 million/year allocation to WAGE to “undertake research and data collection in support of the Government’s Gender Results Framework” (Morneau 2018, 55).

The Gender Results Framework, first introduced in the 2018 budget, is meant to represent the “Government of Canada’s vision for gender equality, highlighting the key issues that matter most” by providing tools to track Canada’s performance on a series of gender-related metrics, clarifying “what is needed to achieve greater equality,” and deciding how progress will be measured in the future (Status of Women 2020). This framework focuses on six key areas, one of which is “economic participation and prosperity”. Under this specific area, six stated objectives include:

- Increase labour market opportunities for women, especially women in underrepresented groups
- Reduce gender wage gap
- Increase full-time employment of women
- Equal sharing of parenting roles and family responsibilities
- Better gender balance across occupations
- More women in higher-quality jobs, such as permanent and well-paid jobs (Status of Women 2019)

This Gender Results Framework will also provide clearer metrics to measure the success of these initiatives. In response to the 2018 budget, the Visible Minority Newcomer Women pilot was announced to deliver programs for visible minority newcomer women designed to help them secure employment. Other policy initiatives targeting women in the workforce more generally include pay transparency and the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy (Government of Canada 2020). Moreover, the Women in Construction Fund leverages $10 million in existing funding from Employment and Social Development Canada to attracting more women to trades (Morneau 2018, 61).

In March of 2021, to address the so-called “Shecession” (Canada 2020, 12) caused by COVID-19 lockdowns, the government announced a new Task Force on Women in the Economy. The aim of this group is “to advise the government on a feminist, intersectional action plan that addresses issues of gender equality in the wake of the pandemic,” in advance of the 2021 federal budget (Department of Finance 2021). Although it is too soon to know the more specific issues this group will focus on, the 2020 Speech from the Throne suggests that a major government priority for the 2021 budget is the creation of a national childcare program.

**Provincial**

The provinces have taken a piecemeal approach to the creation of programs addressing the needs of racialized immigrant women in the labour market. A review of government websites reveals that there does not seem to be a targeted policy approach to the provision of services. Instead, to locate programs and services, individuals need to scan provincial government websites and community centres to find relevant programming. This decentralized approach can lead to the duplication of services and gaps. Many provinces highlight the wider economic and financial benefits of having a high participation of racialized immigrant women in the labour market. Provincial programs focus on retraining and reskilling, credential recognition, and language skills. While all valuable, the focus is often on immigrant women’s responsibilities ‘to improve’ rather than on businesses’ responsibilities to be more inclusive. Prince Edward Island is an
exception, where the government educates the business and local communities to recognize the economic value of immigrants. Many of these initiatives are available on the PEI Association for Newcomers to Canada website, which acts as a central repository for a wide range of programs and services, but there is no exclusive focus on racialized immigrants.

Provincial support for care work, especially childcare, were almost universally cited as necessary to raise the participation of immigrant women and racialized immigrant women in the labour market. Quebec has had a universal, low-fee childcare program since 1997, attributing to a higher proportion of women’s participation in the workforce but other provinces have yet to follow suit despite high demands for such programs. In 2020, British Columbia invested in childcare (British Columbia Ministry of Finance 2020, 9) and Alberta has a pilot project underway to provide $25/day childcare. The Government of Canada will also invest $136 million over three years in the Alberta project (Status of Women 2019, 18). Childcare and the challenges faced by racialized immigrant women to participate fully in the labour market has been noted. For example, a 2017 Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity in Ontario report noted “...the importance of providing universal childcare to allow primary caregivers an option to work full time” (Ontario’s Panel on Economic Growth & Prosperity 2017, 31). In a similar vein, a 2016 report on the health implications of precarious work on racialized refugee and immigrant women called for “Affordable and Accessible Childcare” as a means to address “the physical and mental health and wellbeing of all women workers” (Ng et al. 2016, 34).

