Abstract
Pancomputationalism is the view that every system in nature (e.g. galaxies, ecosystems, brains, digestive tracts, etc) can be understood as a computational system, effectively making everything a kind of computer. But how should we understand such a claim? In the philosophical literature, some argue that there is a difference between whether everything can be DESCRIBED AS computing, and whether something metaphysically IS computing. Moreover, that this distinction between real vs instrumental accounts of computation are central for understanding which things in nature are genuinely minds, and which are not. In this paper, I defend pancomputationalism, and argue that the realist/instrumentalist distinction does not apply to computation. Everything "really" is computing, but this is not nearly so trivial or absurd a claim as many think. Moreover, this fact does not commit us to the idea that there is no distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive systems. We do not need to add any 'special sauce' to our pancomputationalism to demarcate real versus non-real cases of computation or cognition.
Location
Hagey hall
room 334
