2019 - 2020 Publications

Canada and the Gulf

"The article tracks Canada’s relations with the Arab Gulf countries from the early days of the establishment of diplomatic ties in the years following the oil boom of the 1970’s through to the upending of relations with Saudi Arabia in 2018. It highlights the consistent and sustained priority Canada attached to commercial links, even as regional developments forced political and security challenges onto the Canadian agenda. The article notes the central position occupied by Saudi Arabia in Canada’s regional calculations, which only recently came to be challenged by the UAE. The author explores the shift in approach to the region brought by the Harper Government, including sustained political engagement across the Gulf and how the election of the Trudeau Government resulted in a return to more the more limited diplomatic focus Canada had traditionally brought to the Gulf, but with an heightened political focus on human rights (especially with Saudi Arabia). The author argues that the Gulf is too important to discount or ignore and that a resumption of normal diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, whatever problems Canada has with the regime, would be in Canada’s interest." (Horak, 2020)

‘Defence Against Help’: Revisiting a Primary Justification for Canadian Participation in Continental Defence with the United States

"In its classic incarnation, the concept of ‘defence against help’ thus represents a trilateral equation, consisting of an external threat (or threatening context), a smaller state (the security of which is inextricably linked to the perceived security of a larger neighbour), and the neighbouring larger power itself. The equation incorporates how the threat relates to the larger state, and how the smaller state plays (or does not play) an intermediary role in the threat relationship between the threatening context and the larger state. The smaller state’s policy decisions are determined by how and what the larger state perceives as threats; whether the smaller state’s territory, airspace, or maritime zones can play a potential role in offsetting or meeting the threat; and whether the smaller state can feasibly provide adequate defences and sustain military credibility to ensure that the larger power does not infringe on its sovereignty in meeting perceived security threats. Although two powers may share common basic values and definitions of the threat, the normative assumption is that it is always in the smaller power’s national interest to be a sovereign state. Therefore, the smaller state’s national sovereignty concerns can confound the interdependent nature of the security relationship between neighbouring powers in the face of an external threat." (Lackenbauer, 2020)

Working Paper by Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer

• Defence Against Help_Working Paper (PDF)

Policy Brief Recommendations by Vincent Boucher and Kristen Csenkey

• Modernizing ‘We Have the Watch’: Opportunities for Canada Within the Current Continental Defence Partnership (PDF)

GBA+ Application by Andrea Lane

• GBA+ Application: Defence Against Help (PDF)

Infographics_DSFG_Lackenbauer (PDF)

Russia’s Private Military Contractors: Cause for Worry?

"Two major geopolitical shifts – the Syrian civil war and the Ukrainian crisis – drew attention of the global academic and policy-related community to the issue of Russia`s private military companies (PMCs) and the so-called Wagner Group that has operated in Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Mozambique. In so doing, it has become the living symbol of Russia`s covert use of ‘shady’ militarized groups and irregulars in a powerplay against the west and its allies as well as securing Russia`s geo-economic/strategic interests abroad.  

Although they are effective as a tool against weaker opponents, we argue that Russian PMCs should not be viewed as a strategic element in Russia’s military toolkit. Indeed, their effective only when paired with Russia’s regular armed forces. We contend that PMCs are unlikely to be used against NATO members directly. Nevertheless, Russia will continue employing these forces in zones of instability as a means to engage the West in non-linear and asymmetric fashion." (Sukhankin and Hurska, 2020)

Working Paper by Dr. Sergey Sukhankin and Alla Hurska

• Russia's Private Military Contractors: Cause for Worry?_Working Paper (PDF)

Policy Brief Recommendations by Nico Saunders

• Policy Brief: Russia's Private Military Contractors (PDF)

GBA+ Application by Victoria Tait

• GBA+ Application: Russia's Private Military Contractors (PDF)

Infographics_DSFG_Sukhankin and Hurska (PDF)