Microloans are a financial figure destined to remove barriers to credit for individuals lacking collateral or access to regular financial institutions. One such non-for-profit organization is Windmill Microlending (previously Alberta’s Immigrant Access Fund), which specially addresses the lack of means for accreditation problems faced by immigrants. They offer low-interest microloans to help skilled immigrants and refugees get accreditation in Canada, as well as professional financial and credit services. An early evaluation of the program estimated the social return to this investment activity around 33% (Emery and Ferrer, 2014, 206) and indicated that 39% of the loan applicants were women.
European Union

A 2018 European Union (EU) study showed that the employment rate between women born in the EU and those who had immigrated was “8 percentage points larger than the gap among men,” clearly demonstrating the failure of the EU to fully exploit their potentials (Integration Expert 2018). The EU lacks a unified approach to address challenges faced by immigrant women, with only seven governments reporting having such policies in place and “little evidence of action plans and strategies with a particular focus on migrant women or gender issues” (Integration Expert 2018). Governments that have employed such policies were early to adopt policies for migrants with dedicated funding initiatives in support of women’s integration (Integration Expert 2018). These policies aim to address: 1) social integration; 2) discrimination and access to rights; and, 3) labour market integration (Integration Expert 2018). Social integration initiatives recognize that labour market participation alone is not sufficient for immigrant women to achieve a high standard of living. As such, social integration policies and programs take a broad perspective that supports immigrant women’s general integration into their new societies. These initiatives include measures for guidance on integration, various aspects of education such as upskilling, language acquisition, or childcare initiatives to reduce mothers’ burden of care to allow them to pursue education, and personal network-building to alleviate social isolation (Integration Expert 2018). Initiatives aiming to address discrimination and promote access to rights seek to combat a range of inequalities that immigrant women face in the labour market. Policy measures include countering gender-based violence, increasing social, economic and political participation by raising awareness of rights and improving gender equality, and fighting multifaceted forms of discrimination (Integration Expert 2018).

Lastly, the objective of labour market integration policies and programs is to expand access to employment. Policy measures include training, mentoring, targeted support for mothers, equipping migrant women with skills to succeed in women-dominated sectors such as care work, and support for entrepreneurship as an alternative form of employment (Integration Expert 2018). While EU Member States have many policy initiatives it is difficult to meaningfully measure their success.

The underutilization of racialized immigrants is nevertheless a cross-cutting EU challenge. Multiple factors impact immigrant women’s labour market integration, and it is therefore difficult to attribute successes or failures to specific policies or programs. Success is thus often measured using simple output-level indicators which provide information such as the number of participants to complete a specific training program, or the number of participants to be employed following their completion of a specific program. Such modes of evaluation generate limited insights. In particular, they do not capture issues such as labour mobility (Benton et al. 2014). For instance, labour market integration initiatives which support the recognition of foreign qualifications have proven to be useful to women obtain professional licenses or apply for further studies. However, there is little evidence on employers’ level of trust in the equivalency certificates generated by these initiatives, thereby rendering claims on the success of such initiatives in terms of employment.
Impact of COVID-19

Women’s labour force participation has increased steadily in recent decades, with Canadian women representing 47.3% of the labour force in 2020, up from 37.6% in 1976 (Catalyst 2020). COVID-19 has all but wiped out these gains. In the early months of 2020, “the COVID 19 pandemic knocked participation in the labour force down from a historic high to its lowest level in over 30 years” (RBC 2020). According to one study (Canadian Women’s Foundation et al. 2020) “[a]lmost half of recent immigrant women (-43.2%) who were employed in February lost their jobs or the majority of their hours by the end of April, 13 percentage points above the losses posted by Canadian-born women (-32.3%)”. The reasons for this are associated with care work. A recent study (Cafley et al. 2020, 15) explains that, in the wake of COVID-19, “[f]or lower- and middle-income mothers, there is an economic disincentive to return to work if they need access to childcare in order to return”.

Growing gaps in men and women’s labour force participation are also explained by the wage gap, the comparative precarity of women’s work, and their employment in less lucrative sectors, and these patterns also have strong ties to care considerations. For example, women are twice as likely to be part time workers, and many of these women (27%) cite childcare responsibilities as reasons for not taking full time work (Catalyst 2020). Additionally, “[s]ince only 29% of women in double-income families are primary earners, many women were also compelled to voluntarily forego work, with the majority of secondary-earner women scaling back hours or pulling out of the labour force to perform family and household tasks” (Cafley et al. 2020, 18). In essence, the COVID-19 pandemic threw into sharp contrast the consequences of what many policymakers already knew, namely, that women are more likely to be in precarious and part time employment, that they are more likely to be in low paying jobs, and that they are disproportionately responsible for domestic labour and care work. For immigrant women, these divides are even more stark.

