The following publications fit with one or more of the CoLab's research themes. For a full list of Dr. Plaisance's publications, see her Google Scholar page.
Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science
Kathryn. S. Plaisance (2026), The Routledge Handbook of the History of Philosophy of Science After Kant
Over the past 15 years, a new field has emerged within philosophy of science under various headings such as “socially relevant philosophy of science,” “socially engaged philosophy of science,” and “field philosophy.” Scholars working in these areas deploy philosophical expertise to improve public welfare, often engaging with individuals, communities, and organizations outside philosophy in the process. Taking an engaged approach has been shown to generate positive impacts on society, science, and philosophy itself; in fact, many philosophers point to their engaged philosophy as among the most meaningful work they have done. Recent surveys indicate widespread interest in and support for engaged philosophy of science, with some philosophers even arguing that the discipline has an obligation to ensure it has a positive social impact. The historical roots of socially engaged philosophy of science reach back to feminist epistemology and philosophy of science beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, some scholars in the history of philosophy of science argue that socially engaged philosophy of science can be traced back even further, to a few early logical positivists whose work was often motivated by political concerns.
How Philosophy of Science can Enhance Research in Science and Engineering
How Philosophy of Science can Enhance Research in Science and Engineering: The Benefits, Challenges, and Ideal Conditions for Philosophy-STEM Collaborations
Kathryn S. Plaisance and Sara Doody (2026), Synthese
Philosophers of science have increasingly called attention to the benefits of incorporating philosophy of science into scientific practice, with some even offering case studies of fruitful collaborations with scientists. This scholarship is crucial for understanding how we might improve the relationship between philosophy and science, yet most of
it represents the perspectives of philosophers, leaving us with little insight into scientists’ and engineers’ experiences. Previous scholarship has also largely overlooked the barriers that may prevent scientists from engaging with philosophers, as well as the conditions under which collaborations might be especially promising. We set out to generate robust empirical insights on these matters by interviewing 20 scientists and engineers who have collaborated with philosophers of science. Our findings indicate that the benefits philosophers typically highlight are well recognized by participants, thus validating philosophical scholarship. What is more, participants identified practical benefits for their research and alluded to longer-term impacts emerging from the ways the collaboration shaped them as scientists. We also found that scientists and engineers faced two types of barriers, external and internal, although they also noted that the benefits of collaborating generally outweighed the costs. Lastly, participants shared unique perspectives on the conditions that are likely to make such collaborations worthwhile, offering actionable insights into how collaborators can tip the scales in their favor. This research should be useful for philosophers of science and scientists who are interested in engaging with one another, as well as for scientists and engineers more broadly as a way of understanding how such collaborations can benefit their fields.
Moving Beyond Anecdotes
Moving Beyond Anecdotes: Scientists’ and Engineers’ Views about and Engagement with Philosophy and Philosophers of Science
Kathyrn S. Plaisance, Sara Doody, Chad Gonnerman, and Aaron M. McCright (2026), Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science
Several prominent scientists have publicly expressed negative views about philosophy of science—and philosophy more generally—ranging from declarations that philosophy is dead to assertions that philosophy of science is a waste of time for scientists. Some philosophers of science have responded by defending the relevance of philosophy to scientific practice, illustrating how philosophical concepts, skills, and approaches can help make scientific research more epistemically and ethically sound. Such defenses are often motivated at least in part by claims that many scientists are antagonistic towards philosophy of science. A recent empirical study even suggests that philosophers of science perceive a ‘lack of interest from scientists’ as one of the main barriers to fruitful engagement between the two. These claims raise the question: How widespread are negative views of philosophy of science across the broader scientific community? We empirically investigated this and other research questions with data from a standardized survey administered to a probability-based sample of over 2000 scientists and engineers at 54 universities across Canada and the USA. Our findings indicate that the negative sentiments mentioned above are not representative of the wider scientific community. Many respondents even expressed interest in pursuing research collaborations with philosophers of science. Moreover, a majority of respondents reported having informally engaged with philosophers of science in one way or another. This study demonstrates why it is essential to empirically examine scientists' views rather than generalizing from a few cases, regardless of how prominent they may be.
