SEMINAR
Zinovi Rabinovich
Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd, Israel
Invited by PROFESSOR Krzysztof Czarnecki
ALL ARE WELCOME!
Abstract:
Stackelberg Security Games have been widely deployed to protect real-world assets. The main solution concept there is the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE), which optimises the defender’s random allocation of limited security resources. However, solely deploying the SSE mixed strategy has limitations. In the extreme case, there are security games in which the defender is able to defend all the assets “almost perfectly” at the SSE, but she still sustains significant loss. It is possible, however, to improve the defender's utility further.
Perhaps surprisingly, I have found that by strategically revealing information about security measures in place achieves that goal. In this talk, two variations of this approach will be described: a) a simultaneous security allocation and disclosure; and b) a two-stage process with intermediate target commitment by the attacker. We will also mention the flip-side alternative: the possibility of involuntary information disclosure, or leaks.
Biography:
Zinovi Rabinovich is a PhD graduate of CS@HUJI (2008) with post-doctorates at the University of Southampton (2007-2010) and the Bar-Ilan University (2010-2011). Currently a Senior Algorithms Engineer at Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd, he, nonetheless, continues to follow his passion: AI research.