Security implications of device imperfections in quantum key distribution

IQC Seminar - Jerome Wiesemann, Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute HHI

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is on the verge of becoming a robust security solution, backed by security proofs that closely model practical implementations.  As QKD matures, a crucial requirement for its widespread adoption is establishing standards for evaluating and certifying practical implementations, particularly against side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections that can undermine security claims. Today, QKD is at a stage where the development of such standards is increasingly prioritized. This works aims to address some of the challenges associated with this task by focusing on the process of preparing an in-house QKD system for evaluation. We first present a consolidated and accessible baseline security proof for the one-decoy state BB84 protocol with finite-keys, expressed in a unified language. Building upon this security proof, we identify and tackle some of the most critical side-channel attacks by characterizing and implementing countermeasures both in the QKD system and within the security proof. In this process, we iteratively evaluate the risk of the individual attacks and re-assess the security of the system. Evaluating the security of QKD systems additionally involves performing attacks to potentially identify new loopholes. Thus, we also aim to perform the first real-time Trojan horse attack on a decoy state BB84 system, further highlighting the need for robust countermeasures. By providing a critical evaluation of our QKD system and incorporating robust countermeasures against side-channel attacks, our research contributes to advancing the practical implementation and evaluation of QKD as a trusted security solution.

 

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