Among some of the often-cited explanations for the displacement of racialized immigrant women workers from the COVID-19 lockdown and economic slowdown have been factors such as their concentration in tourism, hospitality, retail, and service industries that have been most negatively impacted by COVID-19 lockdowns and economic slowdowns or by digital transformation in these industries; their concentration in jobs that require routine tasks and are hence more vulnerable to automation; and their precarious position in the labour market which means they are often last hired and first fired when economic downturn takes hold (See Mo et al. 2020; Hou, Frank, and Schimmele 2020; Hankivsky and Kapilashrami 2020). Thus, racialized immigrant women are not only in a worse starting economic position but are also more likely to be affected by the expedited digital transformation of the workplace resulting from COVID-19 lockdowns. This is compounded by obstacles to access childcare, which impedes their ability to retrain or acquire new skills and different levels of labour market discrimination. Notably, racialized immigrant women are also overrepresented in care aid roles (Turcotte and Savage 2020).

In the 2020 Speech from the Throne, Parliament recognized that “Women – and low-income women – have been hit hardest by COVID-19,” calling the crisis a “She-cession” (Canada 2020, 12). In response, the Government promised to create “an Action Plan for Women in the Economy to help more women get
back into the workforce and to ensure a feminist, intersectional response to this pandemic and recovery” (Canada 2020, 13). As part of these efforts, the government committed to revisiting longstanding calls for the creation of national childcare (Canada 2020, 13). The last attempt at such a national program was the 2005 Foundations Program, which entailed working with each of the provinces to craft appropriate programs. This initiative, however, was cancelled in 2006 (Childcare Resource and Research Unit 2012). Although immigrant women are never explicitly mentioned, the 2020 Throne speech recognizes that immigration is key to Canadian economic growth and commits to leveraging immigration to aid in Canada’s post-COVID economic recovery and growth (Canada 2020, 29).

![Employment Rate of Canadian Women Aged 15 and Over by Immigration Date, 2019-2021 (3 month moving average)](image)

outcomes unclear (Benton et al. 2014, 20). Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests simultaneous initiatives such as language programs with built-in childcare, or vocational programs that also included professional language training have demonstrated relatively positive outcomes, including better socio-economic integration for participants, both in Europe and elsewhere (Benton et al. 2014, 22).

Australia

Like Canada, immigrant women in Australia are confronted with similar employment integration challenges. Australia’s immigrant women have consistently lower levels of employment compared with Australian-born women possessing equivalent levels of education and irrespective of their level of educational attainment (De Maio et al. 2017). Factors that can influence the economic participation of immigrant women include negative individual experiences (e.g., trauma, racism, and sexism), access to formal education, English language training, income and family support, social networks, and access to public transportation (Women’s Health West 2016, 7). Australia does not have a national policy initiative to address labour market challenges faced by immigrant women. Nonetheless, the 1987 Equal Employment Opportunity Act supports the employment outcomes of designated groups including women, ethnocultural minorities, and non-English speaking immigrants (Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Societies n.d.).

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations is responsible for labour market policy and facilitates the provision of labour market integration services for immigrants (often delivered through third parties). State and territory governments play a significant role in economic integration through their responsibilities for education and health, as well as providing additional funding for integration services where federal funding is deemed insufficient (Liebig 2006, 22). Immigrant women have access to a variety of programs and services: accredited language classes, family or domestic violence support, and parenting support or education services (De Maio et al. 2017). Australia’s service providers have identified some best practices in the provision of services that support employment outcomes. These include building trust among immigrant women through active collaboration, offering bilingual services, and being flexible in the provision of face-to-face consultations. Additionally, inclusive practices such as running information sessions on available services in convenient and accessible locations have been deemed to enhance the impact of programs and services (Women’s Health West 2016, 12).
United States

