We investigate how board expertise affects chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and firm value. The CEO engages in a sequence of tasks: first acquiring information to evaluate a potential project, then reporting his or her assessment of the project to the board, and finally implementing the project if it is adopted.
Related party transactions (hereafter RPTs) involve a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party (SFAS 57; IAS 24). Although not all RPTs are “bad," prior research documents that some RPTs reflect insider opportunism and are harmful to shareholders.
Policy makers and regulators generally believe firms should enlist directors with more expertise. For example, the U.S.
When a firm suffers from a credit downgrade, will it be possible for the firm to record a large unrealized gain in its income? The answer is yes under the accounting standard SFAS No. 159 of the U.S. GAAP.
In a recent study published in The Accounting Review, Assistant Professor Kaishu Wu, School of Accounting and Finance and his colleagues David Guenther and Ryan Wilson (both at the University of Oregon) examine whether high levels of corporate income tax avoidance are achieved with additional risk-taking. In other words, do firms first exhaust relatively “safe” tax planning strategies before turning to “risky” strategies, as they pursue more tax savings?