PhD Defence Notice - Raghav RohitExport this event to calendar

Tuesday, January 14, 2020 — 9:30 AM EST

Candidate: Raghav Rohit

Title: Design and Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Symmetric Key Primitives

Date: January 14, 2020

Time: 9:30 AM

Place: E5 5047

Supervisor(s): Gong, Guang

 

Abstract:

The need for lightweight cryptographic primitives to replace the traditional standardized primitives such as AES, SHA-2 and SHA-3, which are unrealistic in constrained environments, has been anticipated by the cryptographic community for over a decade and half. Such an anticipation came to reality by the apparent proliferation of Radio Frequency Identifiers (RFIDs), Internet of Things (IoT), smart devices and sensor networks in our daily lives. All these devices operate in constrained environments and require reasonable efficiency with low implementation costs and sufficient security. Accordingly, designing lightweight symmetric key cryptographic primitives and analyzing the state-of-the-art algorithms is an active area of research for both academia and industry, which is directly followed by the ongoing National Institute of Standards and Technology's lightweight cryptography (NIST LWC) standardization project. In this thesis, we focus on the design and security analysis of such primitives.

 

First, we present the design of four lightweight cryptographic permutations, namely sLISCP, sLISCP-light, ACE and WAGE. At a high level, these permutations adopt a Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) based design paradigm. sLISCP, sLISCP-light and ACE use reduced-round Simeck block cipher, while WAGE employs Welch-Gong (WG) permutation and two 7-bit sboxes over the finite field $F_{2^7}$ as their underlying nonlinear components. We discuss their design rationale and analyze the security with respect to differential and linear, integral and symmetry based distinguishers using automated tools such as Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) and SAT/SMT solvers.

 

Second, we show the applications of these permutations to achieve Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), Message Authentication Code (MAC), Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG) and Hash functionalities. We introduce the idea of the unified round function, which, when combined in a sponge mode can provide all the aforementioned functionalities with the same circuitry. We give concrete instantiations of several AEAD and hash schemes with varying security levels, e.g., 80, 96, 112 and 128 bits. Next, we present SpoC, a new AEAD mode of operation which offers higher security guarantees compared to traditional sponge-based AEAD schemes with smaller states. We instantiate SpoC with sLISCP-light permutation and propose another two lightweight AEAD algorithms. Notably, 4 of our proposed schemes, namely ACE, SPIX, SpoC and WAGE are round 2 candidates of NIST's LWC project.

 

Finally, we present cryptanalytic results on some lightweight ciphers. We first analyze the nonlinear initialization phase of WG-5 stream cipher using the division property based cube attack, and give a key recovery attack on 24 (out of 64) rounds with data and time complexities $2^{6.32}$ and $2^{76.81}$, respectively. Next, we propose a novel property of block ciphers called correlated sequences and show its applications to meet-in-the-middle attack. Consequently, we give the best key recovery attacks (up to 27 out of 32 rounds in a single key setting) on Simon and Simeck ciphers with block and key sizes 32 and 64 bits, respectively. The attack requires 3 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and has a time complexity close to average exhaustive search. It is worth noting that variants of WG-5 and Simeck are the core components of aforementioned AEAD and hash schemes. Lastly, we present practical forgery attacks on Limdolen and HERN which are round 1 candidates of NIST LWC project. We show the existence of structural weaknesses which could be exploited to forge any message with success probability of 1. For Limdolen, we require the output of a single encryption query while for HERN we need at most 4 encryption queries for a successful forgery. Following our attack, both designs are eliminated from second round.

Location 
E5
Room 5047
200 University Avenue West

Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Canada

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