The politics of immigration in the United States (US) are known to be divisive, making policies difficult to legislate (Hipsman and Meissner 2013). There are no dedicated US federal policies to support the integration of immigrants, let alone racialized immigrant women (Ibid.). This absence assumes that the economic integration of immigrants is rooted in the dynamics of the labour market alone. Historically, US schools, churches, employers, and community-based groups have taken the lead on providing services to facilitate immigrant integration; there are relatively few publicly funded programs specifically designed to promote immigrants’ economic integration (Terrazas 2011; Hipsman and Meissner 2013). Some state or local level programs do aim to alleviate poverty or promote economic opportunity and may have immigrant integration as part of their programming (Terrazas 2011, 13).
EU Member States starting in the early 2000s have generated a significant body of policy research on the labour market integration of immigrants, including immigrant women. The integration of immigrants—primarily third country immigrants, which are those immigrants whose countries of origin are outside of the EU—has been identified as a priority issue (Samek Lodovici 2010). Given this prioritization, immigrant integration has garnered policy attention as a necessary and discreet area of social policy among EU Member States for over a decade (Hooper, Vincenza Desiderio and Salant 2017, 6). Some groups within the immigrant population have been identified as more at risk of societal exclusion than others, requiring targeted integration (Samek Lodovici 2010, 2). Some examples of these targeted initiatives that have been deemed successful include the following.

**Denmark - KVINFO**

The Mentor Network is an initiative of the Danish Centre for Information on Women and Gender (KVINFO) established in 2002. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, KVINFO’s mentorship network is a professional women-women network which matches immigrant or refugee women with women who are well established in the Danish labour market and society. Through this arrangement, immigrant women participants gain different forms of support (e.g. career, social, emotional) and inspiration is mutually shared (OECD 2018, 167). The Network has been deemed as a successful initiative, demonstrated by several studies including an analysis from 2017 which showed that 46% of the Mentor Network’s mentees found jobs while in their mentorship relationships, of which 54% found jobs corresponding with their qualifications (KVINFOs Mentornetværk n.d.). For more information on KVINFO’s Mentorship Network see [https://mentor.kvinfo.dk/en/frontpage/](https://mentor.kvinfo.dk/en/frontpage/).

**Germany - Per Menti**

Per Menti is a project that seeks to address the underemployment of immigrant women by supporting qualified immigrant women in finding appropriate career entry points in Germany. As a sub-national program, Per Menti is funded by the government of the State North Rhine-Westphalia, where the project operates. Following its first pilot, which was initiated in 2016, Per Menti has developed an approach to support immigrant women, especially refugees, with higher educational qualifications (Bachelor or Master level), or work experience, through individualised needs-based programs which comprise elements of career coaching, discussion groups for professional support, language training (at the C1 level), computer courses, and internships aimed at exposing insights into German working life. For more information see [site in German]([https://permenti.de/ueber-uns](https://permenti.de/ueber-uns)).

**Ireland - Building Better Futures**

Building Better Futures is a program run through the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI), with funding from the European Social Fund’s Programme for Employability, Inclusion and Learning. Through this program, the “Building Social Enterprise with Migrant Women Entrepreneurs” project targets immigrant women who have...
previous business experience and start-up ideas. Select participants undertake a nine-week entrepreneurship training program. The overall impact of this project has been assessed as positive because it fosters long-lasting relationships among participants and links between local employers and local authorities through training and increases entrepreneurial confidence. However, these positive assessments are made in the context of a lack of documented best practices in entrepreneurship, particularly for immigrant women (Arnold et al. 2019, 33). For more information see https://www.mrci.ie/about-us/.

**Australia- VICSEG New Futures**

The Victorian Cooperative on Children’s Services for Ethnic Groups (VICSEG) works across several issue areas to provide support and training to newly arrived and recently settled immigrant communities, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. For its part, the focus of VICSEG programs is community development and family support services. However, since joining forces with VICSEG, the New Futures Training Program has been the flagship of this initiative. New Futures contributes to the labour market participation of immigrant women by training these women to become certified childcare workers. Additionally, the New Futures Program familiarises participants with the Australian labour market, offers mentorship opportunities with community members working in the childcare sector, and provides follow-up supervision for new program graduates in the workplace (OECD 2018, 167). For more information see https://www.vicsegnewfutures.org.au/about.

