Highlighted
Decoding effort: Toward a measure – and a better understanding – of effort intensity in accounting research |
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![]() This study by Alan Webb is forthcoming in Management Accounting Research and is co-authored with Gary Hecht, Kristan Rotaru, Axel Schulz and Kristy Towry. The study introduces pupillometry – the measurement of pupil diameter changes – as a direct approach to capturing effort intensity in management accounting research. Traditional approaches using self-reports or performance-based proxies have limited researchers’ ability to study how management control systems influence behavior through effort. Using a controlled experiment with a decoding task, we examine how piece-rate versus flat-wage compensation influences effort intensity and performance. Our findings show that pupil dilation partially mediates the relationship between incentives and performance, with this mediation strongest in early experimental rounds before weakening over time. This dynamic pattern suggests that while incentives initially influence performance through effort intensity, other mechanisms such as implicit learning emerge in later rounds. Beyond demonstrating pupillometry’s validity for measuring effort intensity, we highlight its potential applications across management accounting research streams, enabling researchers to better understand how control system elements influence behavior through effort. Read their paper: Decoding effort: Toward a measure – and a better understanding – of effort intensity in accounting research |
Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation |
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![]() This study, by Kelsey Matthews, Leslie Berger, Lan Guo, and Christopher Wong, uses an experiment to investigate how team members communicate their relative contributions to managers to help with the allocation of team bonuses. We find that low-ability team members are more likely to exaggerate their contributions when the choice to report is voluntary, compared to mandatory. However, requiring explanations for their communication significantly reduces this bias. Our study offers practical advice for managers seeking to strengthen the informativeness of relative contribution communication and foster more favorable team dynamics. Read their paper: Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation |
The Effects of Strategic Alignment and Strategic Clarity on Multidimensional Task Performance |
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![]() This study, by Tyler Thomas and Steve Smith, uses an experiment to evaluate how workers respond to trade-offs in strategic objectives depending on how clearly the strategy is communicated and how aligned the performance measures are with the strategy. We find when the strategy is communicated generally (or vaguely) to workers, performance measures fully aligned with the strategy lead to greater worker performance. However, this is not the case when the strategy is communicated clearly, as greater worker performance is driven by performance measures that are less aligned with the strategy. This evidence suggests firms with strategic trade-offs can promote worker performance by either clearly communicating the strategy or implementing performance measures that fully align with the strategy, as implementing both highlights the strategic trade-offs involved which adversely affects workers’ performance Read their paper: The effects of strategic alignment and strategic clarity on multidimensional task performance |
The interactive effect of organizational identification and reward type on employees’ reward valuation. |
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![]() This study, by Adam Presslee, Weiming Liu, and Khim Kelly, uses two experiments and a survey to examine how an aspect of organizations culture - the extent employees experience a sense of belonging with their organization - impacts how employees value their performance-contingent rewards. We find that this sense of belonging increases employees valuation of non-cash rewards because it results in the rewards being viewed more as a gift rather than an economic exchange. We do not find such effects when the reward is cash. This evidence suggests that firms using non-cash rewards to motivate their employees will benefit from also increasing employees sense of belonging (e.g., company events, collaborative culture) with the firm. |