What is 'Good' Science?
What Is ‘Good’ Science? How Disciplinary Norms and Expectations Discourage Broad Interdisciplinary Collaboration
Sara Doody and Kathryn S. Plaisance (2025), Perspectives on Science
Notions of ‘good’ science exert a powerful influence over scientists’ decisions about how research should be conducted and rewarded. Rarely are broad interdisciplinary collaborations, such as those between scientists and philosophers of science, characterized as ‘good’ science, despite philosophy’s relevance to scientific inquiry. We draw on Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus to explore how notions of ‘good’ science generate systemic barriers to scientists’ ability to collaborate with philosophers of science. We conducted semi-structured interviews with scientists and engineers who have engaged in research collaborations with philosophers of science and then used thematic codebook analysis to examine participant attitudes, disciplinary expectations, and academic incentive structures. We identify two different conceptions of ‘good’ science: field-aligned science, which is a more technical, data-driven approach that conforms to disciplinary incentive structures, and field-disruptive science, which asks more foundational questions but that tends not to be rewarded within scientific disciplines. Given how philosophy can enhance science, we argue that scientific communities would benefit from actively valuing science undertaken in collaboration with philosophers, but that doing so would require a shift in the field and the habitus that it encourages. Such a shift would also make science more conducive to other types of broad interdisciplinary collaboration.
A Framework for Analyzing Broadly Engaged Philosophy of Science
Kathryn S. Plaisance and Kevin Elliott (2021), Philosophy of Science
Philosophers of science are increasingly interested in engaging with scientific communities, policy makers, and members of the public; however, the nature of this engagement has not been systematically examined. Instead of delineating a specific kind of engaged philosophy of science, as previous accounts have done, this article draws on literature from outside the discipline to develop a framework for analyzing different forms of broadly engaged philosophy of science according to two key dimensions: social interaction and epistemic integration. Clarifying the many forms of engagement available to philosophers of science can advance future scholarship on engagement and promote more strategic engagement efforts.
Pathways of Influence
Pathways of Influence: Understanding the Impacts of Philosophy of Science in Scientific Domains
Kathryn S. Plaisance, Jay Michaud, and John McLevey (2021), Synthese
Philosophy of science has the potential to enhance scientific practice, science policy, and science education; moreover, recent research indicates that many philosophers of science think we ought to increase the broader impacts of our work. Yet, there is little to no empirical data on how we are supposed to have an impact. To address this problem, our research team interviewed 35 philosophers of science regarding the impact of their work in science-related domains.
We found that face-to-face engagement with scientists and other stakeholders was one of the most—if not the most—effective pathways to impact. Yet, working with non-philosophers and disseminating research outside philosophical venues is not what philosophers are typically trained or incentivized to do. Thus, there is a troublesome tension between the activities that are likely to lead to broader uptake of one’s work and those that are traditionally encouraged and rewarded in philosophy (and which are therefore the most consequential for careers in philosophy). We suggest several ways that philosophers of science, either as individuals or as a community, can navigate these tensions.
The Benefits of Acquiring Interactional Expertise
The Benefits of Acquiring Interactional Expertise: Why (Some) Philosophers of Science Should Engage Scientific Communities
Kathryn S. Plaisance (2020), Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A
Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.