**United States- I-BEST**

Washington State’s Integrated Basic Education and Skills Training (I-Best) program has proven to be one of the most effective models of training adapted for newcomers encompassing language, basic, and vocational skills using two instructors in the classroom (Benton et al. 2014, 22). I-BEST’s program supports access to career-pathways. This approach reduces the amount of time spent by students in the classroom so that they can move into employment faster. Although this program does not focus specifically on immigrants, it is highly regarded its positive outcomes benefiting immigrant participants. For more information see https://www.sbctc.edu/colleges-staff/programs-services/i-best/#:~:text=Washington's%20Integrated%20Basic%20Education%20and,uses%20a%20team%2Dteaching%20approach.
Entrepreneurship and Racialized Immigrant Women

Immigrants have lower business ownership rates than individuals born in Canada when they first arrive, but after several years in Canada, immigrants exceed Canadian-born in entrepreneurship (Ostrovsky and Picot 2018). This may be the case for several reasons: entrepreneurship is a substitute for the lack of occupational opportunities in the labour market (Li 2001, 1106-1107), immigrants’ desire to increase their earning potential, and as a means to avoid “low returns to their foreign-acquired skills” (Hou et al. 2012, 8). Pursuing entrepreneurship for many immigrants is therefore prompted by necessity, versus in order to take advantage of a business opportunity in the market. While immigrants may be drawn to entrepreneurship due to a lack of opportunity in the labour market, studies show that immigrant-owned firms have a higher level of net job creation and more likely to be high-growth firms than those with Canadian-born owners (Momani 2016; Picot and Rollin 2019). This is in line with prior academic research that shows immigrants make significant contributions to business ownership and innovation in general (Fairlie and Lofstrom 2013; Fairlie and Meyer 2003; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln 2010). With these considerations in mind, entrepreneurship may be a potential option for racialized immigrant women.

Recent data suggests that entrepreneurship is a common route for racialized immigrant women amongst some ethnic groups where “rates of self-employment among women are higher than the national average” (WEKH 2020, vi). For example, women are 56.4% of self-employed Filipinos immigrants, 41.4% of Chinese immigrants, and 40.8% of Latin American immigrants (WEKH 2020, 39). However, in general, and mirroring the Canadian-born population, “immigrant men are twice as likely as immigrant women to be firm owners” (Ostrovsky and Picot 2018). While entrepreneurship can be an attractive option for some immigrant women, offering the potential for economic independence, and flexibility to manage their family obligations, they face considerable challenges.

Research shows that compared to Canadian-born entrepreneurs, immigrants face additional barriers due to financial constraints, language barriers, and smaller networks (WEKH 2020). This is especially the case for women immigrant entrepreneurs who “suffer from a double disadvantage: they are women, and they belong to a national minority” (De Vita et al. 2014, 457). Since personal financing is the most commonly used source of funding for entrepreneurs (Leung and Osytovsky 2018, 6), this could pose a significant hurdle for women and particularly immigrant women who are often not primary breadwinners and financially support dependents. Immigrant women-owned firms often have difficulty providing collateral or a credit history to qualify for business loans. Additionally, a number of studies have pointed to gaps in existing supports and services for immigrant women pursuing entrepreneurship, noting that immigrant women entrepreneurs often lack full knowledge of the local community, struggle with language and literacy barriers, and are burdened by overly complicated paperwork required to set up and maintain a business (Kalu and Okafor 2020, 118). Therefore, if entrepreneurship is to be considered a viable alternative to the formal labour market for interested racialized immigrant women, these barriers need to be overcome.
Existing research on women entrepreneurs has not generally focused on racialized immigrant women, leaving a research gap in understanding their unique challenges and the skills and tools that might help them. This weakens the ability of business support organizations to provide tailored advice and tools to support immigrant women entrepreneurs.

Further research is needed to understand the barriers that racialized immigrant women entrepreneurs face in both the formal and informal economy and to develop appropriate strategies to assist immigrant women to overcome them. The COVID pandemic has exacerbated challenges faced by women (Oggero et al. 2020; Colombelli et al. 2020).
Appendix A

Terminology Used

This report refers to racialized individuals, rather than visible minority or ethnicity, except where the nature of secondary data precludes us. The term race allows for individuals to self-identify, which affords agency in the construction of identities and may extend more formal categorizations. When we refer to women this includes anyone who identifies as a woman.

