The Varieties of Belief
The mathematician and philosopher W.K. Clifford famously wrote that “…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” While Clifford intended this as a normative stricture, it raises a question about human psychology: to what extent do people hold their own beliefs and those of others to this standard? Are some beliefs more constrained by evidence than others, and if so, is this reflected in people’s intuitive theory of mind?
In this talk I'll present recent work from my lab investigating the extent to which people believe beyond the evidence, and moreover think they *should* believe beyond the evidence. Such cases seem to arise predominantly when moral considerations favor a belief for which the evidence is insufficient or even inconsistent - such as giving a friend the benefit of the doubt (out of loyalty) when evidence suggests they may be to blame, or believing in God in part because this belief is taken to have positive moral value.
