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Bio
Usha Nathan works primarily in the areas of ancient philosophy, moral psychology and epistemology (especially moral epistemology). They also have interests in areas of epistemic injustice, Indian philosophy, post-colonial and race theory, and aesthetics. They received their PhD from Columbia State University and currently work at Louisiana State University. Notable publications include Moral Emotions and Unnamed Wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice .
Location
In-person
Hagey Hall room 334
Remote
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https://uwaterloo.zoom.us/j/96523701919?pwd=PsybCmlESNDM7Smmx6a2yAkfipwkXS.1
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that ethical discussions of implicit bias fail in particular ways and propose a new Aristotelian account for actions influenced by bias. Current discussions fail to, (1) distinguish two types of such actions about which our moral intuitions differ: type-(a) actions that involve decisions, e.g., doctor discharging a BIPOC woman who complains of pain post-surgery, type-(b) actions that are bodily behaviours, e.g., moving away when a BIPOC person sits down next to you. They also fail to account for (2) bias generally producing more than one action.
I propose an Aristotelian account of responsibility which explains features (1) and (2) and which accords with our moral intuitions. Type-(a) actions are those one ought to have deliberated. Type-(b) lack this requirement. I argue that each type fails a different norm of rationality: (i) That one’s actions agree with one’s values (type-(a)), (ii) That one consistently realise one’s values through actions (type-b)). On this account, we may be robustly responsible for both action types. I conclude by raising problems for self-based accounts of responsibility.