Please note: some of these works fall into more than one category, so appear in more than one place.
Social and Political Philosophy of Language
Books:
2024. Dogwhistles and Figleaves: How Manipulative Language Spreads Racism and Falsehood (Oxford University Press).
2013. Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics
(Oxford University Press)
Forhtcoming book:
With Patrick Connolly and Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Conversations Online (Oxford University Press)
Articles and Chapters
Forthcoming, co-authored with Ray Drainville. "Visual and Linguistic Dogwhistles", for Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore (Eds), Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language.
2022, co-authored with Tim Kenyon. "Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump", in Horn, Larry (ed.), From Lying to Perjury: Linguistic and Legal Perspectives on Lies and Other Falsehoods, De Gruyter.
2021, co-authored with Elena Hoicka, Eloise Prouten, Laura Whitehead, and Rachel Sterken. "Language Signaling High Proportions and Generics Lead to Generalizing, but not Essentializing, for Novel Social Kinds", Cognitive Science.
2021. "Someone is Wrong on the Internet: Is There an Obligation to Correct False and Oppressive Speech on Social Media?", in MacKenzie, Rose, and Bhatt (eds.) The Epistemology of Deceit in a Postdigital Era: Dupery By Design, Springer 2021.
2021. "Racist and Sexist Figleaves", in Khoo, J. and Sterken, R. Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language.
2019. “What is Happening to our Norms Against Racist Speech?”, Aristotelian Society 93(1): 1-23.
2019. "Immigration in the Brexit Campaign: Protean Dogwhistles and Political Manipulation", in Fox, C, and Saunders, J., Media Ethics, Free Speech, and the Requirements of Democracy, Routledge.
2018. "(How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?", Disputatio 10 (50): 217-244.
2018. “Negligent Falsehood, White Ignorance, and False News”, in Elliott Michaelson and Andreas Stokke’s Lying: Language, Knowledge and Ethics (OUP).
2018, “Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language” in Daniel Fogal, Matt Cross and Daniel Harris’s New Work on Speech Acts volume (OUP).
2018. “Beyond Just Silencing and Censorship: A Call for Complexity in Discussions of Academic Free Speech”, in Jennifer Lackey, Academic Freedom (OUP).
2017. “Feminist Philosophy of Language” original (2004), and revision for Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Revision co-authored with Esa Diaz-Leon.
2017. “Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump”, Philosophical Topics 45:2, 97-116.
2017. “Are Generics Especially Pernicious?”, Inquiry. Currently published online, before print version.
2014. "Stop Thinking So Much About 'Sexual Harassment'.Journal of Applied Philosophy.
2012. "Politically Significant Terms and Philosophy of Language: Methodological Issues"
Anita Superson and Sharon Crasnow, Analytic Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
2009. “On Speakers and Audiences, Feminism and the Lying/Misleading Distinction”
Intercultural Pragmatics 6 (2009): 1, 115-125.
2011. “Maker’s Knowledge or Perpetuator’s Ignorance?”, in Jurisprudence, 2: 2, 403-408.
2011. "Just Go Ahead and Lie", Analysis.
2006. "Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds", with Sally Haslanger, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
2006. “Pornography, Speech Acts and Context”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106:2, 61-80.
Women in Philosophy
2021 (with Helen Beebee). "Women in the Philosophy in the UK (2021)" for British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy UK.
2019. “Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy: A Defence”, co-authored with Jules Holroyd, Philosophical Topics.
2017. “Why so Few Women in Value Journals? How could we Find Out?”, Public Affairs Quarterly 31 (2): 125-142.
2016. (with Laura Di Bella and Eleanor Miles). “Philosophers Explicitly Associate Philosophy with Maleness”, in Brownstein and Saul (eds.) Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volumes 1 and 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 283-308.
2014. “Stop Thinking (So Much) About ‘Sexual Harassment’”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31 (3):307-321.
2014. (with Helen Beebee) “Good Practice Guidelines for Women in Philosophy”, for British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy UK.
2013. “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and Women in Philosophy” in Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Edited by Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchison, Oxford University Press: 39-60.
2012. “Ranking Exercises in Philosophy and Implicit Bias”, in Journal of Social Philosophy, 43:3.
2011. (with Helen Beebee) “Women in Philosophy in the UK: A Report by the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy in the UK”.
Implicit Bias
Books:
2016. With Michael Brownstein. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2. Oxford University Press.
Articles and Chapters:
2019. “Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy: A Defence”, co-authored with Jules Holroyd, Philosophical Topics.
2018. "(How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?", Disputatio 10 (50): 217-244.
2017. “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Epistemic Injustice”, in Ian Kidd, Jose Medina and Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, NY: Routledge: 235-242.
2017. “Why so Few Women in Value Journals? How could we Find Out?”, Public Affairs Quarterly 31 (2): 125-142.
2016. (with Laura Di Bella and Eleanor Miles). “Philosophers Explicitly Associate Philosophy with Maleness”, in Brownstein and Saul (eds.) Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volumes 1 and 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 283-308.
2013. “Scepticism and Implicit Bias, Disputatio, 5:37, 243-263
2013. “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat and Women in Philosophy” in Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? Edited by Fiona Jenkins and Katrina Hutchison, Oxford University Press: 39-60.
2012. “Ranking Exercises in Philosophy and Implicit Bias”, in Journal of Social Philosophy, 43:3.
Other topics
Books:
2007. Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
2003. Feminism: Issues and Arguments. Oxford University Press.
Articles and Chapters
2010. “Conversational Implicature, Speaker Meaning, and Calculability”, Klaus Petrus (ed.) Meaning and Analysis: New Essays on H. Paul Grice, Palgrave: 170-183.
2010. “Enlightened? As if!”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18: 4, 547-549.
2006. “On Treating Things as People: Objectification, Pornography, and the History of the Vibrator”, Hypatia 21: 2,: 45-61.
2002. “Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated”, Noûs, Vol.36 No.2, , pp. 228-248.
2002. "What is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project And Relevance Theorists' Criticisms", Linguistics & Philosophy, 25, pp. 347-372.
2002. "What are Intensional Transitives?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXXVI, pp. 101-120.
2002. (with David Braun) “Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Mistaken Evaluations”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 111, pp. 1-41.
2001. “Critical Study of Davis, Conversational Implicature”, Noûs Vol. 35 No. 4, 630-641.
2000. Did Clinton Say Something False?”, Analysis Vol. 60 No.3, pp. 255-257
1999. “The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription,” Mind & Language Vol. 14 No.3, pp. 356-375.
1999. “Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals,” Analysis Vol. 59 No.2, pp. 106-112.
1999. “The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 29-48.
1998. “The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription,” Philosophical Studies Vol. 92 No. 3, pp. 363-389.
1997. “Reply to Forbes,” Analysis Vol. 57 No.2, pp. 114– 118.
1997. “Substitution and Simple Sentences,” Analysis Vol.57 No.2 , pp. 102– 108.
1996. “What’s Wrong With Metalinguistic Views,” Acta Analytica, 16/17, pp. 81– 94.
1993. "Still An Attitude Problem," Linguistics & Philosophy, Vol. 16, April 1993, pp. 423-435.
