Usha Nathan: Responsibility for Implicit Bias & Beyond: An Aristotelian Proposal

Friday, February 14, 2025 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm EST (GMT -05:00)
photographic negative of figures turning away

Bio

Usha Nathan works primarily in the areas of ancient philosophy, moral psychology and epistemology (especially moral epistemology). They also have interests in areas of epistemic injustice, Indian philosophy, post-colonial and race theory, and aesthetics. They received their PhD from Columbia State University and currently work at Louisiana State University. Notable publications include Moral Emotions and Unnamed Wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice .

Location

In-person

Hagey Hall room 334

Remote

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https://uwaterloo.zoom.us/j/96523701919?pwd=PsybCmlESNDM7Smmx6a2yAkfipwkXS.1

Meeting ID: 965 2370 1919
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that ethical discussions of implicit bias fail in particular ways and propose a new Aristotelian account for actions influenced by bias. Current discussions fail to, (1) distinguish two types of such actions about which our moral intuitions differ: type-(a) actions that involve decisions, e.g., doctor discharging a BIPOC woman who complains of pain post-surgery, type-(b) actions that are bodily behaviours, e.g., moving away when a BIPOC person sits down next to you. They also fail to account for (2) bias generally producing more than one action.
 

I propose an Aristotelian account of responsibility which explains features (1) and (2) and which accords with our moral intuitions. Type-(a) actions are those one ought to have deliberated. Type-(b) lack this requirement. I argue that each type fails a different norm of rationality: (i) That one’s actions agree with one’s values (type-(a)), (ii) That one consistently realise one’s values through actions (type-b)). On this account, we may be robustly responsible for both action types. I conclude by raising problems for self-based accounts of responsibility.