Zinovi Rabinovich
Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd, Israel
Invited by PROFESSOR Krzysztof Czarnecki
ALL ARE WELCOME!
Abstract:
Stackelberg
Security
Games
have
been
widely
deployed
to
protect
real-world
assets.
The
main
solution
concept
there
is
the
Strong
Stackelberg
Equilibrium
(SSE),
which
optimises
the
defender’s
random
allocation
of
limited
security
resources.
However,
solely
deploying
the
SSE
mixed
strategy
has
limitations.
In
the
extreme
case,
there
are
security
games
in
which
the
defender
is
able
to
defend
all
the
assets
“almost
perfectly”
at
the
SSE,
but
she
still
sustains
significant
loss.
It
is
possible,
however,
to
improve
the
defender's
utility
further.
Perhaps surprisingly, I have found that by strategically revealing information about security measures in place achieves that goal. In this talk, two variations of this approach will be described: a) a simultaneous security allocation and disclosure; and b) a two-stage process with intermediate target commitment by the attacker. We will also mention the flip-side alternative: the possibility of involuntary information disclosure, or leaks.
Biography:
Zinovi
Rabinovich
is
a
PhD
graduate
of
CS@HUJI
(2008)
with
post-doctorates
at
the
University
of
Southampton
(2007-2010)
and
the
Bar-Ilan
University
(2010-2011).
Currently
a
Senior
Algorithms
Engineer
at
Mobileye
Vision
Technologies
Ltd,
he,
nonetheless,
continues
to
follow
his
passion:
AI
research.