Visible minority is uniquely utilized in Canada as defined by the Employment Equity Act (1986) as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour” (s. 3). Statistics Canada gathers data on 13 categories of visible minorities (e.g. South Asian, Chinese, Black, and Filipino). These categories have been criticized as “homogenizing” (United Nations 2012, 9) and therefore diverting attention from the problems facing specific groups under the larger visible minority umbrella (Grant and Balkissoon 2019; Sheppard 2006, 53). For example, concerns were expressed about grouping racial communities together, obscuring differences and “deflect[ing] attention from where the problems are greatest” and that the “coherence of a legal category based on physical markers of difference” was troubling (Sheppard 2006, 53). Despite the many differences between the groups included in the definition, Colleen Sheppard (2006, 53) suggests that “the commonality of racism explains the underlying logic of the visible minority terminology”. In addition to concerns about its utility, there are persistent concerns about the accuracy of the term visible minority. Canada’s changing demographics mean that the term “minority” is becoming a misnomer in some cases. For instance, “[v]isible minorities are no longer the minority in places such as Richmond, B.C., and Markham, Ont. – they are now the clear majority. And Statistics Canada projections show that in some other cities – including Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary – visible minorities could be the majority by 2036” (Grant and Balkissoon 2019). Visible minority categories are carefully defined by the government, while race is a matter of self-identification, leading Debra Thompson to call it “a conceptually fuzzy variable” (Thompson 2008, 536). Thompson adds this is useful because it gives individuals the power to define themselves and avoids “mis-recognition or negation of mixed-race identities” (Thompson 2008, 536-537). Race, as defined by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, is a “social construct,” meaning “society forms ideas of race based on geographic, historical, political, economic, social and cultural factors, as well as physical traits, even though none of these can legitimately be used to classify groups of people” (Ontario Human Rights Commission 2016).

As a result of the reliance on self-identification, and a lack of systemization, comparisons between racial categories often lack rigour, making it more difficult to gather quantitative data on race. Despite these challenges, we employ race and racialization in recognition of the power dynamics at play in the construction and experience of race, while relying on some data utilizing visible minority status to support qualitative work on the experiences of racialized groups. Finally, it is important to
that ethnicity is often incorrectly treated as a synonym for, or a more politically correct category for, race. The term ethnicity is seen as valuable because it affirms that race is not a biological category but socially constructed (Thompson 2014, 75-76). Nevertheless, recognition of its construction has been employed in ways that diminish the lived realities of racism (Haney López 1994, 22) and the power dynamics that underlie them (Cornell and Hartmann 2007, 31). In other words, the exercise of power is fundamental to the differentiation of race and ethnicity: “Power is almost invariably an aspect of race; it may or may not be an aspect of ethnicity” (Cornell and Hartmann 2007, 31).

How has data on race been gathered?
The Canadian Federal Government does not collect data on race, but the Canadian census gathers this survey data to generate an understanding of diversity in the Canadian population (Statistics Canada 2017c). The population group variable is concerned with ancestral ethnic and cultural origins and has deep historical roots from pre-Confederation, following which it has been included in the Canadian census since 1871 (Statistics Canada 2017a). Older iterations of the Canadian census surveyed language, ethnic origin, and place of birth which were consolidated to obtain an approximate figure on race (Potvin 2005, 37). In response to the increasingly complex diversity of the Canadian population, the 2021 census questionnaire will expand on distinctions of ethnic and cultural origins by removing in-text examples and instead providing a link that includes over 500 possible options (Statistics Canada 2020).

However, clear categories and the nature and history of racial categories makes this data collection fraught (Thompson 2008, 526), but failure to do so can also be problematic. Fuji Johnson and Howsam (2020, 3) suggest that failure to collect this information “can, effectively, be a form of resistance to prospective practices and policies that are based on evidence and that can better address racialized and gendered forms of exclusion, marginalization and other inequities”. With this in mind, the consensus amongst academics is that the benefits of collecting this data outweigh the costs or harms (Johnson and Howsam 2020, 3; Potvin 2005, 27). Speaking to issues of race-based data collection, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (2016) stated that: “Appropriate data collection is necessary for effectively monitoring discrimination, identifying and removing systemic barriers, ameliorating historical disadvantage and promoting substantive equality. Data collection is only a first step in addressing systemic discrimination”.