Show Me the Numbers
Show Me the Numbers: A Quantitative Portrait of the Attitudes, Experiences, and Values of Philosophers of Science Regarding Broadly Engaged Work
Kathryn S. Plaisance, Alexander V. Graham, John McLevey, and Jay Michaud (2019), Synthese
Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for the importance of doing scientifically- and socially-engaged work, suggesting that we need to reduce barriers to extra-disciplinary engagement and broaden our impact. Yet, we currently lack empirical data to inform these discussions, leaving a number of important questions unanswered. How common is it for philosophers of science to engage other communities, and in what ways are they engaging? What barriers are most prevalent when it comes to broadly disseminating one’s work or collaborating with others? To what extent do philosophers of science actually value an engaged approach? Our project addresses this gap in our collective knowledge by providing empirical data regarding the state of philosophy of science today. We report the results of a survey of 299 philosophers of science about their attitudes towards and experiences with engaging those outside the discipline. Our data suggest that a significant majority of philosophers of science think it is important for non-philosophers to read and make use of their work; most are engaging with communities outside the discipline; and many think philosophy of science, as a discipline, has an obligation to ensure it has a broader impact. Interestingly, however, many of these same philosophers believe engaged work is generally undervalued in the discipline. We think these findings call for cautious optimism on the part of those who value engaged work—while there seems to be more interest in engaging other communities than many assume, significant barriers still remain.
Interdisciplinarity and Insularity in the Diffusion of Knowledge
Interdisciplinarity and Insularity in the Diffusion of Knowledge: An Analysis of Disciplinary Boundaries Between Philosophy of Science and the Sciences
John McLevey, Alexander V. Graham, Reid McIlroy-Young, Pierson Brown, and Kathryn S. Plaisance (2018), Scientometrics
Two fundamentally different perspectives on knowledge diffusion dominate debates about academic disciplines. On the one hand, critics of disciplinary research and education have argued that disciplines are isolated silos, within which specialists pursue inward-looking and increasingly narrow research agendas. On the other hand, critics of the silo argument have demonstrated that researchers constantly import and export ideas across disciplinary boundaries. These perspectives have different implications for how knowledge diffuses, how intellectuals gain and lose status within their disciplines, and how intellectual reputations evolve within and across disciplines. We argue that highly general claims about the nature of disciplinary boundaries are counterproductive, and that research on the nature of specific disciplinary boundaries is more useful. To that end, this paper uses a novel publication and citation network dataset and statistical models of citation networks to test hypotheses about the boundaries between philosophy of science and 11 disciplinary clusters. Specifically, we test hypotheses about whether engaging with and being cited by scientific communities outside philosophy of science has an impact on one’s position within philosophy of science. Our results suggest that philosophers of science produce interdisciplinary scholarship, but they tend not to cite work by other philosophers when it is published in journals outside of their discipline. Furthermore, net of other factors, receiving citations from other disciplines has no meaningful impact—positive or negative—on citations within philosophy of science. We conclude by considering this evidence for simultaneous interdisciplinarity and insularity in terms of scientific trading theory and other work on disciplinary boundaries and communication.
A Pluralistic Approach to Interactional Expertise
Kathryn S. Plaisance, and Eric B. Kennedy (2014), Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A
The concept of interactional expertise – characterized by sociologists Harry Collins and Robert Evans as the ability to speak the language of a discipline without the corresponding ability to practice – can serve as a powerful way of breaking down expert/non-expert dichotomies and providing a role for new voices in specialist communities. However, in spite of the vast uptake of this concept and its potential to fruitfully address many important issues related to scientific expertise, there has been surprisingly little critical analysis of it. We seek to remedy this situation by considering potential benefits of interactional expertise and the ways in which the current conception can – and cannot – realize those benefits. In particular, we argue that interactional expertise hasn't reached its full potential for addressing who ought to be involved in scientific research and decision-making, largely owing to an unnecessarily restrictive way of operationalizing the concept. In its place, we offer a broader, more pluralistic account of interactional expertise – one that is in line with the original spirit of the concept, but also captures the diversity that we see as being an important aspect of interactional experts and the value they can bring to the table.
Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science
Carla Fehr and Kathryn S. Plaisance (2010), Synthese
This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research in this area.
Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant
Kathryn S. Plaisance and Carla Fehr, Synthese Special Issue