Current undergraduate students

Friday, May 1, 2009 11:30 am - 11:30 am EDT (GMT -04:00)

AI seminar: Active learning in regression over finite domains

Speaker: Casba Szepesvari, University of Alberta

It is known that the nonparametric minimax rate for regression in the active and passive settings are the same for various smoothness classes. In this talk, I will look into the simpler problem when the regression domain is finite, but the response variance is location dependent, i.e., the noise is heteroscedastic.

Thursday, July 9, 2009 11:00 am - 11:00 am EDT (GMT -04:00)

AI seminar: Overlapping coalition formation

Speaker: George Chalkiadakis, University of Southampton

In multiagent domains, agents form coalitions to perform tasks. The usual models of cooperative game theory assume that the desired outcome is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions (i.e., a partition of the set of agents).

Friday, July 10, 2009 11:30 am - 11:30 am EDT (GMT -04:00)

AI seminar: Minimal sufficient explanations for factored Markov decision processes

Speaker: Omar Zia Khan

Explaining policies of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) is complicated due to their probabilistic and sequential nature. We present a technique to explain policies for factored MDP by populating a set of domain-independent templates.

Wednesday, October 7, 2009 1:30 pm - 1:30 pm EDT (GMT -04:00)

AI seminar: Taming the complexity monster

Speaker: Holger Hoos, the University of British Columbia

We live in interesting times - as individuals, as members of various communities and organisations, and as inhabitants of planet Earth, we face many challenges, ranging from climate change to resource limitations, from market risks and uncertainties to complex diseases.

Friday, November 27, 2009 11:30 am - 11:30 am EST (GMT -05:00)

AI seminar: Imitation in artificial agents

Speaker: Chris Marriott

Humans possess many social learning mechanisms that may be unique to our species (e.g. human speech). Imitation is a social learning mechanism that ethologists believe is at least unigue to Hominidae (the great apes) if not Homo sapiens.