Sex or gender?
In recent years, the government of Canada turned to modernizing its approach to qualifying sex and gender. Earlier iterations of their efforts included the Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) initiative which has gained momentum in the public sector (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2009). GBA+ is an analytical tool designed to assess “how diverse groups of women, men and non-binary people may experience policies, programs, and initiatives” with an aim to securing gender equality (Status of Women 2017). In addition to gender, the plus denotes a focus on intersectional identity factors, including “race, ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability” (Status of Women 2017). Moreover, in a report to the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Treasury Board of Canada and the Department of Justice recommended further modernization to how the government
denotes sex and gender (Treasury Board 2019). Several federal departments have already made changes. As of 2018, Statistics Canada has updated the terminology it uses to gather statistics.

With the recent additions of gender identity and gender expression to the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code as well as some sources of administrative data changing from sex to gender, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts of sex, gender identity and gender expression within the National Statistical System. To this end, Statistics Canada has revised the variable ‘sex of a person’ as well as creating a new variable, ‘gender of person’. (Statistics Canada 2018c)

The new classification of gender has three variables: Male gender (M), Female gender (F), and Gender diverse (D)(Statistics Canada 2018d). The classification of sex continues to have two options: Male (M) and Female (F) (Statistics Canada 2018e). Similarly, Service Canada has started to use a non-binary option (X) “when collecting information for the Social Insurance Register and Canadian passports” (Treasury Board 2019). These new categories will provide more nuanced data on gender in Canada.
Gathering Data on Race Outside Canada

Other countries have taken different approaches to the collection of data on race, often amalgamating markers associated with race, such as nationality, ethnic origin, and religion, to approximate numbers, but none have resolved the complexities of gathering accurate information on this category. Still, many governments refuse to collect data on race, and rely on markers of migration background, like country of birth, when compiling data on immigrants.

Under the UK Equality Act (2010) public authorities have a duty to collect data on a range of protected characteristics, including race (Farkas 2017, 15, 40). A variety of terms are used to capture the idea of race in the UK, including ethnic minority, minority ethnic, and minoritized ethnic (The Law Society 2020). Race is “defined as including colour, ethnic or national origin, or nationality” (The Law Society 2020). Within the UK, England and Ireland recognize race by collecting and consolidating information on the categories of national, ethnic, and geographic origins (Farkas 2017, 40). Religion or belief are also captured in these categorisations, as Jews and Sikhs are considered ethnic groups, while Muslims are not (The Law Society 2020).

In the United States, population data is collected according to “race and ethnicity” (United States Census Bureau 2017). Since the first US census in 1790, racial information has been collected, though the categories have changed over time (Brown 2020). Racial and ethnic categories are determined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau considered consolidating the census questions on race and ethnicity into a single question, but this change was not approved by the OMB (Brown 2020).

For historical reasons, Germany and France do not collect any official demographic data on ethnicity. Collecting official data based on ethnic categories is legally prohibited in Germany as they perceive this to be a protection of citizens from data abuse (Ohliger 2008). Data on race and ethnicity is operationalised as “migration background,” which distinguishes between German and non-German national backgrounds (Farkas 2017, 12). Notably, migration background includes markers of ethnicity such as language and birthplace of parents, though it does not include religion (Farkas 2017, 12). Similarly, France does not collect information on race or ethnicity because it sees itself as “colour blind” and is strongly against collecting race-based data on the grounds that it contravenes the secular republic principles and would encourage prejudice (Oltermann and Henley 2020). Like Germany, France operationalises data on race using the category “migration background” (Farkas 2017, 11). In France, migration background includes markers for “country of birth and citizenship of individuals and of parents, including citizenship prior to French citizenship by acquisition” (Farkas 2017, 11). The geographical origins of immigrants are defined by country of birth and thereby include persons residing in France who were born abroad (Farkas 2017, 11).
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