Simon Phoenix, Khalifa University
Abstract
The birth of quantum key distribution (QKD) 2 decades ago was accompanied by headlines the world over that the age of perfect security had finally dawned. The media, not noted for its restraint, can be forgiven. But so, too, can the physicists who, by and large, spawned such claims. In the cut-throat world of research funding, quantum key distribution was a godsend. I played the game too.
But 20 years on we are still awaiting this brave new world. Is it simply the technical difficulties of implementing delicate and refined quantum technologies in the brutish world of real communications networks? Or does the reason lie with the context in which the technology works? As Bruce Schneier has so elegantly stated, is QKD a "solution looking for a problem?"
In this talk I shall take a look at QKD and place it within that context and attempt to answer Bruce's question. I shall describe some of my recent work with Steve Barnett that might give QKD a more competitive edge as a modern security solution. In particular I shall focus on the notion of 'bit transport' in QKD systems that allows us to put a different twist on what, up to now, has been a fairly limited, although very beautiful, technology.